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Abstract 
Philip Kessell Bunt 
The Changing Face of Policing: 
Local Issues in National Perspective 
The thesis reviews the changes which have taken place in policing England and Wales 
between 1950 and 1998 with particular reference to foui* key themes: community policmg, 
crime preverition, victims of crime and quality ofservice. It contributes to ah understanding 
of how policing has developed during a period of significant social change and explores 
the rationale which has underpinned legislative development and policy making at national 
and force levels whilst identifying the significance of these changes within a local city 
environment. The development of the key themes at national level is considered within the 
local policing environment of the south-west of England. This has been undertaken with 
particular reference to the way in which they have influenced the direction of policing 
within Devon and Cornwall and, in particular, how aspects of their implementation have 
been perceived by both police officers and sections of the public within the largest urban 
area of the two counties, the city of Plymouth. Much of the detailed research within the 
city has concentrated upon the area of Stonehouse, forming part of the St Peter ward; an 
area which has been identified as one of the most socially and economically deprived 
locations in England. Through personal interviews, telephone and postal questionnaires, 
and an insider's ethnographic perspective, the study is brought into local focus. This allows 
critical analysis of the key themes in terms of their local development against the national 
perspective. 
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Preface 
There is a natural problem for any member of an institution setting out to review structures 
and processes with which they have been involved for almost a quarter of a century. The 
pitfalls. clearly lie in that person's ability to objectively and .critically evaluate 
circumstances which pertain to the envirorraient in which they have worked. This 
challenge reaches an even higher dimension when the purpose of the study is to produce an 
original piece of work which will be the subject of detailed evaluation by members of the 
academic community, as well as members of the researcher's own organisation. Despite 
the fact that belonging to an institution such as the police service provides a researcher 
with relatively unconstrained access to information and situations which outside observers 
would not have, the level of detail and interaction which is attainable does not alone ensure 
that such a review will be either objective, or useful. As Emsley (1991) considered in his 
preface to The English Police, 'There is always a problem with writing about institutions in 
that the text can finish as a celebration of a steady progress to the present' and the 
necessity to relate evidence in a balanced way is one which must always be at the forefiront 
of a researcher's thinking. 
Objectivity in relating some of the evidence in this work has regularly caused the author to 
consider whether citing certain quotations from many of the interviews undertaken would 
have the effect of presenting an unbalanced view of the subject in hand. There is always 
this danger when an interviewee presents an amusing or appealing 'sound-bite' and, 
therefore, on more than one occasion quotations originally included in the draft texts of the 
thesis have been removed when it has been clear by the way it reads that the opinion given 
causes the balance of the debate to be inappropriately weighted in one direction or another. 
Similarly, this study is not one which seeks to give credence, other than with due 
acknowledgement, to some of the clearly subjective and 'romantic' accounts of police 
officers who served during the early to middle parts of the twentieth century, and were 
interviewed about their recollections of policing in Plymouth. Nevertheless, a couple of 
amusing anecdotes remain amongst the quotes which, whilst adding only marginally to 
overall debate, underiine the need to regard memories of times past with caution when 
trying to make sense of policing several decades later. As the purpose of this study is to try 
and draw parallels between the development of policing at national and local level during 
the period 1950-1998, in a way which will identify how some of the key influences on 
change have been implemented and perceived, police and public opinions are seen as 
important considerations. Therefore, the extent to which this enterprise might be perceived 
as a 'celebration of a steady progress-to the present' is ultimately for the reader to judge. 
However, although an 'insider' in the process, the author has sought to maintain a level of 
objectivity in his interpretation of the evidence. This will, hopefijlly, result in an 
acknowledgement that Weatheritt's (1986) contention that 'most institutions tend to think 
of their work as important and necessary and (that) they are not given to spending too 
much time and effort questioning the purpose and the effectiveness of what they do' (p. 10) 
is at least challenged when the research evidence is related by an 'insider' from a less 
constrained academic perspective. 
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1 
structure of the study 
Introduction 
This work is about some of the changes which have occurred in the policing of England 
and Wales since 1950, but in particular, how local, police activity in the most south­
westerly and largest geographic force in England (Devon and Cornwall) can be explained 
in the context of national developments during that period. Policing is an ever-evolving 
process and its existence may be guided by the structures of the law and influenced by 
political considerations, but its implementation is a far more complex process. However, 
the importance of how policing is perceived and delivered at local level underpins many of 
the. cherished beliefs about the British policing system. Whereas the embryonic forms of 
organised order-maintenance in the country can be traced back to the tribal laws and 
customs of Danish and Anglo-Saxon invaders, it has been the latter half of the twentieth 
century which has seen the pohce encounter significantly more diverse challenges than at 
any time in the past. It would be impossible to attempt to detail every challenge which has 
helped shape policing as it is today but, for the purposes of this research, a small number of 
key themes which are particularly pertinent to late twentieth century police development 
have been selected because of their ability to be related to policing at a local level. 
In order to focus upon the policing of a local environment the city of Plymouth has been 
examined in more detail, with specific reference to the St Peter ward area which is one of 
the most economically and socially deprived locations in the country. In looking at 
policing during this period, there are a wide range of issues which could be studied. Four 
have been chosen for research because of their respective importance in building upon the 
Structure of the study 
unique character of British policing,' community-policing, crime preyentiori, victims of 
crime and quality of service. Each has varying levels of difficulty in .dpfinition, and there 
are clear overlaps between them. However each represents a field of policing and wider 
criminal justice policy which has grown in significance at various points, and a different 
rates, since 1950. Similarly, each has had an impact on police activity at local level and it 
is this aspect which will be considered in the chapters which follow. 
Overview of chapters 
Chapters 2 to 5 will set the scene. They will depict how policing, and certain other aspects 
of the criminal justice process developed since 1950, with reference to the political, social 
and economic factors which have played a part in dictating the structiue and style of 
policing today. It is a process which has been developed against a background of notions 
such as 'policing by consent', autonomy from political influence, and individual and 
community primacy. Its origins go back to the last century and the basis of its survival, in a 
form which has remained based on such principles, is one which cannot be divorced from 
the wider constitutional structures of the country as a whole. 
The development, and relevance of community policing, crime prevention, victims of crime 
and quality of service will be considered over four eras: 1950-67, 1967-79, 1979-89 and 
1989-98. Whether the reader agrees that the points at which the eras start and end is 
appropriate is, to a large degree, imimportant. The eras have been chosen to add structure 
rather than identify anything more significant in the way in which policing has been 
accomplished since. Each era v^ll be sub-divided into the four theme categories to develop 
a stractured overview of the research topics which are explored within the Devon and 
Comwall area in later chapters. The order in which the themes will be discussed within 
2 
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each era is determined by their evolution since 1950. 
Community policing is dealt with first because it is considered against a wider definition 
than that which was to become applied to it from the 1980s onwards when the term became 
widely used. This wider definition considers the structure and methods employed by 
officers patrolling in local areas and often being stationed within relatively close proximity 
to the communities which they policed. Such a process is as old as policing itself and was 
the basis on which objectives of preventing crime were originally developed. Crime 
prevention follows as a natural progression in the debate and, with the growing attention 
given it as a national issue from the late 1950s onwards, forms a consolidating position 
from which to consider later developments in policing when the definitions of crime 
prevention and commimity policing become more intertwined during the 1970s and 
through to the present day. 
Police concern with victims of crime did not emerge as a general policy issue until the 
1970s with the development of specific victim interest groups outside the arena of policing 
(even though their position nationally had already received recognition during the 1950s 
and 1960s). Victims of crime, as a section in this work, therefore follows as a chronological 
progression in widening police involvement with criminal justice processes. Quality of 
service emerged as a specific issue during the late 1980s but was already on the policing 
agenda through earlier research which had considered the interactions between police and 
the public (notably victims), and emerging government interest in measuring efficiency 
and effectiveness. Its importance to policing in regaining public confidence in the 1990s 
therefore enables the earlier issues of community policing, crime prevention and victims of 
3 
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crime to be. considered from a contemporary perspective. A short, scene setting precis of 
the four eras'is given below; 
1950-1967 From Dixon to dilemma (Chapter 2) 
the 1950s provided'the public with its icon of the British 'Bobby' through film 
and, subsequently television, in the form of Constable George Dixon.' His image 
of relative perfection in working-class London developed against; a wider picture of 
police scandals nationally which led to major structural changes to poKcing in the 
mid-1960s. 1967 was the time at which changes brought about by the Police Act 
1964 became most obvious - in the amalgamation of forces. It was around this time 
also that Unit Beat Policing (UBP) became established within police forces and the 
'panda car' emerged. Victims had been brought to national attention through the 
period by Margery Fry and others with the first Act which coxild provide 
compensation by the State to victims of violence being introduced. The Crime 
Prevention College was established and the Cornish Committee recommended the 
way forward for this aspect of policing. 
Key events in policmg 1950-67 
1950 Feature film The Blue Lamp portrays PC George Dixon for the first time 
1956-58 Margery Fry's campaign for victim compensation 
1956-59 Series of scandals and confi-ontations involving chief officers 
1958 Netting Hill and Nottingham race riots 
1960 Cornish Committee on crime prevention established 
1960-62 Royal Commission on Policing 
1962 National Crime Prevention College established 
Appointment of Sir William Johnson as first Chief Inspector of Constabulary 
1964 Police Act leading to new tri-partite structure and amalgamations of forces 
Compensation for Victims of Crimes of Violence Act 
1966 Amalgamation of provincial forces begins 
Introduction of Unit Beat Policing as experiment 
' Constable George Dixon began and (temporarily) ended life as a uniform constable in the 1950 film The Blue Lamp in which he was 
shot in the course of his duty. His resumection five years later by the BBC in the series Dixon of Dock Green ensured that the character 
remained central to fictional characterisation for the next 21 years but, in reality, the image remained in the public psyche for 
considerably longer, regularly referred to in the press when various changes in policing stj'le became newsworthy. 
4 
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1967-1979 Technology to community (Chapter 3) 
1967 had begun with an-increased use of technology in the policing role and this 
was to develop through the 1970s with the widespread use of the Police National 
Computer (PNC). Associated with the key areas being considered was the 
emergence of Victim Support Schemes during this period, and the developing role 
of Crime Prevention Officers. UBP began fo lose credibility and the police became 
increasingly involved in order maintenance during trade disputes such as Saltley in 
1972 and Grunwick in 1977. The Police National Co-ordinating Centre was 
established at New Scotland Yard in 1972 to address responses to such incidents. 
Key events in policmg 1967-1979 
1967-70 Amalgamation of forces continues (reduction from 117 to 47) 
including Devon & Comwall Constabulary being formed 
1970-79 Victim Support Schemes emerge initially in Bristol and develop nationally-
1972 Local Government Act: further provincial amalgamations (to 41 provincialforces) 
Saltley coke depot closed during miners' picketing 
National Reportmg Centre established at New Scotland Yard to co-ordinate police 
mutual aid to such issues as industrial disputes 
1973 Wider development and use of Police National Computer nationally 
1974 Police Support Units (PSU) established by forces 
1977 Home Office Review of Criminal Justice Policy and establishment of Working 
Group 
on Crime Prevention 
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure established 
1978 Edmund Davies enquiry into police pay and conditions of service 
1979 Community Policing introduced in Devon & Comwall 
Margaret Thatcher's Conservative administration takes ofHce 
1979-1989 Community through the riots (Chapter 4) 
1979 signified a change of government which was to remain in office tmtil 1997. It 
also saw Devon and Comwall Chief Constable John Alderson's new Community 
Policing philosophy develop through a period where there was widespread public 
disorder in major cities. Central co-ordination of the police reached a height in the 
Miners' Dispute of 1984 and the government became more influential in directing 
'efficiency and effectiveness' amongst police forces. The Police and Criminal 
5 
Structure of the study 
• Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) had a major impact on the activities of the police in the 
fields of prisoner handling, community consultation and accoimtability. 
Key events in poUcing 1979-1989 
1981 Riots in Brixton, Toxteth and other areas of the country 
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure report published 
Lord Scamian reports on the riots 
1982 Police and Criminat Evidence Bill published 
First British Crime Survey 
1983 Home Office circular 114/1983 issued on effectiveness and efficiency 
1984 Miners' Strike 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
Second British Crime Survey 
1988 Third British Crime Survey 
1988-89 'Guildford Four' case reviews and subsequent prisoner release 
1989-1998 Quality of service and performance monitoring (Chapter 5) 
Key evente in policing 1989-1997 
1990 ACPO and staff associations publish Operational Policing Reviews 
ACPO Strategic Policy Document published 
1991 HMIC circular heralds requirement of forces to measure performance 
by new set of indicators 
1992 Local Government Act: forces to collect/publish performance indicators 
1993 Sheehy report published -
Abolition of certain ranks 
Changes to conditions of service 
1994 Police and Magistrates Courts Act - New Police Authority structure. 
sponsorship and income generation sections 
1995 Posen enquiry - core and ancillary tasks 
1996 'Zero tolerance' policing debated 
Police Act consolidating 1964 Act and Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 
1997 Labour win General Election 
1998 Crime and Disorder Act 
The period saw the emergence of Quality as an issue, first inspired by the police 
themselves and swiftly taken ownership of by central instruments of government 
Charters for victims, citizens and police developed significance fi-om 1989 
Onwards, the police became more accountable for their performance through 
legislation such as the Local Government Act 1992 and the Police and Magistrates' 
6 
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Courts Act \99A} The shuchire of PoHce Authorities . changed, as did the 
relationship and control- within the tri-partite system. With the change in 
government in 1997, Labour's flagship legislation dealing with crime and 
community safety. The Crime and Disorder Act, redefines the role of local 
authorities and other agencies in relation to their responsibilities. 
Chapter 6 deals with the methodplogy which has been: employed in; the work which 
follows. As will be understood from its reading, this project has been of a relatively wide-
ranging and diverse nature with the final product looking considerably different to that 
which was imagined at its inception. The author's changing role within the Devon and 
Comwall Constabulary has had much to do with this and the development of different 
focuses across-a period of almost a decade has meant that careful selection and pmning of 
data gathered has been necessary. Nevertheless the rationale for its final production in the 
form which follows is one which has been able to make good use of what, otherwise, could 
have been selective and individual 'snapshots' of police/public activity and attitudes. 
Whereas chapters 2 to 5 deal with the wider national perspective across the themes of 
community policing, crime prevention, victims and quality of service, later chapters make 
use of the research data which brings things into focus in Devon and Comwall and 
Plymouth in particular. Chapter 7 therefore seeks to rationalise the changing focus to local 
level by developing an understanding of why this particular south-westerly section of 
England provides both typical and atypical opportunities to develop the debate on policing 
stmctures and practices. The Devon and Comwall Constabulary's position at the forefront 
^ The Police Act 1996 (Home Office, 1996) went on to consolidate legislation relating to the police which had been developed over the 
previous decades. 
7 
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of certain policing developments, such as commimity policmg znd quality of service during 
the late 1970s through to the 1990s, provide opportunities to contextualise much of the 
research data in the later chapters. Plymouth''s unique position as the largest urban area in 
the two counties, with relatively high levels of crime and deprivation, is seen to epitomise 
the type of problems observable elsewhere in major English conurbations, thus providing a 
relevant focus for the research at local level. In particular the ward of St Peter, and the area 
of Stonehouse within the central city region, provide the opportunity to observe the 
implementation of policing policy over time and thematically. 
Chapters 8 to 11 contain the findings fi"om research within Devon and Comwall. Drawing 
on evidence which has been gained across a period of time which, in some cases pre-dates 
the 1950s, the.chapters are divided into the four key themes of the work. Unlike within 
chapters 2 to 5 (which deal first with the theme of community policing), quality of service 
forms the basis of chapter 8. Although this specific area of interest in the police did not 
emerge as early as community policing, crime prevention or victims of crime, much of the 
evidence on which later chapters rely has been dependant upon work which was conducted 
within the Devon and Comwall Constabulary Quality of Service Unit. An understanding of 
the way in which this stmcture operated, as well as the political and management rationale 
and debate for its formulation, is therefore important in developing later chapters. There 
are obvious overlaps between the themes as policing is certainly not capable of being put 
into such neat 'containers' without some 'spillage'. Nevertheless the separation of the 
findings into these subject areas enables a constmctive development of the overall policing 
picture for the region to be achieved. 
8 
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The continuing development of poUcing means that the opportunity for further 
contemporary research has much appeal, particularly in a study such as this which'has 
followed a course often dictated by circumstance rather than original design. However, the 
need to draw a line at a relevant point was obvious and, therefore, developments which 
took place post-1997 following the election of the new Labour government have not been 
referred, to in detail within the main body of the text. Nevertheless, the wide-reaching 
effects of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 enables the concluding chapter, 1997-99 and 
Into The New Century, to draw into context much of the research which took place during 
the early/mid 1990s. Consequently, this chapter will review the themes which have already 
been explored and consider the way in which they may develop in the future. This will take 
into account the author's current role of having responsibility for crime reduction and 
community safety in Cornwall within a new force structure which has been altered to 
underpin the principles implicit in the Crime and Disorder Act. 
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2 ' 
1950-1967 
From Dixon to Dilemma 
The 1950s had seen the development of a new public persona in the policing identity 
through the introduction of the fictional' constable George Dixon', initially on the big 
screen and latterly on television. This bastion of goodness, bravery and integrity drew 
sharp focus upon policing events through the decades which followed. Reiner's 
interpretation of the police 'becoming not merely accepted but lionised by the broad 
spectrum of public opinion' as 'a symbol of national pride' (1985, p.48) was, in no small 
measure, due to the increasing availability of media services (significantly'television). 
Above all Dixon was portrayed as honest and dependable, and the epitome of what the 
public wanted to believe was the model to which all officers aspired. Emsley's (1991, 
p. 160) quotation from The Times film critic that the Dixon character was the reflection of 
'an indulgent tradition' and not of reality nevertheless ensured that a 'benchmark' had been 
set 'against which the behaviour of the police ... was to be measured'. Even the police 
service's own weekly magazine acknowledged that 'as police propaganda 'The Blue 
Lamp' will be difficult to beat' (Police Review: 20 January 1950, p.34). 
the decade which had begun with the opportunity of a substantial public relations^ success 
in enhancing public confidence in policing ended in much less appealing fashion. A series 
of scandals involving police officers and confrontations between those in authority began 
' See chapter 1, footnote 1. 
^ 'Public relations' is something which 'telescopes two meanings into one', suggests Evans (1975, p.41). It is both the police's approach 
to the pubUc and 'the creation of an image that portrays to the world a picture that its subject wishes the public to see': 
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to draw into question the nature of control and accountability of the police. These included 
the acquittal of the chief constable of Brighton and conviction of a senior CID officer and 
detective sergeant on charges of corruption; a dispute between the chief constable of 
Cardiganshire and the Standing Joint Committee which, whilst eventually resolved through 
Home Office enquiry and intervention, saw the force merged with Carmarthen a year later; 
the retirement of the chief constable of Nottingham following an acrimonious dispute with 
the Watch Committee^; and the ruling of the Home Secretary in relation to the non-
disciplining of an officer who was alleged to have assaulted a civil servant."* The 1950s was 
also a decade which saw the recorded crime rate begin to rise year on year, prompting 
Critchley to consider it 'a crime wave unparalleled in modem times' (1978, p.254). 1958 
saw riots in Notting Hill and Nottingham flamed by racial tension, and this post-war period 
was now being 'invaded' by a new generation who were becoming more unconventional in 
their actions, attitudes and dress. Time was moving quickly but Dixon was still the man 
who was seen to be keeping order on the streets. 
The die had been cast, through these events, for the Royal Commission on the Policing 
which was commenced in 1960 under Sir Henry Willink QC. Central to its brief were the 
important issues which had now become matters of selective public debate and impinged 
on the confidence with which the police could be trasted to conduct their work. Far from 
there being widespread public disquiet over the issues which had been raised, the wider 
availability of information throughout the country meant that such issues more readily fell 
into the public arena and became potentially open to much greater scrutiny. Accountability 
Watch committees were first established imder the Municipal Coiporatioiis Act 1835 which applied to 178 English and Welsh 
boroughs. Elected town councils were tasked with establishing watch committees which would appoint and supervise the towns' police 
forces (Emsley, 1991, p.38). 
•* A civil case was broughtprior to the decision. The case was settled out of court with a pajment to the plaintiff and the police accepting 
no fault or liability' (Emsley, 1991, p. 162)! 
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to the pubHc of poHce officers and,-probably more importantly in relation to the events 
which were to mould policing during the 1960s, politicians, now held a far more central 
position on the stage of policing. 
The formation of a Royal Commission had not been uniquely preserved for the Dixon era 
in order to address fundamental issues relating to the roles and responsibilities of the 
police. Previous commissions had been established to consider the duties of the 
Metropolitan Police (1908)^  and police powers and procedures (1929/ but neither had 
been required to confi-ont the wider question of where ultimate control and accountability 
within provincial police forces lay. This question naturally led to consideration of the 
potential benefits of a police force being centrally controlled and administered (an issue 
which has remained on the political agenda) and the evidence taken by the Commission 
weighed it in the light of constitutional objectivity against examples of continental models. 
Their recommendation to effectively streamline the existing structure accepted the value to 
be derived firom locally administered forces in terms of both public acceptability and 
political accountability. Although one member. Professor A.L. Goodhart, dissented firom 
the majority view in proposing a regionally administered system, and gained a respectable 
degree of support for his ideas elsewhere (including some press commentators and 
politicians), the majority recommendation was eventually accepted by the Government. 
The era which had begun with the progression of a post-war institution re-adjusting to 
'civilian life' had, in its wake, encountered controversy and change brought about by 
factors both within and outside the control of the police. The media inspired fiiture was 
^ Royal Commission on the Duties of the Metropolitan Police, (1908), CmA 4156. 
* Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures, (1929), Cmd. 3297. 
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upon them and, with \i, an emerging cuhure of more questioning and rebellious youth, 
increasing affluence, more overt racial tensions and politicians becoming more confident in 
their ability to use the media to comment and promote ideologies. The police themselves 
similarly needed to adjust to these new environments, and the painful experiences of the 
late 1950s had now brought about a potential overturn of the relationships between chief 
officers and watch committees - a situation in which- the latter held substantial 
establishment power but one in which chief constables exercised more direct influence and 
conhrol. 
The nature of independence from political control now became central and, whilst no 
voices were ever raised to the heights of wishing to see a retum to the autonomy of the pre-
1919 era,^  the. question, of where primaiy power should lie was only countered by the 
overall preoccupation with seeing poHce forces remain locally accountable and 
administered. The constitutional issue of where precisely the police stood in relation to 
their control remained the subject of a degree of questioning, particularly as it related to the 
notion of tme independence against the role of electoral responsibility invested in 
parliament (Marshall, 1965). Whereas the nature of the proposed changes were perceived 
by many as likely to strengthen the objectivity of law enforcers, and constracting a model 
against which local political accountability could reside through newly established police 
authorities,* subsequent events and Conflicts were to draw into question the rationale for 
' The influence which the First World War had on the police service was substantial. Clashes with a new Metropolitan Commissioner 
and attempts by organised labour to influence the police saw the establishment of the Desborough Committee which resulted in 
standardised pay and conditions under Home Office control. The Police Federation became assured and the exchequer now met half the 
total cost of forces. These matters were included in the Police Act 1919. 
* Police authorities became established under the Police Act 1964. 
13 
1950-1967: From Dixon to Dilemma 
believing that the reality bore a true resemblance to that anticipated.' 'Although political 
reality had been moving in this direction for 50 years, 1964 was the first time that the 
supremacy of the chief constable was enshrined in statute' (Lustgarten, 1986). 
The Royal Commission resulted in most of its recommendations forming part of the Police 
Act 1964. In. repealing 19th century legislation it now set about defining the responsibilities 
and functions of key actors in the policing arena - those of the Home Secretary, chief 
constables and the newly established police authorities. These new authorities bore the 
hallmarks of the recommendations of the Commission and had as their prime 
responsibilities the maintenance of 'adequate and efficient' police forces. Their powers 
included the appointment and dismissal of chief constables which was subject to approval 
by the Home Secretary and they were obliged by statute to receive aimual reports from 
chief officers on the running of their forces. Chief constables were given the otherwise 
complete 'direction and control' of their staff, a position which now included the discretion 
of promotion and appointment as well as discipline (formerly the final preserve of watch 
committees). The Home Secretary could require reports from chief constables on policing 
matters in order to satisfy the need to ensure police efficiency was being maintained and 
promoted although this 'eff' word itself remained undefined and subjected to comment and 
criticism (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984). 
The importance of chief constables had far from diminished. On the local scene at least it 
Critics of tlie nature of accountability, in particular, draw upon the experiences of public involvement with the police which is, for the 
large part, seen as partial in that certain sections of societj' have always been more likely to encounter their services than others. Both in 
relation to criminal activity and the routine service role provided, tiie issue of class and powerlessness amongst many customers is 
perceived as a weakening factor within the model. The notion is one enhanced through more recent criminological work arguing that 
fear of crime is an essential element affecting those who are most vuLicrable in society, either through their status or area of residence 
(Taylor, 1981; Lea & Young, 1984; Young, 1986). 
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had fonnally increased, although the influence from cenU-al government in terms of 
direction, rather than operational action, was becoming'apparent. The losers in the power-
stakes were perceived as local police authorities whilst the hands of the Home Office and 
chief constables were strengthened (Reiner, 1985), the inclusion of appointed magistrates 
on Police Authorities being attempts to 'attenuate political control' (Bayley, 1983). Ideas 
disseminated from the Home Office now became more easily assimilated than before and 
an early example of the move in this direction was that of Unit Beat Policing (UBP).'° 
Community policing 
The well-used term commumty policing did not emerge as having a significant impact 
upon policing until the 1980s when Chief Constable John Alderson utilised its positive and 
emotive appeal to depict a redirected style of policing in Devon and Comwall (Alderson, 
1979, 1983). However, when considered in the wider historical context of how policing 
developed since the last century, it is no less appropriate to review the extent to which such 
a term could have been applied much earlier than the Alderson era, albeit in a less distinct 
form than that which became ascribed to it in the 1980s." The essence of this contention is 
one which accepts the varying definitions which can be given to each of the words 
community and policing (Cohen, 1985). Nevertheless, it had as its basis a form of order-
maintenance which was non-militaristic and relied (in orthodox historians' interpretations) 
on co-operation rather than coercion, having 'had roots in ancient traditions of communal 
self-policing' (Reiner, 1985, p. 15). Opponents of this 'idealist' view of policing argue that 
the way in which 'the new police' developed was one which had as its motives the 
maintenance of order needed by the capitalist class, and more centralist social order, with 
'° The development of UBP generally is discussed in the ne.\t section of this chapter and its development in Plymouth is described in 
more detail in Chapter 9: Community Policmg in Devon and Cormvall. 
'' John Alderson's community policing phik>sophy is described in more detail in the chapter 4 Community through tlte Riots and Chapter 
9 Community Policing m Devon and Comwall. 
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the nature of 'consent' impHed in the arrangement being dependant upon an absence of 
crisis when the coercive element of policing would become paramoimt (Brogden, 1982; 
1983; Cohen, 1979). Despite disagreement over the rationale for developing the police 
institution in this way, the reality of a civilian force working in close proximity to the 
public, having their bases of operation within communities themselves, and operating an 
imarmed 'beat' system of patrolling in sirnilar vein to that of 'watchmen', provided a 
structure against which the words community and policing could sit alongside, each other 
with some degree of comfort. 
However locational closeness alone is not one on which a sustainable argument that 
community policing became a comerstone on which the twentieth century police service 
was to develop.can be maintained. The nature of what the police did on a day-to-day basis 
was one which, at a relatively early stage in their nineteenth century development gained a 
'degree of legitimacy, in which they were no longer widely seen as a politically oppressive 
force, by a combination of specific strategies which did give the British police a imique 
character, implanting them firmly in national mythology' (Reiner, 1985, p.47). Local 
policing developed what one of the nineteenth century advocates for police reform, Edwin 
Chadwick,'^ considered to be their 'collateral services', enabling them to epitomise their 
'moral usefiilness' by cultivating 'beneficial services ... on occasions of accident or 
calamity'. Their position as an organised group, able to undertake tasks such as searching 
for missing persons, began to move police rationale for existence into a far wider realm 
than that of law-keepers. Some police forces also began to establish charitable funds to 
Edwin Chadwick: 'a (partly successful) advocate of a national, rationalized, preventive: policing system (Radzinowicz, 1956), was 
also to the fore of refonns in other areas of public and social policy, most notably with regard to Poor Law and public health 
innovations' (Mawby, 1990, p.23). He was a member of the Constabulary Force Commission established in the 1830s to make 
recommendations about possible reforms to policing outside London (Gilling, 1997, p.72). 
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assist the poor arid, by 1893, 'the Bobby was ... firmly established as part of the British 
Constitution' (Emsley, 1991, pp.76-77; 89). 
The nature of the role which the police had during the 1950s in particular was one which 
was not assigned any specific title. However, the basis on which later generations were to 
perceive what was important to them was one based on the idealised notion of good 
policing being synonymous with officers patrolling neighbourhoods and thereby enhancing 
confidence and preventing crime". It was a notion enshrined in the nineteentii century 
foundations of policing itself with the most overt signs of policework being vested in the 
sight of uniform patrols rather than covert investigative activity through perceived spying 
on the populous." The 1950s brought the issue into sharper focus through the character of 
Dixon although there is little evidence to suggest that officers patrolled in the type of way 
which some later reminiscences from the 1990s would have us believe.'^ Patrol work was, 
however, questioned in terms of its effectiveness in preventing and detecting crime in 
several studies. Although research in both the USA and Britain has indicated that crime fell 
when police patrolling increased these failed to show that there was a relationship between 
the amount of police resources committed to such an enterprise and the level of success 
achieved (Reiner, 1985, p. 118). The likely difference in effectiveness of foot, as against 
mobile patrolling, was further questioned in relationship to crime prevention during the 
1980s when it was calculated that the likelihood of a police officer on routine patrol 
coming within 100 yards of a burglary in progress was once in every eight years 
(Chatterton and Rogers, 1989; Clarke and Hough, 1984). However, such clinical analysis 
" Chapter 8 provides an indication of this through the reactions of those survej'ed in the Devon and Comwall and P^moulh areas. 
" The foundations of the Metropolitan Police were based on such a principle with a deUbetate minimal use of plain clothes officers 
because of the perceived fear which the public would have of them spjing on them (Miller, 1977, p.33). 
" The interviews referred to in the later chapter on commumty policing clearly show a rosj' recoUective theme in some respects, but 
equally, a sj'stem which did not promise police officers walking up and down residential streets on a daify basis. 
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failed to take account of the qualitative aspects of police patrol such as a sense of personal 
seciuity, reduced fear, and the opportunity" for interaction which might provide valuable 
information in detecting offences, all of which could be bi-products of an overt police 
presence. 
The increased use of motor vehicles as.a mode of patrol was becoming more common and 
the strategic approach employed in Lancashire during the late 1950s and early 1960s was 
the technological foundation on which Unit Beat Policing (UBP) was advanced in 1966. 
Lancashire had formed special 'crime patrol cars' in the Kirkby area which became the 
model for the 'Z' Cars of the popular television series in 1962. The locality had a high 
crime and disorder problem and was an area where few police officers wished to work, let 
alone reside. Lancashire's chief constable at that time was one of the future chief 
inspectors of constabulary, Eric St. Johnston. He attributed a substantial reduction in crime 
during 1965, together with a corresponding increase in detections over an eight month 
period, to the effectiveness of the scheme which involved officers being issued with 
personal radios and the transformation of eleven foot beats into five mobile patrol areas 
(St. Johnston, 1978, p. 169). The nature of this apparent success was never fiilly researched 
but the appoinhnent of St. Johnston as Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary in 
1966 clearly had much to do vwth the enthusiasm for UBP which emanated from the Home 
Office subsequently. 
' See chapter 3 1967-1979: Technology to Community and chapter 9 Community policing in Devon and Comwall for a more detailed 
discussion on the development of UBP. 
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Crime prevention 
The post-war period had seen'.a gradual decKne in the, apparently unqualified, support for 
the rule of law. With the emergence of a new generation of youth and minority groups 
during the 1950s and 60s, the ability of government to react to rising criminal behaviour 
did not fit neatly into many of the 'accepted' structural explanations of individual 
responsibility and character traits of offenders. The ability, therefore, to directly influence 
politically achievable objectives through conventional and estabUshed justice procedures 
became problematic. The 1950s also saw signs of interest from other institutions in 
achieving a reduction in crime. The insurance industry, with Home Office involvement, 
began an education process aimed at achieving greater public awareness of preventative 
measures through a publicity campaign. This process was seen as most appropriately 
carried forward by the police and some forces took the steps of introducing departments 
through which to disseminate crime prevention advice although, at this early stage in 
developments, the majority did not (Gilling, 1996, p. 103). 
In 1963, the National Crime Prevention Centre, based at Stafford, was estabhshed by the 
Home Office. This training establishment aimed to provide the police with a resource from 
which standardised crime prevention techniques could be instilled in selected officers from 
forces around the country with the intention that their newly acquired knowledge could 
then be utilised in a productive educational way with the public in their respective regions. 
The education process was becoming developed in a way which was perceived as practical 
and, to a degree, targeted. Resources were being committed at local level within policing 
structures and crime prevention specialists and support departments began to emerge as a 
norm. The rationale of providing personal advice at local level became a perspective which 
was to become enshrined in the recommendations of the Cornish Committee on the 
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Prevention arid Detection of Crime'(Rome Office, 1965). The idea that c/-/me prevention 
was becoming a specialism, demanding and deserving of resources, was enhanced in the 
committee's recommendation that specialist officers were required to maintain an 
appropriate level of expertise in an arena of increasing technological advancement. They 
were to bring a professionalism to the subject and engender collaboration with 'outside' 
bodies intended to reinforce the message of crime prevention being of wider responsibility 
than just the police service. 
The history of crime prevention, is one which shows this particular branch of police 
specialist support to have developed in a way which has been often divorced from the 
perceptions of what officers felt was 'real police work'. The Cornish Committee were not 
blind to this possibility in their deliberations and specifically emphasised that they felt it 
vital 'that any crime prevention organisation should not diminish the responsibilities of 
other members of the force towards crime prevention'. Moreover, they felt that there was a 
continual need to reinforce the stimulus 'and maintain an interest amongst all members...' 
(Weatheritt, 1986, p.45-6). The training of police staff in the role of crime prevention 
officers (CPOs) was essential and the Stafford centre (established prior to the committee's 
findings) was well placed to continue its role in providing the type of short courses 
required. 
However, the Cornish Committee recommended action which was far more wide reaching 
than activities within the police service alone, and provided a framework against which 
many of the crime prevention measures developed during the latter part of the century were 
to be built. The need for a multi-agency response was clear in relation to other groups in 
the manufacturing, retail, service and welfare sectors. To a large extent the police service 
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was Still perceived as .the primary owner of the crime prevention problem but the agenda 
had the potential to be moved away from them through the recommendation of a central 
advisory body being established. In 1967 the Home Office Standing Committee on Crime 
Prevention was formed and Contained representatives from government, industry, 
commerce and the police. Its early work concentrated on publicity in specific fields of 
crime prevention and forming sub-committees on two areas of particular mterest ^  personal 
and commercial property crime, and vehicle offences. It was keen to have the notion of 
responsibility for initiatives moved away from central level and recommended the 
establishment of crime prevention panels in all towns with a population of more than 
150,000 (Weatheritt, 1986, p.47). The panels began to become established during the 
second half of the 1960s, stimulated by a government circular (Home Office, 1968). 
Crime Prevention Departments within the police service had sprung up, relatively quickly, 
on the back of the Cornish Committee report which had recommended that an officer of at 
least inspector rank should be appointed in each force as its CPO, with officers in each 
division (preferably sergeants) being identified to liaise with patrolling constables. The 
work of the standing committee and the ensuing involvement of police forces in 
developing departments from their existing resources owed much to the committee's 
recommendations and proved to be the 'genesis of the situational approach'" in an era 
when reaction was still seen as the most effective answer to crime (Bright, 1991, p.65). 
Whereas the foundations were being firmly laid in the mid 1960s for fhe pre-emptive 
activity which set the marker of the collaborative, situational crime prevention model. 
See chapter 3 1967-1979: Teclmology to Communify for development of the concept oisituational crime prevention.. 
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much of the prospectively impactive work was not to emerge as the norm in many areas 
until the 198ds. 
Victims of crime 
The 1950s evolved as a period of emerging cultural change and disquiet in relation to 
crime and disorderly behaviour. Relative stability in social acceptance of norms following 
the War was giving way to a more questioning and experimental geneiration who were^  
gradually let loose from the remaining constraints of post-war British existence. Public 
perceptions of anxiety with developments sat alongside the 'folk-devils' of the day, Teddy 
Boys, to reinforce the notion that much of what was happening lay at the door of 
liberalisation of punishment options (Cohen, 1972; Pearson, 1983). It was also a decade 
which saw the subject of crime victims begin to emerge as a national issue. However the 
police position was one not yet entwined in the politics of this particular-debate. 
Central to the emergence of victims of crime as an issue in its own right during this period 
was the elderly figiu-e of Margery Fry. Her campaigning for rights for victims, based 
around principles of compensation by the State, was one which emerged against a more 
hberalised attitude towards punishment of offenders. The rights of victims was a concept 
which had been alluded to far earlier, at the International Prison Congress which took place 
in Brussels in 1900, where the secretary of the Howard Association'*, William Tallack, had 
suggested that the issue could be addressed through a carefully regulated and State-
administered scheme in which the offender made reparation in money or in service to the 
victim (Rock, 1990, p. 50). The suggestion was not taken up nor pursued by the Howard 
The Howard Association merged with the Penal Reform League in 1921 to form the Howard League for Penal Reform. Margery Fry 
was to be the first Honorary Secretary until 1926. 
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Association whose primary role was associated with the offender and not the victim. 
However, the political 'wheels' which turned at the time of Fry's primary involvement in 
work towards achieving victim compensation were, in no small way, linked to the changes 
in legislation on the use of corporal punishment. Wide political division between reformers 
and those in favour of retaining hard labour and whipping as two methods of punishment 
emerged at the time of the Criminal Justice Act 1948}^ Underlying, imrest about the 
change in legislation continued throughout the decades which followed, with the struggle 
between equating the position of offender and victim within the criminal justice system 
regularly being addressed. The abolition of capital punishment in Britain in 1957 served to 
heighten the debate further and promote the victim to greater prominence. Support for 
legislation giving victims rights to compensation was the opportunity to redress some of 
the balance, which was perceived as having swung too far in favour of the wrong-doer and 
away from the innocent. 
Margery Fry's argument throughout the period was that restitution for the victim from the 
offender was effectively impractical and problematic in enforcing. The State was seen as 
the organ through which compensation should be paid. It was the State which should 
assume this responsibility of repaying citizens for their loss brought about through societal 
problems rather than merely individual estrangement from legislative compliance.^ " As 
developments which followed during the 1970s later indicated, the vwsh of individual 
victims to be identified within a homogenous group known as victims was not without its 
Discussion of the Bill involved Sir Thomas More in identifying that there was 'not one mention in the whole Criminal Justice Bill of 
the word "victim" Indeed it is a cynical commentary on the use of the word "justice"' (Rock, 1990, p.56). 
^ Fry, who died in 1958, was to devote much time during her final years to this campaign for compensation. She did so against a 
background of victims as an interest group which had not, itself, promoted a cause for which to figlit. The challenge was being taken up 
on behalf of a non-identified section of individuals within society vvhich had no effective position within the criminal justice system, 
save to provide evidence to the authorities with which to prosecute offenders. 
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problems. In- addition. Fry's own association, the Howard League,, was far from 
enthusiastic about taking up the issue whilst campaigns such as the abolition of the death 
penalty took centre stage (Mawby and Gill, 1987). 
Fry's crusade becahie supported by a number of prominent individuals within the last two 
years of her life, centrally because of her enthusiastic commitnient • in speaking 
engagements and through increased use of the media to raise awareness, of the issues. A 
cementing relationship in 1957, with a newly formed organisation of lawyers from the 
main political parties. Justice, enhanced the progress of the campaign.^ ' Justice adopted a 
position on the issue which was supportive and based on the need to enhance the criminal 
justice system in such a way as to reduce the likelihood of victims taking matters into their 
own hands when offences had been committed against them. It was Justice which 
forwarded a letter to The Times on 5 May 1958, two weeks after Fry's death, entitled 
Victims of Violence: How Compensation Could be Paid. The request within the article, that 
the ideas be accepted as a memorial to Margery Fry's life, led to a meeting of members of 
the group with the Home Secretary. A foothold on the political ladder having been 
established, the emergence of the Compensation for Victims of Crimes of Violence Act, 
1964 was to be a, not easily achieved, but arguably inevitable result. 
Although probably inevitable, the pohtical path which had to be taken between 1958 and 
1964 was one beset with pitfalls which could have seen history report a situation where the 
Act did not emerge until much later. As political careers and policies developed however. 
Justice did not have the issue of criminal injuries compensation on their agenda prior to its suggestion by Fry and her collaborator, 
C.H. Rolph. Ideas were being solicited by Justice and the relationships which existed between those involved in aspects of criminal 
justice reform ensured that an avenue was open for Fiy's suggestions to get an airing. 
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the crusade's timing was right and became a complementary issue to^  other strands of 
policy of that time. Early 1959 saw a White Paper entitled Penal Practice in. a Changing 
Society consider the obligations of society to victims and a working party was appointed to 
report on the matter. The 1959 Conservative election manifesto had promised to consider a 
scheme to compensate victims of violent crime and, in 1962, their Party conference clearly 
voted in favour of bringing such a scheme into existence.^ The essence of the v/orkiiig 
party's findings in 1961 were that two potential schemes could be considered: one based 
on the existing industrial injuries legislation, and the other being fiirthered by the Home 
Office paying a Imnp sum to victims of crime. The underlying tone of the report was not 
positive in its recommendations however. It questioned, not only how practical it would be 
to implement such a scheme, but also the general principle of whether to assume 
responsibility for this was the role of the State in all cases. In 1963, the New Zealand 
government enacted the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, having requested the Council 
of Justice report be forwarded to it. A model had been established and arguments as to the 
impracticality of administering such a scheme in Britain were less easily defended. 
The Compensation for Victims of Crimes of Violence White Paper was passed as 
legislation during 1964. A Victims of Crimes of Violence Compensation Board would 
administer the scheme and monitor its implementation. The group became re-titled the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (CICB) and during its first twenty months of 
operation received 2,950 applications and paid £436,149 in compensation (Rock, 1990: 
p. 85). The Board had perceivably become 'one of the final bricks of the welfare state' 
^ Also during 1959, a Labour M.P., Reg Prentice, tabled a private member's bill on the subject in the Commons. The principles sat 
neatly alongside positions he had taken with other groups in the industrial relations field althougli, hitlierto, he had not noticeably 
concerned himself with matters of criminal justice. The Bill did not reach debating stage in the chamber and therefore was lost but 
Prentice's position had been established and a colleague MP. presented a further Bill, drafled identically, the following year. This also 
failed although it received a first reading bj' the House. Pressure was now being applied on the government to take actiotL 
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(Mawby and Walklate, 1994, p. 76). The late 1960s was a period in which the development 
of the CICB caused the United Kingdom to be perceived as at the forefiront of initiatives 
for victims of crime which other countries followed (Waller, 1988). For example, in 1965, 
the United States of America introduced a compensation scheme in California which 
included payment of medical expenses as well as a sum to be paid to families of homicide 
victims and other States began to follow. The police position in Britain vis-a-viis victims 
had not developed any specific significance during the period between 1950 and 1967 and 
was still several years away from doing so in a way which would affect national thinking 
oh this issue. However, the eventual emergence of the police into this arena had a generally 
positive impact upon the legitimacy and effect upon volunteer organisations concerned 
with victim welfare which saw the police themselves become more directly concerned with 
their provision of service to this group of customers. 
Quality of service 
The notion of British policing having as one of its core principles an ethos of service is one 
closely linked with the level of legitimacy which the institution has developed during and 
since the last century. The extent to which adopting the role of service-providers (as 
against purely law-enforcers) has contributed to this legitimacy is debatable^ but the fact 
that a substantial amount of the routine work which the police embark upon is not directly 
related to preventing or detecting crime has been a matter of record for some time (Martin 
& Wilson, 1969; Mayhew et al., 1993). The extent to which the police themselves consider 
that their work equates to an ethos of pubhc service, rather than law-enforcers and crime 
^ Crilics such as Brogden (1982, pp. 208-19) argue this situation having mote to do vsith the police window-dressing a basically 
coercive regime than having service to the public as one of their piiitiatj- concerns. 
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detectors, is one which appears to have been less in evidence during the 1950-67 period 
than in subsequent analysis of the position once philosophies of community policing and 
quality of service had become more ingrained in policing during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Interpretations of the individual cultures within policing are similarly recounted in studies 
both within and outside Britain during the period following the Second World War. The 
extent to which such positions were institutionalised, not only by interaction between 
individual officers and their superiors, but withinthe structures of the forces themselves is 
noteworthy." 
To what extent any analysis of the quality of work took place during the 1950-67 period is 
less obvious. There is little to suggest that matters which were outside the crime aspects of 
policing, or'maintenance of ritualistic patrol work, held any specific interest to the 
management of the police service in general. The policing institution was conventionally 
structured against a 'can-do' daily problem solving agenda which directed its efforts 
towards the maintenance of order and crime detection. There was a grudging acceptance 
that many of the tasks which fell outside this remit put officers in the role of peace keepers 
'by supervising the beat and responding to calls for assistance' (Banton, 1964, p. 127). 
Public acceptance of policing methods, and the police establishment's own perspective that 
this was a mainstay of their position in society is able to be evidenced in some cases well 
before the 1950s.^ ^ Limited survey evidence from the 1950s also showed a high level of 
satisfaction with the police and good police-public relations (Emsley, 1991, p,167) but. 
" Brogden's account of how rules on police socialising vvith the public impacted on the responses given in his smdy of policing 
Liverpool between the Wars (Brogden, 1991, pp.31-34) and Reiner's (1985) overview of Skolnick's work (1966, Justice Without Trial, 
New York: Wiley) show examples of aspects of police culture relevant to the pre-enlightened service era. 
" Vox acceptance it may also be possible to nsadpopularity. Early examples (1880-1882) relating to the tasks which the police wens 
required to undertake, including the serving of summonses on parents wliose children failed to attend school, were seen to have the 
potential to make the police 'more unpopular than they were' (Emsley, 1991, p.79). Evidence from Liverpool between the Wars 
(Brogden, 1991) shows aspects of afTmity with some of those policed to the extent that the respect expected in the role of constable is 
atgiiably close to a wish for popularity. 
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whereas the findings were indicative of a generally healthy environment in which the 
police could operate, there was little evidence to measure how effective or appropriate their 
actions actually were. 
The primary insfrument for measurement was Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary 
(HMIC), established in 1856 as. the mechanism to identify forces which were deemed 
efficient enough to receive a quarter of their expenses from central government funds.^ ^ 
The Inspectorate's position by the 1950s/60s had changed little in terms of its overall 
effectiveness as a mechanism to discover problems, let alone measure in more useful terms 
any notions of quality in what the police actually did (Whitaker, 1964). The thrust of the 
inspection process had altered following the Police (Inspectors of Constabulary) Act 1945 
to one which, by the 1950s, concerned itself with a role more familiar to the one which was 
to continue during the next forty years." Following the recommendations of the Royal 
Commission in 1962, Sir William Johnson was appointed as the first Chief Inspector of 
Constabulary (HMCIC) in charge of the regional inspectors who were made responsible 
for eight district areas. These were subsequently reduced to six in 1964 and five in 1969 
(Cowley, 1991). 
The vast majority of HMIs, since the last century, have been former chief constables 
(although the first HMI, John Woodford, had no connection with the police). Until 1948 all 
' In 1919 the national grant was increased to 50% and covered a vvider range of expenditure than only pay and clothing as previously 
(Cowley, 1991). 
" These aspects included police force orgamsation; strength and adequacy; allocation of work and responsibilities of the various ranks; 
police buildingS'and housing; methods of communication; maintenance of discipline and training; equipment and uniforms; and crime 
prevention and detection. 
Tlie Police Act 1945 had Erst allowed the appointment of the position HMCIC but HMI Sir Frank Brook refused to be considered for 
this position as he felt the appointment had the potential of lowering the status of his colleague HMIs. The position remained unfilled for 
die iiext seventeen vears until the recommendations of the Roval Commission, that the position should be filled, were accepted (St. 
Johnston, 1978, p.i65-6). 
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were also men and since then only three women have reached HMI status. Al l of them 
were appointed, or achieved. Assistant HMI positions between 1948 and 1962, the last 
finishing service in 1976. Their position in the 1950s and 1960s was one in which they 
were perceived as having qualities and abilities which enabled them to work well within a 
male dominated culture. The third Chief Inspector of Constabulary, and former chief 
constable of Lancashire, Eric St.. Johnston spoke highly of the 'enthusiasm, drive ... and 
popularity' of Miss Barbara Dems de Vitre, the first woman to be appointed to the HMI's 
office in 1948. However, his comments which followed concerning his support for 'women 
police' perhaps put a more institutionalised view of women in the profession into 
perspective: 'I insisted we should recruit feminine girls rather than 'collar and tie' types. 
What one Wants from a woman is the feminine point of view and intuition. The 
disadvantage of selecting the feminine type is that they usually get married after a short 
while ... but all is not lost for they usually marry policemen, and make good wives' (St. 
Johnston, 1978, pp.280-1). 
The mechanism for inspections was one which involved officers now inspecting chief 
constables who were formerly their peers. Whereas there is no obvious evidence to suggest 
that such inspections were less than formal and reverential to the positions of both HMIs 
and chief officers, the established autonomy of chief constables meant that persuasion, 
rather than an ability to instruct that changes should take place, was the method by which 
the Inspectorate had to operate. Respect and, to a degree, popularity of individual HMIs 
was seen as instrumental to effective operation. St Johnston also highlighted the nature of 
the HMI's role as one o f being a 'father confessor' to the chief constables in their regions 
arid, speaking of his predecessor Ted Dodd, he commented on the perceived strengths Of 
his conservatism and popularity which did not incline him to initiate new ideas - 'an 
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advantage that I did not have, and thus I knew he would not be an easy man to succeed' 
(St. Johnston, 1978, p.264). The level at which objective criticism- was able to be 
promulgated, how it was received and acted upon, together with the influence which HMIs 
had in resolving such potential conflicts does not have independent evidence available to 
exempliiy it. What did emerge during the years which followed was an apparent growing 
influence of the HMCIC to personally inspire and assist in certain policing developmentSj 
such as UBP, drug squads and traffic patrols-which became established nation^vide.^ '. 
1950-1967 - an overview 
This was an era in which the police began with a relatively comfortable and supportive 
existence, and ended as one where the positive media image of their service had shovm the 
first signs of back-firing. Public and political scrutiny had resulted in significant questions 
being asked of their structure and procedures, leading to the first major piece of legislation 
to emerge during the period under study; one which was to result in the dismantling of 
numerous local institutions. As well as principles of accountability and control, the work 
which the police did was beginning to receive greater central direction in two of the key 
areas which are of interest: community policing (through UBP) and crime prevention 
(through the Crime Prevention College and the Cornish Report). Victims of crime were 
also brought onto the agenda and whilst, at this stage the role of the police vis-a-vis victims 
was not considered, victim related issues would emerge as an additional phenomenon in 
which the police would play an increasing role. The quality of police services was 
beginning to emerge as an issue, but only in a more diverse sense through greater political 
and public awareness of their position as an accountable and powerfiil national institution. 
See chapter 3 1967-79 Technology to Communify for more detail. 
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To try and superimpose a relatively modem-day term such as quality of service onto-a 
historical map of policing forty to fifty years ago is, therefore, problematic. It is not only 
problematic because of the nature of the evidence available from that period but, as 
importantly, there is difficulty in defimng the term quality itself There are opportunities to 
develop interpretations of this in relation to more localised studies, and through subsequent 
chapters which deal with the emergence of police and public perceptions of quality in 
Devon and Comwall, this will be considered. However, in. terms of the policing 
environment, the groundwork for much of what was to follow during the next thirty years 
had been laid. 
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Technology to Community 
The 1964 Police Act had provided the power to amalgamate forces, an iristrument which 
had beeh used in May 1966 by the then Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, to affect the 
reduction of provincial forces from 117 to 49. The programme was achieved almost totally 
during the next four years. The effects of reorganisations were perceived to be generally 
successftil at national level in accomplishing the move away from numerous local watch 
committees to more accountable police authorities and chief officers, but at sfreet-level 
amalgamations often proved more problematic in terms of organisational management. 
The resultant changes were substantial in terms of re-ranking senior officers although, in 
line with the privileged position held by this public service mstitution, sfreamlining was 
achieved without enforced job losses or compulsory retirements of officers over 
pensionable service age.' The changes in boundaries, as these affected the operational 
capabilities of the new forces, were significantly less problematic than the issues which 
accompanied the cultures of pride and belonging evident amongst officers in their previous 
forces. The situation was not unique to any one area, nor unpredicted, but one which 
affected many constabularies which had undergone (or were to undergo) similar changes to 
their structure. 
The strength which the Trade Unions had developed within the politics of the country 
' The issue of enforced retirement, at or after pensionable service, is one which has never been addressed, mainly due to the uncertain 
legal position and pressure from staff associations. Interestingly in 1963 the Chief Constable of Devon issued an order that ofScers who 
had completed pensionable service would be required to resign when that point was reached (Devon General Orders, 5/93). However, 
the policy was never implemented fully and, since then, a small number of '30+ year ofiicers' have been 'convinced' to retire through 
more subtle means if their continued service is not required. 
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during the 1960s had led to industrial disputes and strikes becoming more commonplace. 
The organised union power-base was able to co-ordinated picketing of premises connected 
with disputes, both directly, and secondarily, and the role which the police were, expected 
to play in maintaining order became a significant issue in the development of the service in 
the early 1970s. In 1972, the Saltley coke depot had been closed during a dispute, despite 
efforts of the police to maintain access to it in the face of violent picketing.. The 
consequences of this event met with varying responses when oonsidered against the role 
which the police could or should play in such circumstances. The failure of the police to 
keep the passage free for those who wanted to work was seen by many as a dangerous 
development in the overall abilities of them to maintain law and order. However, others 
argued that the increase in the power needed by the police to succeed would have been out 
of proportion to the loss of support and reduced public confidence which would follow 
(Clutterbuck, 1980; Jeffery and Hennessy, 1983). The call for wider ranging powers and 
the possibility of developing a French-style 'CRS' third force, capable of dealing with 
serious public disorder in the political environment, was a common theme which emerged 
in discussion on the future of policing. It was one which was not supported by the police. 
Nevertheless forces began to train and equip officers to enable them to provide mutual aid 
to other areas in times of need. These Police Support Units (PSUs) were used infrequently 
in most forces during the 1970s but were to be employed to greater effect during the next 
decade, particularly during the Miners' Strike of 1984. Combined with this, the 
establishment of the National Co-ordinating Centre based at New Scotiand Yard in 1972 
was the starting point from which strategic inter-force mutual aid to deal with such 
incidents began. By the late 1970s riot shields and protective equipment were becoming a 
more common sight on the streets, particularly in larger forces where their deployment in 
circumstances of serious public disturbance was a more regular occurrence. Provincial 
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forces invested in such equipment to varying degrees dependant upon financial ability and 
the importance which their chief officers-placed on the commitnient, although their use 'in 
the field' was far less regular. 
Whereas police pay had increased in the second half of the 1960s following co-ordinated 
pressure from the Police Federation, the reality by the mid to late 1970s was that the 
service was experiencing general disquiet through the perceived inability of police pay to 
keep pace with ever rising inflation, the Federation was also becoming a far more 
organised pressure group which, whilst not committed to any party-political affiliation or 
support, became instrumental in the eventual election of the Conservative government in 
1979 on a strong 'law and order' ticket (Conservative Cential Office, 1979). In 1978, the 
Edmimd-Davies committee enquiry into police pay and conditions had recommended 
substantial pay increases across the board, together with preservation and enhancement of 
associated financial factors (notably rent allowance) and, most significantly, an ongoing 
pay review formula which would ensure future pay negotiations reflected rising costs. The 
recommendations were accepted by the Labour government but it sought to stage the rises 
over a period of time and not honour the agreement in full. The 1979 election saw the new 
Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, summon the representatives of the police staff 
associations to 10, Downing Street almost immediately upon her appointment to advise 
them that the formula would be paid in full with immediate effect and the future pay 
formula be implemented^ (Reiner, 1985, p.73-5). 
^ The pay rises were significant and saw the minimum pay of a constable in 1977 (£2,775) rise to £6,189 by 1982 (Benyoh, 1984, 
p. 103). 
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Community Policing 
•One of the most noticeable changes to policing style which occurred around the time of the 
amalgamation of forces was that of Unit Beat Policing (UBP). By the early to mid-1960s 
technology was well advanced but most forces had^  hitherto, not taken full advantage of 
such innovations either through lack of funding, encouragement or foresight. UBP was a 
system which, as well as redefining some of the principles of 'patrol', saw an increased use 
of technology to assist the police. Motor vehicles were not new to police, forces but 1966 
saw the Home Office taking positive action to develop their usage still further by funding 
vehicles (which were to become universally known as 'panda cars') either through loan, 
hire or increased grant. Radio communication also became more widely available to 
individual patrolling officers through Pye Pocketphones and again this was supported by 
the Home Office. These intentions were in line with Home Office circular 142/1967 
(Home Office, 1967) issued during August of that year to all forces advocating 
implementation of the new system with the offer of central financial assistance where 
appropriate.^  
There was little about UBP which the public could feel dramatically concerned about at 
this point and, whereas the publicity afforded the scheme concentrated upon the positive 
nature of providing everyone with a modem, well-equipped crime fighting organisation, 
little (if any) attention was directed towards evaluation of what the public actually thought 
of the service. Whether the negative public attitude towards aspects of policing pre-dated 
concerns which were felt by the police themselves about the system is dubious. If anything, 
texts tend to suggest that the enterprise was initially greeted with applause rather than 
The offer related to the provision of vehicles against repayment 'as early as possible in the next financial year' (Home Office, 1967). 
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concern, arguably because the emphasis which was placed on the advanced nature of 
technology being made available that would enable the 'bobby' to be recast as 'the tough, 
dashing, formidable (but still brave and honest) "Crime-Buster"' (Chibnall, 1977, p.71). 
Riding upon the back of the moral panics of the 1950s,'' and emerging during a period of 
'flower-power', drugs and promiscuity in the 1960s, UBP still emphasised the 'friendly' 
face of authority by acknowledging and promoting the role of local responsibility. The 
individual acts now expected to be performed by officers related to swiftly responding to 
emergency calls through the increased availability of transport and an improved ability to 
deal with crime through better communication and streamlined practice. Central to the 
strategy was the role of the 'collator'; a station-based police officer, normally of constable 
or sergeant rank, whose role was to collect and disseminate intelligence and local 
information to his colleagues on patrol. In tune with a mood of public optimism for the 
new system, the character of George Dixon assumed a collator's position at his television 
Dock Green police station in the latter half of the 1960s. This change in role signified not 
only the perceived importance of the collator's position, but also that Dixon's honest, firm, 
but sympathetic community approach to policing had been rewarded by his promotion to 
the rank of sergeant. 
The research that was conducted at the time of UBP development nationally tended to 
indicate that the system had been effective in achieving its aims of providing a rapid 
response, collating intelligence, improving morale, saving on manpower and being well 
received by the public (Gregory and Turner, 1967; Williamson, 1967). However the basis 
for these conclusions is not clear. Weatheritt, commented on the reported improved 
" See Cohen (1972) and Peaison (1983). 
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performance, high morale and public.accejptability by questioning 'What Was measured in 
the first place and how it was measured'. She cited the evidence as being almost entirely 
on crime figures and 'no direct measures of public attitudes, police-publio contact, police 
morale, police response times or police visibility' all of which 'had been presented as 
crucial features of the new schemes'. The research 'was instead largely a fiction which was 
used to dress a policy necessity in the clothes of virtue' (Weatheritt, 1986, pp.94-95). Other 
studies conducted by 'special course' police officers^ through visits to a number of forces 
which had developed UBP models (Coe, et al, 1969; Gospel, et al, 1969; Watson, et al, 
1969; Manning, et al, 1972) revealed slightly more searching stances, but ultimately ones 
which identified that the schemes were working well based on very limited evidence.^  
The widespread establishment of UBP (by 1968 two-thirds of the population of England 
and Wales were covered)' was not shown by later evaluation to have been as effective as 
had been anticipated. In none of nine forces which were studied in 1975 were essential 
elements of the scheme seen to be working effectively, and in some they had not even been 
put in place (Comrie and Kings, 1975). The panda car, heralded as symbolic of a new style 
of policing, had become 'widely agreed, a disaster' (Manwaring-White, 1983, p.23) and 
resulted in a 'depersonalised and insensitive' policing system because of fhe perceived 
reduction in personal contact which now took place between tiie police and public 
(Baldwin and Kinsey, 1982, p.36). However, the temptation to blame a centrally inspired 
system often ignored the possibility of other failings more closely aligned to local 
' The 'Special Course* was attended by seigeants who had been successful in gaining places on the police 'accelerated promotion 
scheme". 
* Officers of junior rank being invited into police forces were unlikely to produce reports v\4iicb would be highly critical of any aspect of 
the schemes, both for reasons of politics and careers (author's observation). 
^ Emslqr(I991.p.l66). 
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personnel and organisational management. Amongst these were the inabilities of individual 
supervisors to direct arid understand the wider strategies upon which UBP had initially 
been based; lack of direction and leadership from middle and senior managers in forces; a 
sparsity or absence of meaningful indicators on which to base the effectiveness of the new 
patrolling sfrategy; as well as the sfructural changes which were taking place within forces 
in a belief that wider centralisation of resources could achieve cost' savings without any 
undesirable effects on policing. An inert unwillingness of some patrol officers to police in 
the way intended also potentially contributed to the ineffectiveness of the process.* These 
problems, whether personnel, organisational or structural issues, nevertheless existed 
alongside an increase in demand from the public. The proposed advantage of the constable 
still effectively being community based and patrolling a beat, was accompanied by 
increased centralisation of resources and the re-evaluation of the necessity to provide 
community police bases.' 
Policing styles within forces were beginning to change in another respect however. The 
more affluent 1960s had seen an increase in the number of motor vehicles being privately 
owned and this, together with improving road communication systems over the next ten 
years made the opportuiuties for police officers to reside even further away from their local 
stations appealing. The amount of housing stock owned by police authorities began to 
diminish as accommodation previously having been used to house officers and their 
families was sold and the proceeds ploughed into policing development, notably 
technology. The stringent hold which chief constables had on where officers were 
* Evidence from the Plymouth research revealed senior and junior police officers' reflections on the process which questioned 
individual commitment to UBP and the opportimities available to circumvent potentially sound strategies of policing (see chapter 9 
Commumty Policmg in Devon and Conrwalt). 
' See Chapter 7 National Perspectives to Local Implementation, and the closure of the local police station at The Octagon' in 
Stonehouse, Plymouth in chapter 9 Community Policing in Devon and Comwall. 
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permitted to live, and their final say on whether or not they would be permitted to purchase 
their own properties, became • loosened as the opportunities available to place them in-
authority-owned accommodation diminished because of housing stocks being reduced. 
Improve radio communication, increased mobility, and the opportunity to realise the 
capital investment in property (particularly during the early 1970s when property prices 
across the countiy boomed) made "the rationale for centralising police services obvious. 
Despite the public's wish for small police bases, particularly those close to residential 
communities, to be maintained, the 1970s saw widespread closure of local stations. This, 
together with a UBP system which by the mid 1970s had fallen into disrepute, resulted in 
emerging concern amongst sections of the public that the community nature of policing 
(which was still ideally perceived to be Dixonian), was being lost and that what was in its 
place bore a less personal and less reassuring identity. 
The end of the 1970s was to see the emergence of community policing in Devon and 
Comwall Constabulary under its chief constable, John Alderson. Details of its problematic 
birth in that force are dealt within later chapters but an overview of its early development 
and rationale through the Exeter Crime Prevention Support Unit (CPSU) is included in this 
section because of the impUcations which it had on a national level in both influencing and 
being complementary to other areas of poUcing, particiilarly crime prevention. It was based 
on a premise that the influence of society in regulating itself was paramount to the 
effectiveness of pohcing and that the best way to keep the peace was to reinforce these 
informal controls. This, however, irnplied a fundamental reappraisal of policing methods to 
bring preventive and reactive policing into balance at local level. The purpose of the Exeter 
scheme was to activate other agencies concemed with specific localities and problems in a 
way which would bring about a co-ordinated stiategy within which the police would 
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become more involved in aspects of social crime prevention. The concept was not new but 
certainly one which had, hitherto, found support in only a few areas. Moore and Brown 
(1981) highlighted two examples where the police had been instrumental in initiating 
similar schemes, one going back as far as 1957 when integrated social action in Gibshill, 
Scotland resulted in a long-running enterprise, and similarly in Kirkby, Lancashire during 
1974 (of particular interest because of this area's pilot status in Unit Beat Policmg some 
ten years previously). 'Implicit in both these projects was the ... interdependence of 
statutory and voluntary social agencies in the task of social crime prevention' (Moore and 
Brown, 1981, pp.6-9). 
Alderson's unit had the tasks of examining the level of crime and community problems in 
specific areas, experimenting with crime prevention initiatives, direct police resources 
accordingly and 'harness public support including the unemployed in activities to teach 
good citizenship and thereby prevent crime' (Mopre and Brown, 1981, p. 10). The 
centralisation of police resources in Exeter which occurred in the 1960s was reversed and 
five separate locations from Which pohcing would take place identified as community 
bases. A policing consultative group was established with representatives of social 
services, probation, local authority, education and others, which became an important 
centrepiece of the structure. It was the basis on which, three years after the inception of the 
CPSU, Alderson laimched community policing as a forcewide initiative, soon to see its 
relevance to the future structure of policing in the 1980s come into sharper focus. 
Crime prevention 
The period during the late 1960s and early 1970s was one of significant upheaval and 
change for the police service coming, as it did, on the back of the 1964 Police Act, 
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recommendations of the Cornish Cominittee, and changing social and econoniic 
envirorohent of the time. Amalgamations took time to become established'and operate with 
any degrees of efficiency, partly because of the structural needs of the new organisations, 
but also because of the need to amalgamate different policing cultures within the areas 
themselves. Crime prevention was becoming established within a minimal framework 
during this period but the remainder of the 1970s was to see it develop niore significant 
weight and a wider outlook. This was largely because of a realisation that conventionally 
held beliefs in the abilities of the police and court systems to affect a continuing level of 
rising crime, low detection rates and costs, were an inappropriate mainstay of a crime 
prevention policy (Gilling, 1997, p. 80). 
By 1976, there appeared to be a general acknowledgement at government level that the 
extent to which crime prevention policies were being pursued was insufficient. In 
particular, the statement from the Review of Criminal Justice Policy document that 'the 
scope for reducing crime through policies that go beyond the boundaries of the criminal 
justice system merits particular attention' gave stimulus to 'involve other Government 
Departments, local authorities and agencies outside govermnent [...,.] as speedily as 
possible' (Home Office, 1977, pp 9-10). This led to the establishment of a Working Group 
on Crime Prevention which included Home Office researchers. The group identified that 
the whole issue of crime prevention needed a much more systematic approach to be 
adopted. However, the extent to which development and co-ordination was to take place 
needed to take account of, not only a wide range of potential partners in the process at 
local-practitioner level, but the fact that a number of government departments were 
involved in the process. Neither was it clear where a direct lead would come from, despite 
the main stimulus for the initiative residing at Home Office level in the early stages of 
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physical security advice which police CPOs were providing on a daily basis. 
Weatheritt describes the years since the mid-1960s as being a period 'marked more by a 
series of obstacles than by a history of achievements', a situation which she contended 
should not be ignored in its significance for future developments, when professionals 
committed to providing more effective prevention can 'overlook or play down the 
difficulties in achieving it' (Weatheritt, 1986, p.44). At the time of her writing the crime 
prevention model in most forces had already fallen into precisely the category which the 
Cornish Committee had warned against - that of a specialist department taking a 
significantly different course to other officers in forces charged with the conventional 
reactive policing style. However, the Home Office researchers represented on the Working 
Group on Crime Prevention had begun to consider other pragmatic research evidence as a 
potential answer to the future direction which crime prevention policy should take. 
Amongst these theories was that of defensible space which considered better architectural 
design could increase the sense of ownership and reduce opportunities for crime through 
more natural resident surveillance of localities (Newman, 1972). The situational approach 
comprised of opportunity-reducing measures that were directed at specific forms of crime 
and involved the 'management, design or manipulation of the immediate environment' so 
as to increase the effort, risk and perceived rewards to the offenders themselves (Clarke, 
1992, p.4). The amount of research available to identify the potential success of the move 
towards situational crime prevention was relatively small during the 1970s, although that 
which was conducted has questioned the simplicity of Newman's theory as not having 
taken into account other social factors which determine crime occurrences (Mawby, 1977; 
1979; Wilson, 1980). The complexity of an environment in which crime took place had the 
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potential to be influenced by better design but not by this factor alone,, a contention which 
Newman himself later conceded (Newman and Franck, 1980), A weakness in the theory 
being that it failed to account for areas which had both poor defensible design and little 
crime (Mayhew, 1979)."' 
The situational approach was 'the epitome of the rational approach to policy-making, and 
it offered a great deal of promise' because its focus was lipon establishing an infrastructure 
to address problems. But to avoid the 'marginality' which had beset the crime prevention 
policy of the 1960s it needed to involve and have active support from relevant agencies, as 
well as overcoming the political ambiguity inherent in post-1979 government policy which 
was investing heavily in a proclaimed 'law and order' strategy but at a superficial level 
(Gilling, 199.7, p. 82). The need for agencies other than the police to be directly involvedin 
order to make a situational model work was one central to the wider social model of crime 
prevention and community policing being developed by Alderson in Exeter during 1976 
and 1979. Whereas co-operation of this nature began to emerge in forces generally, their 
structures were of various designs and effectiveness. Central direction and guidance was 
not yet effective in achieving a uniform approach to the issue but the coming decade was to 
see a more concerted approach emerge to try and derive most benefit from these combined 
resources. 
Victims of crime 
The pressure which had been so effectively applied by the group Justice began to reduce 
' It would be WTong to identify situational crime prevention as only encompassing Newman's Defensible Space theoiy, although it was 
one of the niore influential of the period. Theories of there being 'natural' victims through situational interactions; ecological studies 
which focused on where crimes took place; temporal and spatial distribution of offences, and psychological motivation for offending all 
provided some inspiration for the Home Office researchers of the 1970s (Hughes, 1998, p.60). 
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once the initial legislation for compensation had been put into place-and-the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Board (CICB) was operating. As with all interest groups, the 
purpose having been achieved, another cause must be found for which to fight. Justice 
therefore effectively lost touch with issues concerning victims of crime and moved its 
attention to other matters. The changes accomplished to date had been as a result of outside 
groups and pressure at political level, not from victims themselves banding together. The 
situation during the rest of the 1960s was to remain thus, with no specific group devoted 
exclusively to victim rights reform. 
Just as Justice and the Howard League had not been the most obvious championing groups 
for victims of crime, given their diverse objectives, the next national group to take an 
interest was an.equally less than obvious candidate. The National Association for the Care 
and Resettlement of Offenders (IsfACRO) had been formed in 1966 having replaced the 
previous group entitled the National Association of Discharged Prisoners Aid Society. 
Although, at first glance primarily concemed with the welfare and circumstances of those 
who had committed offences, the group's objectives were far -wider and reflected an open 
and constmctive path which drew other aspects of the justice system into play. In 
particular, these objectives included 'evaluating existing projects ... with a view to 
improving their effectiveness and helping develop and diversify them' and 'building on 
models for and provide other advice on the initiation of experiments and new projects' 
(Rock, 1990: p.94). 
Before the 1960s had ended, the beginnings of what was to develop towards direct victim 
care provision by organised groups had emerged. Not without considerable early problems 
in getting individuals to respond to the offer of assistance, a victim-offender group, based 
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in Bristol appeared to be the first instance of any such facility being concemed with the 
views of victims rather than only considering their role in. terms of compensation. The 
initiative was one which was to herald significant changes in the tenure of criminal justice 
throughout the next quarter of a century. There was an agenda within NACRO which did 
not see the victim as being a stumbling block to the achievement of greater reform in the 
criminal justice system on behalf of the offender. Rather, the Victim wasmore likely to be 
an influential factor in favour of change which could improve the situation for offenders. 
There was a degree of legitimacy which was observed within victims which was not 
obvious in offenders. The victim-offender project met some sixteen times and remained in 
existence until May 1970. 
In January 1970, Philip Priestly, the regional organiser for NACRO produced a paper 
under the title 'What about the Victim?' and in April of that year NACRO organised a 
'Victim-Offender Group Event' which resulted in little further concrete interest. However, 
the media had caught the mood of the occasion and articles began to regularly appear in 
local and national papers alike. Much of the local interest was based around Bristol 
because of the activity which had been observed in the victim-offender field. The factors 
resulted in the prominent establishment of the National Victims Association (NVA) in 
1973, which had as its aims the establishment of a national voice for victims who were 
seen as 'the forgotten people of crime' by promoting new services, encourage conciliation 
between victims and offenders and help for individual victims (Rock, 1990: p.ll3). The 
NVA had been established for some seven months when it announced that it would be 
making donations to victims of crime and sending volunteers to offer support and comfort • 
in victims' homes. This was the first example of what, imder a different guise, was to 
become a staple basis on which the organisation. Victim Support conducted the majority of 
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its work. However, the NVA was not a group which encountered long term success, other 
than in continuing to raise and maintain awareness of the plight of victims. Its objectives, 
although laudable, were highly ambitious given its small core of committed individuals. 
Less than two years after making the announcement of its intentions, the NVA conceded 
that it was not likely to grow further and its future work tended to be based around public 
relations rather than practical actions in support of victims. 
Nevertheless, its achievements were not inconsiderable in their originality and impact. In 
particular the establishment of an advice centre for victims based at Kingswood in Bristol 
drew attention to the issues, as did one specific victim-offender encounter which was 
televised and highly publicised during 1975. Campaigns which were staged at national 
political level also had some impact. In particular, the establishment of a commission 
under the chairmanship of Lord Pearson late in 1972, to consider various forms of 
compensation, was persuaded by the NVA to include compensation to victims of crime 
within this. The NVA's lack of long term success was partly due to its aims being at a level 
which were, perceivably, too ambitious given its limited support and resources. But the 
issue of victims of crime was now becoming firmly established on the political agenda, and 
interest in the subject was growing in the public and academic arenas, as well as amongst 
the police themselves. 
Victim Support's success as an organisation was achieved over a relatively short period of 
time given the voluntary nature of its work. The British version, of what was a support 
function developed in other countries independently of any specific cross-cultural 
influence, emerged during the early 1970s. Its purpose was not offence-specific, nor 
politically inspired on the back of issues such as rape or domestic violence, and was one 
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which developed a more universal ethos to its clientele. Other activity .at the time was, 
nevertheless, influential in raising the profile of victims, the feminist movement in the 
early 1970s was influential in bringing some of these victim issues to wider attention. In 
particular, radical feminists became more concemed with issues of oppression by men and 
associated crimes such as rape and domestic violence which led to the establishment of 
women's refuges,, the first of which opened in Chiswick in 1972, and rape crisis centres, 
initially started during 1976 in London. 
The location and timing of Victim Support's birth in Bristol during 1973 was not 
coincidental as there were linkages with the work already underway in other aspects of 
victim assistance. That linkage was more noticeable through the position of NACRO and 
its Bristol based study group (BACRO) which was established around 1971. But the 
impact which the N V A had in raising awareness of the issues, and promoting its own 
levels of activity within the Bristol area, was a significant stimulus which can not be 
ignored in the way support for victims developed in the Bristol area. However, BACRO's 
role was the lead and involved the study group in discussing potential developments with 
the police, magistrates and members of the probation service. This led to the formation of a 
working party which resulted, during 1973, in the establishment of the first Victim Support 
Scheme project, covering the Bristol area. The main strands to the pilot which were 
proposed became the operational basis on which the scheme worked. Its evolution was as 
an independent entity which made use of resources available through the community and 
other agencies. The administration of the scheme was accomplished through the services of 
a paid co-ordinator and trained volunteers provided a response in situations of distress as 
soon as possible after the event (in effect an emergency response). The demand for the 
service was significantly underestimated in the first instance with some three times as 
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many referrals being received as had been anticipated (Mawby and Gill, 1987, p. 87). The 
trend which was to develop of the scheme needing to be selective as to the types of crinies 
which it accepted as referrals became established at this early stage. It was one based on 
volmne and resources as much as on specific victim need, a point which will become more 
relevant in discussion of the issues later in this section. 
The voluntary nature of the project meant that funding was difficult and the scheme 
withheld its service for some seven months during 1974 and 1975 in order to raise fiinds 
and secure its longer-term future. The result was effective and the scheme flourished 
following the break. As Rock describes it at that stage, 'It was no longer a small and 
endangered project struggling for life, but the germ of a national uistitution' (1990, p. 158). 
Interest in the whole aspect of a victim support service began to grow and was stimulated 
by a community based BBC television programme in 1975 which dealt with the issue as a 
feature. As a result of interest from elsewhere a conference was held in April 1975 from 
which other schemes emerged. More fundamentally, however, was the establishment of a 
need for a central steer for such schemes through a national body. Some of this support 
was initially forthcoming through NACRO and the guidelines which had been sought from 
the conference were eventually produced and circulated in 1977. Regional groups were 
formed and, in 1979, following the formation of a national committee to co-ordinate the 
initiative, the National Association of Victim Support Schemes (NAVSS) came into 
existence. 
A central tenet of Victim Support in the United Kingdom was one of providing a crisis-
intervention service as soon as possible after a crime had been committed. The provision of 
such a service relied heavily on the co-operation of the police and the extent to which this 
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co-operation has been forthcoming during the twenty five year history of Victim Support 
has varied according to area and circumstance. The original scheme in Bristol was 
established as a universal, and not offence specific service for selected categories of 
victims, meaning that early involvement and support of the police was necessary for its 
effective operation. Although encouragement for the scheme initially came firom the 
probation service and NACRO, the proniinence of ithe police role soon became established 
and a chief superintendent was appointed as a liaison officer. The nature of Victim Support 
Scheme management saw the police role develop to one where the formal committee 
structures which became established invariably comprised a representative of the local 
force. Whereas funding of Victim Support relied upon (primarily) charitable donations, the 
police ability to support in other ways became an important aspect in the continued 
development of schemes. Senior police officers would be regular attendees at management 
meetings and were often instrumental in encouraging the formation of new schemes as 
they moved from one area to another on promotion or career development (Maguire and 
Corbett, 1987). The existence of the police as such prominent members of schemes, and 
the encouragement and support which was evident in their public portrayal of the scheme's 
worth, had the effect of raising the status of Victim Support as both a social help and 
(increasingly effective) pressure group at national level. Police involvement was becoming 
more acknowledged as worthwhile and supportive at both local and national level with 
forces regarding the Victim Support system as partners; a situation which pre-dated the 
common acceptance of this as a 'buzz-word' by several years. The emerging willingness of 
the police to see aspects of their role within the system being devolved to others, even 
though this particular role with victims was one which the police had not previously 
accepted formal responsibility for, was a significant development in what was to become a 
more common attitude nationally. 
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As will be identified later in this study, and shown in work conducted in Devon and 
Comwall during the 1980s (Mawby and Gill, 1987), there was, and to a lesser extent still 
is, a level of scepticism amongst some police officers as to the value and purpose of Victim 
Support. This scepticism, however, was not at the level of forward-thinking senior police 
officers who were prepared to develop their roles in support of schemes as much as it was 
amongst constable and sergeant ranks who were the people most commonly having direct 
dealings with victims themselves. The wider police perspective was able to appresciate-the 
potential advantages in terms of improved public relations in addition to being associated 
with a service which had as its overall aim a group of people who they relied upon 
regularly to provide evidence with which to convict offenders. It was a situation 
acknowledged in the second armual report of the National Association of Victim Support 
Schemes in 1982 on the basis of a survey the previous year which had shown that 
policeA/^SS relationships across the country were consistently described as 'good' or 
'excellent' (Mawby and Gill, 1987, p. 154). 
Comparison with similar initiatives elsewhere is also worthy of note. In the United States 
recognition of victim-exclusion from the criminal justice process occurred during the late 
1960s" and 1976 saw the emergence of a victims movement and National Organisation 
for Victim Assistance (NOVA) which developed as a 'clearing house of information and as 
a co-ordinator for hundreds of victim-service programmes which had developed'. These 
programmes, which were often unconnected with the funding which became available 
through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) in the early 1970s, 
included offence-specific services for victims such as rape and child abuse, as well as 
'' 77ie President's Commission on Lcnv Enforcement (1967) resulted in the introduction of the in the 1970s which sponsored projects to 
improvie victim handling within the criminal justice system (Mawby & Gill, 1987, p. 118). 
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court-focused activity (Mawby and Gill, 1987, p. 11-8). What was less obvious in the United 
States than in the United Kingdom was any overarching victim support service which 
applied to a wide range of victims. Given the respective geographic sizes of the two 
countries this is not surprising. However, the US goveniment's early role in raising the 
profile of the victim in the late 1960s and the stmctures which followed this through the 
LEAA, appeared more directed than the UK where the issues had come about, through a 
more piecemeal series of wranglings over issues of compensation. 
A number of different models of police involvement with schemes established to assist 
victims developed in the United States. Police involvement in US schemes varied firom 
area to area and examples of victim services are depicted in Mawby and Gill's (1987) 
review of some of these. Examples are cited of policcrbased systems in Clearwater, Orange 
County and Sanford; a State funded victim/witness programme in Pima County, and the 
American Association of Retired Persons work within the criminal justice system (pp. 126-
7). Victim services are seen to place a greater emphasis on individuals' rights in the justice 
system rather than their needs, a situation distinct from Britain where welfare is key to the 
Victim Support ethos. The US experience appears to have shown more emphasis on the 
'presentation of victims problems as part of a law-and-order problem', a situation which 
led to NOVA 'engaging in political dialogue to a greater extent' than in the UK (p. 131). 
The extent to which police involvement is exemplified relies, to a large extent therefore, on 
their position as part of the justice system. As in the UK, problems are inherent in the 
exchange of information and decision making when victims require additional services, but 
the notion of welfare in the United States is secondary to that of making the justice system 
work most effectively. 
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The victim system in the Netherlands emerged in Hoom during 1975 with the involvement 
of the probation service. As in the UK, schemes were to foCus more on the ethotional and 
material effects of crime on victims and were independent of the justice system. Police 
stations were to be the bases from which the schemes would operate and the Ministry of 
Justice paid for three pilot projects to be established. Whereas the UK development of its 
'umbrella' organisation (NAVSS) worked towards co-ordinating schemes' activities, in the 
Netherlands their National Platform, for Victims Assistance (LOS)'^ which became 
established in the 1980s was explicitly told by the Justice Ministry that they would not 
attempt to impose a uniform structure on local schemes (Mawby and Walklate, 1994, 
p. 118). The development of relationships with the police varied with some schemes 
operating completely independently and dependent on the self-referral of victims, whilst 
others had a police-referral policy (although often restricted in its effectiveness by the 
caveat that explicit permission of victims was needed before referral could occur)." 
In terms of compensation for victims of crime, outside the provisions of the 1964 
legislation, the principle of offenders recompensing their victims for acts committed 
against them was in existence as a potential condition of a probation sentence as well as 
other circumstances." The Wootton Committee (Home Office, 1970) made 
recommendations which led to compensation orders being introduced in the Criminal 
Justice Act 1972 as options available to courts in addition to sentences imposed. This did 
not acknowledge any State responsibility in cases where the offender had not been 
apprehended, nor any financial liability if the order did not get paid (issues which were, at 
Later renamed 77ie National Organisation of Victim Support. 
" The 'cohfidentiaUty' issue is one exemplified also in the Devon and Comwall e.\ample given in Chapter 10 \^ictims of crime in Devon 
and Cornwall where the question of explicit victim approval for referral became problematic in the 1990s imtil resolved by clear policy. 
In 1969, compensation of ov-er £570,000 was paid in total as a result of orders made in a selection of indictable offences (Mawby and 
Gill, 1987, p.51). 
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least acknowledged by the Wootton Committee). Compensation orders were at the 
discretion of the courts themselves to apply and,, as research during the 1970s illustrated, 
there appeared to be reluctance and inconsistency in implementing the option (Tarling and 
Softley, 1976; Softley, 1978). The position of victims in the scheme of compensation was 
problematic. Not only was there considerable variance in courts' reactions to the 
legislation, but victims themselves were almost invariably ignorant of their opportunities' 
for compensation. Moreover, the issue was one which was seldom pursued by the 
prosecution. Payment of compensation was also slow in actually reaching the pockets of 
the intended recipient and may not have materialised at all where offenders received 
custodial sentences, either at the time of initial sentencing or as a result of failing to pay 
fines. 
Quality of Service 
The growing availability of television during the 1960s, together with a generally 
supportive but emergingly critical press, ensured that the nature of what the police actually 
did became subject of much wider debate than previously. The high levels of public 
satisfaction with policing, which were referred to in the 1962 Royal Commission on the 
Police,'^ were later to be criticised as having too much reliance placed on them by the 
Commission as indicators of the true nature of police procedures (Benyon, 1986). Despite 
adverse press coverage towards the end of the 1950s concerning the corruption scandals 
which brought about the Royal Commission, by the mid-1960s press treatment of police 
stories was 'glowing'. Activity in the policing of demonstrations was being viewed in 
homes across the land and the violent nature of these revealed a police organisation which 
The data referred to was taken from a government social survey conducted in the 1950s. 
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was ill-equipped to deal with such incidents. However press coverage of events such as the 
anti-American demonstration, and subsequent riot in London's Grosvenor Square, were 
sympathetic to the police position which was portrayed as a relatively thin blue line 
standing against those threatening the rule of order, and ultimately, the State (Reiner, 1985, 
p. 143). It was against such a background that general public perceptions of the police were 
held and, moving into the 1970s against a continiiingly rising crime rate, their effectiveness 
as well as their public persona became increasingly the subject of press speculation. 
Throughout the period between 1967 and 1979, academic research had yet to develop any 
specifically pragmatic approach towards establishing the quantifiable effectiveness of 
police activity. There were a large number of surveys on victimisation being conducted in 
several countries during.the 1960s and early 1970s, causing Sparks et.al (1977) to suggest 
that 'seldom, in the history of social science research, can so much have been done about a 
single problem by so many in so short a time' (p.3). Surveys commonly epitomised the 
extent to which there was a 'dark figure' of crime (the unreported incidents which never 
appeared in any official statistics) underlying society's fears and perceptions of where they 
lived and official reactions to these situations. Being established firom these surveys were 
the foundations on which more critical evaluation of policework would take place. This 
was particularly so in relation to how the police interacted with specific victims of crime. 
The quality of policework was being studied more widely, and from perspectives which 
debated the rationale for their actions in such areas as politics, working culture, policing 
environment, relationships with communities, and management structures.'^  the nature of 
" For example: Hall et.al, 1978; Holdaway, 1979; 1983; Mawby, 1979; Punch, 1979; Reiner, 1978; 1979. 
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many such works emphasised the wider dimension of poHcing which was often debated 
from radical criminological perspectives. However the emergence of this wealth of interest 
in an institution previously subject to less rigorous academic scrutiny, widened the 
subsequent evaluation of police effectiveness which was to take place. 
The role which the 'watchdogs' of the police service, HMIC, played during the period 
between 1967 and 1979 was one which changed little from the somewhat revitalised 
sfructure which developed under the Chief Inspector of Constabulary's role in the early 
1960s. HMIC did develop a somewhat broader approach to dealing with matters of public 
concern during the late 1960s and St. Johnston's role as HMCIC and, therefore, senior 
police advisor to the Home Secretary, was clearly instrumental in encouraging forces to 
develop certain aspects of their work which are today considered commonplace. Against 
general resistance from chief constables, drug squads became formed despite the argument 
put forward from many areas that there was no evidence of a problem. In addition, HMIC's 
position in being able to negotiate addition funding from the Home Office was exemplified 
in the success of achieving an additional two million pounds to purchase motor vehicles for 
main road patrols in 1968 (St. Johnston, 1978, pp.268-9). However, monitoring the 
effectiveness of such changes remained superficial and unmeasured outside the general 
figures available to indicate the level of crime which occurred in force areas. No 
meaningfiil consideration had yet been given to details of the work which officers actually 
did, or the effects which these had upon the communities which they served; a situation 
which was not to develop for some twenty years. 
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1967 -1979-an overview 
Much of what occurred in poHcing during the period following the mid 1960s had 
hallmarks of the changes and proposals which had emerged from legislation and alterations 
to structures of that period. This was an era when technology was becoming more 
advanced and police forces were being seen to be brought into the twentieth century. The 
mechanics of the changes were only the most visible signs. With UBP and developing 
styles of pafrolling and police activity accentuating "the perceived changing culture of the 
police organisation. Crime prevention and community became even more central to the 
type of debates which were being held. Whilst the former had always had official 
recognition as a police role, it had become more firmly established in the overall strategy 
of policing as a result of Home Office interest and the Cornish Committee's report of 1965. 
The link with the more problematic concept of community was one which was begiiming to 
form the basis of mainstream consideration in policing terms. There were certainly 
foimdations being established on which the debate could be taken fiirther, but the 
association between sociologists' attempts to define community^'' and a pragmatic linkage 
with police activity was only now beginning to emerge.'* 
But it was drawing together the two strands of crime prevention and community which 
became one of the more influential and significant factors to emerge from the era. 
Alderson's work with the Exeter CPSU is probably the mOst often cited example of where 
the merger was formally given credence in England, but the significance of the interaction 
between crime and communities had long been established, initially through the Chicago 
" Social cohesion and conflict provided classical theorists such as Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Comte and Tonnies with the basis on vvhich 
to identify aspects oi community and society. But 'a satisfactory definition of it in sociological terms appears as remote as ever' (Bell & 
Newby, 1974, p.2l) whilst attempts at definitions during the 1950s, such as Hillery's 94 characteristics of a community (1955) appeared 
to add litfle to the practical debate. 
" See, for example. Brown and Howes (1975) which grew out of a weekend conference organised by Cranfield Institute of Technology 
in September 1974. 
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school of sociologists earlier in the century." The significance of developing the issues 
further was far from a mere academic exercise. Attention was beginning to focus on" the 
role which agencies other than the police had in the administration of justice and, in 
particular, preventing crime by one means or another.^ " However, against this background 
was the structured, but relatively unaffected (and partially effective) system of crime 
prevention officers and their departments which had been established within police forces 
around the country.. . . . 
The issues drawing two central and important strands of policing activity closer together 
were beginning to form a more central platform for the future, but the structural reality of 
how forces specifically addressed the issues was some way away from becoming a 
dynamic factor. What was happening in the voluntary sector, with Victim. Support in 
particular, was to develop increased significance into the 1980s. However, the foundations 
on which another arm of support within the criminal justice process was beginning to 
emerge was one which signified a more formal acknowledgement of acceptance that 
certain aspects were not within the direct remit of the police. 
Quality of service remained a background issue, alluded to most obviously through 
criticisms of what was wrong rather than attempts to put them right within the police 
system itself This was beginning to emerge most obviously within the police organisation 
For example, see, Reiss and Toniy (1986). 
^ See WalMale (1991) for a succinct discussion on three aspects of crime prevention Imked to victim, offender and conmiunity based 
reactions, as well as Brown and Howes (1975) for examples of relationships emerging in the 1970s between police, social workers and 
probation. 
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where the cuhure of the profession began to figure more obviously in critical evaluation of 
who the people in this institution were and what they did and thought. 
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Community through the riots 
The 1980s will be remembered as the decade which saw fmidamental reform to the way in 
which police actions and procedures in dealing with the public took place. The changes 
were not superficial 'window-dressing' of a type which could be argued as the case with 
some attempts at changing culture and attitude. This was a legislative upheaval to 
operational procedures which affected the overall accountability of the service to the public 
at large. The move through the late 1970s into the 1980s had seen political reform at a 
wide ideological level with the election of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government 
in 1979. The period which had been left, of widespread strikes and Union power, was 
transformed to one where the disorder conducted by the organised became the riots of the 
oppressed and politically disenfiranchised 
The role of the police in the first few years of the decade was one which came under 
particular scrutiny through the widespread and serious public disorder of the period.^  The 
1970s had been, to all intents and purposes, a relatively stable time in terms of 
development for the police themselves. The underlying causes of what was to follow in 
1981 were, however, telegraphed and, arguably, predictable outcomes of what was 
happening in certain aspects of policing during the years which preceded them.^  
Concentration on the types of issues which were later to be recommended by Lord 
' Whereas Scarman's brief developed to be much wider than the issues concerning the disorders in one region, other studies were 
commissioned locally to review the circimistances, e.g. on Broadwater Farm, London, and Handsworth, Birmingham (Southgate (1982). 
^ A situation which Scarman had identified as one of'tale of failure' that both the police and the local leaders 'must accept a share of 
the blame' for (Beiryon, 1984, p. 100). 
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Scarman (Scarman, 1981) was already acknowledged as important in a number of forces, 
some of which did not have the level of potential for disorder which existedin others with 
more diverse and problematic inner-city regions. The policing of inner-city, multi-cultural 
communities was seen as yet to develop appropriate notions of community involvement 
and consultation. In addition, the actions of officers in certain areas were already being 
drawn to attention because of their perceived bias in interpreting legislation such as the 
Vagrancy Act 1824 and, in London, the Metropolitan Police Act 1839, both of which 
empowered searches and arrests based on the slimmest of evidence.^  . 
The mid to late-1980s was a period which saw government interest in what police forces 
were actually doing become established as a basis for determining resource allocation and 
policy. Whereas still not developed to the extent of what was to become the performance 
indicators of the 1990s, Home Office Circular 114/1983 was a more searching and 
prescriptive docimient in relation to the organisation of forces generally than the vast 
majority of previous papers. Its contribution to a government philosophy of 'rolling back 
the State', efficiency and effectiveness, and value for money was a significant milestone in 
policing terms. Whereas the management of these changes still resided squarely with chief 
officers, agencies such as the Audit Commission^ and HMLC became increasingly 
instrumental in overseeing the process. 
' The legislation was believ'ed to be a necessary weapon in the armoury of the police to combat crime. The enabling nature of the 
Vagrancj- Act 1824, was commonly referred to as 'Sus' (arrests bemg made on SUSptcion only). 
The Audit Commission for Local Authorities and the National Health Service in England and Wales. An indqjendent body al the 
centre of the local audit offices for local authorities and health authorities in England and Wales. It provides district audit offices with 
subjects for audit, training, and assistance through materials to complete their auditing work competently (Love, 1991). Its aim is to 
promote proper stewardship of public fmances and help those responsible for public services to achieve economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness (Audit Commission, 1996a, p.2). 
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Community Policing 
John Alderson, the chief constable of Devon and Comv^all frorn 1973 to 1982, was 
perceived to be the architect of the term community policing, although he rejected the 
notion that the concept was in any way unique and that the term was merely a post 1970s 
expression of 'communal responsibility' and 'probably as old as that of society itself. The 
fact that the ideal of 'prevention of crime and disorder through co-operative effort' 
(Alderson, 1983, p.3) emerged as a phenomena within British policing owed much to 
circumstance and timing as it did to Alderson's changes to policing style in his own force 
in 1979. 
The riots in Brixton, Toxteth and other parts of the countty in 1981 inevitably drew the 
question of the effectiveness of this new order policing into the limelight. The concept was 
effectively far more multi-faceted than observers both inside and outside the police service 
perceived at the time (Weatheritt, 1983). It straddled the divide between reactive-response 
styles of policing, with the more socially engineered model of pro-activity, which 
engendered both confusion and derision from some quarters within Alderson's own force. 
Confusion primarily existed in relation to Alderson's vision of the pro-active elements 
necessary to achieve the 'concept and understanding of the common good' (Alderson, 
1983, p.2). It was this type of hnguistic detail, together with the perceived need to 
influence societal change through 'non-conventional' policing methods, which dictated the 
early pace of scepticism accompanying the development in Devon and Comwall. 
The concept was not one which merely appeared on the streets imheralded and 
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unresearched. The Exeter Crime Prevention Support Unit (CPSU)^ had been based upon a 
practical rationale relating to 'identifying alternative ways for the police to deal with 
problems and to make choices between them' (Moore and Brown, 1981, p. 121). Its 
establishment had been based around the identification of 'crime and relevant community 
problems'; In addition to producing and experimenting with 'new ideas in crime 
prevention initiatives', it was 'to encourage and direct available Ibcal police measures-to 
prevention of crime' through harnessing and activating 'public participation and support 
towards the creation of good citizenship and community awareness, thereby help(ihg) to 
control crime' (Alderson, 1983, p.3). Most influential to the national development of 
community policing however was the evidence which Alderson presented to Scarman's 
enquiry into the riots (Alderson, 1981). This resulted in a number of recommendations 
specifically concemed -with closer community involvement, with the police, police 
authorities and chief officers, particularly as this related to the issue of consultation. 
The evidence which was presented drew much press comment of Alderson's 'hearts and 
minds' philosophy of policing, but it was his subsequent comments which drew most 
attention. In them he laid charges that the government and police leaders were 
'misunderstanding the challenge' which confronted them and that some seemed 'hell-bent 
on sacrificing a policing style which is the envy of the world just because of a few hours of 
madness on the sfreets.' On 3 September 1981, under headlines such as ''150 years of 
Britain's police heritage 'down the drain " (The Times), 'Alderson attacks 'over-reaction' 
to riots' (The Guardian), and 'Police chief blasts crackdown on riots' (Daily Express), the 
perspective of both "the softer option' (Daily Mirror) and the 'hard facts of mugging and 
See chapter 3 1967-79: From Teclmology to Commimity and chapter \QCrime prevention in Devon and Comwall for fiirther 
information oh CPSU. 
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robbery in Lambeth' (Daily Telegraph), were succinctly (although rai:ely impartial^) 
debated. 
Alderson had become no stranger to alienation by his chief officer colleagues around the 
country because of his views, but the riots and subsequent evidence and comments which 
he gave had developed a fault in the landscape into a chasm which was obvious to all. 
Media comment tended to be understanding of his views but much, ultimately, came down 
on the side of the need to control the crime which currently existed in cities through direct 
offensive responses. Some comment was scathing of Alderson's perceived audacity in 
entering such a debate. 
'We hear interminable mumping language about "Community policing", "Exposure 
to community groups in non-conflict form" from a Chief Constable burdened with 
the horrors of St Austell and Paignton. Other policemen l<now that we already have 
a South Bronx in the hands of a certain category of West Indian criminal. The gap 
between the police and the streets appears to be total." (Daily Telegraph editorial, 
3 September 1981) 
Alderson's police officer critics did not remain silent either. His ideological opposite, 
Manchester's chief constable, James Anderton, launched a stinging condemnation of the 
community policing concept in the Police Review some months later.^  Whilst not 
mentioning Devon and Cornwall's chief by name, the text was unmistakably referring to 
Alderson. 
'Until a chief constable, no matter how distinguished and respected, has been 
required personally to attend the tougher operational demands of policing a 
densely populated, multi-racial conurbation, and accepted direct responsibility for 
them, he is unqualified to challenge or criticise those of his fellows carrying a much 
greater daily burden than himself. Furthermore, if any chief constable in recent 
years has enjoyed a comparatively cosseted life free from irrational political activity 
and the continuous operational pressures felt routinely by colleagues elsewhere, 
^ The topicalify of the. conflict even resulted in the Police Review running a weekly cartoon comic strip entitled 'Aldy and Andy' 
involving two chief police characters with singularly diflering views on policing. 
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especially in the Metropolitan areas, he has been singularly fortunate.' (Police 
Review, 26 March 1982, pp.582-583) 
Despite such attacks, Scarman's report accepted much of what Alderson had suggested 
was necessary to direct the way in which community/police consultation should take place. 
Section 106 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 subsequently placed a legal 
responsibility on Police Authorities to estabhsh. groups involving the police and 
community representatives. It could be said that community policing--was 'officially' bom 
(or rebom) during the 1980s as a result of many of the issues surrounding the riots. 
Attention has been paid to its perceived success and failure during the past two decades 
including examinations of police forces' intemal mechanisms for influencing change and 
officers' abilities to re-interpret messages, either deliberately or ignorantly, which 
imdermine the potential advantages of initiatives (Manning, 1911)7 How such issues relate 
to the competence of officers, and the service generally, requires understanding of how 
officers 'assess their practice ... to achieve a realistic appreciation of their response to any 
initiative that is meant to affect front-line policing' (Fielding et al., 1989 p.50). Research 
completed in Hampshire (Horton and Smith, 1988), for example, revealed substantial 
hostility by area beat officers (ABOs) being questioned on their roles against areas of 
criticism implied by the researchers. The mystification of Xh& community constable identity 
appeared to be intrinsically related to elements of autonomy felt to be challenged through 
deeper interpretations of the roles performed. 
At a relatively early stage, in the formal development of community police officers, Irving 
et al. (1986) identified the derisory terms which were being assigned to such officers 
' A number of examples of this nature are recounted in the Sloneliouse example used later in this work and the opportunity for confiision 
to arise, and systematic alienation of types of policing culture within the organisation itself, become remforced by the misinterpretations 
of policy. 
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('hobby bobbies', 'dummy policemen' and 'imiform carriers') and the independent nature 
of patrol which such officers • were permitted to'perform. The degree to which this 
independence was assigned, however, was often determined by direct line supervisors and 
commanders but, often more formally, through the enthusiasm or otherwise of police 
commanders (Fielding, 1994). In particular. Fielding cited the nature of performance 
measures being used (informally) to equate that of the community officer with colleagues 
on 'relief shifts (Irving et al., 1986) through quantitative analysis of arrests and the nature 
of their duty tended to predispose those in non-community roles as being able to 'do as 
they please'. As Fielding relates, and unsurprisingly since the more forthright approach 
adopted by Sheehy on behalf of the government (Home Office, 1993a), to appraisal related 
pay (ARP) during the mid 1990s, this is 'a problem which official initiatives... have failed 
to address' (Fielding, 1994, p.305). 
The nature of community policing should not, however, be evaluated only through the eyes 
of other police officers. Surely, the diverse nature of fellow officers' prejudices towards 
more standard levels of police activity, measured against simplistic 'arrest' criteria, carmot 
be ignored. But, as surely, the less quantitative nature of the work embarked upon by 
officers within the community arena, more specifically those of crime prevention and 
public reassurance, has now become more central to a number of the measures by which 
the government has chosen to assess performance. The nature of policing which was seen 
as 'fire brigade' by community officers ignored the intricacies of the more personal 
community role aimed at achieving the same ultimate goal as those on the 'relief 
(Fielding, 1994). 
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Crime prevention 
The crime prevention role is probably one of the areas into which' community police 
officers most naturally placed themselves, alongside that of public reassurance. This role 
was often more ascribed than natural to the philosophy through the dependence which 
forces placed upon their employees to signify the importance of pro-active public 
commitment necessary to address rising crime. Paramount to the success was seen as that 
of the officer prepared to stand out fi^om the crowd and identify themselves as being 
devoted to a geographic area rather than being more anonymous within a large 
organisation. But, the significance of the crime prevention model was one based on a 
variety of structures far less local in their nature than the average community 'bobby' 
would aspire to. At national level, the government commitment to prevention, as a specific 
means to address the problem of increasing crime, manifested itself in a series of formal 
initiatives siich as Neighbourhood Watch and subsequent publication of the glossy Home 
Office magazine Crime Prevention News, both of which had varying degrees of 
importance in raising the subject's profile. 
The way in which crime prevention developed during the 1979-1989 era was one driven by 
a number of factors. The 1970s had not seen constructive moves towards developing the 
partaership approach to policing* which might have been expected to be the natural 
evolution of such issues following Cornish in 1966, and the 1980s had seen the notion 
reside in a relatively low position on the police's order of priorities. This may be 
considered surprising given the nature of the increased media interest in policing methods 
and other sources debating the effectiveness of policing on the back of research findings 
* With the notable exception of examples such as Alderson's Crime Prevention Support Unit in Exeter between 1976 and 1979. 
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(Clarke and Hough, 1980). However, the work which had hegun by the Home Office 
Working Group on Crime Prevention identified that the issue needed to be tackled in a 
more systematic fashion and feasibility studies looked at a new approach to organising 
crime prevention within opportunity, social and legislative environments (Gladstone, 
1980). 
The problem which the Conservative Govenmient of the 1980s had to confront was one 
which had not been addressed during the previous decade and a half That was one of 
where responsibility for crime prevention lay in terms of funding. Clearly, there was the 
likelihood of successful policies and inter-agency strategies being developed at local level 
more easily than through national strategies. However, the evidence of the 1980s indicated 
that 'central government had sought to by-pass local goverrmient with its crime prevention 
strategies' and that 'it was apparent early on that ideology informed the government 
sfrategy with its clearly defined objective of encouraging private sector involvement while 
marginalising local government' (Loveday, 1994, p. 182). Alongside major initiatives such 
as Safer Citie^ and Crime Concern^° were numerous associated programmes such as city 
action teams (CATS), inner city task forces, the Urban Progranune, Enterprise Zones, and 
Estate Action Teams. There appeared to be much to indicate that the issue of crime 
prevention was being given a high degree of attention. Between November 1982 and 
December 1989, no fewer than twenty eight 'key Home Office initiatives' were embarked 
upon, which included a number of seminars, one of which was chaired by the Prime 
' See also chapter 10 Crime prevention in Devon mid Cornwall. 
Crime Concern, a voluntary organisation, was estabhshed by central government with an advisoiy board comprising representatives 
from the police. Home Office, business and voluntaiy sectors. By the mid 1990s, Crime Concent had 'undoubtedly become a major 
force in crime pre\-ention (although) its lack of full independence makes it unwilling to question the brief it has been set, which leads to 
the proliferation of piecemeal local schemes and projects, rather than a clear national crime prevention infinstructure and programme' 
(Gilling, 1997, pp. 139-142). 
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-Minister in 1986." Within these were the establishment of The Five Towns Initiative 
(1987/88) which saw resom-ces aimed at crime prevention strategies-in major locations 
across the country; the launching of the Safer Cities programme with government aid and 
guidance (1988), and the introduction of overseeing guidance on good practice and 
research through Crime Concern (1988). 
The situation was one which was to gain mpmentimi within the next.few years. Alderson's 
work within Devon and Comwall, and his evidence to Scarman (Alderson, 1981), had 
highlighted all aspects of police involvement in supporting commimities against crime. The 
nature of the approach was one of pro-active policing, encompassing wider dimensions of 
commumty involvement than might have been conventional to the methods of policework 
previously. Crime prevention and community policing became more naturally 
acknowledged as having similar roots and, with the report of Lord Scarman acknowledging 
the potential solutions of a model such as Alderson's (Scarman, 1981), the nature of 
community and other agency involvement in the prevention of crime reached a higher 
place on both government and police agendas. It also fitted well within the concept of 
'management by objectives' which formed the basis of addressing issues in the 
effectiveness and efficiency field, as promoted through Home Office Circular 114/1983.'^  
The development of coherent strategies, based along the lines proposed in the govemment 
circulars, were far less easily brought into being than might have been assumed. Crime 
Prevention Officers and their departments had become established parts of police 
" For a list ofthe initiatives see Home Office (1991a), pp.38-39. 
'* By 1984, Home Office circular 8/1984 liad built and substantiated the initiative still further, making it clear that the police were to 
make changes in their strategies for controlling crime along multi-agency lines. Some fourteen years later, the introduction ofthe Crime 
and Disorder Act 1998, legislated for this making local authorities and other statutory groups responsible, as partners with the police for 
strategies to combat crime and promote community safety (sec cliapters 7 and 12). 
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organisations and the development, although having been long-established in most cases, 
continued to remain, within most forces, an add-on feature to what was perceived to be 
'real' policework. Weatheritt (1986) and Harvey et al. (1989) had concerns that the non­
dynamic nature of these intemal stmctures, and the marginalisation of those within them, 
did not become issues which were immediately seized upon by managers of police forces. 
Neither, as crime prevention remained, in the words of Home Office Circular 8/1984, 'a 
primary objective of the police', were other agencies mshing to accept any lead in taking 
responsibility for the problem where it was perceived that the police themselves had not 
placed the notion at the 'hub ofthe wheel' (Gilling, 1996). 
On the outskirts of what is perhaps best thought of as an inter-organisational, stmctured 
approach to crime prevention was the development of Neighbourhood Watch (NHW) as an 
initiative during the 1980s. The concept of NHW was, to a large extent, seen as another 
initiative of the pohce and, to a degree, this was correct in relation to its modelling on 
similar schemes working in the United States"^  in the early 1980s. The emphasis of 
schemes in England and Wales was targeted specifically on the concept of residents taking 
the initiative themselves guided by the enabling stracture supported by the police. This 
notion of formalising and legitimising specific personal activity under an accepted police 
umbrella significantly reduced the scope for interpreting their formulation as linked to 
vigilante type groups such as 'Guardian Angels' which dominated attention in certain parts 
ofthe United States. The potential for 'citizen patrol' aspects of schemes was reacted to 
negatively by the police service in general and by its leaders in particular (Boothroyd, 
1989; Pennell et al., 1986). There were also clear distinctions drawn between its use of 
" See Bennett (1987) in relation to NHW USA initiati\-es such as 'Block-Watch'. 
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volunteers in the pre-justice process when compared to the formally structured and legally 
accountable special constabulary police reserve (Gill and Mawby, 1990).' 
The basis of Neighbourhood Watch existence was one of protection of local communities, 
and therefore a mechanism for deterring and detecting crime. It could, therefore be as 
appropriately grouped under the generic heading of community policing as that of crime 
preventions^ However for the purposes of this study it has been considered appiropriate to 
contrast its characteristics with those which form the basis of the crime prevention 
subjects. Whilst many of the characteristics of NHW complement much of the rationale 
which underpinned a broad commimity policing philosophy, such as voluntary and 
shiictured mechanisms for local residents to assist the police, it was also an initiative 
which became shrouded in the general Govemment preoccupation with reducing and 
detecting crime. Its development within police forces was one which became more 
associated vwth the work of crime prevention departments where its encouragement and 
servicing often became owned. 
By the end of the decade it had become by far the most popular voluntary crime prevention 
activity with over 81,000 schemes in England and Wales. These covered 4 million 
households with an atmual increase in schemes approaching 20,000 per year (Husain and 
Bright, 1990). By 1994 the figure was reported to be 130,000 schemes covering some five 
million households (Home Office, 1994). Similarly the third British Crime Survey 
(Mayhew et al., 1989) had revealed a large rise in the number of schemes between 1984 
and 1988 with almost one fifth of those interviewed saying that there was a scheme 
operating in the area in which they lived. The Home Office statistics for the period 
" See Mawby (1991, chapter 11) for discussion on the projjlems of defining 'community involvement' in policing. 
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between 1985 and 1991 signified the apparent enthusiasm and importance which was being 
displayed towards this new measure available to the public to play an active role in crime 
prevention (table 4.1). 
January 1985 3,669 
December 1985 8,106 
June 1986 14.523 
October 1986 17,422 
March 1987 28,516 
October 1987 43,375 
March 1988 51,887 
July 1988 55,836 
October 1988 59.476 
December 1988 63,907 
March 1989 66,523 
September 1989 75,354 
March 1990 81,302 
March 1991 90,000 
(H.O. statistics, quoted in McConvilie and Shepherd 1992, p.9) 
Table 4.1: Number of Neiqtibourhood Watch Schemes in 
England and Wales. 1985 - 1991 
The popularity of NHW had apparently grown considerably during the late 1980s, judged 
against the number of schemes which were recorded as being in operation. The success of 
the schemes was not, and still is not, used as the measurement of whether or not they are 
working to the benefit of crime reduction. The existence of them remains of paramount 
importance, or so it seems, to the philosophy at govenmient level of whether individuals 
are prepared to commit themselves to a system supported by the police. 
Victims of crime 
The 1980s was the period during which the victims issue 'came of age'. The Home Office 
position was beginning to emerge from its 'gloomy cycle' of defensive policies to one 
which had begun to perceive the need (as David Mellor, a Minister in the Home Office at 
the time said) for'increased public confidence in the system' which would lead to people 
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believing that they 'don't need capital punishment' (Rock, 1990: pp. 256-8). The agenda of 
the new Conservative administration was primarily aimed at a restoration of confidence in 
the criminal justice system through strong policies of law and order, a position which was 
given added impetus through the sporadic, but serious, incidents of public disorder which 
occurred during the 1981 to 1985 period. But the need to address what was being reported 
as a growing tide of lawlessness and disorder, through measures directed at detection and 
punishment, had cost as well as policy implications. Whereas spending on strengthening of 
the criminal justice system increased, it was not perceived to be effective as a lone 
strategy. There was a need to consider more lateral approaches to the problem, and one of 
these was the necessity to address the nature of public confidence in the system. 
What was emerging as a separate policy issue during the same period, was the level of fear 
amongst individuals that they would become victims of crime. It was an issue in which the 
likelihood of becoming a victim was seen as being 'out of all proportion to the risks' 
(Maxfield, 1987). Whereas the first British Crime Survey (Hough and Mayhew, 1983; 
1985) had drawn attention to this and identified the large number of 'comparatively trivial' 
offences to be significantly greater in number than those of a more serious nature, other 
work had drawn, and was to continue to draw, attention to the disproportionate effects 
which these 'trivial' matters appeared to have upon victims' fears (Maguire, 1980, 1982; 
Maguire and Corbett, 1987; Mawby and Gill, 1987). The effect which these crimes were 
having upon peoples lives was one which required addressing and the opportunity to alter 
public opinion and redress what was seen as a misinterpretation of the figures as popularly 
portrayed in their starkest form by the media, was a potential way forward. 
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The need to address the problem through a wider 'community' approach was one which 
encouraged a greater involvement by the police with other groups and agencies (Home 
Office, 1984). Community policing initiatives were determined as 'shells' which could 
effectively house a new, wider philosophy of social order involvement by the police with 
others more closely linked to the public in other areas of service provision. Victim 
strategies were becoming more closely associated with other aspects of the police role in 
crime prevention than had previously been institutionally accepted. The emergence of 
initiatives such as Neighbourhood Watch and Crime Prevention Panels provided tangiblie 
examples of where the police could become involved and have some direct bearing on the 
issue of public confidence. 
Victim Support Schemes.had a less direct entry into the official arena of crime prevention. 
The voluntary nature of its origins, political ambiguity with its national history involving 
bodies not specifically identified as having an interest in the victim, and problems in 
establishing a co-ordinated strategic role within Home Office thinking, meant that funding 
of the NAVSS was slow to emerge in a workable form. Initial local schemes were seen to 
be more the preserve of local authorities on questions of finance and grants. Govemment 
provision of the first grant was reliant on a proportion of funds coming fi-om other patrons 
and the Cadbury Tmst. The Tmst played a supportive role in this respect, leading to a 
reassurance being developed within the Home Office that wider political opportunism for 
the group to develop in a way which could be linked to a ideologically inappropriate stance 
was imlikely.'* Eventually, in July 1979, an offer of £10,000 a year, for the next three 
years, was made to the NAVSS to assist in its initial administrative costs. £5,000 a year 
Rock (1990, p. 169-170) explains how the media attention and development of NAVSS from the background of NACRO had caused 
central support to be critically considered before funding was eventually given. Key to the concerns were the emergence of other 
offence-specific victim interest groups as well as the well-trodden debate over the possibility of such schemes leading to vigilanfism. 
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was to be provided by the Department Of Social Security during this period and the gesture 
implied the Government's sympathy to the concept of what 'could be the beginnings of 
something very much bigger'.'^ It was a gesture which signified a possible longer term 
commitment and a major breakthrough in the institutionalisation of the NAVSS as an 
organisation and the local schemes which existed. 
The importance of developing specific services for victims of crime, was one which, 
despite the recognition of Govemment through the initial fimding, was far fi-om 
straightforward in the early stages of VSS. The position of the NAVSS as a key player in 
policy making and debate was tenuous at the best. Central to its concerns though was 
money. It had become financially independent of NACRO by Febraaiy 1981 and its 
attempts at achieving funding fi-om other organisations had met with indifferent responses. 
Despite the growth in the number of local schemes, and a fifty per cent rise in the number 
of victims which had been seen since its previous years award of £21,000, the issue of how 
practical support was being funded in the localities had not been agreed with the Home 
Office. Govemment 'treated its financial applications as an administrative matter that 
raised no new questions of policy or politics' (Rock, 1990, pp.335-9). The voluntary, and 
independent nature of local schemes made the recmiting of co-ordinators problematic, both 
in areas of relatively low crime (primarily mfal), and in urban districts where the workload 
was higher and required daily, unpaid, commitment'^ 
By the 1985 Armual General Meeting of the NAVSS the danger of several local schemes 
folding was real. A resolution to approach Govemment for direct local funding was passed. 
Letter of Home .Secretary, Leon Britlan, 20 July 1979, quoted in Rock (1990, p. 171). 
" This issue is discussed in relation to its impact within Devon and Comwall (see chapter 10: Crime Prevention in Devon cmd 
Comwall). 
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The idea of establishing regional co-ordinators, also on the agenda for presentation to the 
Home Office, vyas met with a response which underlined a Govemmeht feeling that little 
would be accomplished other than increased bureaucratic administration of an initiative 
which was viewed as primarily voluntary and community based (Rock, 1990, pp. 341-2). 
Cenh-al political messages were ambiguous as related to the way in which the Govemment 
saw the, development of YSS, and had been so since the early 1980s. The likelihood of the 
centre-doing more was a continual possibility but one which evolved in slow and uneven 
stages. Understanding of what support for victims actually meant was not clear in political 
terms and the tight fiscal policy of the Conservatives dictated less than enthusiastic support 
for becoming more involved in a voluntary stmcture whilst the philosophy of 'rolling back 
the state' remained a central political platform of policy and decision making. 
In terms of Compensation to Victims the issue of reparation remained a key strand of 
Govemment rationale and the apparent willingness to invest resources in support of 
financial recompense to victims of crime was given increased significance through the 
1982 Criminal Justice Act which permitted courts to make compensation orders as 
sentences. Where offenders were unable to pay fines and compensation orders 
simultaneously, priority was to be given to compensation before fine payirients. 
Quality of Service 
Although the formal beginnings of the police Quality of Service initiative (QOS) cannot be 
identified as having emerged until the era 1989-1990, there were, nevertheless, important 
developments during the period between 1979 and 1989 which can be seen as partial 
foundations on which the later strategy was to be developed. It is against this background 
that the decade leading up to the formal beginnings of QOS must be judged. The idea of 
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developing a policing niodel to focus more direct attention on the core nature of policing 
tasks, set against a philosophy of service and quality, did not occur by chance. There were 
both influential internal and external factors at play during the late 1970s, and through the 
1980s, which were to ensure that changes would occur. With a perceived 'crisis of 
confidence' banner being regularly unfurled in both political and media rhetoric on a 
regular basis, the inevitability of a legislative and organisationally concerted response to 
the type of issues being addressed occurred. 
Govemment interest in the performance of the police was not out of line Avith that which 
was to emerge during the 1980s and 90s in other public services. Value for Money was the 
bi-word which exemplified central government's commitment to the slimming down of 
State services and, whereas policing continued to attract regularly increasing finance, the 
move towards justifying how increases were being used grew in significance. If there was 
a linkage to be perceived between a govemment initiative during the 1980s and the quality 
of service developments in the 1990s, it most probably had, as its starting point, the 
publication of Home Office Circular 114/1983. The instraction to forces was not overtly a 
call to review the quality of the service which was provided to the public. However, its 
requirement for chief officers to review the functions of their force stmctures, against 
which bids for increases in staff could be considered by the Home Secretary, drew into the 
arena issues of performance measurements which were to emerge more strongly in the next 
ten years. The circular was primarily concemed with what was labelled 'efficiency and 
effectiveness' and passed a clear message that forces were to be judged against such 
criteria for successful increases in funding in future years. However, it went further than 
being merely a circular expounding the need for chief officers to justify requested 
increases in their establishments. It emphasised the need to set 'objectives and priorities' in 
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'activities, managemeiit and manpower' against a background of reduced government 
spending on policing. The need was explicitly stated that 'resources should be applied on 
the basis of what they are likely to achieve' (para. 10) in 'secur(ing) objectives and 
priorities' (para. 5). 
The historic development of the notion that policing is far more than a form of public order 
maintenance on behalf of the State is necessarily central to a more detailed consideration of 
how the quality ofservice initiative became part of the household language of police forces 
throughout Britain. Within this, literature pre-1989 is relatively short in supply when 
sought against a 'QOS' search. Terms such as 'effectiveness and efficiency' clearly 
emerged during the 1980s as driving criteria but the terin quality failed to make any 
significant impact on the terminology of writers. Even Reiner's celebrated first edition of 
The Politics of the Police, (1985), a significant re-evaluation of the police both pre- and 
post-Scarman, contains no index entry under Q at all. But, to a large degree, this is no 
indication that true quality has in any way been ignored by either this writer or the 
numerous others who have considered police behaviour and policy. Academic writings on 
policework have been filled with indications of the degree of success which the police have 
had in providing a quality service fi-om numerous perspectives but it took until the 1990s 
for the term quality of service to become an established rationale and measurement against 
which the police themselves initially volunteered to be judged. 
Where initiatives more akin to the, later to be developed, QOS phenomenon were obvious 
was within forces which had begun programmes of reform. Key to much of the basis for 
these changes was seen the need to address the culture of policing which was perceived to 
not be commensurate with a 'service' ethos. During the course of the research for this 
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thesis visits were made to Thames Valley Police on two separate occasions as part of work 
conducted for the Devon and Comwall Constabulary and Police Research Group. As a 
result of the type of excellent co-operation commonly shown between police forces, the 
ability to research through a combination of personal interviews and participant 
observation, was significantly easier and more open than might otherwise be achieved by 
non-police researchers. In addition, visits were made to other forces which had embarked 
on the^war//0; road through a cultural approach to the issue. These included Kent Police 
whose 'Way Ahead' programme had commenced in 1989 under Chief Constable Paul 
Condon (later to be knighted in his new role as Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police), 
and the Bedfordshire force which, in the early 1990s, had employed the services of a full-
time consultant who had previously worked for a major car company in the field of 
cultural change. 
Probably the first genuine approach towards a change in culture appeared in 1986 when 
the chief constable of Thames Valley, Charles Pollard, committed his force to a 
programme entitled 'Make Contact'. It was an initiative led from, and well supported by, 
the very top of the organisation with a chief superintendent and superintendent being 
charged with its implementation. A series of seminars which were used to sell the message 
of quality, with an underlying belief that officers were basically high performing 
individuals who needed a more directed steer on their activities in all ranks, formed the 
comerstone of the initiative. The seminars were stmctured and practical affairs, led by 
senior officers, and targeted at groups within the force who were seen to be influential 
opinion-formers. Central messages were sent regarding important issues such as the nature 
of communication and empowerment within the force. It was a commendable attempt at 
moving the quality issue forward whilst not doing so under a performance measurement 
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quality of service title. The officers charged wth its implementation did not do so in a 
blinkered way and were well aware of the perceived hurdles which would require vaulting 
to ensure correct messages were not only sent, but received. An evaluation of their success 
took place some twelve months later within the force and this revealed that. Whereas there 
had been a generally favourable response to the tone of the messages being delivered, 
there was still a substa.ntial degree of scepticism amongst officers as to how the work had, 
and could, result in change for their benefit. 
Further work on 'Make Contact' followed with sergeants being a group within the force 
which was seen as particularly influential in selling the message. The reality that 
individual and group change did not occur easily, either through a cascade system of 
information or seminar 'instruction', had been adjoined with a stark understanding of 
where the communication process was most influential: that of the middle and direct 
supervisory ranks of the service. The cultural initiative continued through further work 
with sergeants and inspectors who were seen to be two of the most influential ranks in 
making change in the organisation happen. To a large extent the initiative, whilst 
eminently laudable, lacked a tangible theme which was shortly to emerge through 
activities which were more centrally driven. Charles Pollard was to become the chairman 
of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Quality of Service committee during 
the early 1990s, and his staff officer. Superintendent Peter Cusworth, had worked directly 
on the 'Make Contact' initiative. The combination of a centrally inspired police service 
focus in the work completed by ACPO and the staff associations in 1989, together with the 
specific influence which Pollard and Cusworth had in already promoting a formula for 
change, resulted in a re-evaluation of the 'Make Contact' theme. The initiative became 
rebom in 1989 under the title 'Make Quality Contact'; partly a realisation of the quality of 
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service structure which was just around the comer and a genuine wish to move for\Vard 
with a piece of work which, had begun some three years earher. 
'Make Quahty Contact' did not seek to revisit in the same depth much of the former 
seminar work which was seen as a building-block on which the quality initiative could be 
formulated _against, what was fast becorning, a strategic focus of forces around the countiy. 
The re-bom philosophy still concentrated on communication between, individuals and 
ranks within the force as being critical to its success, but it now became" obvious that the 
notion of standards of service were becoming even more influential to the measurement of 
the success of the project. The singular focus which had begun as one of needing to tinker 
with the culture of the organisation became one which accepted more directly the notions 
implicit in a more pragmatic approach to quality. There was still a central, and essential, 
groundswell approach to the whole concept which saw the way forward as being one 
directly influenced by the attitude of its officers, but the focus was to be swiftly re-drawn 
through the direct influence which the ACPO initiative was to have on the early 1990s 
approach to policing. The Thames Valley experience was not imique and, dependent upon 
the viewpoint adopted, not necessarily the most dynamic of its type. It was however a very 
early-starter in the cultural imperative seen to be key to influencing future policing 
strategy and continues to be an example of a force whose chief officer believes change is 
capable of being achieved through a variety of means. 
Other examples of attempts to change the culture of policing were to emerge towards the 
end of the 1980s. One of the most publicised was that of the Metropolitan Police which 
launched a programme entitled Plus in 1989. The purpose of the initiative was to enhance 
the corporate image of the organisation and alter the culture to one of 'service' rather than 
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'force'. By the admission of officers of that force spoken to during the course of this . 
research, and representing a range of ranks and positions, the success of Plus was highly 
debatable in achieving what were perceived to be its objectives. One senior officer 
proffered that the main reason for the scepticism which had greeted the initiative was that 
it had portrayed the force as being intrinsically flawed and in need of drastic change, a 
view which he identified as widely disputed within the organisation at lower ranks in 
pailicular. Plus was not a. one-off attempt at reform and developed revised initiatives on 
the basis of the messages being received from its staff during the 1990s. There were clear 
messages beginning to emerge from police initiatives aimed at changing the culture that, 
firom within the service, many of its members disputing that they were in need of as much 
change as was being suggested. However, as a mission statement. Plus could be seen as 
prototypical of policing for the 1990s (McLaughlin, 1992). 
Leading into the 1990s at National Level 
To a large extent the cultural work which had already been embarked upon by some forces 
was given increased legitimacy with the results from the 1988 British Crime Survey 
(Mayhew et al., 1989) which showed a reduction in public satisfaction with policing 
services during the 1980s. Albeit, satisfaction was still rated as 'very good' or 'good' by 
85% of respondents, but the reduction was seen as significant to leaders within the police 
service in particular. This relatively small statistical reduction was observed against a 
recent history of conflict and trauma within society at large; a situation which had seen the 
police playing key roles in preserving order in riot-torn inner cities and in the miners' 
strike of 1984. Publicity firom these events had produced vivid images available to all, 
through widespread media coverage, of police officers dressed and acting in significantly 
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different ways from that which was perceived as the. conventional norm by the uninvolved 
sections of the British public. 
The archetypal 'Bobby' had been replaced by the para-military State police officer and 
efforts to redress the balance between what was perceived, and what was reality in the vast 
majority of encounters which the'public would have with thejpolice, was seenas essential. 
. Less easily addressed were the series of corruption and evidence-rigging issues which were 
gradually beginning to emerge from a time, pre-PACB, when the professional standards of 
the police in gathering evidence and prosecuting wrong-doers was less stringent than those 
which accompanied cases in the latter part of the 1980s. The ambiguity of the messages 
which were now being received by the public, of a position where the 'good old days' of 
the British 'Bobby' were, in fact, far less clearly exemplified against the wrong-doings in a 
number of cause celebre cases, needed redressing. 
It was this juncture in policing history which is most commonly seen as most significant to 
the development of the service's Quality of Service programme. The need for a 
springboard from which a cultural and service based change to policing could be launched 
was to be achieved through an initiative of ACPO which was formulated and researched 
during 1988/1989. The Operational Policing Review (ACPO, 1990a) was supported by the 
other staff associations: the Police Federation and NALGO (latterly to be named 
UNISON), and involved a number of forces studying a variety of aspects of policing, 
amongst which was quality of service. It indicated the division between what the public 
and police expected of policing and what was most likely to be the future style of policing 
(Stephens and Becker, 1994). 
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Performance Monitoring 
As has been alluded to earlier in this work, there is a natural degree of overlap between 
aspects of commumty policmg and crime prevention. Alderson's. model had seen the latter 
as being the result of the former, with emphasis being placed on the role which the police 
could play in activating communities to work effectively towards providing themselves 
with a level of natural order maintenance. However, the relative 'simplicity' of this 
• position was one which, by the 1990s had become more detailed in its interpretation, given 
the wide range of changes which had taken place during the previous ten to fifteen years. 
Policing activity had become legislatively widened in terms of accountability and 
procedures through the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and this combined v^th 
indications emanating from the Home Office that crime prevention needed to take on a 
wider multi-agency approach, should perceivably have brought the Alderson model of 
community policing into sharper focus. The reality of the evidence fi-om the early 1990s 
was, however, not this clear. 
Whereas PACE had been bom out of the disorders of the early 1980s, and dealt primarily 
with police procedures, the Govenmaent's intentions in relation to encouraging active 
citizenship alongside attaining effectiveness and efficiency in policing became just as 
important in directing the way in which policing moved forward into the 1990s. If active 
citizenship was legitimised by encouraging citizenship of a 'responsible' rather than 
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'autonomous' slyle^ in voluntary activities such as Neighbourhood Watch or Special 
Constabulary involvement, there was the potential for enlarging 'the public's responsibility 
for personal and community safety without, apparently, undermining police 'ownership' of 
these functions' (Johnston, 1996, p.63). The move was towards one of encouraging public 
contribution to what had, historically, been the comerstone of policing. However, unlike 
Alderson's vision of community policing, this active citizenship was of a distinctly less 
stmctured nature vwth the focus and rationale for individual activity being enshiined in the 
debate of what could make policing itself more effective, efficient and therefore, less 
costly. Taken alongside the increased availability of private security firms to provide 
services conventionally supplied by the police, and akin to those which the public 
perceived as important to increasing their safety (a regular visible presence and foot 
patrols), the 'activated' neighbourhood could as appropriately choose to pay for their 
safety as they could contribute voluntarily to NHW or the special constabulary (Dale, 
1994; Dale and Mawby, 1994). 
The extent to which police services became challenged during the 1990s, and the way in 
which legislation was drafted to signify that policing was viewed centrally as no longer the 
preserve ofthe forces themselves, was exemplified in the enquiry team led by Ingrid Posen 
at the Home Office, and the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 (Home Office, 
1995a). In 1993, Posen's team was set up to consider and recommend ways in which the 
delivery of core police services could be accomplished most efficiently and identify which 
services provided by the police could be regarded as 'ancillary' to their primary objective 
"Responsible' citizenship is officially sanctioned and sponsored by the State (whilst) 'autonomous citizenship' occurs when 
individuals or groups engage in vigilantist modes of 'self policing' without the recognition or support of the State' (Johnston, 1996, 
p.62). 
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as law enforcers and preventers of crime (Home Office, 1994b; 1995b): Alongside Posen's 
work emerged a separate independent enquiry, conducted by the Police Foundation and' 
Policy Studies Institute (Cassels Enquiry) which, whilst drawing a wider remit, 
nevertheless also sought to establish which policing tasks were 'core' and which could be 
undertaken by others (Police Foundation/PSI, 1994). Posen's work was criticised by 
ACPO and the police staff associations because of its apparent Treasury-driven "and non-
consultatory structure whilst the Cassels enquiry was perceived as less threatening in its 
conshiiction because of its independent nature (Howe, 1994; Judge, 1994). Although 
neither document was officially acted upon to any extent which significantly changed the 
nature of policing core tasks, the work which was being undertaken by the respective 
committees was considered serious enough to cause the Devon and Comwall Constabulary 
to commission-its own research amongst the public to put the debate into a more informed 
perspective (Redshaw and Sanders, 1995).^  
The Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994, however, represented a far wider-reaching 
change to policing than that which either of the two enquiries into core and ancillary tasks 
succeeded in doing. Although relatively unconcemed with the 'nuts and bolts' of policing 
activity which Posen and Cassels had reviewed, the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 
stmck at the heart of policing accountability and devolved authority in a way which had 
not been attempted since the Police Act of 1964. Pohce authorities were to become firee-
standing corporate bodies able to precept on local authorities for a proportion of their 
funding, with the lion's share of cash being provided by central govemment. The duty of 
police authorities was to secure the maintenance of efficient and effective forces for its 
^ To a large extent the more tieasuiy driven model could have been seen on the drawing board several years earlier with the 
encouragement of forces to embark on activity sampling, a statistical process aimed at identifying the work which officers actually 
undertook down to a period of minutes (Home Office, 1989; Home Office and HMIC, 1992). 
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area having regard to the Home Secretary's key objectives, Hhs, police authorities own plans 
and objectives, and performance targets set by the police authority itself Chief constables 
were to be responsible for the direction and control of their respective forces having regard 
to the local poUcing plans issued by the police authorities. The intention was set out to 
place ownership of strategic management and policy making in the arena of the police 
.:authorities whilst chief constables were tasked with managing their forces in,accordance, 
with the strategic plans. ' 
K'&y Police Authority Plan & Objectives Chief 
Home S e c r e t a r y — N a k m a l > Monitoring of finance > Constable 
Objectives Monitoring of performance (onf/tappt) 
I 1^ 
Inspection through HMIC 
& Audit Commission 
Figure 5.1: The new 'linear* model of police accountability 
Herein lay a fundamental change to the long-established tri-partite mechanism of policing 
with particular concern being voiced from within the higher echelons of the police service 
that the position of the chief constable would now be more directly controllable through 
the political structure, notably the central political administration. The position was 
perceived as one which had changed the hi-partite structure into one which was more 
linear in its working (figure 5.1). A direct line of control from the Home Secretary was 
seen as possible by virtue of several factors including his ability to set and measure success 
or failure against his own performance indicators. Police authorities were obliged to follow 
these in the setting of their strategic objectives and plans. Furthermore, they were required 
(under penalty of sanction) to monitor financial and other performance indicators of local 
objectives and targets which were, in turn, to be submitted to HMIC and the Audit 
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Commission" for auditing. Chief constables were to be employed on fixed-term contracts 
approved by the Home Secretary. ' 
Notwithstanding the extent to which chief constables now formed the politically lower 
(and therefore prospectively less influential) position in the linear formation, a key 
observation against the form which this legislation took was that it .had been drafted 
without proper consultation and the possibility for the influence to. be placed on chief 
constables through the structure could compromise their operational independence, notably 
through a fixed-term appointment system (Oliver, 1996). Oliver's arguments, whilst 
having a rationale underpinning his call for a Royal Commission to recominend on such 
matters, appears to have underestimated the political frustration amongst key governmental 
players of a system which had seen expenditure on the police rise dramatically over the 
previous decade, a situation which was significant enough for one ex-Home Secretary to 
comment in his memoirs 'We have thrown money at them and we have the highest level of 
crime in our history' (Baker, 1991, p.450). Similarly underestimated was the extent to 
which simple management rationale in having police authorities of sizes which were 
commensurate with effective debate (17 to 19 members dependant upon area as opposed to 
the common 30 to 40 who previously sat) could have an impact upon the newly constituted 
corporate bodies. Alongside these considerations was the reality of a substantial period in 
the late 1900s when policing became a more political entity often being seen to fail in its 
objectives of reducing and detecting crime, with blame for this falling most commonly on 
the shoulders of chief constables, despite an alleged stracture of tri-partite accountability. 
The system of bidding to the Home Secretary for increases in the personnel establishments 
of forces was removed and police authorities and their chief constables therefore had more 
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influence over the structure and deployment of resources.^  :The Police and Magistrates' 
Courts Act also included sections which gave greater flexibility for police forces to sell 
their services and generate income through sponsorship or other means (Bunt et al., 1997, 
pp.4-10). A movement towards levels of contractual arrangements between the police and 
the market society echoed certain sentiments within Bayley's Police for the Future (1994) 
which debated the role of the private security sector as being utilised on the State's behalf, = 
a position which has been criticised because of the likelihood of jaltemative legitimate = 
institutions' being 'likely to generate both inequality and authoritarianism' (Johnston, 
1996, p.67). 
However, within the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act was the potential for the police 
themselves, to become providers of paid-for services and compete with private security 
providers. Although examples of where forces chose to do so in a large-scale commercial 
way have not to date been evident, the provision of officers to patrol local estates at cost to 
local authorities, and to establishments such as hospitals'* and shopping centres was 
becoming a more common phenomenon. Of importance to those choosing to take up the 
police option was not, it appeared, the per-officer cost as at an individual level far more 
private employees would be available for the same money. Policing offered a wider 
package of both expertise and secondary (free) resources based around experience in 
community and crime prevention issues. The opportunity of a community policing and 
problem-solving style of private security was one which the police were ideally placed to 
provide and brought the notions of inter-agency work and active citizenship into focus 
The extent to which HMIC and the Audit Commission played a part in monitoring the new arrangements is discussed later in this 
chapter. 
* In Devon and Comwall, the position in both Exeter and Truro between 1995 and 1999 was one which saw the police take over the 
responsibility for securitj' services at two local hospitals when private security firms contracts were not renewed. 
88 
1989-1997: Quality of Service and Performance Monitoring 
within a commercial. environment - a situation which effectively amalgamated differing 
options within Bayley's 'future' vision of policing. 
Community Policing 
Typically, programmes which forces put in place emphasised a mixture of increased levels 
of local accountability, community based crime prevention initiatives, elements of routine 
work which were divorced from the established nature of policework, and those which 
were based on emergency response to incidents (Skolnick and Bayley, 1986). More 
recently, some police officers themselves considered community policing to embrace 
concepts of 'social welfare' (O'Dowd, 1993, p.58), whilst the need to set police work in a 
context which the public accepted as conforming to their views of what the police should 
be, and the roles which they should perform, was not universally evident. The symbols of 
greater police accountability, through consultative committees, and personally identifiable 
police officers, still provided a level of knowledge about what the public wanted which 
was far from unambiguous. The Operational Policing Review (ACPO, 1990a) survey of 
the public had suggested that a community policing style was preferred to one which was 
based on more obvious law enforcement methods, but the indications that the police role 
was expected to be 'all things to all people' was exemplified by studies showing these 
expectations included dog-fouling of pavements (Morgan, 1989; Shapland and Vagg, 
1989). The efforts which had been made to raise the positive public profile of the police 
towards the end of the 1980s had not appeared to have been able to clarify the precise 
nature of the policing role which was expected to be undertaken. 
Central to the public's notion of policing was still the nineteenth century concept of Peel's 
preventative patrol by uniform constables, whilst the wider challenge inherent in multi-
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. agency work, which formed the new 'backbone- of emerging crime prevention strategies," 
was less evident as a symbol of effective deterrence. The Audit Commission identified the 
public attaching great value to police patrol as reassurance, local knowledge of individual 
officers, and the notion that this underpinned 'policing by consent'. But it acknowledged 
that the police were unable to meet public expectations with some eighty percent of 
residents being dissatisfied with levels of foot patrol in their area- (Audit Commission, 
1996b). The ability to provide a comprehensive service was not one which the police 
themselves pretended to be a reality. However, efforts to maintain a balance, which 
included notions of 'high visibility' patrolling, were still at the comerstone of the public 
face which forces attempted to portray. This was one which did not necessarily reflect a 
common theme of placing little value upon routine patrolling, but it was one which was 
increasingly difficult to provide when prioritising of tasks was a reality. 
One of the key issues which related to the continuing debate on the role of community 
policing was that of its close and inevitable connection with the police role as detectors of 
crime. In times of limited resources the extent to which this particular aspect of policework 
should form the dominant feature of daily activity underpiimed much of the basis of 
Posen's enquiry. The way in which policing had developed to encompass a more 
concentrated emphasis on the core issues relating to detection had, to a large extent, 
sidelined notions of community policing. Whereas the concept was still regularly referred 
to within police forces, its emphasis was reduced in management terms and often given 
little more than lip service. Chief police officers, regardless of their perspective on the 
value of a preventative community based model, were generally reluctant to publicly 
declare a move away from a concept of which the public approved. 
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The British position in this respect could be interestingly compared-to that ofthe United 
States of America which had seen a continuing level of widespread endorsement of a 
community policing ethos dating back to the 1960s. Although not uniform in its 
development since this period, the notion of closer ties with local communities, foot 
patrolling of areas and a general acknowledgement of problem solving being predominant 
over simplified crime-control methods, was one which found favour in the philosophy of 
US policing. The recent position in the 1990s has similarly seen an acknowledgement of 
this perspective, although the notion that community policing was dominant in reality was 
questionable against research showing that^  whilst concentration on non-crime community 
issues enhanced job satisfaction, there was nevertheless a level of scepticism evident 
amongst police officers as to the measurable value of the initiative with crime-control 
continuing to be a function prioritised over a service role (Lurigio and Skogan, 1994; 
McElroy et al., 1993). 
The public perspective of community policing also related to environmental factors 
impinging on the lives of residents. This saw a mid-1990s sti-ategy of zero-tolerance find 
some favour within both the US and UK. Although based on a problem-solving 
philosophy, its tactics of strict law-enforcement of minor crime, enabling the rebuttal of 
perspectives that the police had 'lost control' in certain areas of large cities, appeared to re-
emphasise order-maintenance over the wider social and community based approach which 
community policing engendered (Mawby, 1999, pp. 47-48). Whilst finding favour in 
certain places within the United States, and being highly publicised as being the strategy 
which had brought New York's chronic crime problem under a degree of control in the 
mid 1990s, William Bratton, New York's Police Commissioner from 1994 to 1996, denied 
that he had given it the name- 'zero tolerance' or that it was an enterprise which 'ran 
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roughshod over neighbourhoods and civil liberties'. Therefore it was believed by him to be 
conhradictory to the ethos ot community policing (Daily Telegraph, 14 June 1997.). 
The acceptance of zero-tolerance in Britain met with a varying response at political, police 
and community levels. Whereas Prime Minister Tony Blair went on record in 1997 as 
being 'passionate' about the zero 7o/era«ce concept, Charles Pollard, chief constable of 
Thames Valley felt that it was being seen simplistically 'as a panacea' with, the potential of" 
short-term gains being at the expense of long-term community relations building (Daily 
Telegraph, 11 April 1997). Despite this, residents of neighbourhoods suffering 
disproportionately from crime and disorder welcomed a system which concenhrated 
resources deployed to their problems, although, in line with the strategy which Bratton 
himself had. developed in New York, such initiatives commonly had a wider approach than 
one which was merely enforcing the law when minor misdemeanours occurred. The term 
zero tolerance itself had too narrow a meaning for many and, whilst publicly 
acknowledging the benefits of planned operations to address local problems, chief police 
officers such as Devon and Cornwall's John Evans chose to entitle such strategies as 
Quality of Life. 
The 1990s epitomised a growing influence within central govemment to move the policing 
agenda to one which was far more measurable than in the past. The effect which this had 
upon aspects of policing, developed a greater degree of professionalism in a number of 
areas. However, it was one which required forces to reconsider their commitments and 
priorities to the extent of revisiting the general concept of community policing and 
whatever form this had taken in their particular locality. 
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The fears which had been expressed in the Cornish Committee's report of the 1960s 
(Home OfiBce, 1965) about the way in which the role ofthe crime prevention departments 
within forces might develop was one which had come to be true (Harvey et a l , 1989). The 
lack of any real integration of crime prevention into the strategies of policing was one 
which reflected a part of the orgamsation which was demand-led, in the same way as much 
of the bulk of policework was, and, therefore, lacking the elements of 'pro-activity' which 
the Home Office and John Alderson had envisaged It. is suggested that 'the theory and 
practice emanating from the Home Office and others, are very different animals. The latter 
seeks a rationally planned, disciplined approach, whilst the former is much looser'. The 
suggestion made is that for 'the police to play a leading role in crime prevention, they need 
to first get their own house in order' (GilKng, 1996, pp. 107-8). Gilling's comments are a 
realistic critique of the way in which the situation within police forces had developed His 
rationale for prophesying that the fiiture structures were now more integral, but only likely 
to be achieved once underlying issues of conflict, professional job role ambiguities and 
organisational purpose were better defined, is pragmatic.^  
The history of crime prevention into the 1990s consists of a number of elements from 
within the police service, outside agencies and Govemment. A major problem in 
commenting on the British Government's crime prevention policy was identifying those 
theories of criminal causality on which the Home Office based its strategy (King, 1991, 
p. 93). The crux of fhe nationally formulated literature circulated by the Home Office was 
The police service was not blind to the problems, as an internal ACPO circular (1991 c) on the role ofthe crime prevention officer 
showed. 
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primarily concemed with the reduction of opportunities to commit crime, as witnessed 
through some of the late 1980s literature entitled Practical Ways to Crack Crime (Home. 
Office, 1988). Publicity material into the 1990s had taken on more of the partnership ethos 
with the Partnership in Crime Prevention booklet (Home Office, 1991b) and Partners 
against Crime: manual for action (Home Office, 1993b) but its underlying message was 
•reinforced in the press pack which was circulated as part of the launch: that preventing 
crime was. still seen as directly .related to primary prevention by direct action at the 
potential scene of crime. As the Home Secretary reiterated, the campaign was based on a 
three-tier approach: Neighbourhood Watch, Street Watch and Neighbourhood Constables 
(Home Office, 1994a), all of which were initiatives able to sit comfortably in the 
predominant situational prevention model, with an influential degree of law enforcement 
being incorporated at the periphery through the special constabulary. 
To a large degree, the 'new powerful partnership' suggested by the Home Secretary, was 
little more than a reaffirmation of earlier calls for the public to become more directly 
involved in working alongside the police in preventing crime and passing information. The 
'new' partnership was, in reality, a rekindling of one which was subject to considerable 
effort in many parts of the country to maintain it in a tangible and workable form. The 
initiative was overtly political in its tone and intentions to raise the profile of the 
Conservative govemment still further in the law and order stakes. The timing of the news 
release, 28 September 1994, fell most neatly into a convenient spot on the annual party 
conference timetable. However, the partnership of this particular scheme was not one 
which brought home the thmst of the Morgan Committee Report (Home Office, 1991a). 
The Morgan Committee had been established under the Standing Conference on Crime 
Prevention to monitor the extent to which partnership was developing,at a multi-agency 
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level in line vyith Home Office Circular 44/1990 which had emphasised the importance of 
producing local strategies arid structures from within existing resources (Home Office, 
1990a; 1991b). Whereas the committee made recommendations relating to issues such as 
resource availability and training, it went further than the govemment anticipated in that it 
'refused to neglect the wider context, and thus produced a critical report' (Gilling, 1997, 
p.98). It recommended that local authorities' should have a duty in respect of crime 
prevention alongside that of the police and that a much greater focus should be given to 
youth issues and community safety, the latter being a term which was perceived as more 
appropriate than crime prevention. 
The Morgan Report, although 'not warmly received as a solution by the government' was 
responded to by the estabhshment of a National Board for Crime Prevention in 1993, the 
purpose of which was to identify new ways in which all sections of commimities could 
combine to reduce crime and fear of crime (Gilling, 1997, pp.99-100). The thmst of a 
continuing centralist approach to the issue, rather than that which had been implicit in the 
recommendations of Morgan of devolved responsibility to local authority level, was 
epitomised in the production of Crime Concern's Practical Guide to Crime Prevention for 
Local Partnerships (Crime Concem, 1993). To a large extent this reaffirmed the notion 
that responsibility for preventing crime was not solely a matter for the police but was able 
to provide little more than advice as to what the role of others should be and share good 
practice. In fact, most police forces had already developed good working relationships with 
other agencies which supported the concept of group problem-solving. However it was to 
take a change of govemment in 1997 to bring the thmst of the Morgan Committee's 
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recommendations to the central stage of crime prevention policy through the Crime arid 
_Disorder Act 1998.^ 
r 
Victims of crime 
The 1990s was the beginning of a decade marked by central direction and commitment to a 
number of the aspects of criminal justice through 'charters'. Victims were one part of this. 
The effort by the govemment to publicly declare levels of service which victims could 
expect to receive from the police and other agencies in the justice system through its 
Victim's Charter (Home Office, 1990b) saw the commitment, at least at a superficial level, 
become more formalised. However, the document provided assurances rather than any 
specific rights for victims of crime and was little more than guidance for those who may 
have to provide services for victims, despite very explicit recommendations being made 
within the publication (Mawby and Walklate, 1994, p. 188).' The emphasis upon victims' 
'rights' became more focused in the second version of the Victim's Charter which was 
produced several years later (Home Office, 1997). Whilst not enshrined in law, there was 
an emerging emphasis on charter commitments within the work conducted by the Audit 
Commission and HMIC during the 1990s; a factor which served to provide a more 
coherent focus than had previously been observed in the field of victim care. In addition to 
this, the more widespread use of surveys by police forces to establish the level of service 
which they were providing also raised the profile of victims wdthin police management 
stmctures. 
^ See Chapter 12:1997-1999 and into a nev/ century. 
' Evidence to support contentions that the Victim's Charter did Jiot initially provide the standards of service, and thereby, any 
dramatically noticeable alteration to the tangible position of victims within the justice system, is available through the research 
conducted within Devon and Comwall (see chapter 11: Victims of Crime in Devon and Comwall). 
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-It is highly improbable whether, at any time prior to the 1990s, victims of crime were 
surveyed more about there opinions of the service which they had received from the 
police/ At a national level there were four further British Crime Surveys and, across the 
country, police forces were formulating and administering questionnaires as one of the 
required indicators of performance from the Association of Chief Police Officers.^ There 
were also incalculable numbers of snialler scale surveys being conducted to varying levels 
of competence by graduate and under graduate researchers, as well as there being a steady 
flow of interest in victims from established academics. 
The victim had been at the forefront of much attention during the 1980s but, i f that was a 
period where there was stiU seen to be a relatively steep uphill struggle to co-ordinate the 
activities and initiatives which aboimded between agencies for victims' benefits, the 1990s 
was the era which saw the position somewhat 'sanitised' in the way in which they became 
approached by the police. The way in which this sanitation took place was quite accidental 
but arguably, predictable. The requirement to measure performance (outlined in the next 
section) had dictated the way in which police forces were to go in establishing whether or 
not victims were satisfied with the service which they had received. That way was surveys. 
There were a far wider range of potential sources of victims to survey than those which did 
eventually appear as the formal two which forces were expected to collect (victims of 
burglary and violence). Ambitious early drafts from ACPO had suggested forces should 
also survey victims of domestic violence, for example, a proposition which was dropped 
* A telephone survey conducted by the author in 1992 revealed that twenty of the forty three forces in England and Wales had already 
embarkal upon routine surveying of victims of crime. 
' ACPO had proposed measuring levels of satisfaction with a variety of police services in response to HMIC and Audit Commission 
requirements to measure a wide range of police activity which it was felt did not alone reflect 'quality' of work, merely 'quantity' (see 
next section). 
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following a period of consultation. There were forces who were prepared to recommend" 
potential ways of conducting such sensitive research (including Devon and Comwall)'" but, 
in cases where a structured methodology was likely to produce valid results, issues of time, 
commitment and financial resources played a big part in determining that such research 
would not be practical on an on-going basis. 
But 'sanitation' was also inadvertently achieved through .the development of technology, in 
particular computerised crime recording which allowed a facility to keep victims updated 
on the results of cases through standard letters. The Victim's Charter (Home Office, 
1990b) had guided forces that updating of victims was an important aspect of overall 
service standards. The Devon and Comwall computerised system, which was developed 
firom American software in the first instance provided standard letters advising of the result 
of court cases. The letter included fields in which details of fines and compensation/costs 
could be inserted prior to sending and this was completed and sent to appropriate victims. 
However, the software had not been customised for British use and the fields were prefixed 
by a '$' rather than a '£ ' symbol which epitomised the routine and impersonal nature of the 
letter Large gaps on the page also re-emphasised the fact that a machine had produced the 
letter rather than an individual, all of which appeared to increase the 'sanitising' effect of 
how matters of importance to victims were merely routine in the police enviroimient. 
Certain aspects of improvement did become evident during the years which followed the 
'° Suggestions fell into two brought categories: simply handing out cards with infomiation thereon and giving the victim the opportimify 
to answer some basic questions, or, a more scientific methodology which was based on personal interviews using non-police personnel. 
The former \vas, and still is, used in certain forms but the purpose is not linked with any dictated performance indicators, rfhe latter has 
not, as far as can be ascertained, embarked upon by any force as a matter of routine. Thens are examples of specific indi\idual studies 
into this area which have guided future police action in some cases, but the institutionalisation of this method of research by the police 
has not dev-eloped in this particular subject area. 
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charter's. pubHcation in the area of assistance given through the courts system. Govemment 
finance became available for the establishment- of civilian liaison officers, initially in 
Crown Courts, and latterly beginning to spread to Magistrates Courts (Mawby and 
Walklate, 1994; Rock, 1991). Victim Support was utilised as the stracture within which the 
local schemes could be administered. Financing of the schemes was therefore routed 
through this organisation, to local level for administration. However, relatively little 
evidence of any structural alterations to practice were found tp have developed through the 
work of courts themselves and the Crown Prosecution Service continued to see liaison with 
the victim as primarily the responsibility of the police and other agencies. 
The emergence of the police QOS initiative 
1990 saw the launch of the Quality of Service initiative on a national level. The Police 
Federation and Superintendents' Association, with ACPO as the prime leaders in this tri­
partite collaboration, had already worked together, with the assistance of a mmiber of 
police forces to complete the Operational Policing Review (ACPO, 1990a), a piece of 
work which had researched a number of key aspects of policing, amongst which was the 
quality of the standards of policing experienced by members of the public. This document 
led to the formulation of the publication which was to become the lead stracture in the 
development of QOS. The Strategic Policy Document: Setting the Standards for Policing: 
Meeting Community Expectations (ACPO, 1990b) had as its stated aims the needs of the 
service to develop and portray a corporate identity which it commenced through its 
statement of common purpose. 
The purpose of the Police Service is to uphold the law fairly and firmly: to prevent 
crime; to pursue and bring to justice those who break the law; to l<eep the Queen's 
Peace; to protect, help and reassure the community; and to be seen to do all this 
with integrity, common sense and sound judgement. We must be compassionate, 
courteous and patient, acting without fear or favour or prejudice to the rights of 
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others. We need to be professional, calm and restrained in the face of violence 
and apply only that force which is necessary to accomplish our lawful duty. We 
must strive to reduce the fears of the public and, so.far as we can, to reflect their ' 
priorities in the action we take. We must respond to well-founded criticism with a 
willingness to change. (ACPO, 1990b) 
The statement was one which reflected the three key areas which those responsible for 
developing the initiative considered requiring of attention: (i) the setting of standards in 
relation to the delivery of police services and the effectiveness of these; (ii) the nature of 
'customer' expectations and the question of whether or not-these expectations were being 
met by the police; and (iii) the issue of consistency in standards of courtesy, fairness and 
sensitivity (p.6). The statement was a set of principles which underpinned the ethos of the 
service and which all chief constables signed up to during the following twelve months, 
normally through public proclamation at local level, together with a varying degree of 
aplomb in producing literature to accompany the words. The words of the statement re­
echoed much of the sentiment of the origins of fonnal policing in Britain during the 
nineteen-hundreds and the oath of allegiance given by all officers enjoining the service. It 
was, by its very nature, central to the QOS ethos and effectively the mission statement of 
the organisation. 
Here stood the model for the 1990s, but how far removed was it from the concepts of 
policing prior to the ACPO initiative? At first reading few impartial observers would 
identify in it any aspect of policing which was especially radical or new, given the 
relatively high esteem in which the police continued to be held despite the public disorders 
and scandals or corruption during the 1980s. There had, however, been a noticeable 
falling-off in positive public reaction to the police as reported in the 1988 British Crime 
Survey (Mayhew et al., 1989), a tirend which caused concem when taken against the 
findings of the earlier surveys conducted by the same means in British Crime Surveys, 
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four and six years "earlier. The perceived gap between police activity and public 
expectations was one which did not escape comment in the Strategic Policy Document. 
This factor, taken alongside a series of adverse press reports of police malpractice and 
inability to perform effectively many of the roles which the public had come to expect 
from their 'bobbies', appeared to be a factor of considerable influence in directing the 
activities of ACPO and the staff associations. 
Having established a partial" basis on which the Strategic Policy Document and 
subsequent QOS initiative was developed, an understanding of the intertwined factors 
which accompanied the 1989 work has to be taken into account. Much of this is described 
elsewhere in the thesis in relation to the emergence of community orientated policing 
strategies, closer focus on the services available to victims and the fundamental nature of 
the police role as owners of the crime prevention mantle. Accompanying this are the views 
of practitioners and observers to the process from both national and local level. But the 
pre-initiative attitudes of individuals and forces to the notion of the quality issue per-se is 
less easily, but potentially well exemplified. 
By 1991, interest in the Quality of Service initiative was growing in strength, as was the 
staff associations' involvement in various aspects of its implementation. But that interest 
was spreading roots at a rapid rate and had begun to develop a life of its own in a more 
overt political arena. This was the year in which forces received their first major 
'broadside' from the agents of the cenfre: Her Majesty's Inspectorate and the Audit 
Partial because it depicts the initiative as solely driven by political expediency and the need for public acceptance whilst ignoring 
what optimistic observers would consider the natural desire of those individuals within the poUce to provide a service of the highest 
standards for the benefit of the community at large; 
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Commission. There was no doubt from the tone and content of what wasreceived by way 
of letter that the centre intended to make it their business to co-ordinate at least the 
quantitative nature ofthe initiative. On 10 September 1991 Sir John Woodcock, the then 
Chief Inspector of Constabulary, wrote to all chief officers concerning the development of 
a framework of performance indicators to be introduced into the inspections process from 
1992. This letter was accompanied by a list of indicators which, it was suggested, would 
'assist forces and HMIC in assessing the quality of service provided at the point of contact 
with consumer-caller, victim, suspect, etc.' 
Woodcock's own position as it related to the Quality of service initiative had been laid out 
in an article relating to the culture of the police during the same period in which the 
quantitative wrangling was commencing. The article questioned the 'we know best' 
philosophy adopted by the police and argued that the public deserved, and the police 
should except and encourage, greater involvement in decision making on setting priorities. 
He saw the service culture as one which valued systems higher than individuals and 
worked to the detriment of public satisfaction - that even when the police considered they 
had dealt with a job 'by the book' this was not an indication that it had been done in a way 
which would be appreciated by the member of public involved. It was a view which struck 
the heart of much of the conventional wisdom surrounding quality management issues. 
The call from Woodcock was for a de-professionalisation of the service, to make it more 
responsive and less steeped in a police service culture (Woodcock, 1991). 
But this position was one which had to be considered against a service which did not bear 
the hallmarks of private enterprise in a marketplace of singular commodities and services 
easily conhroUed and led by supply, demand and profit factors. There was a need for the 
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resources available to the police to be rationed at an appropriate rate to operate in the daily 
reality of unpredictability. The views did not meet with universal approval, and whilst it is 
not possible to indicate how large or small a proportion of influential police individuals 
agreed with these principles, there was a clear indication from some senior and chief 
police officers spoken to in a variety of forces during the course of this research that they 
took issue with Woodcock's sentiments. Without reference to HMCIC's views, one senior 
officer, in presenting initial findings on his force's quality of service initiative to. chief 
officers summed up his observations thus: 
'We have to be mindful of providing not only what the public want, but what they can 
afford to pay for - because only so much of their money is put towards policing. We 
have to make those decisions. For example, a car analogy: there's the Rolls Royce, 
got everything, costs fifty thousand pounds but is top of the range - cigar lighter, fridge 
in the back, leather seats - but it's expensive and not many people can afford it. The 
ones who can like it but that's not many. Then there's the Ford Sierra - £12,000 - not 
so plush as the Roils, doesn't have the cigar lighter or the fridge, or the leather seats, 
but it goes well - it's reliable, it's affordable and people like it. Then there's the 
Skoda - its cheap - £5,000 - and it's got a lot of optional extras like windscreen 
wipers and tyres. It gets you from A to B sometimes and the public aren't really too 
keen on it. It might be cheap but not too many people want it because it's not reliable. I 
suggest to you, gentlemen, that in terms of the service we give we can't afford to 
provide the public with the Rolls and neither should we be content with giving them the 
Skoda model. We need to aim towards the Ford because it's good value, it works well 
and its liked by the public. Sir, at present, I submit that the model this force most 
resembles is the Skoda Gti with a sunshine roof.' (LV) 
Within a short period of time, the letter from HMCIC was joined on the desks of chief 
officers by a consultation letter and appendix from the Audit Commission which outlined 
the measures which they were proposing be collected by police forces as indicators of 
performance, which would form part of the forthcoming Local Government Act 1992. In 
all, with the indicators from both organisations taken into account, there were over sixty 
proposed indicators of police performance by the end of 1991. Some were effectively 
" Author's note: apologies to VW who now own Skoda - T am aware that your excellent product is no longer deserving of such 'cairist' 
jokes as the one above!' Potential lawsuits to philip.bunt@virgin.net 
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duplications, others were requesting answers to the same type of question but through 
different measurements and some appeared to have totally different agendas. The situation 
was one which dismayed many police officers of senior rank. The multitude of requests for 
information and the sudden apparent interest in a system masquerading as quality of 
service appeared to have little to do with.quality and more with quantity.'^  It was however 
clear that the situation required a co-ordinated approach and, it could be argued by default, 
that the role fell to the fledgling QOS sub-committee - of the ACPO General Purposes 
Committee.'" The suggestion that this happened by default was certainly a view held by a 
number of individuals who were involved in the Quality of Service initiative in their 
respective forces. 
'I'm afraid they have stuffed us with the job of collecting numbers when we started off 
trying to do something positive to promote a change and provide better quality. I've 
gone from being a champion for TQM (Total Quality Matiagement) to a statistician.' 
(Inspector on a force's QOS department, 1993, ref: EA) 
'ACPO seem to be pushing us down the road to support all these pieces of number-
crunching and have even added to it by including tlieir own indicators. They seem to 
have lost the thread here somewhere.' (Inspector on a force's Performance Review 
department, 1993, ref: EP) 
'No point in it whatever - no point in us doing it. It won't benefit us a bit.' (Chief police 
officer, August, 1993 ref: ED) 
Co-ordination did very much centre around the QOS sub-committee which began taking 
the issue forward during the early part of 1992. In a letter to chief officers on 20 February 
1992 fi-om Michael Hirst,'^ chairman of the sub-committee, it was clear that the 
development of the performance indicator strategy was being drawn into the quality of 
" Subsequent negotiation and discussion reduced the nmnber of indicators to a more manageable size, although the cooperation of 
ACPO in doing this served to institutionalise the process far quicker than it might have been in some other circumstances. By 1993, a 
Home Office Circular (17/1993) outlined the indicators for that particular year (Home Office, 1993d). 
" The QOS sub-committee achie\'Bd flill committee status in ACPO iti 1993 rather than remaining as an arm ofthe General Purposes 
Committee, underlying the increasing importance given the subject by chief officers. The sub-committee's work had included reviewing 
key operational service areas of policework (ACPO, 1991a), which underlined the practical side of performance review. 
" Michael Hirst was, at that time, chief constable of Leicestershire. 
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service arena under the banner of the five key service areas which had been identified in 
the ACPO Quality of Service Management Guide (ACPO, 1991b) which had been ratified 
by the ACPO Council on 16 January 1992. The letter bore none of the underlying tones of 
resentment at the diversion of the initiative away fi-om a qualitative path which was being 
perceived as being achieved by many, and the letter was almost upbeat in its appreciation 
of the opportunity being given to the service: 'Although the Audit Commission will be 
required to formally consult with a variety of organisations and agencies at a later stage, 
the Quality of Service Sub-Committee is being given an early opportunity to influence the 
thinking of the Audit Commission on this subject' A.J.P. Butler's'^ interpretation of the 
Audit Commissions stance was that they were being both fair and clever in their approach 
to the service. Fair because the opportunity to have an influence on what was in or out of > 
the indicator table was being offered, but clever in that the police would have difficulty in 
' complaining in the future if their own measures did not relate to quality of service (Butler, 
1992, p. 41). 
The scepticism within the police service that the quantitative measures being proposed 
would form league tables of forces' performance was becoming a relatively dark cloud on 
the quality horizon, and one which could potentially undermine the rationale and 
enterprise which a nimaber of forces had already begun to put into making cultural change 
a priority. The acknowledgement that QOS did not sit comfortably alongside some of the 
Audit Commission imperatives was again observed by Butler who feared that 'it would be 
a tragedy if history repeated itself in the 1990s' referring to the commitment which the 
' A.J.P. Butler was deputy chief constable of Leicestershire and went on to become chief constable of Gloucestershire later in the 
1990s. 
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police service had given to Home Office circular 114/1983 which had resulted in 'the 
over-emphasis of those outside the service on the issue of costs and efficiency.' (1992, p. 
49) His reaction was based on an early, well founded fear, that sufficient consideration 
• had not been given to establishing a clear link between the performance indicators to be 
used to measure such issues as cost and effectiveness, and the level of public satisfaction 
with police services and the quality of their delivery. In the realisation^that there was much 
qualitative information about the police service which would, in normal circumstance not 
reach the media, in 1993, and subsequently over the next few years, the service produced a 
series of 'fact sheets' which were intended to redress the balance (ACPO, 1993b; 1994b; 
1995; 1996). These were designed as a 'hymn book' from which officers from each force 
could 'sing', and positive messages such as the police service costing each individual less 
than the price of a pint of milk each day became regularly quoted in police/public haison 
forums across the country. A more detailed consideration of the role which HMIC and the 
Audit Commission have played in the development of the Quality of Service initiative and 
the influence they have had in their inspection and monitoring roles helps to understand 
the position in which both national policy and local interpretation reside in the policing 
debate. 
Under the Local Government. Act 1992, the Audit Commission is required to determine 
a set of indicators for local authority services. Every authority in England and Wales 
will have to measure its performance against these indicators and publish details in a 
local newspaper. The Commission will then compare the different levels of 
perfomnance achieved by different authorities, the first national report being due for 
publication in 1995. (...) Before deciding on the first list, the Commission consulted 
widely. In December 1991, it published a short paper on how it intended to proceed 
once the Act had received Royal Assent, which it did in March 1992. In September 
1992, the Commission issued a consultation document which set out the background 
to the Citizen's Charter and proposed a range of possible indicators. {Ctiarting a 
Course: Audit Commission, 1993, p .2)" 
Charting a Course summarised the results ofthe consultation, the way in which the Commission had modified the proposals it 
published in September 1992, and how it intended to proceed during the following year (p.4). 
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The Commission honestly summarised the views expressed by the police and other local 
authorities in the first line Of Charting a Course in that they had all 'expressed reservations 
about the ... proposals' and that 'even on the issues which the Commission has influence, 
there was no consensus' (p. 5). This comment exeniplified the concerns across all the 
public agencies about the number of indicators proposed as well as the interpretation 
which would be given to them and the cost involved in their collection. It wasan open and 
informative piece of work from, the Commission which, set a positive tone for what was to 
follow during the subsequent years, given the severe uphill nature of the task presented to 
the audit group in gaining acceptance for its existence. 
Previous publications'* of that body had proved influential in the direction which forces 
had taken in terms of, for example, the civilianisation and rationalising of tasks in the 
development of administrative support units (Audit Commission, 1988) and its future 
papers on the criminal iiivestigative process from an audit perspective, as well as others, 
led contemporary academics to suggest that 'the work of the Audit Commission is highly 
regarded by many (if not most) senior police officers' (Savage and Charman, 1996). This 
presents a potential irony for, if the Audit Commission's work 'points the way to many of 
the elements of the social market approach to the police and policing, then managers 
sympathetic to the approach (...) may be in danger of facilitating the very sorts of 
developments many senior officers have opposed when advocated by central government' 
(p. 51). Their status amongst the higher ranks of the police has been enhanced by the level 
of professionalism and openness with which- they operated and the attention which was 
the Audit Conimission produced ten papers benveen May 1988andMarch 1991 relating to the police covering, in addition to the 
Administrative Support document refened to above, fingerprint services, vehicle fleet management, police training, commuriications 
rooms, financing provincial forces, income generation, performance review, organisational review of provincial forces and financial 
delegation. 
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paid to the conslihative process and high quaUty .informative and instructional vwritten 
material. 
Probably one of the most influential factors in their sustained respectability has been a 
focused position on the agendas which they have set against the legal duty they had to 
specify indicators of performance. Paul Vevers of the Audit Commission was keen to point 
to the future when addressing the Cheltenham Police Management Conference in 1994 
(ACPO, 1994a, pp. 16-19) in which he indicated to the audience of leaders in the police 
service his belief that, handled sensitively, the Commission had a useful part to play in the 
accountability and management of police services. He acknowledged the concem of the 
service that most of the indicators were perceived as measuring only quantity and not 
• quality of work done but disputed that their existence said nothing about quality as many 
of them touched on such issues. The Commission's duty was to look at indicators which 
would sustain comparisons between forces and he acknowledged that the survey work 
being promoted within forces as an ACPO indicator had potential for standardisation in 
relation to certain questions which would be of use to the Audit Commission. 
Vevers points conceming measures not being solely quantitative in nature was 
convincingly argued and accurate in that, whereas the results may be produced in terms of 
numbers, that was not to say that they were merely 'bean counting' as had been argued by 
a senior officer at the first ACPO Quality of Service seminar, held at Bramshill in 
December 1992 (Waters, 1996, p.210). Numbers could reflect upon the quality of work 
done; they could similarly be just counters of an item. Clearly statistics showing how 
many officers were available for duty within a force was a simple 'bean-counting' 
exercise, but figures showing how many victims had been advised of the resuhs of a 
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burglary, for example, had an underlying measure of quality as it related to police activity 
which was qualitatively based. The argument about not counting things, because they did 
not reflect the quality of work which was done, did not stand much scrutiny. 
One of the primary concems of police forces around the country was the potentially 
destructive and misleading effect which the proposal to publish comparative data of 
performance by the Commission might have. There was firstly a large amoimt of 
information, and secondly, much of it was Of such a nature as to be relatively meaningless 
in producing a relevant comparator. The demographic nature of the respective forces, 
particularly the dissimilarity which were to be found between forces in relation to racial 
and social mixes, was one such issue which was used to underline the potential invalidity 
of any such data produced at national level. 
There was also a practical level of concem as to the impact of such publication when a 
wide and diverse range of indicators were portrayed across, what was believed would have 
to be at least a double-spread broadsheet newspaper format. Would the public make any 
sense of it? Having taken the concems of the various interested parties into account the 
Commission decided to use only a small number of the indicators in its initial publication, 
this list being comprised of those which it felt to be of most interest to the public. The list 
developed relatively little during the first two years of publication and the paper produced 
on 18 April 1996 included forces' speed of answering 999 calls and time taken to respond 
to emergencies, the amount of crime and specifically the amount of violent crime and 
burglary, and the crime detection rate (Audit Commission, 1996). The concem of the 
police as to the use and accuracy of such data in comparative terms continued and remains 
a source of concem to senior officers, a fact not misunderstood by the Commission itself 
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The national publication of police Pis received .exterisive coverage in the national 
press and television. Locally, ovei" 1,000 newspapers and over 60 radio and television 
stations covered the story. The national coverage was generally reasonable and well 
balanced, but local coverage was inore variable. The response ofthe police service to 
national publication continues to give cause for concern, with a number of chief 
constables expressing their lack of confidence in the value of the Pis as a comparative 
measure of performance (Audit Commission, 1996a). 
Forces adopted different attitudes to their responsibihties in relation to the Local 
Govemment Act 1992. The amount of information required was clearly substantial but the 
willingness of forces to fulfil the first set of obligations which were place on them, to 
publish their indicators of performance in at least one local newspaper before the end of 
1994, was however less to do with concem over the philosophical debate as to its rights 
and wrongs, or even how the public were likely to interpret the data. It was primarily 
related to the technology which forces already had in place for the collection and analysing 
of the information, as well as the identification of individuals, or departments, within their 
organisations which would 'own' the task. A further factor was the decision as to how the 
publication would actually look and the possible cost of this to the policing budget. The 
legal requirement did not specify how precisely this should be done except that the 
circulation should be in a 'paid for' newspaper and not a free-sheet or publicity material 
merely made available by the force. The situation caused somewhat of an anomaly in 
terms of the rationale applied as there was clearly an opportunity for forces to provide a 
much greater circulation of the information through a 'mail-drop' to all homes in their 
area. 
As has already been mentioned, this responsibility often fell within the remit of units 
originally conshiicted under the quality initiative with a natural degree of misgiving being 
expressed as to how relevant this particular job was to furthering the effectiveness of the 
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service. Devon and Comwall Constabulary produced the publication of its performance 
indicators in July 1994, having'had the figures audited by the Dishict Audit Service during 
the previous month. It was the first force in the country to publish and this occurred on the 
same day as the first local authority to complete the task. Brent (London) on 13 July. The 
police publication took the form of an eight page, part colour, supplement in a local 
newspaper. The Western Moming News,. (Devon and Comwall Constabulary, 1994b) and 
a one page monochrome summary published in eight other, more local, weekly 
publications. The cost of this had been supplemented by selling advertising space in the 
supplement which covered approximately half the overall cost. It was done in such a way 
that, whereas all the required indicators were included, they were seen as secondary to the 
potential to portray the force in a positive light and 'sell' images and messages relating to 
crime prevention, victim support and traffic safety. 
A number of forces followed the lead set by Devon and Comwall and arranged for similar 
supplements to be produced in local newspapers. Others adopted a legislatively acceptable, 
but less impactive approach by providing just the figures required in a tabular or list form, 
although these forces commonly accompanied their enterprise with a press release and co­
ordinated P.R. strategy. Some chose to produce their own literature for circulation whilst 
still complying with the terms of Act in as cost efficient way as possible.'' 
Since the dynamic emergence of the Audit Commission into the quality of service 
stracture they have become regular contributors to the debate on the way in which the 
See chapter 8: Quality of Service in Devon and Cormvall for further information on how the Audit Commission arranged for the 
impact of these publicatioiis to be assessed. 
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service is proceeding. Each year since 1994 legislative directions have been issued relating 
to the performance indicators which authorities will be expected to collect and publish 
during the following year and these have invariably been preceded with a commendable 
degree of consultation. The list of indicators has now grown to encompass those which 
ACPO formulated in the early stages to measure the quality of work performed by use of 
surveys of 999 callers, victims, road accident drivers and casualties, police station visitors 
and the general public in relation to their perceptions of the level of foot and mobile patrol. 
Although, in the 1995 directive (Audit Commission, 1995) referring to these, it is 
incumbent on only those forces 'in which monitoring was carried out' (p. 17) to provide 
this information, the likelihood of a more concerted approach to bringing all forces into 
line with a common survey policy in the fiiture is unlikely to be ruled out. 
It is difficult to fail to acknowledge the significant effect which the Audit Commission has 
had on the police service during the 1990s. What began as an almost advisory tinkering 
with the outskirts of policing, had now moved far more centrally into the arena of tasks 
considered core to the effective and efficient running of these organisations, a situation 
which caused the term 'Auditshire Constabulary' to be coined during the early stages of 
this movement, a situation in which Love (1991, p.96) indicated the Commission were not 
setting out to describe what this mythical constabulary looks like 'but they are quite clear 
about how it works.' The position of the Commission needs to be considered against that 
of the second main players in the quality initiative, HMIC. 
There is, much evidence to support the view that Her Majesty's Inspectorate had become 
substantially more influential in their role amongst police forces than they were prior to 
1990. Its sfructure, with a chief HMI based in the Home Office responsible for five 
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regionally based inspectors and further 'lay' inspectors,^ " has a primary responsibility of 
inspecting forces on behalf of the Home Secretary arid issuing 'certificates of efficiency' 
as to their overall ruiming. Forces are subject to inspection at regular, normally armual, 
intervals with the form which the inspection takes varying according to the discretion of, 
and needs perceived, by individual HMIs. Conventionally these vwll take one of three 
forms: primary inspections during which a force will normally receive an extended 
inspection covering a period of some two weeks, these taking place every three years; 
performance reviews, which take a less detailed form and occur annually, and thematic 
inspections which concenhrate on specific themes of interest or concem at a particular 
point in time, e.g. quality of service, equal opportunities, complaints procedures etc. 
The nature of the increased level of influence which can be observed owes much to the 
position of the stmcture close to the centre of govemment where there is a naturally 
significant degree of interest in seeing the nature of policing activity develop in line with 
wider government policy. Chief constables remain autonomous in their operational 
decision making capability although legislative changes during the 1990s, specifically the 
1994 Police and Magistrates' Courts Act (Home Office, 1995) have defined the 
responsibilities of these individuals more precisely and in line with the position of the 
newly established police authorities, which hold a more collaborative and legal 
responsibility for the efficiency of policing than previously, the profile of HMIs 
themselves has changed from being primarily chief officers in the twilight of their careers 
moving firom forces to perform an inspection role based on, what was mamly, their own 
°^ 'Lay inspojtors' are non-police and normally selected for their specific expertise in a subject area of specific relevance to an aspect of 
study, including management and financial matters. 
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experiences,.to one which now sees younger officers accepting the mantle with qualities 
more akin to the lateral thinking 'trouble-shooters' ofthe private sector. 
There is a less clear distinction to be drawn between the activities of HMI and the Audit 
Commission than there may have been prior to the Local Govemment Act 1992.Regular 
statistical retums on police performance have been a staple'diet of HMI for many years 
and whilst providing much of the 'number-cmnching' characteristics so maligned by 
forces in the early period, now encapsulate a wider degree of, potentially at least, quality in 
their collection and analysis. Indicators of performance adopted by ACPO relating to 
surveys, for example, have formed part of the HMI (form 7) retums since 1993 and are 
provided as intemal information in a similar format to those of all other indicators 
(although HMI have not sought to publish these more widely). Clearly the potential for 
duplication of effort and conflicting agendas between the HMI and Audit Commission 
existed in the early stages of development, but the experience of the enterprise has not 
transformed itself into anything more problematic than an administrative burden. 
The highly centralised role which the Inspectorate play has heightened the degree of 
concem about the influence which such a stmcture has on directing future policing policy 
at a local level (Reiner, 1992). The evidence to support this conjecture is far from clear, 
although there are certain examples of HMIs having a considerable degree of influence in 
persuading chief officers to adopt strategic management initiatives within their areas. One 
such force in which interviews took place revealed that they had received little more than 
friendly advice from a now-retired HMI but subsequently made a number of changes to 
their policies on community involvement, complaints procedures and strategic planning 
following inspection by a new-order inspector. The interviewee, who worked closely wdth 
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Others involved in policy making within the force indicated that such changes were 
probably overdue and would more than likely have been arrived at eventually through the 
changes which were then taking place with the forthcoming new police authorities. The 
existence of the HMI in its more political management role had, he agreed however, 
moved things on faster than would have been otherwise achieved. 
'1 have no doubt about it, the HIVII made a difference. I'm not too sure the top conidor 
were overly impressed with the new style, but what we had before wasn't very testing 
and I think, in reality, some hard questions had to be answered.'.... '\ don't think there 
is anything too threatening in it - politically I mean - the legislation which is coming 
means that things are going to change and we're all going to become a lot more 
accountable, whichever way you look at it.' (GD) 
The example may not be one which can yet be considered a universal phenomenon across 
forces but serves as an indication of the way that HMI has developed in terms of its 
influence on policy making (Jones et al, 1994). The direct influence which HMI has had 
on the Quality of Service programme is no less tangible and, to some degree, where it was 
imphed that change to local policy was necessary, directly against a structured executive 
decision which had already been taken. The Devon and Comwall position during the early 
stages of public surveying, for example, which had taken a pragmatic approach to 
questioning only those who had been users ofthe service and not the general public, was 
questioned in forthright terms during a pre-inspection visit by an HMI staff officer. The 
rationale for the policy decision which had been made had little or no effect on persuading 
the inspecting staff officer that the decision was logical and based on the best use of data 
and cost effectiveness. Clearly there were arguments to be made in favour of the 'general 
public' approach to surveys, not least of which was the forthcoming requirement for new 
police authorities to consult in relation to their annual plans. This required a stmctured 
approach which Devon and Comwall adopted through a programme of focus groups and 
personal interviews at local agricultural county shows over the next three years and which 
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was done in such a way as to make most actionable use of the information for'local police 
commanders. The influence of HMI was perceiivably important in heightening awareness 
of the forthcoming requirements of legislation and reflected another dimension of direct 
involvement which might influence or overturn previously made policy decisions. 
The Inspectorate's position has also been increasingly associated with the dissemination of 
'good practice' and directories were issued on an annual basis during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Similarly HMI reports of force performance make use of highlighting such 
items and recommending action which should be taken in other areas. Such reports are 
benchmark indicators which chief officers choose to ignore at their peril, and which retum 
as agenda items both during the intervening periods between inspections and at subsequent 
inspection visits themselves. The role of HMI has become more central to the notions of 
improved performance than was evident during the period pre-1990. The combination of 
legislative change, the statutory requirements of the Audit Commission, and a belief that 
change can best be accomplished by a more lateral-thinking management approach 
exemplified by the younger breed of chief officers, have all been major influences on the 
developing role of Her Majesty's Inspectorate during the 1990s. 
1989-1997: an overview 
The period had begun wdth a significant degree of effort being put into the future of 
policing by ACPO and police forces themselves through addressing both the culture of the 
organisation and the quality of service given to the public. However, by the mid 1990s the 
lead had been firmly taken by Govenmient, in not only setting out inspected criteria by 
which police performance would be judged, but in legislating to redefine the roles of key 
players on the policing stage, notably police authorities and chief constables. Community 
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policing had become submerged in a more statistically driven culture which, on the one 
hand acknowledged basic principles to which the public could subscribe in measuring.the 
amount of time officers spent 'on patrol', whilst also placing requirements upon new 
police authorities to financially manage relatively scarce resources. Despite the willingness 
to devolve this accountability to police authorities, key concepts from within the Morgan 
Report of similarly divesting the crime prevention mantle to local authorities, who would 
have a legal responsibility with the police .and others to ensure community safety, were not 
taken up under the Conservative administration. The move towards making other 
institutions as well as the police legally responsible for such matters was, however, to 
emerge as early 'flagship' legislation from the incoming Labour Govemment. 
Of significant .importance to this period was also the major constitutional change which 
took place in redefining the tri-partite stmcture to one which was more hnear in nature and 
held the position of chief constables as potentially far more directed in their activities than 
at any previous time. The accountability now placed upon police authorities as the key 
mechanisms to ensure that effective consultation and priority setting took place was one 
which was accompanied by changes to their stmcture, making them more streamlined in 
their composition, but also potentially more able to be directed in their approach through a 
clear line of accountability through to cenfral govenmient. The dilemma which had been 
presented at the end of the Dixon era some thirty years earlier was one which had now 
been revisited and addressed in a far more wide-reaching and fundamental way; one which 
would see the wider sharing of power and responsibility across police and local agencies 
leading into the new millennium. 
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Explanation of how this work has been conducted will begin by considering the way in 
which the project developed in 1990 as a local police initiative, but changed focus as the 
author's role in the Devon and Comwall Constabulary altered between 1992 and 1998. 
Prom a localised evaluation of policing activity in an area of Plymouth, vAth a specific 
focus on victims and inter-agency initiatives, the research grew, and diversified to 
encompass wider aspects of policing at both a local and national level. The chapter wall go 
on to outline the methodology which has been employed and detail the extent of its use in a 
variety of situations. 
The original idea for some sort of research in Plymouth stemmed from the Devon and 
Comwall Constabulary's Flamed Policing system which had been developed during 1989 
as a stmctured approach to the 1980s philosophy 'management by objectives". During 
December 1989, the deputy sub-divisional commander for the Charles Cross (city centre) 
area of Plymouth, Chief Inspector Roger Mechan, submitted a 'form 301' through his 
divisional commander, to undertake a study of crime in his sub-division. The '301' was 
approved by the assistant chief constable Keith Portlock^ on 22 December and retumed to 
Chief Inspector Mechan for further action. 
' The purpose of the Planned Policing model was to identify specific problems and propose methods of soKing them within a specific 
time-scale. Cohwntionally this process was used for measurable, and actionable, police operational work. It involved the completion of 
a ' form 301' (Objective/Action Platming Report Form) which ensured the process was linked to one of the 'Force Goals' and detailed 
how success was going to be measured. Within the police service this 'management by objecti\'es' became 'poUcing by objectives', the 
stv'le vi'as one encouraged through Home Office circular 114/1983. 
^ Keith Pordock Q.P.M. is now Deputy Chief Constable of Devon & Cornwall Constabulary. 
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FORM 301 
OBJECTIVE: To undertake a two year study.of crime in all its aspects,.real 
and perceived in an area of Charles Cross sub division and produce a strategy 
for inter agency co-operation in tackling the problems highlighted and report 
on the results of that co-operation as it affects the reduction of crime, real and 
perceived. 
During the months that followed in 1990, the chief inspector sought the views of Dr Rob 
Mawby ofthe University of Plymouth' as to how such a study could best be progressed. It 
was suggested that the work could form the basis of post-graduate research conducted by a 
police officer and it was decided to offer this opportunity to the author who was then 
stationed at Charles Cross as one of five uniform section inspectors. Following 
discussions, it was agreed that the area to form the basis of the study would be that known 
as Stonehouse* which, in 1990, was policed by two community constables. One covered 
the area on the North East side of Union Street up to the natural boundary with Victoria 
Park; the other, premises to the South and North West of Union Street. Union Street ran, 
more-or-less across the centre ofthe area and received a relatively large amount of police 
attention. The reason for this related particularly to the maintenance of pubhc order as a 
resuh of the number of licensed premises and late-night refreshment establishments there 
located. For the purposes of the study it was seen as an ideal location for research given its 
relatively high level of criminal activity and level of deprivation in social and housing 
amenities which surrounded Union Street.' 
Each section inspector had geographic responsibility for an area of Plymouth within the 
Charles Cross Sub-division in addition to supervising routine reactive patrol work. In 
^ Dr RI Mawby is now a professor at the Universitj- of Plymouth. The nniversity title is used for the purposes of identification during 
this period although the actual change of status from Polytechnic South West to the new title did not occur tmtil 1991. 
•* See Chapter 7 National perspectives to local implementation for more detail on the area of Stonehouse. 
' Union Street is one which has an international reputation amongst sea-farers, and armed-service personnel in particular, for the night­
life and 'service."!' it afforded, h is referred to in more detail throughout chapter."! 7 and 8. 
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reality the' amount of pro-active work which they had the opportunity^ or incentive to 
commit to their areas varied considerably. The'author did not have a specific responsibility 
for Stonehouse; his 'patch' was in a different part of the city known as Greenbank.* 
Nevertheless, the need to gain as close a position to the 'ground-activities' of Stonehouse 
as possible was seen as an important requirement of the research as there was a significant 
aura, or mystique, which surrounded the area, mainly by reputation. The importance of 
being in a' position to report objectively on factors of the research, within Stonehouse, 
without the 'baggage' of more general perceptions, was likely to be aided by a wider level 
of understanding of how the area functioned at a community and policing level. One of the 
initial considerations was, therefore, to regard at least part of the study as ethnographic in 
its research opportunities. 
There were other considerations which played a part in the initial decisions on how the 
research would progress. Firstly, the work needed to reflect the area from as wide a cross 
section of views as possible. The importance of reflecting residents' and victims' views 
was significant in both evaluating their reaction to the environment and the services which 
they perceived were being provided by the police and other groups. No less important were 
the views of police officers themselves and the evidence which would be available to 
support an understanding of how policing in Stonehouse was being, achieved. Secondly, all 
of these needed to be considered against the historic development of the area to provide a 
qualitative interpretation of the evidence presented. One aspect considered worthy of 
research was that of the police stmctures and activity pre-1990. There was perceived to be 
ample indicators of police development and an opportunity to place this 'factual' 
* Initial attempts were made to move his geographic responsibility to the Stonehouse area but this met with resistance from the 
inspector currently responsible for the patch and the sub-divisional comntander decided to abandoned this idea. 
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information in a wider perspective through use of recollections and 'oral history'. The 
historic approach was one able to draw into focus perceptions, of both police and public 
and provide a qualitative 'backdrop' against which to judge views expressed on the current 
environment. From the police side, this was able to concentrate upon structural issues as 
well as personal interpretations. Policy decisions at both local and Force level were able to 
be considered more critically against evidence from this method of enquiry. Public 
understanding of their envirormient, and the role of the police within it, potentially had a 
less structured perspective, but one which was able to be compared with other informed 
sources. These included residents and workers within the area. Thirdly, the statistical 
evidence of the makeup of the area was informative in terms of both demographic and 
official crime information. 
There were clear advantages in the author's local working role and the relatively close 
liaison which occurred between him and those involved in policing and the other 
individuals and groups which were either residents, victims or, in some other way involved 
in the Stonehouse environment. This did not minimise the potential disadvantages from the 
research position, particularly ethnographically, which will be considered in the section 
which follows. Having established a number of core links and contacts within Stonehouse 
the 'servicing' of these was fairly easy to accomplish whilst the physical proximity of the 
author to individuals and groups concemed was maintained. This was reinforced by his 
position within the police division where his work could be seen as directly linked to the 
daily needs of police/public liaison. Clearly this was not an essential prerequisite of being 
able to conduct research at this level, but it was a distinct advantage. 
By December 1991 a considerable amount of the initial Stonehouse research had been 
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undertaken; This included the completion of over ninety personal interviews with police 
officers, residents and victims of crime, as well as attendance and development of liiiks 
with a number of key voluntary and formal groups active in the social arena. It was at this 
point that the author moved to Exeter to work as an inspector on the newly formed Quality 
of Service Unit based at force headquarters. The work which he was then to become 
involved in during the following three years, while working in this new capacity, drew into 
the equation a range of research work which was directed more towards-tiie wider strategic 
levels of policing at both force and national level. The more localised focus of the study 
which had originally been intended became part of a wider picture of policing not 
originally envisaged when the study was started.' In reality, many of the objectives ofthe 
initial work had been completed but had not progressed in the way which would have been 
possible i f the author had remained a member of the Plymouth division. These primarily 
related to the management of the results and- impetus to accomplish change based on 
these.* 
The structure of the work which the author now embarked upon within the Quality of 
Service Unit was, however, directly relevant to certain aspects of the study which had 
already been completed in Stonehouse. In particular, the reaction of crime victims to the 
service which they felt they had received from the police became a comerstone of the 
activity which the force embarked upon during 1992. The way in which the organisation 
developed its intemal stmctures to address some of these issues, although now considering 
' There were clearly a number of stnicUiral issues which had already been identified within Charles Cross sub-division which could be 
used in a practical sense to fiilfil a number ofthe aims ofthe original proposals. These were highlighted and reported upon by the author 
in a memorandum forwa«led to the divisional commander for Plymouth during March 1992. In addition, and in line with the intentions 
of Chief Inspector Mechan at the time of submitting the original '301', a presentation was made to members of the local poh'ce/pubh'c 
liaison group shortly after\vards. 
' As with many such initiatives, the dynamic of the potential became lost when personal ownership did not reside with an individual 
who had direct responsibility for accomplishing results based on change. There were some indications that the work had not been totally 
without purpose, and the links v.'hioh had been established did lead to certaiii initiativ-es being pursued. 
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the whole of Devon and Comwall, was nonetheless equally lelevrnt to Stonehouse and 
Plymouth in general. Whereas the 1990/91 project had produced information about the-
reactions to policing at a local level, this data was now able to be used to supplement some 
ofthe questions which were being asked across the whole force. However, Stonehouse was 
now being studied without the direct links and personal contacts being developed at the 
leyel which would have been possible had the author remained Plymouth based. 
Methodology employed 
Four broad strands of research methodology have been used in this work. Firstly, an 
ongoing review of literature and subject-specific information from a range of sources 
which enabled the research to develop in a progressive and longitudinal fashion. Secondly, 
a review and analysis of demographic, criminal statistical and performance related data 
over periods according to the relevant key areas. Thirdly, methods of establishing activity 
and opinion through telephone, postal and personal interview surveys. And finally, 
ethnographic work conducted throughout the research. 
The review of relevant sources was accomplished throughout this period by two primary 
means. One was developed to ensure that appropriate police research and articles were 
reviewed as they became available and indexed using the simplistic (but effective) 
Cardfile facility of Microsoft Windows'®. This allowed a sufficient 'search' facility to be 
employed to identify such literature when writing-up parts of the work. A substantial 
amount of information was gained in the course of the research by way of documentation 
from Devon and Comwall, as well as other police forces, including papers presented at 
conferences which were attended on a variety of themes during the period of the work. 
These often formed the basis for reference material rather than core texts but, when 
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indexed, were subsequently able to provide backgroimd information in developing certain 
aspects of the study. This was particularly so where documentation from sources outside 
Devon and Comwall were made available to the author on a 'no-quote' basis. Amongst 
'revealable' sources outside immediate police circles were those obtained through the 
British Criminology Conferences of 1993 and 1995, The Police Foimdation, a number of 
management courses at the Police Staff College, plus quality of service and performance 
indicator seminars mn by management consultants and other institutions.' The second 
method involved a wider review of sources directly related to subjects being researched 
and was accomplished by systematic reviews of library databases in a number of key 
locations. These included the Police Staff College, the Home Office library, the Devon and 
Comwall Constabulary library and museum, and the University of Plymouth. In addition 
sources such as the Home Office Police Research Group's Enquiry Desk and, more 
recently, a variety of locations on the Internet were used. Information on crime statistics 
was provided from the Devon and Comwall Constabulary Criminal Information System 
(CIS) and an earlier version of this database (CRIMES) which was in use prior to 1992, as 
well as the force's Operational Information System (OIS) and its original computerised 
'command and control' system 'FALCON', Other sources of assessing crime statistics 
were used through the Home Office national figures which provide information on a 'force 
by force' basis across the offences committed and recorded within Home Office 'counting 
mles'. 
In terms of ethnography, there are inevitable problems in embarking upon any form of 
' IBC Technical Services, 37-61, Mortimer Street, London. 'Ensuring Qiiality of Service m the Public Sector' 2-3 November 1993 (al 
which chief constable Richard Wells presented a paper (Wells, 1993); Metropolitan Police, London 'Fairness, Community and Justice 
Conference' 26-28 February 1993; Police Foundation, London 'Performance hidicators' (July, 1993). 
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research using this method. UnUke statistical analysis of data, ethnography is more 
concemed with establishing 'closeness' and 'authenticity' in accounts of other people's 
lives. But to do so is fraught with danger as 'the ethnographer is never a neutral channel of 
communication, and to pretend to be is a deception' ... 'however carefully disguised...(the 
researcher)...is always the elephant in the room' (Pearson, 1993). Ethnography can take a 
number of forms and rely on different methods of data collection from anthropological 
styles of participant observation to in-depth interviews with 'actors' in their 'life-plays'. 
These are often combined to provide a multilateral perspective where direct evidence 
through interview is capable of being 'fleshed-out' through a background perspective of 
circumstances and environment. 
However, this work did not seek to be primarily a ethnographic account of policing 
development at local level. It necessarily combined elements of this discipline which are 
acknowledged and accounted for by the author because of his position as an 'insider' in 
one of the environments being studied (in this case, the police service). In other situations, 
the author's position was far more 'outside' the groups under consideration (e.g. the 
residents of Stonehouse, and the formal and voluntary groups with whom contact was 
made). In each situation, potential pitfalls in the gathering and reporting of information had 
to be both acknowledged and accounted for. But the reason for suggesting that this work is 
not primarily concemed with being a ethnographic study is because each series of 
encounters has not been undertaken with a view to distancing the author fi-om the 
'baggage' which accompanies him as a police officer. There are examples of where this 
has been done with some of the evidence presented from the writer's position in a police 
envirormient, but to seek to justify the whole work as being detailed in an ethnographic 
way would be unsustainable. Nevertheless, issues such as the ethical considerations in data 
125 
Methodology 
collection, personal values and beliefs, as ^vell as societal, and employitient status within 
the police organisation, all fomi important considerations in the way which this research 
has been conducted. 
One of the issues which had to be considered was that of the ethics involved in conducting 
research whilst working within the normal employment envirormient. This was less critical 
in terms of the formal aspects of the study which was taking place, as established 
sociological techniques and standards would be applied to any interviews which were 
undertaken. These included the promise that the respondents would remain non-
identifiable, an issue which was seen as particularly important when the remarks made may 
be critical of one or more aspects of the police service or, probably more relevantly, other 
officers. But other ethnographic reporting was perceived as potentially more problematic. 
The nature of the problems was seen as two-fold. Firstly, the simple fact that operating 
amongst one's colleagues, without them being aware that the substance of what they did 
and said held the possibility of being referred to in a piece of academic research. In other 
words, how much would they willingly impart to someone who they may have trusted 
less? Secondly, how accurately could the encounters be recorded, given the commonality 
of work experience and natural affiliation between researcher and researched? To what 
extent would they be relevant pieces of sociological research evidence, achieved through 
an objective understanding of the environment in which they took place? How much of the 
author's personal views and beliefs would be superimposed on the discussion, not to 
mention his position in the organisation when set against the position of some of the 
respondents? 
On the positive side, however, to what extent could the detailed understanding of certain 
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pieces of 'inside knowledge' benefit the communication between researcher and 
researched? Barriers could be more effectively broken down in this two-way process, thus 
allowing better quality data to be recorded than might be possible in a less informed 
encounter. Jock Young (1991) suggested that an insider's account could hopefully achieve 
the 'finer grain and detail' demanded of post-modem 'anthropology at home' whilst 
'reducing the problems faced by McCabe and Sutcliffe (1978) [....] where complex insider 
activities (were) being carried out in a sub-language designed to exclude the uninformed' 
(p.25). But if ethnography involves an element of'stepping outside' oneself, together with 
an ability to perform a detached intellectual process, how adequate would information 
gained from intemal personal research be? There were a number of aspects to this which 
provided a level of discomfort when writing up such information. It was therefore 
encouraging to note Tim May's (1993) observations on such issues, in particular the 
potential loss of imderstanding which can accompany the dismissal of personal feelings 
and perspectives in research situations; and being able to take these into account in later 
reviews of field notes for the writing up process (pp.92-4). Such matters have been 
considered and acknowledged elsewhere. Simon Holdaway (1983), an ex-police officer, 
placed much of his reporting in appropriate context but, nevertheless, still researched as an 
'insider' on matters intemal. Young's (1991) reflections on police practice and culture, 
provide carefiil consideration of the issues involved in participant observation in similar 
vein (pp.23-25) and Dick Hobbs (1988), although studying the police from the 'outside', 
nevertheless studied his own environment as a central element in his work whilst 
acknowledging some of the difficuhies inherent in the interpretation of relationships in a 
later paper (Hobbs, 1993). 
In an attempt to address some of these concems, the way in which information was 
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recorded was perceived to be an important element of the ethnographic part of the 
research. To ensure as accurate a recording mechanism as possible was developed, the 
author sought to lay down some grovmdrules for the way in which he would collect, and 
subsequently be able to analyse, information which was gained during the course of his 
normal working environment. The procedure adopted he entitled 'NASAP' for the 
purposes of being able to identify, in the writing ofthe work, comments and experiences 
which were collected outside the structured and semi-structured interviews. It followed a 
tradition which has been both commonly used, but, unfortunately discredited (circa PACE 
Act) in formal policing evidential circles! NASAP stands for 'Notes made As Soon As 
Possible' and was seen as a highly desirable form of compiling information as a result of 
personal experience. The decision to make notes of particular events or conversations 
which were held, or overheard, by noting the experience as soon as possible after the event 
in a 'diary' format, was similar to the daily experience of all police officers in having to 
make such records in their pocket note books when dealing with incidents. There is, of 
course, one essential difference - police officers' notes are made for the purpose of 
presentation before a court of law and need to contain facts able to substantiate an offence 
having been committed. Wider experiences of routine pafrol, therefore, never appeared in 
such documents. However, for such a method to be used to collect data for a piece of 
academic work, the need to ensure it was able to be scrutinised in a different, but no less 
important environment, required careful consideration. As such, a set of ground-rules were 
established by the researcher, to ensure that the notes made were as reflective as possible 
of what had actually been experienced.'" 
The 'Groundrules for use of NASAP data recording' are shown at appendix 'A'. 
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The basis on which NASAP was formula;ted proved particularly useful- later in the research 
in different environments in which the researcher found himself Life on the streets of 
Plymouth was the primary example of where the 'notes' proved particularly useful but the 
method was not exclusive to this use. NASAP had its problems in as much as it could 
never replace the accuracy of recall in recording properly constructed and controlled 
interview environments. However, in terms of understanding the wider environment in 
which cotnments and behaviour are perceived, it was potentially more valuable. It was also 
potentially controversial in its application, as the degree of trust invested in the researcher 
was one not based on an agreed notion of confidentiality prior to speech. Whether firank 
and controversial issues would have emerged through the course of semi-structured 
interviews is unclear, and it is probable that a number of subjects would not have been part 
of a more structured discussion in certain circumstances. 
The author made a deliberate effort to integrate himself more fully into the working 
environment of the two community constables who covered Stonehouse. The practical 
effects of this were not dramatic m terms of how routine policing was accomplished. No 
role-ambiguity was experienced, nor conflict engendered by this more diverse integration 
of his management position. The effect was particularly useful to the research because of 
the wider level of understanding which developed fi-om the local officers' perspectives on 
policing their particular areas. Good relationships were established with these community 
constables which enabled the desired 'feel' for the area to be accomplished. The position 
which the author held, in research terms, was highly privileged, with almost unrestricted 
access to the organisation in which he served. The ability to perform this semi-
ethnographic study of the environment and its people was without many of the bounds 
which constrain researchers from outside the police service. 
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The need to gauge a 'feehng' for the environment in which the initial (local) research was 
based dictated the need to encompass ethnographic styles of data collection, a decision 
which was primarily influenced by the position in which the researcher found himself An 
early evaluation of the task made it clear that whatever methodology was used to capture 
information from victims, residents and members of other groups in the area, the strategic 
nature of the role which was played by the officers who worked the Stonehouse patch, was 
crucial to an understanding of how the policing role was accomplished. A decision was 
made to concentrate attention upon officers who played the most prominent roles in daily 
policing tasks in the area, supplemented by qualitative background information gained 
from those who had been involved in policing Stonehouse in the past. The experiences of 
previous incumbents of a police mantle was a section of data collection which will be 
described later, but it was one considered desirable and informative as a tool to 
establishing how the current rationale of policing had developed. Within this particular 
aspect of the study were the seeds within which the focus of the overall work changed to a 
wider perspective on policework. 
The method of personal recollection amongst previously serving officers was relatively 
conventional and uncomplicated through the use of semi-structured interview schedules 
being used in personal interviews. Contemporary study amongst serving police officers 
was, however, directed by circumstance and pre-planned structure simultaneously, with a 
degree of ethnography forming the structure through 'inside' participant observation. The 
area of Stonehouse covered two 'beat areas' within the St. Peters ward of the city and ran 
from the Tamar estuary and Millbay Docks area, north-westwards along the city centre 
boundary (Western Approach) and was bounded on the western side by Stonehouse Creek. 
It covered a relatively small proportion of the city and was comprised of a variety of 
130 
Methodology 
accommodation and household types, mainly in the lower bands of social status. The two 
beat officers (commimity constables) who had responsibility for the North East and South 
sides of the area were seen as key informants to the process of policing. 
Personal interviews were conducted with both officers on a number of occasions. Each 
responded openly to an initial semi-structured interview aimed at identifying their 
perceptions of policing and the social environment which they policed, together with 
background information on their personal circumstances and views on a variety of 
subjects." Other personal interview records were made by use of the NASAP based 
method which was to be used throughout the subsequent research. Notable examples are a 
tape-recorded interview conducted with a retired police officer who, when the interview 
had finished told the interviewer to turn off the tape and 'have a chat about what it was 
really like.' The circumstances precluded any notes being made at the time and, through 
trying to re-gain the threads of the interview schedule from memory, notes were made 
straight afterwards in the researcher's car, thus ensuring as much information as possible 
was still available for reference purposes. Similarly such notes were found to be the only 
effective way of monitoring the views and opinions of senior and chief police officers in 
informal discussions atseminars and meetings both within Devon and Comwall and other 
forces. Again, the circumstances and the situation in which such 'chats' took place were 
always noted and great care taken not to attribute remarks to identifiable individuals. 
Oral history 
A central strand which is used throughout this work to exemplify many of the issues is that 
See Appendix 'B' for details of semi-structured interview schedule. 
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of oral history. This has been used in the recounting of interviews conducted with police 
officers who policed in Plymouth from the 1950s (and occasionally earlier) to the present 
day. The approach of using oral history as a technique to document individual experiences 
in unique situations has formed the basis of other writers' primary sources of information. 
Recent confributions such as Graef (1989), Brogden (1991) and Weinberger (1995), whilst 
developing the information at different levels of analytical debate, depict the use of various 
survival techniques adopted by those involved in countering aspects of their profession 
with which there requires a degree of rationale enhancement to support activities in the 
context of their historical perspective. Earlier criminal justice social investigation can be 
related back to the last century (Bennett, 1981) and throughout the twentieth century 
examples of this form of enquiry have added to the qualitative nature of understanding a 
range of aspects associated with criminal justice, lifestyles and the psychology of both the 
poHce and the policed (Sutherland, 1937; Punch, 1979; Hobbs, 1988; Reiner, 1991). 
In making sense of wider contextual issues researchers have utilised the direct quotations 
of actors to gain a more detailed inside understanding of some of the intrinsic aspects 
associated with the their debates. Brogden's text of the lives of police officers in 
Merseyside between the Wars developed the wealth of collected reminiscent evidence to 
elucidate the management of class and cross-pressures, contiadictory class locations and 
notions of personal integrity to address 'the problem of surviving work-life, in the crucible 
of conflicting class pressures' (Brogden, 1991: p. 165). The mystique which surrounds 
policework, for example, was approached by Punch (1979) as being capable of 
demystification by 'simply viewing it as work' and Hobbs (1988), through his semi-native 
study of the east-end of London was able to identify parallels of significant cross-
occupational behaviour between the law-enforcers and law-breakers, where both groups 
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were as much constrained and encouraged-by the social environment, as fornial legal or 
disciplinary rules which pervaded the justice system. Recollections and more recent oral 
testimony needs to be interpreted against the appropriate social and professional 
background to portray with any semblance of accuracy the meanings associated with the 
verbiage. Stonehouse through police eyes, therefore, could only ever be recorded as 
individualistic, guided snapshots of history when dealing with events and changes several 
decades ago but, set in the context of the historical development of the area, this 
information develops a greater degree of significance in interpretation. 
The views of the past may lack objectivity in recollection but should not be disregarded as 
totally flawed. The ability of many to recount with the basis of hindsight may be singularly 
more appealing simply because of the wider historical knowledge base from which they 
now draw. The dichotomy here is that the views of present day officers may be more 
accurate from a factual perspective but often no less subjective and, -with no opportunity to 
foresee outcomes, may well alter given the dynamic nature of operational policing in an 
intensely public and overt political atmosphere. In interviews conducted with serving and 
retired police officers the delicate, subjective interpretation of 'community' emerged 
frequently, as did the still more abstruse 'consent' model of policing. 
There is no intention to create a one-sided accoimt of events leading to present day 
policing development. The 'emotional mosaic' of direct speech and reference to real-life 
incidents is, however, an effective way to single out primary issues of both past and 
present. By doing so themes can be targeted and explored in greater depth; the agenda 
thereby being set by those whose experiences still hold centre stage in memories as well as 
through records available from the time. The police comments, therefore, set an agenda for 
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debate to some extern and are used in the integration and consideration of the pubhc view 
of these issues. 
Police officers serving at The Octagon 
Being centrally positioned in Stonehouse, this police station was one at which early 
evidence of how policing was accomplished prior to 1967 could be found. Formal records 
of life at The Octagon were not plentiful and those which were located tended to be from 
references within personal files and documentation offered once the series of personal 
interviews which were embarked upon took place. These interviews were seen as 
potentially providing two main functions: (i) obtaim'ng information about the Octagon and 
the way in which the area was policed, and (ii) enabling key areas of the research to be 
explored from the perspective of personal recollections and views on how policing had 
developed over time. 
Contact was made through the police personnel department at Exeter, and through the 
National Association of Retired Police Officers (NARPO), in order to identify officers 
who had served at Tlie Octagon. This search process proved not to be as straightforward as 
was first anticipated. Police records were not able to be searched through computerised 
means against search criteria of previous stations and, in any event, records of officers 
still serving tended to indicate that prior to 1967 they had been members of Plymouth City 
Police rather than the precise location at which they served in that constabulary. NARPO 
records were similarly unhelpful in this respect and contact made with the local secretary 
For more information on Tlie Octagon and its ofHcers' recollections see chapter 9: Community policing in Devon and Comwall. 
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of the branch indicated that the most fruitful way forward woiild be through personal 
contact with a number of officers who he knew had served in Plymouth City Police. 
The opportunity to complete the selection of a small sample through conventional random 
means appeared to be problematic and hence a less conventional but nevertheless 
productive process was embarked upon. In any event, one of the overall objectives in this 
stage of the research was to gain a 'flavour' of what policing Plymouth pre-1967 meant for 
a relatively small sample of individuals through detailed semi-shnactured personal 
interviews rather than produce a scientifically valid and representative sample. 
Subsequently, however, a record was found of the names and addresses of all officers 
serving in Plymouth in 1967 with their home addresses at the time and details of where 
they were serving. In addition, the Chief Constable's Annual Report of 1967 provided 
additional data. This proved useful in placing the individuals who had been interviewed in 
a context of where they were in the organisation at that particular time. 
The secretary of NARPO was able to provide the names and addresses of six officers who 
he knew had served in Plymouth and spent at least some of their careers at Tlie Octagon. It 
was intended that constable and sergeant ranks in particular would be selected to provide 
information through interviews but there was also a wish to elicit fhe views of more senior 
officers. The period during which these individuals had been at The Octagon was also 
important in establishing some common ground in evaluating responses. Initially, contact 
was made with the six officers by letter, and subsequent personal contact was made to 
identify that the information which had been given was correct and that they had served 
during a period which was seen as appropriate for this study (1950-1967). Five of these 
individuals fell within this category and interviews were conducted. These, and subsequent 
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interviews with others, normally took place at their homes, but also at locations chosen by 
them (in one case a police station, and another, the local Conservative Club).'' 
Each of the five initially interviewed was asked to provide what information they could 
recall about colleagues who had also served at The Octagon and, in all cases, similar lists 
of names were provided. Some were referred to more than others in recollections and this 
was influential in deciding on some prioritisation to seeking fiirther interviews. In all 
cases, names given were referred back to NARPO records to identify current addresses 
where appropriate (as some were no longer alive) and introductory letters forwarded to 
these ex-officers also. Table 2 reflects the sample which was eventually achieved. 
Constable Sergeant Inspector Ch Inspector Sup'tendent 
Senred 
1950-1967 
11 2 0 1 2 
Served outside 
period 
2 0 0 0 0 
Other reasons 
No interview** 
3 1 0 0 0 
Total 
sample 
16 3 0 1 2 
Total 
interviewed 
8*** 2 0 0 2 
* Rank referred to is rank on completion of service. 
** IncoR-ect information on vAere served, dead or not contactable. 
*** One officer was seriously ill and another could not be contacted. 
Table 6.1: Plymouth City 'Octagon' officers interviewed* 
It would clearly have been possible to delve further into the NARPO and force records to 
identify additional officer to interview. However, the historic perspective to the research 
had only partial relevance to the overall thesis and, upon later reflection of the deployment 
of officers in 1967 (as listed in the Chief Constable's Annual Report), it was perceived that 
the twelve officers who had been interviewed did reflect a broadly representative selection 
See appendix ' C for introductoiy letter sent to retired police officers and appendix 'D' for interview schedule employed. 
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of those who would have served during the period under study.''* There was a second 
'string' to this 'bow' which was able to be taken into account. That was the fact that this 
particular sample had been drawn exclusively from retired police officers and there were 
many who were still serving in Devon and Comwall Constabulary who may have had 
personal experience or recollections about The Octagon. 
Interviews with other police officers 
During 1991, whilst still serving as a shift inspector at Charles Cross in Plymouth, the 
author sought permission to undertake a number of interviews with constables who worked 
at that location, and elsewhere in the division, to elicit their views and opinions on policing 
styles particularly as they related to the Stonehouse area. Selection of the sample was 
drawn at random from the duty hst of staff using a simple numbering and selection 
method. This was effectively stratified by the way in which the duty sheet was published, 
dividing officers into five sections vidth community constables being shown separately. 
Twelve officers were sought, two from each of the five sections, and two commimity 
officers (other than the two who would be interviewed because of their positions as 
resident officers for the two beat areas covering Stonehouse). The establishment of 
constables at Charles Cross at that time fluctuated aroimd 130 to 140 and the sample size 
of 12 was therefore in the order of some 9%. In addition to these officers, during the 
course of the following four years, a further five interviews were conducted using the same 
interview schedule with constables with whom the author worked at locations other than 
Charles Cross. These were conducted on a significantly more subjective basis for selection 
A 'cast list' of individuals who have provided information for this work through interviews and NASAP is shown at appendix 'E'. 
Officers from the sample shown above are clearly identified within this. 
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- the central criterion being a perception that they had something to offer to considering 
how policing in Plymouth was being conducted or had developed. Officers with specialist 
knowledge in one or more of the four key theme areas of conmiunity policing, crime 
prevention, victims of crime and quality of service were also canvassed on their wider 
views on policing as they related to their professional interests. These included ofBcers 
who were able to add value to the debate at Stonehouse, Plymouth, Devon and Comwall, 
and national levels. In these cases, interviews were conducted against differing, sometimes 
less stmctured, schedules aimed at attaining wider, and more strategic overviews of 
policing. Amongst these were three officers who had performed a role of crime prevention 
officer at some point in their careers. 
Literature and reports reviewed, and discussions which took place with police officers who 
had been involved in the policing of Stonehouse for some considerable time highlighted 
the need to take account of the way in which policing had developed in the area. The 
changes which had taken place, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, were commented 
on by many as instrumental in shaping the feelings of individuals within the area. These 
initial discussions were influential in directing the line which was followed in the resident 
and victim surveys which were to be conducted. There were three central groups which 
could provide the type of information necessary to understanding Stonehouse. These were 
residents ofthe area who had been living there during the times where many of the major 
changes to policing styles emerged; victims of recent crimes which had occurred and, 
police officers who had been serving during this period or otherwise instrumental in 
policing the community at the present time. 
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From the initial, deliberations there was a clear line of feeling, often observable, and 
detailed later in the ethnographic substance of this work, that the role which the police 
played in the area was one which few members of the public did not have a view upon. 
There was, however, an equally clear message which related to vestiges of authority and 
bureaucracy which indicated there was a likelihood that postal self-report questioning may 
produce a lower than average response rate. The quality of response which would 
potentially be missed through undertaking work by any other method other than personal 
interviews was perceived as not being in the best interests of the research. Parts of the 
research concentrated upon aspects of policing within the area such as Community 
Policing and inter-agency work. In these cases also it was felt that to be sufficiently 
detailed in its enquiry would be difficult to build into a self-report study with the same 
likely degree of success in response rate and quality of data retumed. 
Surveys 
Three primary means were used to survey public reaction to crime and police activity, as 
well as views relating to knowledge and feelings about the social environment of the area 
in which individuals resided. These were personal interviews, telephone surveys and postal 
questionnaires. Each was used during the course of the research at a level conunensurate 
with the need for information on particular issues. In relation to the interviews which were 
conducted personally, these were primarily used to establish resident and victim 
perceptions within the Stonehouse area, whilst telephone and postal surveys were intended 
to gauge reaction at a wider level. Within this, benefit was gained through the work which 
the author was involved in instigating within the Devon and Comwall Constabulary 
Quality of Service Unit based at police headquarters in Exeter. This enterprise consisted of 
the establishment and training of a pool of telephone interviewers who were tasked with 
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contacting victims of burglary and violent crime to inform the cohstabu]ar>''s quality of 
service and performance monitoring programme. The data gained from these surveys, 
together with postal questionnaires and stratification of the results enabled more focussed 
analysis of public opinion within the Plymouth and Stonehouse areas. 
Al l structured questionnaire work was conducted within Devon and. Comwall and no 
formal surveys were administered outside the Force botmdaries. The reasons for this were 
two-fold. First,'the comparative nature of the research was able to be accomplished within 
the 'controlled' environment of the Force area, where factors which impinged upon 
reactions and views could be analysed against criteria capable of explanation and fiirther 
research. This was notably relevant to questions asked of victims where the controlled 
nature of the service environment at both police and other agency level could be related to 
other aspects of the study. Second, the period during which this work was undertaken was 
one in which almost all police forces were conducting some level of pubhc survey work 
either directly or through an agency of some description. Gaining access to survey public 
perceptions within another force which may have already completed or be involved in 
their own evaluation was therefore seen as potentially difficult at both a practical and 
political level. 
The methods of survey are outlined in more detail below, together with the methods which 
were employed in their administration. They will follow a chronological order, depicting 
the nature of the research as it developed, and explaining the considerations which were 
Political difliculty being perceived because of the namre of questions which, effectively, asked the public to 'rate' the service which 
they had recei^ -ed, thereby providing an outside Force with 'inside' information about another. In practical terms, the enterprise would 
have been problematic given that a significant proportion of the questions asked related to procedures which were common within 
Devon & Comwall, but which may not be applicable elsewhere. 
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influential in deciding to conduct research in these, ways. The first strands of survey work 
were completed in the local 1990/91 stage of the project and involved victims of crime and 
police officers. The rationale for selecting each group for study in this way was 
encouraged by the experience of the author in his ethnographic work role. 
Victims of crime 
Between 31 August and 27 October 1991, a total of 263 criminal offences were recorded 
by the police as having occurred in Stonehouse. Of these just under one third (87) involved 
victims who resided in that area or who had a business located in the area in which they 
were directly involved. Interestingly these figures did not immediately indicate residents of 
Stonehouse as being disproportionately victimised when compared to figures relating to the 
city of Plymouth as a whole. Crimes which had occurred between. 1 January and 16 
September 1991 in the three city sub-divisions of Charles Cross, Devonport and Crownhill 
totalled 17,477 and of these 1,179 (6.7%) were committed in Stonehouse. However when 
crimes which were non-personal-victim specific were excluded from the overall figure (i.e. 
shoplifting, commercial theft/burglary, corporate fraud), as well as crimes which were 
recorded due to their detection (in categories such as going equipped to steal and handling 
stolen goods), the overall crime figvu-e for the city fell to 14,556 indicating an 8.1% total of 
crime being committed in the area of study. 
1991 Personal Interviews 
The thrust of this initial stage of the work was to uncover, amongst a representative 
proportion of victims within the area, details of the police involvement in that and any 
previous crimes, personal beliefs and feelings about police activity in the area generally, 
views on the most appropriate way of policing the area, knowledge of other agencies 
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which operated from bases within the city and Stonehouse in particular and, the level of 
feelgood factor of living where they did. One of the potential benefits which was identified 
as being derived from undertaking this detailed and time-consuming level of investigation 
was the likelihood of gaining a greater level of qualitative data than would likely be gained 
through self-report questionnaires. 
The advantages derived from personal interviews are primarily in the hands of the 
researcher and the interpretative opportunities which exist with a semi-structured 
questionnaire can potentially lead the study in a direction not originally anticipated. In this 
instance a stmctured interview form was used with opportunity, through open questions, to 
provide verbatim qualitative data. Notes were made at the time and later transcribed by 
hand to a card filing system for subsequent use in analysis. A decision not to tape-record 
the interviews was taken as this was not the most opportune method given the stractured 
nature of the questioimaire and subsequent resources available to transcribe information 
were not readily available. It was found that the information forthcoming was of such a 
length and nature as to be easily noted at the time. 
The benefit of developing the personal interpretative data from residents was seen as 
providing an opportiinity to form a link between perceived and actual rates of crime from a 
perspective otherwise overlooked or ignored. By attempting to 'steer a course' through 
personal experience clearly hid many problems in both the collection of such data 
objectively and in subsequent interpretation. In any event, the result would only provide a 
relatively small personal snapshot over what would be a different period of time for each 
individual. The likelihood of this providing any more than an interesting set of reminiscent 
data was an accepted possibility but the opportunity of it being capable of a more tangible 
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linkage to policing activity, the quality of which could be well in excess of that gathered in 
simpler, less time-consuming ways, was the encouragement and rationale for its 
continuance. 
The questionnaire was piloted during August 1991 with five victims of crime taking part. 
This led to a number of important changes being made to the format of the document 
which related, in particular, to alteration of questions previously requiring pre-coded 
responses to allow verbatim replies to be recorded and coded later.'* This change was 
found to be desirable in that wider development of discussion about police activity, outside 
the confines of the crime which had occurred during the September/October period, often 
proved difficult to place in the initial categories with development of the interview 
occasionally drawing into question the appropriateness of an earlier coded answer. The 
need for clearly labelled 'show-cards' for certain questions also became apparent, 
particularly in questions relating to the interviewee being required to grade a response 
according to personal opinion rather than fact. The questionnaire was sectioned into the 
following main category areas: 
(i) the most recent crime which had occurred.'^ The questions relating to this section 
concentrated upon the victim's I<nowledge of the crime being committed, reasons for 
contacting the police and method of so doing, initial response of the police upon receipt 
of the information, satisfaction with this response from the police, attendance of the 
police, attitude of the officer(s) attending and satisfaction with action taken at this stage, 
further visits from the police and/or other agencies (primarily Victim Support); 
(ii) the individual's personal beliefs of levels of police patrolling, police effectiveness and 
visibility of police in the area; 
(iii) previous contacts with the police and feelings about these; 
(iv) understanding of the crime level in the area in relation to both other areas ofthe city 
and over time as well as fear of becoming a victim of crime again; 
See appendLx- 'G' for details of interview schedule used with victims of crime in Stonehouse. 
In 3 cases this was not the offence which had been identified the victim for research, i.e. they had been a victim subsequent to the one 
which occurred during the eight week smdy period). It was deemed more appropriate to detail responses to the most recent incident in 
order to minimise the likelihood of confitsion between events and maximise the chances of accurate recall. 
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(v) the area in which the victim resided In terms of their feelings for its community 
aspects and spirit both in the present and over time with reference to what influence, 
police, public and other agencies could have; 
(vi) knowledge of other agencies operating within the city and Stoneliouse with 
information on previous involvement (including Victim Support assistance given); 
(vii) details of household makeup by individuals there resident. 
The period of the year which was chosen to administer this survey was selected partly in 
line with the availability of the researcher but also being immediately outside the summer 
holiday period when it was suspected there would be a higher number of non-responses 
due to residents being away from the area. Similarly avoidance of the summer was more 
likely to ensure student rented accommodation was occupied and would capture this 
information as being part of the transient nature of certain areas of Stonehouse. It was 
uncertain how important interviewing students, and others who had been in 
accommodation for a relatively short period of time, would be. It was deemed 
inappropriate to sunply exclude them from the sample frame simply because of their 
student status as the period of their residence could well be relatively long-term. 
The Devon and Comwall Constabulary crime recording system in 1991 (named 'CRIMDES 
'91') allowed searches to be conducted across a range of variables including name, 
address, beat area code, date, type of offence and post code. Because the beat code areas 
were, effectively by design, co-terminus with the boundaries of the area being called 
Stonehouse for this work, the most appropriate starting point for a crime search was 
through the beat codes 35D (mainly north of Union Street) and 35B (mainly south of 
Union Street) by date. However, the location of Stonehouse, immediately on the edge of 
the city centre, drew into the beat areas a small number of central shops and also a large 
multi-storey car park. It was deemed that neither had a direct enough impact on the 
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residents of the area by either personal victimisation or geographic influence to justify 
their inclusion. Offences relating to theft of and from vehicles, as well as shoplifting, were 
therefore excluded if committed in these areas. However personal 'street' offences (e.g. 
theft from person and robbery) remained where the victim was identified as residing in 
Stonehouse. 
The original sample was drawn on 21 September and covered crimes reported to the 
police between 1-20 September. A second sample was drawn on 28 October for crimes 
reported between 21 September and 27 October, a total period of eight weeks. By 
searching CRIMES '91 using the listings page of 'aggrieved persons for Victim Support"^ 
sufficient information was included on four lines to allow selection of the sample. 
Information on each crime was studied and, of the 263 offences originally listed against 
straight 'location by date' searches, 176 victims who lived outside the Stonehouse area 
were excluded from the sample. Weeding based on the other criteria took place also which 
resulted in 87 crinies being identified for research. 
What was apparent from the analysis of the total crimes committed, when compared with 
residency of victims, was the proportion of offences which appeared to have had no 
obvious local impact on individuals as direct victims. Burglary showed the highest 
percentage of victims living locally and of the 24 cases shown above as having residents 
in the area, 20 were conventional residencies, 2 were a comer store (burgled twice during 
the period), 1 was a church and 1 a public house (table 6.2). 
" This page, although a facility available on the system which enabled a print-out of offences to be given to Victim Support was never 
actually used in this way even though a relatively open system of allowing access to 'crime recording books' by VS volunteers operated. 
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Total No. of No. of offences with No. of offences with 
Offence offences victim a resident of area victim not a resident 
Burglary 44 24 20 
Theft of/fmM/V 110 31 79 
Damage 41 16 • 25 
Assault 22 6 16 
Theft (other) 42 10 32 
Robbery 2 0 2 
Other 2 0 2 
TOTAL 263 87 176 
S9urce: Devon & Cornwall Constabulary - CRIMES '91 information system 
Table 6.2: Crimes recorded by police as having occurred in area beat codes 358 & 35D 
between 1/9/91 & 27/10/91 
The samples were drawn in two separate groups to enable visits to be made to addresses 
as soon as practicable. Attempts were made to interview in as chronological sequence as 
possible but this proved to be difficult to achieve due to the restrictive nature of the 
interviewer's time and the availability of victims. On average, victuns were surveyed five 
weeks after the crime had occurred with the shortest period of time elapsing being ten 
days, and the longest just over two months. Nevertheless the difference m delay appeared 
to have produced few adverse results in ability to recall events during the interviews. 
Because major pruning of the original sampling frame had taken place as a means of 
being specific on the criteria of individual to be surveyed, the sample, reduced to 87 
offences, proved to be a manageable size and no further sampling was undertaken to 
reduce this figure. If was deemed more beneficial to commence work on this group rather 
than take a wider time firame and random sample within the selected criteria. Primarily 
this was because it was considered that the immediacy of the interviews within a few 
weeks if possible was important and that should a wider time period be taken, stratified 
random saihpling would have proved difficult with what would still have been relatively 
small numbers of cases. 
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Initially letters were Written to each victim introducing the researcher and indicating that 
he would make contact during the following few weeks with a view to 'talking through' 
some aspects of 'policing in Plymouth' and in particular the crime which they had 
reported.The letter was found to be a useful tool for reassuring interviewees upon later 
contact that the interviewer was genuine although in one case he was kept waiting on the 
doorstep, through a semi-opened door, required to show his identification which was 
snatched off him and only allowed full access to the flat once the occupier had telephoned 
the police to confirm that all was in order. Five minutes into the interview a police 
constable arrived to further reassure the 42 year old smgle mother that the interviewer was 
who he claimed to be. 
There was a general willingness amongst all but a few victims to welcome the researcher 
into their home and spend normally at least an hour and on average ninety minutes 
discussing the case and their views on the area and its police. Overall, of the 87 cases, 
only one individual specifically refused to co-operate and 20 households were visited or 
• telephoned on at least three occasions without replies forthcoming.^ " 6 cases were deemed 
unsuitable, 3 because they were identified as being related to assaults of a domestic (intra-
familial) nature, 2 due to the offence appearing as one of two attacks on the same 
premises/person during that period (both occurrences therefore being able to be covered in 
the one interview) and 1 wrongly identifying the victim as being local to the area. In total, 
therefore, 60 of the 87 potential victims chosen to form the sample completed the 
interview, an equivalent response rate of 69% (table 6.3). 
See appendix 'H' for details of letter used as introduction to \ictims in Stonehouse. 
Visits/telephone calls were made during the davtime and on at least 1 e\-ening to ensure the greatest likelihood of success. 
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Number of interviews Average age Gender 
Assault 2 . 37 (27 - 47) 1 M, 1 F 
Burglary (dwelling) 15 38 (19 - 69) 8M, 7F 
Auto-crime 23 32 (19 - 67) 17 M, 6F 
Damage 12 41 (22 - 64) 8M. 4F 
Other offences 8 28 (18 - 46) 3M, 5 F 
Total 60 34 (18-69) 37M, 23F 
Table 6.3: Overview of resident-victims interviewed (by reference to crime recorded) 
In the majority of cases interviews were conducted with only one member of the 
household. An initial question sought to identify whether or not the person named in the 
police record as being the victim was the person who had actually suffered the loss, harm 
or damage. In a small number of cases it was found to be more appropriate to interview 
another member of the home. In others, where it was clear that there had been effectively 
similar impact upon more than one resident, second and third members were invited to 
remain during the questioning and supplement any particular aspect of the responses 
which they felt relevant. This only occurred in five cases and did not cause any imdue 
conflict in alternative responses which were given by those in attendance. Where 
opposing views were offered, this fact was noted on the questionnaire and any comments 
made in relation to the question were noted as verbatim responses for subsequent use as 
appropriate. 
Quality of Service Surveys 
The 1990s has seen formalisation of the collection of performance indicators across a wade 
range of service areas. The police Quality of Service initiative had resulted in the Devon 
and Comwall Constabulary embarking upon a number of ways in which the indicators of 
performance, set by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), could be monitored. 
Two of these indicators related to the satisfaction of victims of crime with the service 
which they had received from the police. Two specific victim categories were included: 
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victims of household burglary and victims of violent crime. Between October 1992 and 
June 1996 a total of nine individual surveys were completed for burglary and violent crime 
cases, each following similar methodological procedures and utilising identical questions 
to identify the standard of service which had been provided by the police officer attending 
the scene, as well as subsequent action which the police service had taken to keep the 
victims informed. '^ A Quality Assurance Check system had assisted by identifying areas 
of initial police action which might require examining and it was considered appropriate to 
use the recollections of victims to evaluate whether or not these procedures had been 
followed.^ ^ In total, through these surveys, the recollections of over three thousand burglary 
(dweUing) victims, and more than thirteen hundred violent crime victims were recorded. 
Table 6.4 shows the regularity with which these surveys took place and the sample size 
responding in each case. 
Surveys conducted When conducted Sample responding Notes 
Burglary victims Feb-May 1993 776 Postal & telephone 
questionnaire 
Burglary victims October 1993 236 Postal & telephone 
Violence victims 132 questionnaire 
Burglary victims January 1994 302 Postal & telephone 
Violence victims 196 questionnaire 
Burglary victims April 1994 218 Postal & telephone 
Violence victims 149 questionnaire 
Burglary victims August 1994 305 Postal & telephone 
Violence victims 182 questionnaire 
Buiglary victims Sept-Dec 1994 575 Postal & telephone 
Violence victims 236 questionnaire . 
Burglary victims Jan-June 1995 243 Postal & telephone 
Violence victims 154 questionnaire 
Burglary victims July-Dec 1995 217 Postal & telephone 
Violence victims 147 questionnaire 
Burglary victims Jan-June 1996 235 Postal questionnaire 
Violence victims 136 
Table 6.4: Devon and Comvyall Constabulary Quality of Service surveys conducted 
See appendix T for details of postal questionnaires which were used. Telephone surveys followed this structure also. 
See chapter 8: Quality of Service in Devon and Comwall for fijither information on the Quality Assurance Check system. 
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It was intended that the surveys would provide a useful management tool within the Devon 
and Cornwall Constabulary rather than only a general indication of the pubhc's 
perceptions. The key issue was ' i f people aren't satisfied - what can be done differently?' 
The need to translate the more detailed analysis of the survey findings into direct 
management action to accomplish change was the aim. This proved to be a difficult task, 
and one which has met with varying degrees of success. As will be shovm in later chapters, 
public perceptions of the police were generally positive, but in an attempt to ascertain 
precisely what police officers were doing in their interactions with victims, the survey 
questions were structured to ask recollections of fact in more detail than recalling feelings 
of satisfaction or otherwise. 
An analysis of how the specific questions asked in the Quality of Service work was broken 
down to identify the responses given by victims of burglary and violent crimes. The 
responses were coded to show whether the victims were residents in one of the following 
three areas: Stonehouse, the rest of Plymouth and the rest of the force area. The 
administration of the surveys to allow data to be analysed at the Stonehouse level was 
completed on those which were conducted during 1994 only. This was primarily because 
the surveys procedure was, by late 1993, sufficiently established and reliable to enable 
such changes to be made without imdue disruption to the working procedures of the 
interviewers. They did not continue in this form after 1994 as the author moved to another 
location in the force and, by 1996, surveys for the Quality of Service process were then 
accomplished through use of postal questiormaire only. In any event, it was felt that the 
size of sample surveyed during 1994 was sufficient to enable a representative view to be 
achieved of how these aspects of police investigation and service delivery were being 
accomplished at the Stonehouse level. 
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Survey samples and responses 
In all 166 victims of burglary residing in Stonehouse responded. The total sample frame 
across the force for burglary victims during the 1994 period was 2,608 with an overall 
response rate of 54% (1,400) being achieved. The sample frame of victims within 
Stonehouse was 362, from which a response rate of 46% (166) was achieved. By 
comparison, response rates Of 54% (256) and 57% (1018) had been achieved for the rest of 
Plymouth and the force respectively. Of those who responded across the whole force 
(including Plymouth and Stonehouse) 760 (53%) were female and 680 (47%) male in the 
cases of burglary. The trend was similar in the three geographic areas. The response is not 
of particular surprise, given that burglary in the home is likely to have an impact on 
anyone there residing and women may have been as likely to complete a postal 
questiormaire as their male partners. In terms of telephone questioning, interviewers were 
instructed to ask for the person named on the crime report but to be prepared to interview 
another member of the household i f that person answered and suggested that they were 
there at the time when the police called. A higher proportion of the burglary victims 
responding from outside the Plymouth and Stonehouse areas were 45 years Of age or older: 
57% as against 33% {Stonehouse) and 34% (rest of Plymouth). 
Victims of violent crime were surveyed on the basis of where the offence had occurred, as 
opposed to where they resided. This meant that, of the responses, only 22% of those 
victims whose offences occurred in Stonehouse lived in this area. However, (including the 
Stonehouse responses) 87% resided at a Plymouth address which was policed by officers 
within the city. Out of a sample frame of 1,289, 763 replies (59%) were received. 549 of 
these were through successful telephone contacts with 11 further victims contacted by this 
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means declining to take part in the survey. In all 732 postal questionnaires were sent and 
214 (29%) retumed completed. 
The surveys were identical in format to those administered amongst burglary victims and 
the method of selecting the sample was identical, using a time-frame tp identify the cases 
to be surveyed. The main difference was that more of the original selection was excluded 
after checking to ensure that victims who were imder 16 years of age, those where the 
offender was shown as a family member (or lived at the same address) and victims of 
sexual assault did not receive a telephone call or postal questionnaire. 242 (32%) female 
victims responded and 521 (68%) male. The type of violence cases surveyed (i.e. 
excluding sexual, domestic assaults etc.) showed a slight over-representation of female 
respondents compared to the likelihood of them reporting such offences across the whole 
force. Two-thirds of violence victims were under 35 years of age (65%), whilst 38% were 
under 25. Only 53 (7%) were 55 years of age or more. 
The proportion of the sixty victims surveyed by personal interview in 1991, who had 
resided in the area prior to 1980, was relatively small (7) and included 3 who had resided 
in more than one home in the area during that period. The desire to supplement this 
number resulted in an additional question on length of residence being added to the 
telephone interviews of burglary and violence victims from the area as part of the quality 
of service process during 1994 (table 6.5). This sample frame had been boosted 
specifically to enable a larger number of victims from the Stonehouse area to be surveyed. 
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1-6 6-12 1-5 5-10 10+ Total. 
months months years years years 
Burglary 
victims 
3 27 42 34 11 117 
Violence 0 8 11 9 0 28 
victims 
Total 3 35 53 43 11 145-
Table 6.5: Length of residence of victims in Stonehouse as reported in Quality of Service siirvevs 1994 
Eleven burglary victims were identified as residing in the area for 10 years or more and 
were subsequently contacted again by phone, this time by the author rather than a Quality 
of Service interviewer. Each was asked if they could indicate precisely how long they had 
lived in Stonehouse and whether they would have any objection to being interviewed 
about their recollections of policing in the past. One individual refused and the remaining 
ten agreed to be seen personally for the purpose of interview. Of these ten, four had been 
in the area prior to 1975, three since between 1975 and 1980 and the remaining three had 
taken up occupancy between 1980 and 1984. The six residents who had resided in the area 
before the 1980s were visited and a semi-structured interview conducted relating to their 
opinions and recollections of policing now and in the past. Together, with the interviews 
which had been completed in 1991, this meant that a total of 254 victim-residents had 
been surveyed using either personal interview, quality of service questions or a 
combination of the two (Table 6.6). This included questioning around their recollections 
of The Octagon police station, any personal dealings with the police they could recall 
firom that time, and their feelings about the effectiveness of pohcing in the area. The 
probing was designed to illuminate and draw linkages with the recollections of other 
respondents (notably police officers) who had been involved during this period. 
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Personal interview 
(1991) 
QoS survey plus 
personal interview 
QoS 
Survey only 
Total 
60 6 188 254 
Table 6.6: Stonehouse resident victims by means of interview (1991-1994) 
Methodology: an overview 
Although the writing up of what has actually been undertaken by way of research appears 
fairly logical in its enterprise, there is no doubt that the changes in direction throughout 
the work have made the final product far more complex and wide-ranging than that which 
was originally intended. Within each of the key areas of review: community policing, 
crime prevention, victims of crime and quality of service there is massive potential for 
wide and detailed elaboration at both national and local level. In reality the methodology 
developed alongside the author's regularly changing environment although, upon 
reflection, early principles and objectives still provided a useful foundation on which to 
build. If the opportunity to revisit the way in which the work has developed were possible 
then a somewhat more planned approach would have been preferred. However rewriting 
the past is not possible and the need to draw together that which has been gained to 
provide a useful perspective on local issues in a national perspective is, hopefully, one 
which is now possible. 
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National Perspectives 
to Local Implementation 
Chapters 2 to 5 considered the development of policing at national level since 1950 with 
specific attention being paid to the four key themes of community policing, crime 
prevention, victims of crime and quality of service. This chapter will set the scene for those 
which follow conceming the way in which policing has developed in Devon and Comwall. 
To do this it will consider demographic and crime data at national and local level, review 
the development of Devon and Comwall Constabulary where the more detailed research 
has been conducted, identify the changing intemal stmctures of policing, and debate the 
rationale for these changes in the national and local context. The national perspective on 
policing development, which has been discussed in the previous chapters, will be brought 
into local context by identifying the area of Stonehouse which formed the basis for much 
ofthe research, and the Devon and Comwall Constabulary will be reviewed taking account 
of general developments in its sfructure since amalgamation in 1967. The city of Plymouth, 
and the ward of St Peter (in which the area of Stonehouse is located), is described in more 
detail taking account of the demographic and crime factors which relate to the area 
together with the extent of crime in Devon and Comwall. 
The national policing perspective 
In the early 1960s, at the time of the Royal Commission, there were one hundred and 
nineteen separate police forces in England and Wales.' Following the Police Act 1964 this 
' Excluding national forces such as the British Transport Police, Atomic Energy Authority Police, Royal Parks and MOD Police. 
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number reduced dramatically and, by the early 1970s, just forty three forces remained, hi 
the south-west of England, four forces within Devon and Comwall became amalgamated 
(see next section of this chapter). On a national level the nature of crime and policing have 
changed significantly since then as previous chapters have identified. Here it is perhaps 
worth noting two particular Changes - the number of police officers employed, and the 
extent of crime. In 1950 the total police strength was 63,091 serving.a population of 43.6 
million. By 1998 the number of police officers had almost doubled to over 124,000 serving 
a population of some 52 million. The average number of officers per 1,000 residents in 
1950 was, therefore, 1.5 whilst in 1998 this figure was 2.4 (table 7.1).^  
Population Police officers Civilian staff Special 
Constables 
Police officers 
per 1.000 pop. 
1950 43.595,000 , 63.091 4.203 63.648 1.5 
1967 48,075.300 86.935 17,713 41,873 1.8 
1979 49.461.700 109,669 39.494 15.960 2.2 
1989 50,485,500 124,166 46.102 15.589 2.4 
1998- 51.823,073 124,933 57,196 19.874 2.4 
Source: CIPFA statistical tables (1950-1998) and HMCIC Annual Reports (1979-1998) 
* figures have not reflected secondments from forces. 
Table 7.1: Police staff and population figures (England and Wales) 1950-1998* 
The highest concentration of police per head of population has remained within the larger 
city forces, during this period, whilst less densely populated provincial areas have had 
proportionately less police resources to deploy. For example, taking account of the 1998 
data, the Metropolitan Police had 3.6 officers per 1,000 population and Merseyside, 3.2. 
However Devon and Comwall shared one of the lowest average number of officers per 
1,000 population with nine other forces (1.9), whist only two forces, Cambridgeshire and 
North Yorkshire, had a lower ratio (1.8).^  Also worthy of note is the extent to which 
civilian support staff numbers have risen during this period. Originally employed in 
^ Interestingly, despite Govemment and opposition party public pledges to increase police numbers by several thousand during the 
1990s, the nine years between 1989 and 1998 saw relatively little change to the police strength. 
' HMIC data, 1993. 
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primarily routine administrative capacities, support staff have increasingly been used to 
perform functions which were seen as exclusively roles for police officers. These have 
included the introduction of traffic wardens, professional finance, administration and 
personnel managers, gaolers, scenes of crime officers and enquiry office clerks. Overall, 
the number of civilian employees per 100 police officers has risen from 6.7 in 1950, to 
45.8 in 1998, a significant upward trend which has been observed in all forces across 
England and Wales. Interestingly, special constables outnumbered regular police officers 
according to the official figures of 1950 but their numbers had reduced to a third of this by 
1998." The initial high figure may have reflected the number of volunteers who became 
involved in the special constabulary during the period follovwng the War, whilst the 
subsequent decline in numbers appeared to have reached its lowest level during the 1980s, 
after which time more concerted drives towards recruiting volunteers resulted in the 
increase observable during the 1990s (table 7.1). 
During the last forty years overall recorded crime in England and Wales rose at an average 
rate of over 5% a year, from 669,000 in 1958 to 4,467,000 in 1997. This eight-fold 
increase represented 1,500 crimes per 100,000 population in the 1950s having risen to 
8,600 per 100,000 population by 1997, although the peak of total crime occunred in 1992 
when 5,383,000 offences were recorded (10,500 per 100,000 population) (figure 7.1). The 
vast majority of recorded crime is identified by police as property-related (in 1997 over 90 
per cent were property related) but the proportion of violent crime as a percentage of total 
la 1950, within three of the four tbrces serving Devon and Comwall, special constables outninnbered regular officers by an even 
higher proportion. In Devon this was 2,606:546, and Cornwall, 635:392. In Exeter City the difference was less dramatic at 167:107, and 
in Plymouth City special constables were outnumbered by regular officers - 144:310 (CIPFA statistical tables). 
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crime has increased from aromid five per cent in 1958 to eight percent m 1997 (Home 
Office Research and Development Statistics Directorate, 1998). 
_ 
Notifiable offences recorded by the police per 
100,000 population, England and Wales 
I I 
1 1.000-^  
I. 
I 1,0001 
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Source: Home Office Research and Development Statistics Directorate. 
Figure 7.1: Notifiable offences per 100,000 population (1958 - 1997) 
However, the extent to which recorded crime reflects the true level of criminal behaviour 
has long been considered inappropriate as an accurate measurement. Since the 
establishment of the British Crime Survey in the 1980s as a regular monitoring mechanism 
on the extent of crime, wide differences between recorded levels and higher unrecorded 
crime have been noted. The level of success which the police have had in detecting these 
offences has mcreased in proportion to the resources which they had available to deploy. In 
1958 the ratio of recorded crimes to the number of serving police officers was 9:1 with a 
detection rate which equated to 4 offences per officer. By 1992 the ratio of recorded crimes 
per officer had mcreased substantially and peaked at 42:1 with a detection rate of 12:1, and 
by 1997 crimes per officer had fallen to 36:1 with detections per officer at 10:1. Recorded 
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crime levels had, therefore, been increasing at a faster rate than the number of police clear-
ups despite a substantial increase in police staffmg. However, the increase in staff had 
developed at a slower rate than that of recorded crime but individual officer productivity 
appeared to have more than doubled in terms of crimes detected (figure 7.2).' 
° i I i i I 1 I S s s s I i i i i I s 2 ! 
VMn(l*HU>1M7) 
Source: Home Office Research and Development Statistics Dept. 
Figure 7.2: Ratio of recorded crimes and clear-ups to the number of police officers (1958 - 1997) 
Devon and Cornwall Constabulary 
Forming the most south-westerly portion of the United Kingdom, the Devon and Comwall 
Constabulary covers the largest geographical police area in England extending 180 miles 
from the Dorset and Somerset borders in the east to the Isles of Scilly in the West, in total 
an area of 2.5 million acres. To consider its size in perspective, it is large enough to 
' Detections included all crimes solved irrespective of the manner of detection. Therefore, taking account of those which were 
concluded by secondary means such as 'taking into consideration* (TIC), or the more widespread use of post-conviction interviews in 
the 1990s, individual officer productivity could not be regarded as being fully reflective of primary detection work. 
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the time of amalgamation the total police strength of the combined forces was just short of 
two thousand officers serving a resident population of almost one and a quarter' million. 
These figures reflected an average ratio of police officers per thousand population as 1.6 
across the two counties. However, this ratio was not evenly spread across the four 
constituent forces, with Pljonouth having 2.1 officers per 1,000 population, whilst the 
Devon and Exeter, and Cornwall constabularies had 1.6 and 1.3 respectively (table 7.2). 
Comwall Devon & 
Exeter 
Plymouth Combined 
Population 353,360 651,140 213,980 1,218,480 
Police officers 469 1,065 438 1.972 
Officers per 
1,000 pop. 
1.3 1.6 2.1 1.6 
Table 7.2: Police staff and population figures (Comwall. Devon & Exeter, and Comwall) 1966 
Following the establishment of the new force it was divided into thirteen divisions, within 
three districts, each district being under the command of an assistant chief constable. The 
dishicts and divisions are shown at table 7.3 with their respective personnel establishments 
at the time of amalgamation. Interestingly, in an apparent attempt to reduce the leyel of 
parochialism which might occur if No.l dishict covered only the county of Comwall, 
Okehampton, and part of the former Bamstaple division (both previously within the Devon 
and Exeter Constabulary) were included as part of the district area within 'D ' division. In 
1969 the number of divisions was reduced to eleven with ' B ' (Truro) and ' N ' (Tiverton) 
divisions being incorporated into neighbouring areas. On 1 January 1971 this number was 
reduced further with the removal of ' M ' division (Newton Abbot) from the force stmcture 
and subsequently a forcewide traffic division was established also. A Chief Constable's 
General Orders (part 1)'' dated 3 September 1969 indicated that a number of country police 
• General Orders (part 1) are now referred to as force 'weekly orders' and provide updates on staff promotions, transfers, legislative 
updates, and other issues of relevance to the routine administration ofthe force. 
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stations would be closed during the forthcoming, years, although increased availability of 
alternative police accommodation for officers would dictate the rate at which these 
closures would take place. This involved, in total, 137 stations being listed for closure in an 
appendix to the order, a factor which has a bearing upon the discussion on community 
policing which takes place later in this work. 
Chief 
Const 
Ass't 
Chief 
Const • 
Chief 
Supt Supt 
Chief 
Insps Insps Sergts Const Total 
Force Headquarters 1 3 3 6 5 17 • 18 82 135 • 
No 1 District HQ 1 1 1 2 5 1 11 
'A' Div (Camborne) 1 1 3 4 21 116 146 
'B' Div (Truro) 1 1 4 3 22 115 146 
' C Div (Uskeard) 1 1 3. 4 22 114 145 
'D' Div (Launceston) 1 1 5 15 75 97 
No 2 District HQ 1 1 1 3 3 10 20 39 
'E' Div (Plym Central) 1 1 2 14 36 176 230 
'F' Div (Crownhill) 3 . 9 22 161 197 
'G' Div (Plympton) 1 1 2 5 21 132 162 
No 3 District HQ 1 1 1 2 5 
'H' Div (Bamstaple) 1 1 2 4 20 106 134 
'J' Div (Exeter) 1 1 3 10 29 139 183 
'K' Div (ToriDay) 1 1 4 7 27 141 181 
'L' Dtv (Exmouth) 1 1 4 17 100 123 
'M' Div (Newton Abbot) 1 1 4 16 95 117 
'N' Div (Tiverton) 1 1 3 13 74 92 
Totals 1 6 14 23 42 96 314 1547 2,143 
Devon & Comwall Constabulary Annual Report 1967 
Table 7.3:- Composition of Police Officers: Devon and Comwall Constabulary 1967 
During the next ten years further changes to district and divisional boundaries took place. 
In the 1970s Cornish divisions lost the geographic management structure which had linked 
them to part of Devon in No.l District when the three ACC commanded dishicts 
disappeared and eight divisions, each under the command of a chief superintendent were 
created (table 7.4). Further reviews of the policing structure and staffing deployments took 
place during the 1980s and a change during the early years of the decade saw the number 
of divisions reduce still fiuther to six, a position which was to remain until 1994 (table 7.5) 
although changes to the sub-divisional boundaries within the divisions saw the original 
total of twenty five reduce to twenty in the early 1990s. The main rationale underpinning 
these various organisational changes was operational effectiveness and staffing 
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deployment.- Whereas the number of constables had risen, -so too had the. higlier 
mariagement ranks in the organisation, a position which was to change significantly during 
the 1990s as pressure brought about by Govemment and, in particular, the report of Patrick 
Sheehy (Home Office, 1993a), concenh-ated upon the management 'on-costs' of the police 
service. 
• Chief 
Const 
Ass't 
Chief 
Const* 
Chief 
Supt Supt 
Chief 
Insps Insps- Sergts Const Total 
Force Headquarters' 1 4 7 15 15 39 57 97 225 
'A' Div (Camborne) 1 2 7 13 67 265 355 
'B' Div (Launceston) 1 2 6 10 48 192 259 
'E' Div (Plymouth) 1 6 5 22 65 378 . 477 
•G' Div (Ptympton) 1 1 4 5 31 121 163 
'H' Div (Bamstaple) 1 1 5 7 29 156 199 
'J' Dfv (Exeter) 1 2 3 11 44 199 260 
'K' Div (Torbay) 1 3 5 17 53 283 362 
'L' Div (Exmouth) 1 1 4 4 32 120 162 
Traffic Division 3 4 5 26 205 243 
Totals 1 4 15 36 58 133 452 2,006 2,705 
Devon & Comwall Constabulary Annual Report 1979. * including Deputy Chief Constable. 
Table 7.4: Composition of Police Officers: Devon and Cornwall Constabulary 1979 
Chief 
Const 
Ass't 
Chief 
Const* 
Chief 
Supt Supt 
Chief 
Insps Insps Sergts Const Total 
Force Headquarters 1 4 7 15 17 32 50 97 223 
'A' Div (Camborne) 1 3 6. 17 63 314 404 
'B' Div (Launceston) 1 2 5 9 52 214 283 
' C Div (Bamstaple) 1 2 4 . 8 38 179 232 
'D' Div (Exeter) 1 4 4 20 76 340 445 
'E' Div (Plymouth) 1 .5 8 25 85 471 595 
'F Div (Torbay) 1 4 4 18 71 363 461 
Traffic Division 1 2 3 5 23 208 242 
Totals 1 4 14 37 51 134 458 2.186 2,885 
Devon & Comwall Constabulary Annual Report 1989. * including Deputy Chief Constable. 
Table 7.5: Composition of Police Officers: Devon and Comwall Constabulary 1989 
During 1993 a review was conducted of the force organisational stmcture which, in April 
1994, led to the realigning of divisional boundaries and the establishment of three 
headquarters 'support' divisions. The decision to review the management and stmcture of 
the force was influenced by the Audit Commission and Her Majesty's Inspectorate, both of 
which identified potential benefits to be derived through moving towards a single-tier 
command stmcture outside headquarters. In addition to pressure being applied to reduce 
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management on-cpsts,-the reorganisation also took account of the goyemment review of 
local authority administration and boundaries which was, at that time, being conducted by 
Sir John Banham. The decision to review boundaries in this way was influenced by the 
Morgan Report (Home Office, 1991a) which had identified the role which local authorities 
could have in the reduction of crime. 
It was clear that certain local govemriient areas were likely to receive 'imitary authority' 
status with their own budgets distinct from those of the county areas within which they 
resided. The police reorganisation team identified three locations v^ithin Devon and 
Comwall which were likely to become unitary in the future: Exeter, Torbay and Plymouth. 
The police divisional boundaries were, therefore, redrawn to reflect the geographic areas 
which would form those of the new authorities, whilst the remainder of the force area 
became divided into six divisions broadly encompassing district council boundaries (figure 
7.4). In the event, the reorganisation team correctly assumed the majority of 
recommendations which Banham was to make, with the exception of those relating to the 
city of Exeter which failed to gain unitary status and remained part of the two-tier local 
govemment stracture. The effect of these changes meant that the two unitary authority 
areas of Plymouth and Torbay, as well as the non-unitary Exeter City Council, each had a 
police commander responsible for policing only these specific areas ('E', 'F ' and 'D ' 
divisions respectively), whilst commanders in the remaining divisions served either two or 
three district authorities. Comwall, with its six district authorities and the Isles of Scilly,^ 
became three police divisions ('A', ' B ' and 'G') which each covered two authority areas. 
The Isles of Scilly enjoys a unitary status in terms of its local govemment budgetary and decision making processes. 
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and the remainder of Devon, with eight district authorities, reahgned into three pohce 
divisions also ( 'C , ' J ' and 'K') . 
A Division (Penvwth and Kenier District Councils) F Division (Torbay District Council) 
B Division (Caradon and North Comwall District Councils) G Division (Carrick and Restormel District Councils} 
C Division (Torridge and North Devon District Councils) J Division (W.Devon, Soutti Hams & Telgnbridge 
D Division (Exeter City Council) District Councils) 
E Division (Plymouth City Council) K Division (East Devon & Mid Devon District Councils) 
Source: Devon and Comwall Constabulary ('X Department) 
Figure 7.4: Devon and Comwall Constabulary territorial divisions (April 1994) 
The timing of the reorganisation was also relevant in terms of the structural changes which 
were taking place in policing nationally, particularly through the Police and Magistrates' 
Courts Act 1994. Annual Plans for the policing of Devon and Comwall were already in 
existence, as were five year Strategic Plans, but responsibility for the production of these 
was to change from that of the chief constable to the police authority.' In tum, police 
divisions produced annual plans for their areas following local consultation. Within both 
force and divisional plans were targets which reflected the national key objectives set 
In reality, the plan was formulated by the constabulary and submitted to the pohce authonty for approval and adoption as its policing 
plan. 
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annually by the Home Secretary.'" Together with an increased level of devolvement of 
certain budgets and decision making authority to divisions, the nine territorial commanders 
became more accountable than previously for the results which were achieved against 
these indicators; a position which was emphasised through the Policy Advisory Group, a 
monthly management group chaired by the chief constable. 
The Police and Magistrates 'Court's Act had also widened the scope for generating income 
and, although still subject to force approval, local commanders were encouraged to identify 
options for increasing income within their areas through sponsorship or payment for 
services. Examples of where this was done included the Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital 
Trust's decision to employ two full-time constables at its Exeter sites in preference to a 
local security firm; a Cornish council's agreement to pay for the services of constables to 
patrol a coastal village during the sunmier months; sponsorship of 'Ringmaster' telephone 
systems to enable the regular updating of Neighbourhood Watch co-ordinators, and various 
sponsorship of vehicles and equipment under crime prevention banners.'' 
However, the nature of local responsibility and accoimtability within divisions increased 
the opportunity and rationale for continued development of crime prevention initiatives 
such as those already embarked upon in Plymouth.'^ Approaches to community safety, as 
having a wider level of significance to agencies other than the police, became evident 
through the development of 'community safety sfrategy groups' (CSSG) in other areas of 
'° National Key Objectives (NKOs) were set by the Home Office and reflected the Government's emphasis on directing the priorities 
which the police should work to, together with an agenda against which the Audit Commission and HMIC could measure performance. 
With the change in Govemment in 1997 NKOs became 'Ministerial Priorities'. 
" The extent to which Devon and Comwall promoted the opportunit)' for income generation was one which dewloped at a cautious rate 
taking account of the wider political situation whereby the extent to which income received had the jwtential to be 'olawed-back' by the 
Treasury. It was also clear, from research conducted, that the willingness of other forces to become involved varied according to 
pragmatic and philosophical positions adopted by chief constables and police authorities (see Bunt et al., 1997).. 
^ See chapter 10: Crime Prevention in Devon and Comwall. 
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the force, whilst in Plymouth, the emergence of a ward policing system in which teams 
workedto problem solving agendas alongside other agencies received recognition 
nationally (Audit Commission, 1996b)." Whereas no statutory responsibility for the 
prevention of crime lay with any agencies (a position which was to change following the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998), the extent to which the thrust of multi-agency work was 
being followed, and initiated, by police commanders who sought to.achieve targets of 
reducing and detecting crime, dictated much ofthe pace in the initiatives. In Plymouth, the 
work which had developed during the previous few years was given additional impetus 
through the reorganisation and the potential for wider levels of funding such as that 
available through Safer Cities added to the practical opportunities still fiirther. 
In 1997 an intemal force review of the changes which had taken place during the 
reorganisation of 1994 was instigated. A small team of officers and support staff (including 
the author), under the command of a superintendent, conducted the review between January 
and March. As well as considering the effects which reorganisation had made to the 
financial and management stmcture of the force, the views of officers were seen as an 
important factor in determming the overall benefits which may have been derived. In 
addition to canvassing views from individuals of all ranks and positions, as well as the staff 
associations, particular effort was made to ensure that senior officers' views were taken 
into account. This qualitative evaluation explored how reorganisation had worked in 
practice, how it had been received by members of the constabulary and whether roles and 
stmctures were understood. It also sought to determine whether the effectiveness of the 
Force could be improved and if there had been any perceived adverse consequences which 
See chapter 9: Community policing in Devon and Comwall. 
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were not foreseen in the planning and implementation of the reorganisation. As part ofthe 
process attempts were made to personally interview all divisional commanders and heads 
of headquarters deparhnents, as well as members of divisional management teams 
(DMTs).''* The interviews revealed that the majority of respondents felt the establishment 
of the three support divisions ('L', ' M ' and 'O') had been a positive development. 
However, concern was expressed that, in some instances, these divisions were seen to be 
leading rather than supporting divisional work. This was more prevalent in comments 
which related to ' L ' (crime) and 'O' (operations) divisions where territorial commanders 
expressed the view that the lead taken, on occasions, drew into question whose decisions on 
deployment of resources had primacy. 
The steps which had been taken to develop the support divisions, was seen as having 
increased the professionalism of the force in being able to respond to major incidents, and 
those requiring specialist experience. However, the movement of resources to centrally 
managed divisions was also potentially problematic in as much as these staff were not 
perceived as being directly available for deployment by territorial divisions to address local 
policing needs. There was undoubtedly a pool of expertise available to supplement specific 
initiatives, particularly in the guise of officers from the 'tactical aid group' (TAG), who 
were frained to a high level of competence in public order policing; and within the crime 
division (L) who undertook intelligence support and major incident management. However, 
these resources needed to be bid for by local divisions, and the opportunity for this to cause 
territorial commanders to perceive that they were not always receiving an equitable share of 
" In all 41 constables, 19 sergeants, 14 inspectors and 12 civilian support staff submitted views to the reorganisation review team. 
Personal interviews were conducted by the author with a total of 62 staff including 4 chief officers (one of whom was the civilian 
director of finance and administration), 11 ofthe 12 divisional commanders, 9 department heads, 29 members of DMTs and 9 other 
senior individuals from within ditisions or departments. 
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the resources was potentially problematic. The structure and establishment of the\force 
thirty years after amalgamation is shown at table 7.6. Following on from the review, and 
with the impetus given by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the force restructured again in 
1999 along lines which emphasised the local disfrict council bormdaries even more than the 
1994 changes had done. The new structure saw the establishment of district commanders 
(in either chief inspector or superintendent rank) each responsible for one of the sixteen 
local govemment authority areas of the force. These districts formed part of four new 
'areas' each commanded by a chief superintendent. 
Chief 
Const 
Ass't 
Chief 
Const* 
Chief 
Supt Supt 
Chief 
Insps Insps Sergts Const Total 
Force HQ 1 3 4 4 12 16 31 16 81 
'A' Div (Camborne) 1 2 8 26 164 201 
'G' Div (Truro) 1 1 2 7 26 191 228 
'B' Div (Launceston) 1 3 8 28 154 194 
"C Div (Bamstaple) 1 3 9 22 146 181 
'D' Div (Exeter) 1 2 9 16 157 185 
•E' Div (Plymouth) 1 1 4 18 40 385 449 
•P Div (Torbay) 1 3- 9 21 170 204 
'J' Div (Totnes) 1 1 2 11 37 221 273 
'K'Div (Exeter) 1 3 6 27 152 189 
•L Div (Crime) 1 3 6 7 31 175 223 
'M' Div (Crim Justice) 1 2 13 61 64 141 
'O' Div (Operations) 1 3 4 17 54 328 407 
Totals 1 4 12 17 48 138 420 2,322 2,963 
Devon & Cornw/all Constabulary Annual Report 1997/98. 
* including Deputy Chief Constable. 
Table 7.6: Composition of Police Officers: Devon and Comwall Constabulary 1998 
This change saw '1 Area' covering Comwall; '2 Area', Plymouth; '3 Area', South and 
West Devon; and '4 Area', East and North Devon. Whereas Areas 1, 3 and 4 each covered 
a mmiber of district authority locations, 2 Area had responsibility for the Plymouth City 
Council area alone (partly because of its unitary authority status, and also because of its 
size and challenges in policing terms). Its organisational management stmcture was 
reflected in there being no officer delegated to a district command role as in other areas of 
the force. In Plymouth the Area Commander assumed overall responsibility for local 
policing issues, assisted by officers of superintendent and chief inspector rank with specific 
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responsibilities for crime reduction, community safety and operational matters. The 
rationale for the force restructurmg was based around local ownership of problem solving 
between the police and local authorities, a central tenet on which the Crime and Disorder 
Act had been buih. A map showing the geographic structure of the force post-6/4/99 is 
shown at figure 7.5. 
Dsvon & ComwaO Constabutary Area / District Boundaries 
(To M B aaact • t « M | 
4 AREA 
1 AREA Nortti Cornwall 
Torbay 
3 AREA 
Penwit Plymouth 
2 AREA 
MuolSciv 
(Some district boundaries are yet to be finalised) 
Source: Devon and Comwall Constabulary ( 'X' Department) 
Figure 7.5: Devon and Cornwall Constabulary territorial divisions (April 1999) 
The 1997 review of force structure had also identified a much wider range of policing 
activities being managed from headquarters-based divisions and departments than during 
previous periods. There was a clear rationale to this in relation to the development of a 
corporate approach to providing a policing service across the two counties. Nevertheless, 
with an mcreased level of devolvement which had been a product of the 1994 
reorganisation, there was an underlying feeling amongst territorial commanders that a more 
direct line of resource command to them, rather than through the centre, would be 
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beneficial in local problem solving. The headquarters role in policy making and' direction 
was accepted as an essential elenient of force organisation, epitomised by central 
departments such as 'community affairs', which had been in existence under this title (or 
other variations of it) since the estabhshment of crime prevention officers in the 1960s. 
Structurally, the force had seized many of the numerous opportunities to develop its 
strategies in terms of comrnunity safety, crime prevention, victim services and quality 
issues, by directing policy from headquarters. At local level, divisions had established 
mechanisms to implement these policies. These were conventionally under the command 
of the divisional superintending rank, although direction would also be forthcoming from 
the centre. Resultantly, posts such as crime prevention, youth affairs and schools liaison 
officers often exhibit some ambiguity in terms of line management and strategic direction. 
The position in which the force 'commimity affairs' department found itself during the 
early 1990s was one which saw it move from being a department, to become part of the 
headquarters 'imiform operations' and, later, 'operations' (O) divisions'. In 1995 it 
reverted to being a department in its own right (R department). The rationale which 
underpinned the incorporation of it into an operational division was, in large part, an 
acknowledgement that the perceived gap between what was being done on 'the ground' 
and iri 'the office' had grown too wide. However, no structures were put in place to 
incorporate the conimunity constables' roles more coherently into the sfrategy and, within 
a relatively short period, it was perceived that the nature of work which was cenfral to the 
'community affairs' existence had become reduced in importance. 
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This early 1990s period was one within Devon and Comwall vvhich sav/ the relegation of 
the conimunity policing role in its strategic importance to the force. Moving responsibility 
for its forcewide strategic direction away from a specialist department to within 
'operations' was more than just cosmetic in its wider significance. What happened could 
not be divorced from the sea-change of emphasis at national level where performance was 
becoming even more statistically measured and use of resources needed to be seen to be 
having an immediate, rather than long-term effect. There was a hiore pragmatic approach 
being conceived at force level to the use of resources, and integration of a specialist 
department servicing the 'soft-core' of policing did not necessarily fit with a model which 
was becoming based more on strategies of intelligence-led policing^' than community 
problem solving. The fact that the more community based approaches to policing became 
re-established as a separate department again, relatively shortly after their amalgamation 
was,, to a large extent, an acknowledgement of the significance of much of the strategic 
work relating to ancillary matters such as support and servicing of neighbourhood watch. 
Victim Support and crime prevention. It was not, however, until the work which was 
completed in reviewing the force structure again in 1997, that the force aim became 
specifically directive in its acknowledgement of the role which community based policing 
and problem solving strategies had in achieving results. 
Crime in Devon and Cormvall 
In the last year of its existence (1966), Plymouth City Police recorded 6,436 crimes of 
which 2,704 were detected.'* Recorded crime was about twice that of ten years previously: 
' Intelligence-led policing w-as developed as a model across the force in the early-mid 1990s following a rational philosophy of making 
best use of intelligence to enable the detection of crime. Centrally driven by the force's Crime Division, and with substantial resources 
devoted to the technological requirements of computerisation, it became a model of good practice acknowledge as such by HMI and 
others. 
'° Of interest is the fact that 669 (almost 10%) of the recorded 6,436 crimes were subsequently shown as 'no crimes having been 
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3,280 (.1956), a trend not out of line With that observed nationally. The rate of increase in 
recorded crime had almost doubled in Cornwall oyer a similar period, from 4,291 in 1957 
to 7,803 in 1966, whilst in the rest of Devon and Exeter crime had risen by as much as 
thirty six percent in the three year period covering 1964 to 1966: from 8,453 to 11,467." 
Between the mid 1960s and 1998, crime across Devon and Comwall rose in line with the 
national frend with the first set of data for the newly formed. Devoii/ and Comwall 
Constabulary showing 26,448 crimes being recorded, as against 92,196 in 1997/8 (table 
7.7). The overall percentage rise in the various categories of crime is shown at figure 7.6. 
1967* 1979 1989 1997/8 
Violent crime 519 i:980 3.845 6.614 
Sexual offences 576 „ 577". 702 812 
Burglary 2,908 . ,7.661 15.845 19,244 
Auto thefts 4,070 7,142 " 17.702 22.355 
Thefts (other) 15,810 19.243 23,950 25.183 
Damage 948** 2,774 9.677 14.301 
Other oftences 1,617 1,955 3,946 3.687 
Total 26,448 41.332 75,667 92,196 
Source: Devon and Comwall Constabulary Annual Reports 1967-1997/98. 
* 1967 figures extrapolated from data shoving theft previously defined as 'larceny" and other altemative titles such as 
'housebreaking' and 'shopbreaking' being included above as 'burglary'. 
** 'Malicious injury to property* has been combined with 'kindred offences' under the heading 'offences against property with 
violence' to arrive at this figure. The former definition showed only 71 offences which clearly under-reported damage 
offences. 
Table 7.7: Recorded crime in Devon and Comwall between 1967 and 1998 
The way in which the recorded crime rate varied across regions of Devon and Comwall 
followed a reasonably consistent frend with Plymouth regularly accounting for some 
quarter of the total crime for the two counties, well above that predicted from its share of 
the population (see Plymouth section of this chapter). Moreover, the proportion of certain 
crimes, notably violence against the person, showed a consistently higher level of 
occurrence in Plymouth than elsewhere vdth the distribution of such crimes distinctly 
committed' in the official figures making a nett crime rate of 5,757. However, in view of the proven vmder-recording of crime through 
the later British Crime Surveys it appears most appropriate to consider the larger ofthe two figures to be more closely aligned with a 
representative figure. 
'' Source: Chief Constables' Anniml reports during the periods referred fo. 
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focused on certain areas of the city such as Stonehouse. This increase in crime impacted 
upon different areas of the force and, whilst subject to local variations, followed a 
relatively consistent trend throughout the period. Factors such as increased opportunities 
for criminals to travel over much improved road systems ensured that criminal activity 
became more possible further away from places of residence. In terms of residential crime 
within urban locations, such as inner-city Plymouth, offenders remained predominantly 
natives of that city, whilst conurbations within striking distance attracted a criminal 
element away from their places of residence. 
01 M 
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Figure 7.6: Recorded crime in Devon and Comwall shown as % increase between 1967 and 1997/8 
However, the extent to which these increases in criminal activity are explained by 
reference to individual factors is problematic. Wider variables, such as the status and 
proximity of the area to the offender, as well as vulnerability must be considered when 
explaining high victimisation rates for certain areas or categories of individuals (Baldwin 
and Bottoms, 1976; Bottoms and Wiles, 1986; Mawby, 1978; 1979). Moreover, the 
opportimity for these factors to be more clearly focused in areas of high recorded crime 
and social deprivation is of particular significance when considering a densely populated 
area of a relatively large urban area such as Plymouth. 
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Plymouth 
Plymouth is the most significant urban area within Devon and Comwall. It is atypical of 
the force area generally, being the only one of the centres of population which resembles 
other large cities of the UK. This is so in terms of at least three criteria: its concentration 
economically around indushial bases, such as the Royal Naval dockyard at Devonport; 
areas of higher than average population density; arid specific inner city council wards such 
as St Peter, which are both-more economically and socially deprived than elsewhere, with 
high levels of criminal activity (see later in this chapter). Historically, the city's position as 
a key naval base, and centre of population, caused it to be the subject of sustained 
bombing during the Second World War, a factor which was to result in widespread 
destmction across the area and the eventual rebuilding of significant amounts of the city 
during the years which followed. The 'Plan for Plymouth', prepared in 1943, outlined 
proposals to redevelop the city along totally new lines and not attempt to rebuild it as it 
was before the blitz. This resulted in the dispersal of the city's population across a much 
wider area. In 1938 the population of 220,000 occupied 5,719 acres, contrasting with a 
slightly smaller number of residents living in accommodation covering 13,136 acres by the 
1960s.'* A large proportion of council-provided housing, however, was redeveloped in 
locations relatively central to the city centre. St Peter ward in particular saw significant 
development of multi-storey accommodation, in the main restricted to three and four storey 
buildings, but with higher-rise acconimodation being erected in the Devonport area. 
Therefore, whilst overall acreage provided for accommodation per resident across the city 
had increased, the concentration of residents within the this inner-city area was generally 
higher than elsewhere. 
Source: The New Book of Plymouth by W. Best Harris, published by The Guild of Social Services, Buckwell Street, Plymouth 
(undated). 
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Forming part of St Peter ward, Stonehouse is demographically diverse in hs make up and 
comprises a mixture of council, housing association, privately rented and privately owned 
property. St Peter has an especially high level of deprivation when measured against 
national indicators: a situation noted m studies conducted durmg the 1990s. Payne (1995, 
p.49), for example, used the Department of Environment (DoE) Index of Local Conditions 
to measure relative deprivation and identified that it was 'the most deprived ward in 
England' with mdex scores well above those recorded for the next three most deprived 
wards in Tower Hamlets and comparable with Granby m Liverpool.. Previously, 
Dunkerley (1991, pp. 168-176) had used 1981 census data to indicate St Peter as having tiie 
highest rates of unemployment, and the lowest for car ownership and owner-occupation in 
Plymouth. 
Fiqure7.7: Plymouth showing location of Stonehouse within the council 
ward area of St Peter (yellow) 
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A review of the data'confirms the ward's deprived status with a disproportionately high 
. percentage of children, living in low earning households' (48%) and 'unsuitable' 
accommodation (78%); almost a quarter of residents (24%) being unemployed, and just 
over a third (37%) of households owning a car, with only 6% possessing more than one 
motor vehicle. Against all these measurements St Peter was found to be the most deprived 
ward-in the city;' Figure 7;7 shows the council ward area of St Peter within which is' 
Stonehouse'.- Table 7.8 depicts the available social indicators. 
St Peter 
ward 
Plymouth: nearest 
comparable ward 
Plymouth: least 
Comparable ward 
Children in 
low earning 
households 
48.2% 38.2% 
(Ham) 
8.2% 
(Plympton) 
Children in 
unsuitable 
accommodation 
77.8% 43.5% 
(Keyham) 
0.69% 
(Plymstock Dunstone) 
Total 
unemployment 
(16-64 yr. olds) 
23.8% 17.7% 
(Sutton) 
5.5% 
(Plympton St Mary) 
Total • 
unemployment 
(16-24 yr. olds) 
27.7% 24.5% 
(Ham) 
9.41% 
(Plympton Earie) 
Own 1 or 
more motor 
vehicles 
37.4% 46.1% 
(Sutton) 
84.7% 
(Plympton Earie) 
Own 2 or 
more motor 
vehicles 
6.1% 7.9% 
(Sutton) 
30.4% 
(Plympton St Mary) 
'Breadline Britain' 
deprivation 
index score* 
38.7 31.0 
(Budshead) 
10.4 
(Plympton St Mary) 
DoE 
local cond'itions index 
score* 
17.1 15.2 
(Keyham) 
-11.9 
(Plympton Earie) 
Jarman 
Underprivileged Area 
index score* 
65.4 42.3 
(Keyham) 
-12.6 
(Plympton St Mary) 
'Townsend material' 
deprivation index 
score* 
17.1 10.13 
(Sutton) 
-3.74 
(Plympton St Mary) 
Source: 1991 census. 
Table 7.8: Comparison of social indicators - Plymouth wards 
Policing Plymouth 
Throughout the half century during which various changes to police style and structure in 
Devon and Comwall took place, Plymouth city has remained a central focus as either a 
force in its own right, or latterly as one of the four area commands within the two 
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counties/^ Plymouth, pre-i967, was a city policed jfrom six locations, within three 
territorial divisions; Greenbank, and the City Centre stations covered the centre and 
adjoining residencies and shops to the East; Ker Street (latterly Exmouth Road in 1966), 
had a responsibility for The Octagon police station within Stonehpuse (see below); and 
Crownhill and West Park stations covered the North East of the city. Since the 1967 
amalgamation; policing ofthe Stonehouse area has been undertaken-frorri the station which 
also covers the city centre and adjoining areas. However, for thirty years prior to this, a 
small police base situated on the ground floor of a block of flats in Octagon Street, less 
than a hundred yards from Union Sfreet, was the station from which policing took place. 
Known by all as The Octagon, it provided a twenty-four hour service and was a local 
landmark which figured tellingly in the recollections of those residents and police officers 
interviewed during the research.^ " Its position was one which epitomised much of that 
which could be considered 'locational policing', through both its geographic closeness to 
the area of pafrol, and the work which officers based there performed. It was perceived as 
sfrategically important because of its close proximity to Union Sfreet and that location's 
notoriety for a large number of public houses and night clubs, together with the regular 
public disorder problems which were experienced there. Although its location was also a 
the cenfre of a densely populated urban area, there is little to suggest that its position was 
determined by a wish to provide a service base for local residents (even though subsequent 
recollections later in this work indicate that those stationed there felt this to be one of their 
key roles). 
" For a history ofthe Plymouth City Police leading through to the 1970s, but concentrating mainly on the period earlier in this century, 
see Dickaty (1977). 
See Chapter 9: Community PoUcing in Devon and Comwall. 
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Pre-amalgamation, shifts in the two divisions of Plymouth City Police which covered the 
city centre Were based on six tours of duty which ensured that men were available at times 
when they were most needed. The third division worked a four-relief scheme which was 
seen as most beneficial to its quieter location.^' Writing of the new shift scheme in the 
Police Review, J.F. Skittery (1951), the chief constable, indicated that the views of his men 
had been canvassed and that eighty-five percent preferred the six-relief system to either a 
seven-relief one, which had been piloted during 1949/1950,- or the three-relief scheme. He 
cited the reasons for change as the number of officers available at times when most 
incidents of crime occurred, welfare of his staff, and levels of supervision. Clearly, 
availability and obvious police presence were part of the strategy, but this was seen, 
primarily, in coimection with response policing and an increased ability to have officers 
available at times when it was believed most incidents occurred. Nowhere in the article 
were the public mentioned and no acknowledgement was given to the possible impact of 
higher visibility on public perceptions or reassurance. Policing was still locally based with 
officers patrolling from their respective stations, but the purpose of pafrol had, effectively, 
been more directly defined through the alterations to duty arrangements. That definition 
had concenfrated on crime detection as the main imperative, with Skittery drawing 
attention to the number of officers which he would previously have had pafrolling during 
the 'dead hours' between 2am and Sam. His evidence, he said, clearly showed 'that the 
normal "breaker" [burglar] does not get out of a warm bed in the small hours of the 
moming and sally forth to commit crime.'^ ^ 
'^ In November 1949, the Chief Constable, J.F. Skittery had broken new ground by moving away from the conventional system of three 
shifts. A trial period with a seven shift roster had been refined by 1951 to one which ensured police cover on the basis of working times 
follovring a pattern of: 6am-2pm-, 8ain-4pm; 10am-<5pm; 2pm-10pm; 6pm-2am and 10pm-6am. 
^ The absence of the 'public' being mentioned in the article could not be taken to indicate any ambiralence by the police of that period 
to the potential knock-on benefits to be derived from their more structured scheme aimed at crirne detections. However, any direct 
linkage between these conventional attitudes of police purpose and the concepts of 'communih'' support were not immediately evident 
during the period through, either documentation or oral history. It was a relatively easy task to obtain detailed and interesting 
reminiscences from officers and public who recalled policing during this period, but making meaningful linkages between what was 
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• Constable .. Sergeant Inspector*' Ch. Inspector* Sup'tendent* 
A Division . 5 1 1 
City Centre 48 10 
Greenbanl^  38 4 
B Division 4 1 1 
West Parl^  35 5 
Crowntiijl 35 4 
C Division 6 1 1 
Exmoutfi Rd 49 5 
Tfte Octagon 24 4 
Specialists** 118. 29 '13 1 3 
Total 347 . 61 28 4 6 
* Ttiese' ranks were in 'charge of the divisions and v/ere not-assigned to specific stations. •-** Specialists for this table 
Include CID, traffic arid administrative divisions. ' Source: Plymouth City PoUce Annual Report, 1957, p.3. 
Table 7.9: Plymouth City Police: Rank and location of service, 31st March 1967 
In 1967, where officers lived was a situation not totally within their control because ofthe 
requirement placed upon them to reside at locations approved by the chief constable." 
The high nimiber of officers who were residing in their own properties, or receiving 
rent/lodging allowance during 1967, appeared indicative of a high degree of personal 
preference being allowed. However, all but three of the officers serving in 1967 resided in 
Plymouth or the neighbouring, to-wns of Plympton and Plymstock which fell -within the 
force boundary. The other three lived at Saltash, Torpoint and Downdeny, all three 
locations being on the Comwall side of the River Tamar and accessible via ferry and/or 
rail and road bridges (the road crossing of the Tamar having opened in 1961). 
Owner occupiers 302 
Officers in Poljce houses 9 
Officers in Council houses 40 
Other Officers receiving rent 
or lodging allowances 109 
Source: Plymoutfi City Police Annual Report, 1967. p. 11. 
Table 7.10: Plymouth City Police: Housing occupier status. 31st March 1967 
perceived as "normality' and the wider ideological and structural changes which would occur during the next forty or so years was not 
within the scope of most interviewees natural responses. 
^ A protocol which exists still towards the end ofthe century. 
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The, emergence ofthe Devon and Cornwall'Constabulary saw considerable changes to the 
way in which aspects of the locational nature of policing was to develop over the next 
thirty years. Plymouth, having been initially established as three divisions, was reorganised 
as four sub-divisions within one division (E division) under the command of a chief 
superintendent with superintendents in charge of each sub-division during the 1970s, 1980s 
and early 1990s. The sub-divisions were based at Charles Cross'.(covering the city centre), 
Exmouth Road, Devonport (covering the Western side' of the city up to the Tamar 
boimdary), Crownhill (the divisional headquarters covering the northern section) and 
Plympton (the suburbs of Plymstock and Plympton, together with the market town of 
Tavistock some twelve miles away on the edge of Dartmoor, and Ivybridge to the East). 
The local Octagon base was disbanded in 1973 having been used as primarily CID and task 
force office locations between 1967 and that date. Greenbank and West Park, together with 
the original city centre base, had been closed and resources centralised at either Charles 
Cross or Crownhill. Specialised traffic resources became managed under a chief 
superintendent based at Exeter with local area superintendents, chief inspectors and 
inspectors based at Plympton and Charles Cross within the Plymouth area. The deployment 
of officers within each sub-division was primarily based around a five week duty roster 
covering the twenty four hour period. Post-1979, community constables were assigned to 
beat areas and worked a variety of shift patterns dependant upon the station from which 
they patrolled. Despite the divisional structure between 1967 and 1994 seeing command of 
the area also encompassing the adjoining areas of West Devon and parts of the South 
Hams, the relatively high crime rates and industrial base of the city ensured that significant 
resources servicing the area were based within the city itself 
These moves also saw a much wider spread of locations in terms of where officers who 
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had dealings with the policing, of the Plymouth, city area personally resided. Whilst the 
total number of officers who now had a working base somewhere within the Plymouth area 
had significantly increased since the final annual report of the Plymouth City Police was 
published in 1967, the proportion of these who now resided within the new divisional area 
(including Plympton and Plymstock, but excluding Tavistock, Ivybridge, and the rural 
areas outside the city) was less come the 1990s. Better road communications had enabled 
officers to-develop their careers both laterally and promotionally without the need to' 
uproot families. Locations as far afield as Exeter (42 miles away) could now be reached 
easily within one hour and less. Whereas records available from the final nominal role of 
Plymouth City Police had shown almost all officers residing within Plymouth and its 
Devon-side suburbs (99%), by 1996 this percentage had reduced to 63%. 
This move away from locational 'closeness' was one which did not depend upon police 
officers' personal preferences alone. The 1980s in particular had seen a move nationally to 
dispose of police-owned accommodation within areas where officers had conventionally 
been housed, allowing wider opportunities for owner-occupation in places of the officers' 
choice. Local regulations dictated that these individuals could only be required to travel up 
to a maximum of twenty miles to perform duty, but it became more common for officers to 
voluntarily forego this rule in order to reside at locations of their choice. The extent to 
which these domestic considerations had determined the contemporary structiure of 
policing in the city, and in particular within Stonehouse, needs to be understood in context. 
An address check from the 1967 nominal role only identified two officers who actually 
resided in accommodation with a Stonehouse address whilst 1996 showed three. It was also 
observable from the results of interviews conducted with public-residents in the 
Stonehouse area that perceptions of how well they considered they were policed from a 
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community perspective, bore little reference to where police officers' homes were, and 
more distinct calls for a need to identify with an individual Officer by name, or a policing 
base more local to the community in which they lived. How such views, and the 
perceptions of officers themselves, had an effect upon the question of affinity with local 
areas and problems are, therefore, questionable. The concept of public servants as 
'gatekeeper-commuters' of community affairs is,..however, one not exclusively a preserve, 
of the police as previous research has shown (Mawby, 1986). For example; probation 
workers' locations of residence compared with areas of work responsibility in Mawby's 
study showed over a third residing in villages and small towns within approximately 
fifteen miles of the city, whilst the remaining forty addresses which were mapped showed 
a considerable spread of homes within Plymouth ward boundary areas with no clear 
correlation to factors of crime dr other work-related need. 
The part which the police played within the community, whether based there by way of 
residence or station, together with their role as 'local generalists not central specialists' 
(Mawby, 1986) was also found to be influential in the opinions which residents expressed 
of the way in which their local communities were policed. If a 'golden era' of policing ever 
existed, where bobbies on bicycles spent their days patrolling the streets and talking to 
residents, it appears to have made little difference to the way in which those living in 
Devon and Comwall and, in particular, Plymouth regard what constitutes effective police 
methods. The apparent reality that a street foot-patrol presence became a less obvious 
symbol of policing following the development of Unit Beat Policing in the 1960s was one 
which interviews conducted in Stonehouse in 1991 evidenced: 80% of residents in this 
inner-city location reported that they saw an officer on foot patrol in the area in which they 
lived 'less than once a week' or 'never' and the general consensus Was one which showed 
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these, and residents interviewed, in later surveys, to feel that the police did not pay enough 
attention to the areas in which they (the public) lived. This level of satisfaction with foot 
patrol was common across the force area with surveys conducted in the course of the force 
Quality of Service initiative indicating that between 17 and 23 percent of those surveyed 
were satisfied with the level of foot patrol in their area.^ "* 
In terriis of Crime; between 1966 and 1998, Plymouth maintained a significantly higher 
level of recorded offences per head of population than other areas within Devon and 
Comwall. Taking account of the rest of Devon and Comwall during this period, it can be 
seen that, the proportion of crime committed in Plymouth had risen at a slightly higher rate 
than the rest of the force area (a 326% rise in Plymouth as against a 316% rise elsewhere). 
This equated to 30 crimes per 1,000 population in Plymouth in 1966, compared with 18 per 
1,000 across the rest ofthe force. By 1997 the differential had altered little, although the 
number of victims per 1,000 population had risen in line with the increase in crime, with 
98 victims per 1,000 in Plymouth and 58 per 1,000 elsewhere (table 7; 11). Recorded 
violent crime across the whole force rose by over 1,300% during this period, but whereas 
less than 1 in 1,000 population were victims of violence fdrcewide in 1966, by 1996/7, 7 
victims per 1,000 were identified in Plymouth, as against 3.5 per 1,000 elsewhere (table 
7.12). 
Plymouth Rest of D&C 
1966 6,436 18,411 
(30.1) (18.3) 
1996/7 25,097 75,520 
(98.4) (57.9) 
Table 7.11: Total recorded crime in Devon and Comwall and Plymouth (and crime per 1.000 population) 
" Sec chapter 9: Community policing in Devon and Comwall. 
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1966 • 137 • 350 
(0.6) . (0.4) . 
1996/7 1,795' 4,592 
(7.0) (3.5) 
Sources: Plymouth City, Devon and Exeter, and Devon and Comwall Constabulary 
/\nnual Reports (1967 and 1996/7) and D&C Constabulary CIS data. 
Registrar Generars Population Estimates. 
Table 7.12: Total recorded violent crime in Devon and Comwall and 
Plymouth (and crime per 1.000 population) ' 
This factor is also' significant in considering how increasing crime levels have impacted on 
residents in Stonehouse. The position of Union Street in Stonehouse plays an important 
part in the lives of residents, and is one which is referred to throughout the evidence which 
has been gained for this work. Its notoriety as the principal location in the city around 
which night-life is based extends back many decades, and is one to which residents and 
police officers alike have referred in their recollections past and present. The crime rate is 
relatively high compared to the rest of Plymouth when considered on a crimes per head of 
population basis. Of significance to the impact which Union Street's night-life has upon 
those who reside in Stonehouse is that of the amount of disorder and assaults which occur. 
In a review of recorded violent crimes committed in public areas in Plymouth during 1996, 
almost a quarter (22%) occurred in Union Street itself This figure excluded crimes which 
were committed in roads and alleys which adjoined or led to the street and when the net 
was widened to one which included the Stonehouse area generally, this figure rose to 
nearer 30%. An analysis of data collected during the research also revealed that of all 
incidents which were reported as occurring in Stonehouse during a twelve month period, 
almost ninety percent of the streets within this area had been subject of at least one call for 
police assistance. Whereas Union Street and the surroimding area accounted for a h i ^ 
proportion of these calls, the extent to which almost all locations in Stonehouse had 
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received some police attention during the period underlined the overall pattern of crime or 
disorder which epitomised the area. 
National and local perspectives: an overview 
The extent to which the Devon and Comwall Constabulary developed its style of policing 
over thirty years was one which took account of, and reacted to, the wider political 
situation and direction given by central govemment on many issues. Within this period 
were examples of where the force has been at the forefront of certain developments. 
Alderson's community policing, the early establishment of a quality of service unit, 
investment in computer technology enabling an intelligence driven crime system to be 
developed to a high level of effectiveness, and the emergence of multi-agency based 
initiatives within Plymouth such as ward policing, have been just four of the notable 
milestones. Of interest in each case is the extent to which their developments impacted 
upon the wider central direction and philosophy of the force itself Community policing 
appeared to find relatively little prioritisation in its continued development after Alderson 
retired in the early 1980s, as intemal studies subsequently indicated (Shaw, 1987; Wilcox 
et al., 1987). The work of the quality of service unit, inspired through the national initiative 
of the staff associations, seemed to change direction from one of ensuring quality, to one of 
measuring quantity, with the direct contact telephone surveys being replaced by 
conventional self-report questioimaires. Computer technology and the crime management 
system which enabled an effective model to be developed received much praise but has 
still to reach its full potential in terms of predictive analysis and development of 'problem 
orientated policing' strategies; whilst ward policing developed steadily within Plymouth 
despite a force strategy of centralisation of many services and resources 'in support' rather 
than at 'the coal-face' of policing contact with the public. 
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These observations are not put forward in order to reduce the:' importance of any of the 
initiatives and strategies employed. However, they do epitomise the way in which 
changing priorities, and personal visions' of senior members of the organisation, caused 
development towards a single goal to be problematic. The idea of a single goal itself was 
not without its problems as the changing priorities and messages at national level, 
particulariy during the 1990s; indicated. To- what extent the post-1994 changes in 
legislation, and restructuring of the force leading up to 1999, developed a prolonged and 
critical reappraisal of the way in which policing could be most effectively conducted in 
Devon and Comwall has yet to be evaluated. Certainly the changes which took place in the 
more devolved and locally accoimtable 1999 stmcture, bringing statutory responsibility to 
the doors of district/county authorities and other agencies, appears to provide an 
opportunity to develop a more coherent and productive method of operation. Time will tell. 
Clearly Devon and Comwall is not typical of England and Wales as a whole, and the fact 
that HMCIC and the Audit Commission have incorporated forces into different 'families' 
for comparison purposes tends to underline the diverse nature of the geography within the 
region. Nevertheless, within the force, and within the context of Plymouth and Stonehouse, 
evidence can be found of how changes at national level have impacted upon the stmcture 
and philosophy of the organisation. 
The chapters which follow will interpret these findings in greater detail, with specific 
reference to the core themes outlined in eariier chapters. The order in which these chapters, 
which deal with the more localised evidence of policing in Devon and Comwall, has been 
decided upon has been primarily dictated by the needs of the reader to have certain 
information to hand in order to meaningfully interpret how the information was gathered. 
Chronologically, the order in which community policing has been followed by crime 
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prevention, victims of crime and quality of service in the earher chapters is logical taking 
account of the periods during which certain initiatives developed. However, much of the 
information which follows has heen based on work conducted during the 1990s when the 
quality of service structure was central and influential in the gathering of data. Therefore, 
an appreciation of how and why this unit was established, together with the methodology 
employed during this period,, is desirable to make.sense of parts of the information in 
subsequent chapters. Resuhantly, the chronological thrust will be interrupted by the next 
chapter considering Quality of Service in Devon and Cornwall but, it is hoped that this 
temporary departure from the structure will enhance, rather than reduce, the overall impact. 
Subsequent chapters then revert to the original ordering, covering, respectively community 
policing, crime prevention and victims of crime. 
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Whereas the quality of service initiative at national level did not emerge until the late 
1980s it is perhaps' surprising, given his forward thinking apjproach to commimity based 
solutions, that chief constable John Alderson had not also developed a culturally and. 
performance driven model to accompany that of community policing. A speculative answer 
to why this did not occur may lie as much in Alderson's own perspective on making 
change occur, and in particular 'selling' that message within his own organisation. 
Structurally the opportunities afforded through the Exeter Crime Prevention Support Unit 
(GPSU) were clear and developed to become Devon and Cornwall's community policing of 
the late 1970s and 1980s. However, as evidence provided in chapter 9 will show, Alderson 
encountered a number of difficulties in convincing those within his own organisation of the 
process and, in particular, the nature of policing which he saw as primarily service rather 
than enforcement based. Although changes which occurred within Devon and Comwall 
clearly outlined what was effectively an integral review of policing methods relating to the 
quality of service which was being offered, it was never effectively sold under this 
umbrella. 
As an opportunity to develop notions of quality of service alongside community policing, 
Alderson's approach appeared to more naturally revert to his academic leanings than those 
of inspirational intemal change manager Information in chapter 9 clearly indicates that 
there were varying degrees of confusion and scepticism within his own organisation as to 
what he was hoping to achieve. Not, therefore,, a basis on which the type of cultural change 
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and focus which became the hallmark of late i980s work in other forces, and subsequently 
the ACPO Quality of Service initiative, was bom. The extent to which community policing 
became accepted as a policing style within Devon and Comwall was one of which the 
public appeared to generally approve, but through reminiscences of that period appeared to 
place its value in the visible elements of the service provided. That focus was on 
community based constables, rather than an understanding of the wider inter-agency work 
which formed the comerstone of the philosophy. It was the nature .of sbhie of the quality of 
service work some ten years later which, if having formed a part of the original community 
policing stmcture, may have alerted the force to the more focused indicators of 
performance and the need to consider soine of the intemal cultural issues debated later. 
Quality of Service, as a specific initiative, did not emerge in the Devon and Comwall 
Constabulary until the 1990s. However, the focus which had followed the force since the 
work of Alderson as the Chief Constable, laid the foundations on which the organisation 
could build. Community policing remained the publicly proclaimed mainstay of policing 
philosophy within the force and was a concept which was approved of by the public. The 
opportunity to develop notions of effectiveness and efficiency, and latterly quality of 
service, against a backdrop of a strategy which placed community at the centre of policing 
activity should, therefore, have been a significant advantage. 
Developments during the 1980s 
Home Office Circular 114/1983 was addressed by the force in relation to the publishing of 
annual aims and objectives and reviewing levels of effectiveness and efftciency. These 
were, primarily, intemal reviews of staff deployment and usage with attention being paid 
to reducing costs where possible, notably through a programme of civilianisation of police 
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posts. Consulting the public on levels of individuar service delivery did riot form part of a 
force strategy although police/public liaison meetings (required under section 106 of 
PACE) had become well established by the end of the decade. Management by objectives 
was introduced in response to the circular and the annual task of producing the 
forthcoming year's aims and objectives followed a course not • dissimilar to other 
constabularies; 
The 1989 version of management by objectives was developed with the arrival of John 
Evans as the newly appointed chief constable. Building on a model from his previous 
force, Surrey, the system of Planned Policing became the structure on which policing in 
Devon and Comwall was to develop. Its principles and aims relied on operational officers 
working to a system which was linked to realistic and achievable objectives within their 
own abilities and the resources of the force. The need to link objectives with action was 
perceived as an important factor in achieving results. As a model of management it was 
stmctured and had distinct potential. However, as an intemal thematic inspection 
conducted in 1993 showed, the outcomes were more difficult to accomplish than was 
originally anticipated. One of the main observations in the inspection document was the 
problem of officers understanding in what circumstances the process should be used. In 
theory it could be applied to almost any policing activity but, because it was 
bureaucratically based and required forms to be completed (forms 301),' work was often 
undertaken outside the system and therefore not recorded and made subject of realistic 
measurement (Devon and Comwall Constabulary, 1993a). Nevertheless it was a process 
It will be recalled from chapter 6: Ktethodology, that the basis for the beginnings of this thesis were subject of a form 301. 
191 

Quality of Service in Devon and Cornwall 
which" attempted to identify, plan and measure policing tasks and had the unfulfilled 
potential of being a measure of public satisfaction with service delivery. 
Quality of Service Unit 
In December 1991, the Devon and Comwall Constabulary established a Quality of Service 
Unit, based at force headquarters and staffed by a superintendent and inspector. The 
rationale for establishing such a unit came at a time when the police service was beginning 
to build on the public acceptance of conimunity policing as a style and develop a more 
overt 'service' ethos following the events of the 1980s. This unit developed its terms of 
reference to encompass many of the national strategies which were being either initiated 
from within the police service itself, or imposed upon it from cenfral govemment. A 
variety of options for the way in which the force could most beneficially develop its 
service sfrategy had already been produced (Devon and Comwall Constabulary, 1991). 
The unit, when established, had only loose terms of reference. It was to report directly to 
the then deputy chief constable, David Phillips^ who had a wish to see the unit develop in a 
pragmatic way. In particular he wanted to ensure that any work was not seen as 'window 
dressing' the force, but could clearly be distinguished as having an active role in improving 
police performance. As notes, made by the author as the Quality of Service Unit inspector 
following his first meeting with the deputy chief constable on 10 December 1991 reveal, 
Mr Phillips was reflective of the way in which some police forces had chosen to approach 
the issue in terms of merely surveying the public without then producing tangible data, 
able to be acted upon by police managers. The linkage between getting notions of 
^ J.D. Phillips Esq., Q.P.M., B.A. (Eoon). Mr Phillips left the Devon & Cornwall ConstabiJaiy in March 1993 to take up the position of 
Chief Constable of Kent Police. 
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'ownership' of quality where it belonged .'on the ground', and management issues of 
supervision and training, were key principles which Mr Phillips felt needed addressing.^  
The establishment of the Quality of Service Unit was one which involved a three month 
review of the experiences of other police forces in this relatively new arena. Central to the 
rationale of what the new unit should be concentrating upon was a presumption that quality 
of service was 'about setting agreed standards in line with public demands and measuring 
delivery of those standards' (Devon and Comwall Constabulary, 1992). But the question of 
measurement was the one which was central to the philosophy which dictated the initial 
methodology of the unit. As was discussed in the meeting with deputy chief constable 
Phillips on 10 December, 'how could an organisation improve if it did not know precisely 
where it was at the moment?' The need for the new enterprise to therefore concentrate on 
inspecting aspects of its work against a form of template which would be regarded as 
minimum service standards was the direction which was to dominate 1992. The other part 
of the quality of service presumption - that of 'public demands', was not seen as 
problematic if combined with a realistic 'inside' view of how the organisation was actually 
working. Providing any questioning of the public was done in such a way as to make the 
results capable of direct action, then it was felt that progress could be made. However, Mr 
Phillips was determinedly resolved not to embark upon any general public attitude surveys 
which he regarded as of little real use to the force." One analogy made at the time by 
another senior police officer was that of a washing machine manufacturer: 
^ A discussion paper presented on behalf of ACPO outlined the wide differences between the pragmatic and cultural extremes of quality 
of service irutiatives being pursued by forces - Devon and Comwall begirming to develop at the pragmatic end ofthe continuum (Bunt, 
1995). 
•* This position was not one suggested by the Audit Comim'ssion as being appropriate. They felt that it was 'important to assess 
satisfaction amongst members of the public who have not encountered the police directly. Opinion surveys usually omit this majority on 
the basis that its opinion will owe more to its diet of TV piolice fiction than real life. But (...) it is no less inqx>rtant in relations between 
the police and commvinity on which they depend' (Audit Cormnission, 1990: p.24). 
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'If you want to know what people think of HOtpoint washing machines, you ask 
someone who has' got one and not someone who has got a Hoover" (LV). 
How correct the interpretation was in market research terms is debatable given that one can 
learn much from the experiences of the satisfied customer of a competitor, but the police 
were not perceived to be in that position. The question was more simple: 'Did we do what 
you expected, and how well did we do it?' The feeling of negativity towards general 
attitude surveys was that the public may have unrealistic or imachievable demands, 
dependant upon their individual circumstances. There was a need to spend money wisely 
and surveys of this nature, as well as being costly, were not perceived to be capable of 
producing real value for money in policing terms. The argument went that, in terms of 
satisfaction, what, was to be gained from knowing that, in line with national surveys which 
had been conducted against a more rigorous methodological framework, 70%+ felt that the 
police did a very or fairly good job? What was to be done with that information? The 
debate was one which continued with the deputy chief constable during the initiation 
period of the unit, where the potential advantages of gauging a voider degree of public 
satisfaction, other than with only those who had direct involvement with the police, were 
outlined. Arguments for a general survey to establish this wider perspective were not 
successful until much later.^  
Quality Assurance Checks 
In line with the terms of reference which were eventually determined for the Quality of 
Service Unit, internally inspecting to establish the level of service currently given was to 
be the first weapon in the armoury of improvement. A system oi Quality Assurance Checks 
Public attitude surveys took place as part of the force's consultative process from 1994 onwards in the form of interviews with 
members ofthe public at the two Countv' Shows (Pevon County and Royal Cornwall) conducted by staff from the Executive Support 
Department of Headquarters ('X' department). 
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was established which involved supervisory officers (sergeants and inspectors) reviewing a 
number of burglary cases which their own subordinates had dealt with against a template 
of expected actions. The methodology was far from scientific in its implementation but 
was seen as a management tool rather than any instrument of sociological research. The 
purpose was to identify common themes which could lead to improvements. 
Sub-divisional commanders were allowed to pick a number of cases 'at random' or 'by 
selection' from within their own area and delegate supervisors to re-evaluate the service 
which had been provided.^  Amongst the areas which these officers were tasked with 
reporting on were the time taken to respond, the action taken at the scene, whether forensic 
examination had been carried out, and the nature of inquiries which had been made. Of 
concem also was whether paperwork had been correctly completed, messages routed and, 
through re-visiting the victim, establishing to what extent these individuals felt the police 
had performed a satisfactory role.^  The results were retumed to the Quality of Service Unit 
which reported the findings back to the deputy chief constable without identifying any 
individual officers by name. In all, over four hundred checks were completed and the 
results made available to sub-divisional commanders as well as the force's chief officers.* 
This resulted in certain changes to working practice such as rationalising the circumstances 
under which statements of evidence were taken fi-om victims, reducing duplication of 
information on forms and messages, and providing clearer guidelines on the initial 
investigation of crimes.^  
" The selection process allowed senior managers to select cases dealt with by officers with whom they may have had concems. 
Subsequent analysis ofthe selections which were actually made did not indicate that commanders had specifically targeted more than a 
small number of such ofBcers and the results showed that some officers who were generally held in high regard had conducted poor 
in\'estigations. (See also chapter 11: J'ictims of Crime in Devon and Cormvall). 
See 'appendix 'J' for a copy of the evaluation form which was used by supervisors to complete the Quality Assurance Checks. 
' See chapter 11: Victims of crime in Devon and Comwall, for details of the results achieved. 
' The exercise also highlighted the difficulty caused in communicating information by paper across a geographically large area. This 
issue led to the introduction of a 24 hour telephone bureau being established which allowed officers to telephone crimes directly fi-om 
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Quality of Service surveys 
Within the performance measurements which had been circulated nationally were a 
number of indicators formulated by ACPO designed to establish the quality of police 
response through the eyes of the public. These were based on the need to survey 
'customer' attitudes. One of the principles which the author succeeded in persuading his 
force to accept in embarking upon surveys of the public was that the methods used should 
be professional and conform to valid and accepted social science methods. It was therefore 
agreed that the services of Dr Mawby from Plymouth University should be employed as a 
consultant to the Quality of Service Unit for the purposes of assisting in the establishment 
of a suitable set of questionnaires and methods of sampling and adminisfration. In addition 
he was to give advice on the analysis of the data. It was decided to incorporate, within each 
questionnaire, a number of questions which would identify the level of service and 
satisfaction in relation to call handling, time of arrival and encounters at police station 
public enquiry counters.'" Following discussion, it was agreed to develop a trained team of 
staff to conduct interviews by telephone amongst victims of burglary and violent crime, as 
well as drivers who had been involved in road fraffic accidents. The. force agreed to pay a 
number of its civilian support staff, who volunteered to conduct telephone surveys during 
the evenings, at the standard overtime rate." 
the scene by use of a 'Freephone' number. Subsequently, the force's crime management model was completely revised to incorporate 
crime recording vvith a networked crime intelligence system accessible across the whole area. 
'° These were also required by ACPO to be surveyed. The decision to incorporate them was determined by the inaccessibility of suitable 
data which woiild enable samples of this nature to be drawn by other than manual collection. In the event, it proved a streanJined and 
effectiw way to capture data required without undue additional work. 
" All such staff graded for pay purposes within grades 1 to 3 (the least costly!) were written to and invited to volunteer. The selection 
process resulted in a team of twenty three being ofl'ered positions in late 1992. Each individual then undertook training which the author 
provided. This initially in\iolved telephoning 'stooges' and administering the first set of questionnaires which had been written, a process 
which also enabled 'safe' piloting of the surveys to take place. 
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Quality control of the process was seen as of particular importance arid, therefore, the 
surveyors worked in groups of three with a supervisor. Four staff were identified as 
suitable for additional training in this role and the services of a market research company, 
based in Plymouth (RKR Research) developed, with the Unit, a day's course of inshiiction 
for these people.'^  This was followed up with a refresher half-day some six months into 
the project. The process worked well and the standard of interviews was generally high. 
Close attention was always paid to the attitude of the interviewer in ensuring any element" 
of bias in asking questions was kept to an absolute mininium. Asking the question which 
was written, and not their interpretation of it was continually reinforced during training. 
The surveys were conducted using a piece of software developed by SPSS called 'Data 
Enhy IF (DEII). It enabled questionnaires to be written direct onto an IBM compatible 
computer with each response field capable of being automatically coded and labelled ready 
for immediate use on the standard SPSS statistical analysis programme. It also enabled 
'skip' and 'range' rules to be set, thus minimising the opportunity for inappropriate coding 
to be entered during the interviews. The questions relating to respondent's satisfaction also 
benefited from use of DEE. Four options were given for responses, they were: 
Satisfied - all aspects 
Generally satisfied - some areas of dissatisfaction 
Generally dissatisfied - some areas of satisfaction 
Dissatisfied - all aspects 
" RKR undertook regular market research telephone stirveys and their expertise in the management of such an environment was 
identified as being useful for the professional development ofthe team. The day's course identified and formulated suitable quality 
control check sheets and methods of allowing the supervisors to monitor calls in a non-intrtisive way. Advice was also given on dealing 
with members of the public who may be concemed or aggravated bj' receiving telephone calls of this nature. 
" Interviewers' attitudes were emphasised as important. In particular, they were encouraged to not respond to comments in any way 
which could indicate pleasure or displeasure with a reply which was given. One trainee quickly learned that the response of'Lovely' to 
every other answer she received was not the most appropriate terminology. A visit to another force which conducted telephone 
interviews had identified that surveyors would regularly ask questions such as 'So you were satisfied then?' as opposed to the structured 
question on their sheet. 
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DEII allowed the interviewer to get a response to the question in this way: 
'So would-you'say Wat you were generally satisfied or dissatisfied witti the service the 
police provided?' 
If the answer was 'satisfied' the interviewer would then ask, prompted by the machine, 
which would adjust the next question according to the previous answer given: 
'Were you satisfied with all aspects of what the police did or were there any areas you 
were dissatisfied with?' 
if the answer to the first question had been 'dissatisfied' the software would have 
provided the second question with the words satisfied and dissatisfied in opposite 
positions. 
The survey samples were drawn from information held on the force's crime recording 
system, as well as data from the accident database. Surveys took place, on average, three 
times a year during the period between 1992 and 1995 when the telephone interviewing 
method was used. The sample frame was taken from a period during the month prior to 
surveying where print-outs of each individual's name, address and telephone number were 
listed by date of report with each day being sfratified by the divisional area in which the 
crime or accident had taken place. Where no telephone number was known, a postal 
questionnaire was sent, a procedure which was also followed when three unsuccessful 
attempts had been made to contact someone by telephone. Postal responses were also 
sought if the victim was shown to be over sixty five years of age to minimise any 
likelihood of concem being caused to an elderly person receiving a telephone call. The 
telephone surveys proved to be successful for two particular reasons. Firstly, response rates 
were high amongst those with whom contact was made. On average only between one and 
two percent of the public contacted in this way declined to be interviewed. Secondly, the 
direct contact allowed prompt remedial action to be taken if there was any level of 
dissatisfaction; most commonly this involved individuals who wanted further information. 
Interviewers could access a screen on their computer terminal which allowed a 
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memorandum to be printed and faxed to the division concemed asking:that further contact 
be made. 
Policing Charter 
The benefit of estabhshing standards which the pubhc could expect were becoming 
increasingly relevant in the light of fhe work which the Quality of Service Unit had 
undertaken during its first twelve months. The Quality Assurance Checks had indicated, 
not only that police officers appeared uncertain as to the minimum level of investigation 
and service which they were to offer, but that the public were either similarly confused or 
had unrealistic expectations. In addition, the newly formed Conservative Govemment 
under Prime Minister John Major had produced the Citizen's Charter in which public 
bodies, including the police, were seen to play an important role in the provision of quality 
services throughout the country. A separate charter in relation to victims of crime had 
already been made public (Home Office, 1990b) and, the combined effects made the 
potential benefits of a local charter for policing considerable. Diiring the early months of 
1993, the force embarked on a consultation exercise with its staff and used data attained 
through its Quality of Service process to produce a mmiber of draft Charters. The final 
version was approved and launched at the Police Authority meeting in Autumn of that year 
and was accompanied by a publicly available video and poster campaign which was staged 
during the month leading up to the launch to gain maximum awareness of the issues which 
the Charter sought to address. 
Getting Things Right 
The ACPO summer conference at Bramshill in 1992 had been devoted to the quality of 
service issue and it was at this meeting that a strategy of attempting to ensure that police 
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officers got things right emerged publicly. Under the title Getting Things Right (ACPO, 
1993a) it identified a number of key intemal elements to policing which were seen as 
important aspects to moving the cultural and management elements of quality of service 
forward. These included systems and procedures, managing resources, leadership and 
communication. The principal message in the documentation was, however, that the police 
service was changing to one of a no-blame culture in which openness and trust were 
considered essential cultural features alongside the empowerment of staff A series of 
documents and leaflets were produced and made available for forces to purchase and 
distribute to officers of both management and constable/support staff positions. These 
outiined the cultural nature of change which was seen as important to getting things right. 
The extent to which forces took up the initiative was not imiversal. in Devon and 
Comwall, although there appeared to be a willingness at chief officer level to support the 
ACPO lead, a decision was made to not circulate the leaflets widely. The substance of 
Getting Things Right was made available and discussed at senior officer level but there was 
general agreement that any such initiative locally should be careflilly introduced and 
guided in order to ensure that clear and relatively unambiguous messages were given by 
those involved in the process. It was also felt, with the uncertainty which was being created 
by the forthcoming enquiry into police pay and conditions of service (Home Office, 
1993c), together with the ongoing quality of service initiative, that there may be difficulty 
in developing a positive enough atmosphere within which a prograrmne aimed at cultural 
change could flourish. Getting Tilings Right did not, therefore, become used by the force in 
the form in which it was produced by ACPO. However, many of the principles of 
devolvement and empowerment of decision making to the lowest appropriate level began 
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to become more openly debated and used as the style of management, particularly amongst 
newly promoted senior officers. 
Performance Indicators 
As the role of the Audit Commission became increasingly active in policing matters, 
. notably following the Local Government Act 1992, the need for the force to establish 
mechanisms to collect and publish data on their performance became obvious. The 
coordination of this task fell to the Quality of Service Unit which resulted in a degree of 
misgiving being expressed as to how relevant this particular job was to furthering the 
effectiveness of the service. Devon and Comwall Constabulary published the first 
indicators of its performance in July 1994, having had the figures audited by the District 
Audit Service during the previous month. It was the first force in the country to complete 
the task and this occurred on 13 July, the same day as the first local authority (Brent, 
London) made public their information. The police publication took the form of an eight 
page, part colour, supplement in a local newspaper. The Western Moming News (Devon 
and Comwall Constabulary, 1994b), and a one page monochrome summary published in 
eight other, more local, weekly publications. The cost of this had been supplemented by 
selling advertising space in the supplement which covered approximately half the overall 
cost. It was done in such a way that, whereas all the required indicators were included, 
they were seen as secondary to the potential to portray the force in a positive light and 
'sell' images and messages relating to crime prevention, victim support and tiaffic safety. 
A number offerees followed the lead set by Devon and Comwall and ananged for similar 
supplements to be produced in local newspapers. Others adopted a legislatively acceptable, 
but less impactive approach by providing just the figures required in a tabular or list form, 
although these forces commonly accompanied their enterprise With a press release and 
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coordinated PR strategy. Some chose to produce their own Hterature for circulation whilst 
still complying with the terms of Act in as cost efficient way as possible. 
The Audit Commission had made arrangements for some of the early examples of 
publications to be reviewed by a management consultancy group'" and the Devon and 
Comwall supplement and one page advertisements were chosen as part of this evaluation. 
In all the company conducted 305 personal interviews with residents stratified by gender, 
age and employment status across the two counties in eight locations (Bamstaple, Exeter, 
Honiton, Plymouth, Launceston, Redmth, St. Austell and Tmro). Of those asked only 2% 
spontaneously recalled seeing the Pis published in any newspaper and, after prompting a 
total of 16% remembered either the supplement or one page advertisement. These 
responses were from a sample of which 53% said that they regularly read one or other of 
the publications which the Pis were published in. The company had defined an 'exposure 
measurement' score'^  which they utilised to identify good practice across the range of 
authorities which had published. The score given to the Devon and Comwall initiative was 
14%.'^  This compared with a range of between 7% and 19% for other authorities which 
had relied solely on newspapers. However, those which had sought to make an impact over 
and above their legal requirements, by distributing their own publication on a door-to-door 
basis had achieved scores in the range of 27% to 36%. 
Robertson Bell Associates Ltd., 172-174, Harrogate Road^  Leeds LS7 4NZ 
" 'Exposure measurement' score was based on die exposure to the Pis amongst the public, i.e. the proportion of residents who say that 
they saw a one-page publication or at least glanced at a publication of more than one page. 
The qualitatiw research results in relation to the Devon & Comwall publication identified that the WMN supplement was the more 
popular of the tivo means used to display the information. The advertising was seen as making the supplement more 'real' in terms of 
what would be seen in other pages of the newspaper and it appeared to many as a 'crime supplement' prodiiced by the newspaper rather 
than the police which gave a perceived degree of independence and credibility to it Criticisms of the format primarily relat^ to certain 
aspects of the layout and lack of colour co-ordinatipn. The consultant's overall summary was that the work was 'a good first effort with 
room for improvement on the newspaper insert format or scope for a slightly different format, e.g. Newsletter or magazine. 
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Quality of Service during tlte mid 1990s 
By 1994, the Quality of Service Unit had-become an estabhshed part of the management 
and direction of the forCe. A full-time researcher had been employed within the unit and 
the original superintendent who had formed it, having retired, was replaced by an officer 
of identical rank who had the wider responsibility of running the Executive Support 
Deparhnent ( 'X' department). This department reported- directly to the deputy chief 
constable and, in addition to the Quality of Service Unit, comprised the' force 
inspectorate,'^  statistics section, activity analysis and, subsequently, corporate planning 
unit. ' X ' department became active in the dissemination of management information 
throughout the force and, in January 1994, produced the first Quarterly Performance 
Review^^ which was circulated to police and support staff ranks of inspector (or equivalent) 
and above, as well as members of the police authority. The document contained 
information on force performance aimed at identifying good practice and highlighting the 
extent to which standards proclaimed in the force charter were being met. Results of the 
on-going customer surveys formed a regular part of this document. In 1995, a monthly 
circulation entitled Divisional Management Information was also produced which 
provided more in-depth statistical analysis of local performance. Such information was, 
subsequently, also networked using the force computer system and became a regular item 
of discussion and action at the force Policy Advisory Group, attended by divisional and 
departmental heads from Devon and Comwall. 
' Forming part of X department, and working to the Deputy Chief Constable, the Force Inspectorate was responsible for administering 
the intemal inspections sj-stem. This de\-eloped as a self-inspection and thematic inspection system during the early 1990s but rev-erted 
to one of personal review by officers ofthe inspectorate during the mid 1990s. 
The first three Quarterly Performance Reviews (QPR) were edited and contributed to by the author, it having been his original 
concept. The document continued to be produced every three months until the end of 1998 when it was replaced by an improved 
monthly management information paper. Attempts to alter the format of the QPR prior to this had been resisted at chief ofBcer level 
because of the perceived use and value they placed upon it and its use by Police Authority members at their meetings (an audience which 
the original editor had regarded as secondary). 
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Customer attitude surv^ eys moved to a less costly, but also arguably, less impactive system 
from the end of 1995 onwards when use of telephone interviewing was dropped in favour 
of only postal questioimaires. Nevertheless, continued review of the areas which were of 
concem in earlier surveys became developed within the questionnaires to establish a wider 
level of understanding about the action which could be taken to improve the service. What 
had begun as a pragmatic attempt to improve working practices in the early part of the 
decade had grown to encompass the feared quantitative indicators of the Audit 
Commission and HMIC in a way which became complementary to the objectives of both 
forms of measurement. 
Quality of service: an overview 
It is clear that there was potential for a quality of service initiative to have been developed 
in Devon and Comwall much earlier than it actually was. As has been alluded to at the 
beginning of this chapter, the extent to which Alderson's vision of policing had the 
potential to encompass much of which was to follow is a matter of conjecture. However, 
once a decision had been made in 1991 to establish a Unit specifically to address the extent 
to which quality was being provided in service delivery by the police a number of 
developing outside factors were already in play. The decision to address the national 
debate on quality of service at local level in this way was one which had been researched 
(Devon and Comwall Constabulary, 1991) but had then taken a distinctly more pragmatic 
than cultural approach under the leadership of the then deputy chief constable. 
The extent to which this sfrategy was successful is debatable. There were undoubted 
benefits in having thorough reviews of police procedures such as the quality assurance 
checks but there was an overlap between this work and that which was simultaneously 
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being undertaken by the force inspectorate. Commitment to a philosophy of standard-
setting was evidenced in the production of the force charter in 1994 and the need to 
monitor the extent to which these commitments were being met needed a continuing 
review system which the Quality of Service Unit was well positioned to undertake. The 
development of victim and customer surveys mirrored what many other forces were doing 
but as the 1990s progressed the original rationale for surveying as a tool for direct line 
managers became less evident. Performance indicators emerged as a dominant driving 
force behind the Quality of Service UnU with the remedial action procedure, which formed 
an essential part of the early work, being discontinued. This having been done, the survey 
work became aless immediately impactive management tool moving emphasis away from 
ensuring individual customers in the process received immediate feedback or remedial 
action. However, as an effective way of monitoring general levels of customer satisfaction 
for management digest on a quarterly, and subsequently monthly basis, these figures 
maintained a force commitment to regarding qualitative measurement as an important 
performance indicator The force inspections system developed alongside this to review 
wider aspects of policework during the mid to late 1990s, and made some use of the data 
attained by the Quality of Service Unit. However, the extent to which the unit failed to 
fialfil its full potential as a vehicle for accomplishing change, as opposed to a mechanism 
for collecting performance data, is a matter of record. 
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in Devon and Cornwall 
If the term community policing had an association with any one poHce force, or any one 
individual, then Devon and Comwall, and its chief constable between 1973 and 1982, John 
Alderson acquired such recognition. The term itself is not vwthout problems of definition 
but, nonetheless, maintains a symbolic positive appeal even though over twenty years have 
passed since Alderson's ideas were first put into embryonic practice in the city of Exeter. 
The purpose Of this chapter is to consider how the term community policing became 
defined and enacted in Devon and Comwall during the era when Alderson was in 
command, and both before and after this; in total a period of some fifty years during which 
a number of major changes occurred in how the police organisation was both structured 
and managed. These considerations will involve the examination of police and public 
perceptions, details of intemal management stmctures, development of local initiatives, 
and debate on which dimensions of commimity relations with the police have been most 
influential in determining the success, or otherwise, of working at community level. Many 
aspects of community policing have a basis in crime prevention and this is clearly the case 
with the development of Neighbourhood Watch which, for the purpose of this work, has 
been included in the following chapter dealing with criihe prevention in Devon and 
Comwall. In particular, the way in which these developments can be understood within the 
local environment of Stonehouse provides a more intimate focus on a number of the wider 
issues. 
To set this scene, the initial sections will consider certain developments in Plymouth which 
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were prevalent during the 1950s and early to mid-1960s and became affected by strategic 
national changes to the policing environment. The way in which routine operational 
policing took place during the period between 1950 and 1967 (prior to the amalgamation of 
Plymouth with the rest of Devon and Comwall) signifies an appropriate starting point for 
considering later developments in the city. Although relatively detailed in the extent to 
which the evidence portrays some of the stmctures and personal recollections prevalent to 
the period, it nevertheless underlines a strategy which epitomised the continuing reactive 
nature of local policing. Whilst general evidence based on the Plymouth City Police did 
not appear to focus attention on the 'community' nature of policing, interviews conducted 
with officers who served at the police base central to Stonehouse, The Octagon, provided 
an insight into how work was accomplished and the way in which this was perceived. The 
section which follows strays slightly further back in time than 1950 in relation to some of 
the background and comments about policing from The Octagon. However, it is relevant to 
do this, in order to understand the nature of policework within this small local 
environment. It is also useful to an understanding of how and why long-term residents of 
Stonehouse responded as they did in interviews dealing with the nature of commimity and 
policing in their area. 
The Octagon 
For almost three decades prior to the disbanding of the Plymouth City Police the 'street 
policing' of Stonehouse was conducted firom The Octagon Police Station. Occupying a 
position at the ground floor comer of a three storey block of council flats, and accessed 
firom Octagon Street just thirty yards from Union Street, The Octagon, was approved for 
occupation by the watch committee in 1935, and eventually became operational in 1938. 
The need for its positioning had less to do with the perceived needs of providing a service 
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for local residents than as an easy deployment post for policing public order .problems in 
Union Street. It formed part of D division of Plymouth City Police and was the 
responsibility of a superintendent based at Ker Street Police Station in Devonport, about 
half a mile away. The facilities were sparse, as were those generally in Plymouth City 
stations of the day. 
'It was just a flat: a charge room, a bit of a kitchen and toilet and a room with a 
table and lockers.' .... "You were locking up these stinking bloody prostitutes and 
drunks while we was there eating our grub.' (AB) 
Its lowly status and effect upon local policing morale were eluded to in a letter, sent 
anonymously on 6 August 1937 by a constable with twenty five and a half years service, to 
the Home Secretary of the day. In it he wrote: 
'The Council has had a small police station built under some slum dwellers, as you 
can see by this photograph marked X. I should not think the Home Office would 
have that, this is the roughish part of our city with no police station with any cells in 
it. In this district are all the picture houses, theatres, amusement arcades, and 
about 70 public houses, some of them two policemen has to be outside at closing 
time on account ofthe class of people that frequent them, in the main street, there 
is a fun fair a disgrace to Plymouth, two policemen has to be stationed in there 
every night to throw out the rowdy characters who go there for the purpose of 
having a fight. There is not enough policemen here, some nights a policemen has 
to look after about 30 public houses. No lavatory accommodation a disgrace.' 
This letter led to an enquiry involving handwriting experts who identified the writer as one 
constable Frank Toms. He appeared before the chief constable who requested his 
resignation as an altemative to appearing before the watch committee when a 
recommendation of dismissal without pension would be made. Toms resigned. He died in 
1962. 
Despite this criticism of the physical conditions, the sense of pride felt by retired officers 
from the war and post war period leading up to the change of use of the premises upon 
amalgamation to a CID and task force base was obvious in many comments. The 
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impression of camaraderie .in adversity appeared" instilled through- feelings of having 
provided local residents with a much appreciated local service. 
'The flat residents (Rendle Street/Octagon Street) regarded the police station as 
their own and even changed money there for the gas meter.'... 'At The Octagon 
you were one of the family'.... ' well more than one family I suppose, there was a 
family of poljcemen, sure, but there was a bigger family outside and we were part 
of it.'... 'It was understood that the station PC would look after the residents of the 
fiats. They would come in when they couldn't sleep and talk to the office man.'... 
'They were as poor as church mice:- but it was their community.' (DQ) 
'Who else's shoulder could they cry on?' (QC) 
'All sorts of peoJDle used to come in at night. The dark people living nearby in 
cheap lodging houses came in and asked for the time because of the black-out.' 
(AB) 
These comments from officers whose working lives had revolved around policing in a 
force where a posting or promotion would take them literally only a maximum of a few 
miles in one direction or another can be interpreted as more than mere sentiment. The 
whole nature of policing such a small part of the city was implicitly linked with a need to 
feel protection and belonging from people and an environment which could often be 
hostile. In a time where safety was not provided through the benefits of personal radios and 
mobile 'metal boxes', the reliance officers felt had, as a matter of course, to be provided by 
their colleagues working in close proximity. Being a small and singular unit within a 
relatively compact city area had such perceived advantages for officers serving there. 
'We were always within view of each other in Union Street and would always know 
roughly where we could find each other elsewhere. Because we a|l worked from 
The Octagon and knew each other and we knew about each other. We knew who 
was going to need helping out and who could handle himself in a rough-house.' 
(RC) 
The imitary nature of policing from such a small station was one which was accompanied 
by some apparent concems by senior officers as to its independent nature. A sergeant, who 
served at The Octagon, recalled: 
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'Skitter (Skittery tfie Cliief ConstalDle) used to cone down. He'd say "I hear you've 
got a force of your own down here", joking really 1 suppose because he was the 
one who put me there.' (AB) 
The extent of concern expressed by the hierarchy about how poHcing was conducted from 
The Octagon was not obvious from official documentation. Whereas the research has 
discovered obvious incidents of undisciplined conduct, assault complaints and criminal 
offences from the 1,800 or so cases to come before chief constables between 1892 and 
1967, there was no common linkage or theme to the officers' posting or attitude relevant to 
The Octagon or Union Street areas.' However, the acceptance that its policing style may 
not have met with universal acceptance and was subject to more local cultural rules of 
engagement than elsewhere was implicit in comments made by a former Superintendent 
serving in the early 1960s who had responsibility for the area from his base in the 
divisional headquarters at Ker Sfreet. 
'I had. the impression that The Octagon was a police force within a police force." 
l'\i\ihat in particular gave you that impression?'] "I suppose the way we acted, as a 
group who were there doing a dirty job and had to put up with the aggro on the 
streets every night." ... "There was an inbuilt pride in what we did down there and 
we policed in a way which might not have been approved of officially." ... 'The 
bosses knew what went on though and I knew when I was a higher rank .;. 
approved of a lot of it I suppose ... but couldn't say so out loud." ... 'AB (the 
sergeant quoted above), he was the backbone, and IV, (a constable serving at the 
station for many years) they were it - not me. I was the person who's name went 
up front for everything; but policing, real policing, was done by them - they led and 
did it well most of the time. People followed a strong lead.' [It's been suggested 
that The Octagon was a "force within a force". Do you think that is a fair 
description?] 'Only in as much it was a part of the city policed in a hard way put I 
don't think it was the only place like that." (DV) 
The cenfral theme retumed to remorselessly by officers who had served at The Octagon 
was one of maintaining public order, mainly in Union Sfreet. The 'strip', as it is now 
iirfectiously referred to by these officers' contemporaries historically porfrayed the "big city' 
' The Plymouth Citj' Police discipline book, now held at the Devon and Comwall Constabulary Museum in Exeter, contained, in one 
boimd volume, all cases which came before the Chief Constables ofthe period. 
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image of trouble in a predominantly rural county. The kudos of having served in, and 
policed. Union Street continues to be one of the more impressive career achievements of 
police officers in the modem force without any detailed evaluation being considered as to 
the precise nature of how policing was done. 
They can't take that away from you, two years at Charlies (Chades Cross Police 
Station) or Devonport - it will always stand you in good stead." (CD) 
To have survived without adverse comment on any aspect of an individual's ability, rather 
than most appropriate practice, tended to be the benchmark of a successfiil tour on the 
'mean streets' of Plymouth, hideed the pre-amalgamation Plymouth City officers regularly 
cited incidents of violence in Union Street to emphasise their own, or their colleagues', 
strengths as good police officers. For those who served at The Octagon theirs was a sense 
of having been selected to perform a role due to personal attributes of good solid policing 
tradition. As Toms wrote in a subsequent letter of appeal to the Home Secretary on 4 April 
1938: 
'We were a kind of picked men for this locality, because that is where a Policeman 
got to be a Policeman. "'And may I say a man'".' 
The sergeant referred to above as one of 'the backbones' of The Octagon held a similar 
view of his vocation: 
'The Chief Constable said to me "I want you to show the young men how to keep 
order there." He meant in Union Street and there you had to keep them (the public) 
in order.' (AB) 
And order there would apparently be. But the recollections of officers at The Octagon was 
of two specific types of order: that necessary to quell disorder brought about through 'large 
scale' disturbances in Union Street (primarily involving service personnel), ofteri couched 
in humorous remembrance: 
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'The old Paramount dance hall' ....'a real disturbance one night. A group of yobbos 
wanted to get the Yanks' ... "We saw there would be trouble as soon as they went 
there and there was.' ... 'we went in and chucked 'em out and rounded 'em up. A 
dozen easily.' "I threw the bastards down the steps. I whacked one with my 
truncheon and they all started to shout out 'They hit him. He hit him." and then the 
landlady said (to me) "Oh Cfiadie, you've hit the bloody bandsman, he's one of 
ours!" I said "Served the bastard right, he's been playing like a cunt all night.'"... 
'All these bastards were charged and they all had two months." (AB) 
"HMS Bulwark was in and Naval Patrol had heard there was going to be trouble. 
There were hundreds of them from Two Trees /a local pub] io Tlie Octagon. I used 
the speaker system on the car and they lined up in threes.' ... 'I shouted over the 
speaker like a sergeant major "'Quick march and sing you bastards, sing."' They did 
and off we went down Union Street back to their ship.' ... 'At the old bomb site I 
said "Fall out for a slash". I marched them all to St. Levan Gate and there: "Fall out 
for oggies.'" (lA) 
...and a more delicate form of social order to which the apparently deserving residents of 
the area would be treated. 
'I can think of one time in particular: I got him 6 months for stealing and he was 
worried about his wife and family. I went straight from court to his wife, leant her 
some money and she repaid it. National Assistance came down within the hour.' 
(lA) 
"You made it your business to tell people what was happening and they, in return, 
used to tell you things." (DQ) 
'People used to look after each other more than today. They knew who their 
neighbours were and they helped each other. I remember a right villain who lived 
there and when his wife was poorly his neighbours who were all straight down-the-
line still went in and saw she was OK.' (BP) 
'Remember I was the superintendent so didn't actually work there then but the 
people down there thought the worid of the police, i knew because people would 
say to me things like "why don"t you bring him back"" about officers who used to 
work there." (DV) 
'People weren't afraid of us. We didn"t have to make people afraid to get our job 
done or keep them in order. Not like what I saw on TV the other day, you 
remember when Downing Street was bombed, that PC out in the street shouting at 
the cameramen.'... "I remember it took me a lot more time to get the confidence of 
the people down at the Barbican than it did around Rendle Street flats." (QC) 
There was a sense of policing two communities, one an overt controlling presence to 
maintain order amongst the transient, night time community, based around the pubs and 
clubs of Union Street; and the other a 'community based' control model constructed on 
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perceived 'Consent' and assistance. But what o f the pubHc's perceptions o f poHcing? 
Again , their recollections clearly had to be treated with caution because o f the. relatively 
small number o f individuals who were interviewed i n depth.^ Comments tended to be more 
interesting than objectively illuminating but were, nevertheless, appropriate 'snap-shots' o f 
certain aspects o f policing. The perception o f the Stonehouse police revolved around 
notions o f 'hard but fair' work being done which met with the approval o f local residents. 
Resident interviews made referenceto the more 'corporal ' nature o f policing but notions o f 
what might have been defined as community policing were equally as ambiguous as their 
police 'servants'. 
They were times much harder than now. The police might have been about more 
but some of them didn't speak to you.' (ref: 2/1991) 
'Where we lived you were lucky if you ever saw a policeman. There were plenty in 
Union Street and the rougher areas where there was trouble, but they didn't patrol 
up and down our street, that's for sure.' (ref: 5/1991) 
'I suppose it was community policing because they were at The Octagon and that 
was our 'community' I suppose.' (ref: 33/1991) 
There was an underlying tone of acceptance that a degree o f class played a part in 
relationships between police and public. The police were portrayed as basically 'working-
class' individuals who had ah affinity with the residents o f the area. However, their role 
was perceived as controllers and helpers rather than as friends and associates. Examples 
tended towards a remembrance of the police as people who you 'could not trust' but who 
would 'always be prepared to help' in times-of need. Residents who recalled the Plymouth 
City period were nonnally able to name at least one police officer either with whom they 
had dealings, or whom they knew by sight or reputation. 
^ The total number of interviews with 'long-temi' residents (i5re-1980) wasT3. Brief descriptions of all victims personally interviewed, 
together with the crime committed against them, is shown at appendi.\ 'K'. 
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'You could call at the police station [Tine Octagon] if you needed help and it would 
be given when they could.' (ref: 23/1991) 
'I know they would bend the rules to get convictions and they would be pretty 
rough when the need arose, but I think they were basically OK.' (ref: 6/1994) 
'When my mum needed some help with a 'lodger' she called them and a constable 
come along. There was a bit of ruckus but he [the lodger] left and my mum made 
the constable a cup of tea.' 'He would pop in again from time to time and have 
a'cuppa'.' (ref: 29/1991) 
What hnkages, then, between these recollections and community policing^ It could be said 
that, in terms of the pro-active nature of the system which was to emerge over a decade 
after amalgamation, there were few direct similarities which were found from the 
interviews with residents of the area. The trend was equally apparent in recollections 
leading up to 1979 with little to indicate that a bond outside the strictly defined roles of 
'police' and 'policed' existed. Where there did appear to be commonality in interpretation 
was at a level where neither perceived the police role as being oppressive in a formal 
sense. Whereas there were examples cited which would accurately fit a definition of 
'oppression' in individual circumstances, the overriding tone was one of 'belonging' and 
'ownership' based on a geographic and social area. There was also 'compassion' for 
individuals in certain circumstances. It was a one-way compassion in that police would 
recollect their thoughts on how they felt sympathy for individual residents (including some 
of the criminals) in the encounters which they had with them but there was little 
compassion offered in retum. What there was, was a degree of recalled gratitude where 
specific circumstances were related. It was not necessarily the 'oh thank you so much' type 
of gratitude, as a more general appreciation of police officers just doing their jobs and 
occasionally bending mles or going outside their immediate remit to help. Exceptions, 
either way, can always be found, but in the course of the interviews tended not to be. 
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That poHcing was conducted in a hard way was not indicative of it also being 
uncompromising. The attitude with which officers and others recounted them performing 
their duties regularly underlined the nature of the 'compassion' which was perceived to 
unwittingly permeate the recollections. A letter which was written to the chief constable on 
24 October 1959 from a convicted prisoner bore testimony to one specific officer. 
Constable Arthur Uzzell, who had served iri the city between 1925 and 1959. He had 
passed away on 22 October of that year. The letter contained the following comments: 
'As you know, Sir, Artliur Uzzle [prisoner's spelling] was always greatly respected 
and admired by the men from Plymouth. Sir, on behalf of all the men in here from 
Plymouth we are asking you if you would be kind enough to pass on our very 
deepest regrets and sympathy to Mr Uzzle's relations and to the people who are 
closely connected to him. Many of us here will always remember Arthur as.one of 
the finest person whom we have ever known'... 'Arthur was a good one. He spent 
his life doing what he could to help other people and he never tired of trying to 
make things as pleasant as possible for us.' (Police Review, 13 November 1959, 
p.774) 
One such example clearly does not provide an indication of everyone in Plymouth Police 
being as compassionate and considerate as Arthur. Records of discipline and complaint 
revealed numerous relatively minor misdemeanours as well as some elements of 
dishonesty and more regular entries conceming officers' inappropriate drinking habits 
(although such entries were far more plentiful during the early half of the century than 
during the post-1950s).^  Whereas the level of service provided appears now to have been 
recalled with some degree of fondness, one police constable of the 1960s did reveal his 
personal concems that there was an underlying level of cormption which was informally 
acknowledged, but never checked. 
' There were relatively few formal complaints found from members of the public but this is of no great surprise as the natiue of 
policework at the time would have dictated that the sergeant or inspector at the station concemed would have dealt with the matter 
without necessarily recourse to more formal channels. Thus, it is inappropriate to think of the era prior to amalgamation as being one 
which was free from scandal or corruption. 
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*lt depends what you mean by corrupt. There were bent coppers, but only a 
handful and no one had any time for them. But there were others who, today you 
would say were corrupt, but then it wasn't seen that way.'... 'the pocket book for a 
start was probably one of the biggest fairy tales going. I know one officer who had 
lost the evidence - it was a broken bottle from a fight, with blood on it. He got a 
bottle and broke it and nicked his finger to squeeze blood over it before he went to 
court.'... 'no one would accept it today and I suppose we shouldn't have then, but 
he would have been disciplined if he had said he lost evidence.' (JM) 
Unit Beat Policing 
If commumty policing is to be considered in its widest sense, and related to how the 
interaction between police and public is not only accomplished, but perceived, then the 
Unit Beat system (UBP) has to be an important step in the evolution of modem day 
policing. Its inception is generally acknowledged as having had its roots in a scheme 
developed in the town of Kirkby in Lancashire during 1964" where the amalgamation of 
eleven foot patrol beats to form five areas covered by 24 hour mobile patrols with personal 
radio communication was established to address high crime and vandalism rates. The 
apparent fall in crime and rise in detection rates during the following year resulted in the 
Home Office Police Research and Plaiming Branch becoming involved in the initiation of 
a modified version of the Kirkby scheme which was to run in Accrington later that year. It 
involved four mobile patrol beats with two constables within each area being responsible 
for foot patrol with a detective also being assigned responsibility for the area. This, 
together with the establishment of a police 'collator' who was responsible for collecting 
and disseminating information, formed the basis upon which the new faster response 
mobile units and maintenance of a visible foot presence was seen to provide the best of 
new technology and traditional policing methods (Weatheritt, 1986). 
•* See chapter 2: From Dixon to Dilemma, for further information on UBP in relation to the chief constable of Lancashire's subsequent 
appointment as Her Majestj-'s Chief Inspector of Constabulary. 
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This section will outline, in more detail, how UBP was introduced to Plymouth and Devon 
and Comwall. The naUire of the changes which it brought about at local level are-
considered against the views and opinions of officers and residents who took part in the 
interviews. UBP will be considered first of all from the Plymouth perspective because it 
was this area in which the initiative was progressed during 1966 whilst the city was still 
under the command of its own chief constable, Ronald Gregory. A superintendent who was 
interviewed for this research recalled that he had already begun a scheme a year earlier 
which he considered was not dissimilar to UBP in its concept, but lacking some of the then 
more innovative use of technology which was fast becoming available. 
'I started a system when I went there and Inspector RL who was then a sergeant at 
Ker Street was with me. I told him I wanted a very large map on my wall showing 
the area. I got flags, not flags, pins, for aimes to put on it. 1 got it up in two to three 
weeks. Then I asked for a car and had a driver. We only had one, a Ford Prefect, it 
had a driver in uniform and others in civvies. There was a system up in Lancashire 
where it had started where they had a terrific amount of crime. This system was 
nothing like that. 1 had a small group who worked a month with no holiday then had 
a week off. Three officers would be dropped off and later on they were picked up 
and another three dropped off - dropping off, coming back. They were 
concentrating on the prevalent crimes on the map. I had a sergeant in charge of 
them. It was so successful crime just fell - finished. This was only in C division. The 
Mets sent two people down from the Home Office to interview me and look at the 
system. They told Ronald Gregory that they wanted this system breaking down to 
see why it was successful. We did all this -1 explained it all to them. After a few 
months we packed it up and they introduced the Lancashire system.' (DV) 
The experiment was referred to in the Annual Report of the force in May 1967 in the 
following terms which were portrayed in a more positive light than the recollections of 
' D V . 
In February 1966 an experimental system of policing was introduced in the 
Devonport Division to measure the effectiveness of combined uniform and plain 
clothes patrols to deal with: 
(i) commitments where it was considered a man in uniform was 
necessary; 
(ii) crime pattern areas where plain clothes patrols could be more 
effective; 
(iii) the examination and supervision of vulnerable and high value 
property by mobile patrols without fixed beat coverage and 
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{iv) the allocation of selected officers to specific tasks, e.g., breaking 
offences, thefts from unattended cars; indecency offences etc. 
After a period of 12 months the results were found to be inconclusive, but many 
lessons were learned and the Research and Planning Branch at Home Office were 
able to formulate the basis of a new method of policing which was subsequently to 
be introduced as "unit-beat policing". 
(Plymouth City Police, 1967, p.31) 
The anrangements for UBP in.Plymouth were set out in a letter from the Home Office 
dated 5th December 1966 to the Chief Constable: 
'As regards equipment, we will provide six Morris 1100 saloon cars, three 
automatics and three geared. It will be very interesting to see how they compare. 
The cars wiii be painted to our specification and will be taxed for the year, they will 
be on loan to you for six months. We have also consulted Communications Branch 
regarding personal radio and they have agreed to co-operate. It is anticipated that 
we shall require about thirty sets for the experiment.'.... 'We are also considering 
an experirnent with a fo.rm of centralised dictation which can be used with personal 
radio. I am not sure how we can do this, but if we decide to try it, I would be 
pleased if we can introduce it in Plymouth to run with this experiment.' 
The scheme was an immediate success! According to divisional order no. 1/1967 dated 24 
January: 
'UNIT BEAT POLICING SYSTEM 
On the 11 th December, 1966 a pilot scheme of Unit Beat Policing was 
commenced in 'B' Division. This has proved successfu/(author^s itaiicisation) and it 
is now intended to extend the scheme to the whole of 'B' Division. In conjunction 
with the.Home Office Research and Planning Branch the experiment will extend for 
6 months from 12th February, 1967.' 
There should be little surprise at this given the local context - 'success' was more likely to 
be defined as "to date the wheel hasn't come off as to any objective evaluation set against 
specific criteria of accomplishment. The entry gives support to Weatheritt's (1986) 
contention that little research of any consequence was conducted to analyse the perceived 
advantages of UBP. The 'Reflections on the Experiment' document (Gregory/ 1967) was. 
' The report was prepared by E. Gregory at the Home Office and not R. Gregory the Chief Constable of Plymouth. The ^ vo were reputed 
to be brothers which may have had some influence on the choice offeree for one ofthe early experiments following on firom 
Lancashire. 
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she explains, not a research study but primarily an 'operational aide memoire' giving 
advice on such issues as the preferred residency of officers, tenure of post and single or 
double crewing of patrol cars. The divisional order continued: 
'AIMS 
(1) To increase police efficiency. 
(2) Cultivate a better understanding with members of the public by:-
(a) Closed contact with the man on the beat. . 
(b) Swifter response to calls for assistance and complaints. 
(3) To increase and improve the information flow. 
(4) By combining resources to overcome the shortage of police officers. 
(5) To create a new challenge in the method of beat working, particulady for 
the younger constables.' 
By August 1967, two months after amalgamation, plans were already well advanced to 
extend the scheme further in Plymouth. UBP became the newly established policing ethos 
for the people of Stonehouse. There was little about it which the public could feel 
dramatically concemed at this point and, whereas the publicity afforded the scheme 
concenfrated upon the positive nature of providing everyone with a modem, well-equipped 
crime fighting organisation, little (if any) attention was directed towards evaluation of what 
the public actually thought of the service. 
If the 1950-67 period could be argued as a conventional epitome of what the public 
expected to be community policing then the nature of UBP was to drastically alter 
perceptions. It was also a watershed which was recalled equally by police and residents 
alike in the interviews. Whether public attitudes towards aspects of UBP pre-dated 
concems which were felt by the police themselves is dubious. In Plymouth, however, the 
negative perceptions of changes which were occurring could not be laid totally at the door 
of UBP as it emerged at the same time as the loss of the city's own constabulary. More 
importantly to those involved in the area, it would appear, was the concurrent loss of The 
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Octagon as an operational uniform station.^  Before considering TJBP in more detail it is 
worth revisiting The Octagon and some of the recollections which accompanied its demise. 
Not surprisingly the feelings of that station 'belonging' to both police and residents alike 
resulted in a belief that lack of the close locality of police officers, at least in a work 
situation, if not a residential one. Was partly to blame for the perceived breakdown in 
police-public relations since amalgamation. Officers who had served' at The Octagon 
recalled: 
'Yes, The Octagon could open up again and people would know they could come 
in there. You could build up to the policing as it was 23 years ago.' [but don't you 
feel that society and the people who live there today would not accept the strong-
arm policing ofthe past?] 'In time, it would take time, but we could do it. It would 
work, but gradually.' (lA) 
'It was a mistake to close it down. I hear about how they are thinking of setting up 
shops where people can go in some areas and in towns to meet their needs. Well 
The Octagon did that, and very well, so why shut it?' (DQ) 
'There is too much centralisation. The Octagon would be right there - in where it 
happens. There was no doubt in the policeman's minds about what the problems 
were because they were there - in it. They could respond to it, knowing what it was 
all about. Not like today. Today they come in from outside and no one really cares. 
Well they care, but they don't understand and appreciate the results of what they 
do. They don't really know what they mean to the people who live there, and I 
think, if The Octagon was still there, the people down there would think an awful lot 
more ofthe police.' (DV) 
Residents' views ofthe appropriate nature of having a police base close to their community 
were recounted in terms not dissimilar to those of police officers. Its loss was perceived to 
be symbolic of negative change in much the same way that constables riding around in cars 
rather than walking was. Recollections were commonly depicted at this level of symbolism 
rather than in accounts of how the station being where it was had provided specific 
services for residents: 
° Unit Beat Policing does not stand alone in its importance to the policing of Plymouth and Stonehouse during the late 1960s and 1970s 
because other factors such as the loss of Plymouth City Police accompanied its occurrence in the early stages, and changes to the 
divisional structures ofthe force which followed in later years. But it is a stage in the evolution of policing the city which is identified 
with bj'many officers and residents alike fiorn a \-arietj' of perspectives. 
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M do think it was a wrong move to move away from the area. It might not have 
been much more than an office, but at least people knew where the police were -
not too far away from where they lived." (ref: 5/1994) 
'There were times when I would actually walk back home that way because I knew 
the police station was there. It meant I actually had to walk closer to Union Street 
than I might have done otherwise but at least you knew there were going to be 
policemen, about in that area." (ref: 3/1994) 
'It would be nice to have a local station back. Not saying that place necessarily, 
maybe just a base where they could be somewhere in the area. Not hundreds of 
them, just enough so we know there was a policeman always in the area.' (ref: 
31/1991) 
What, then, of the perceptions which accompanied the new techno-mechanical age of 
structured policing under UBP? To begin with it is important to realise that, of those 
officers who were spoken to, few had initial reservations about a number of the advances 
which were being made to bring their local police into the twentieth century. Radios might 
not originally have been plentiful enough for each officer to have one issued to them for 
each tour of duty which they performed, and motor vehicles were not supplied in such 
quantity as to negate the necessity for many to still ride 'Shanks's pony'. However, there 
was an unmistakable theme which identified many of the changes as being beneficial. • 
'I think most saw it as a move towards making us more professional. It certainly 
meant we were able to do our work without having to be chased up hill and down 
dale by the sergeant every two minutes. He could check up on you over the radio if 
he needed to.' (RC) 
'The cars were great because you knew you could get a fair bit more done and 
didn't have to break your back going from A to B on foot." (BC) 
'I know a lot of officers now look back and say Unit Beat was a bad thing for the 
police but I was aware of quite a few at the time who couldn't wait to get their 
hands on the radios and cars which came with the package." ... 'Perhaps there 
were others who didn't appreciate it as much but I suspect that they would say that 
to any sort of change.' (ER) 
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The exceptions were obvious, although not as plentiful in rephes as those appreciating the 
technological advances. ER's final comment is possibly an accurate reflection of life in 
general and at least one officer sppken to appeared to fall within this category. 
'Change, bloody change. It just moved on so damn quick. No one knew where they 
were or what they were supposed to be doing. Walkie-talkies, cars, new 
instructions - better they left it alone and did things a bit more slo\yly.' (RD) 
The experience of UBP did affect the nature of policing in Plymouth during the years 
which were to follow. However, consideration of policing as being one which was valued 
because of its local nature also brought into question the extent to which officers who 
worked in the area also resided there and, by implied definition from the types of 
comments from residents of the area, had an affinity and understanding for the types of 
problems the communities encountered. 
The Alderson Era 
It was in Devon and Comwall that Community Policing first came to be given wide public 
prominence on the back of the large-scale public disorder in cities throughout Britain 
which occurred during the early 1980s. Through the pioneering activities of John Alderson, 
the chief constable between 1973 and 1982, community policing elaborated on the 
necessity to link police and community in a concerted alliance against disorder and crime. 
Alderson began an experiment in 1976 based in Exeter (Moore and Brown, 1981) which 
drew police and other agencies closer together in their respective responsibilities with a 
view to 'cutting crime off in the seedbed.' Targeted work on the extent of crime and who 
committed it, together with 'pro-active' initiatives to draw police officers themselves 
closer to the community in non-confrontational situations were key elements of the new 
community policing philosophy. Resident Beat Officers (RBOs) or Community Constables 
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were advised that only half of their time spent policing was to be on routine patrol, whilst 
the rest was to be devoted to working with the community, for the community. This meant 
that direct involvement of such officers in the running, and even setting up, of community 
facilities such as youth clubs and voluntary initiatives was encouraged. It was a scheme 
which, by May 1979, was seen as being ready to be implemented across the rest of the 
force area. 
Community policing in Devon and Comwall was introduced across the Force some twelve 
years after amalgamation. The recollections of the author at the time when he joined the 
service (about a year before community policing was launched forcewide) was one of a 
days work in St Austell, Comwall being ordered and routine with enough stress to excite 
when necessary but insufficient to break the back of the proverbial camel. Community 
policing was launched there at a meeting when a senior officer addressed the constables 
and sergeants informing them of who would be covering which area as a 'new and 
improved' constable. Such 'marketing' (or lack of it) led to widespread misunderstanding 
and scepticism over the initiative, particularly as many of the country police stations 
which, in the view of many, offered the ideal base for tme community policing had now 
been sold and a more rational form of reactionary policing was already being conducted 
from central locations such as St Austell, In addition the 'Panda' had bitten hard. Few 
officers ever walked countiy beats and, although the halcyon days were still recounted with 
fondness, there was much less of a wish to become more directly involved with the 
community by spending hours walking when a car was more comfortable and 'safe'. 
The, then radical nature of Alderson's opinions, which formed the basis of a number of his 
books and papers, did not win him universal support from rank arid file officers or even 
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senior colleagues from other forces. One of the most public examples ofthe dislike, which 
his own patrol officers felt about the new philosophy was broadcast on national radio' 
during 1979 and subsequently reported in Police Review (6 April 1979, pp.53 8-539). One 
police officer interviewed for the programme offered the following personal view: 
'Alderson tends to talk way over people's heads. He is not addressing a seminar at 
the bloody Queen's College, or whatever it is- he's talking to.the people of 
Plymouth, or Devon and, Cornwall. Iget the impression that.people think "what the 
hell has he justsaid?' 
There was a perception that his doctrine, which acknowledged a Durkheimian perspective^ 
of crime being a natural part of society and one which saw cure as only ever partial and 
relative to society's acceptance of behavioural norms, overturned much of established 
policing culture by concentrating too readily on offender-based models of crime reduction. 
This model, growing as-it d i d from the ExeterCrime Prevention Support Unit (CPSU), was 
strongly based around inter-agency co-operation and wider police-public consultative 
groups. Within five years of community policing being implemented in Devon and 
Comwall some of these notions were enshrined in legislation {Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act, 1984) following the recommendations of Lord Justice Scarman to whom 
Alderson had given evidence at the enquiry into the Brixton disorders.' 
The work of community constables was intended to be deliberately 'pro-active' in its 
approach, along the lines ofthe Exeter CPSU experiment, and was one which emphasised 
the integrated approach to policing which involved other groups and individuals from the 
' BBC Radio 4 'File on Four' programme. 
' •Crime is normal because a societj- exempt fiom it is utterly impossible' (Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, New 
York Free Press, 1964, p.67). 
' Latterly, tlie muhi-agency approach to crime prevention gathered even greater significance with the Morgan Report (Home Office, 
199 la) and as a priority ofthe new Labour govemment in 1998 with the enactment of Crirne and Disordeir legislation (Home Office, 
1998), see chapter 12:1997-1999 and into anew century. 
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community. In 1979^  the reaUty of inter-agency co-operation "wasone which was boosted 
through the decision to fund a 'unique £170,000 Govenmient experiment to bring police 
and Social Services together in new initiatives to tackle crime and other problems 
involving young people'. The joint venture 'the first of its type in Britain' was a result of 
'national interest in new community policing concepts being developed by Devon and 
Cornwall's Chief Constable';.Funded by the Department of the Environment as. a five year 
research project it sought to bring 'elements of the two agencies together under one roof' 
(and) strengthen existing procedures and build on them for the future.' 
Clearly the respective positions of establishment agencies such as social services and 
probation had ideological and professional positions which needed to be addressed in 
identifying the common denominators which existed in any co-operative functions to be 
undertaken with the police." There were formal and voluntary mechanisms of integration 
which became established during the mid to late 1980s, some of which were more routine, 
rather than inspirational, functions. However, whereas the concept had been developed 
along fhe pioneering efforts of Alderson's CPSU, the position of the ofBcers who had been 
newly assigned to positions as commimity constables across the force area did not fit 
clearly within this framework when devolved to a local level. The building blocks had 
been carefully laid to enable these constables to have a wider strategic view of how their 
role, and that of other agencies, could be understood and built on.'^ The evidence of the 
actual development, however, saw the specialist fimction held within the headquarters 
inspired initiative, whilst the locally based 'resident-beat' function developed 
Devon and Comwall Constabulary press release, 23 May 1979 (see Forbes et al., 1979, appndx. 6). 
" A situation which was acknowledged as needing to be addressed in the early stages of debate over how best to police commtmities, as 
indicated, for example by Kilby and Constable (1975) and Howe (1975). 
" Primarily through a two day locally based training programme for commimitj' constables (see Forbes et al., 1979, appndx. 4). 
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a more day-to-day visible, imperative than- a structured and integrated social service 
approach. • " 
The problematic evolution of community constables 
1984 saw the development of the Devon and Comwall Constabulary's 'Commimity 
Services Department' which was to become the 'Youth and Community Department' 
during the following year. It provided, what one of Alderson's chief constable successors, 
Donald Elliott'^ saw as 'a strengthening of the already good relationship with other 
agencies ... to ensure that young people are given every possible chance to develop into 
responsible and law abiding members of the community' (Devon and Comwall 
Constabulary, 1986, p.5). The department oversaw the work of six juvenile bureaux 
located in each division of the force. In Plymouth, the bureau was established in 
conjunction with social services and the staff involved worked alongside each other in 
shared premises owned by the local authority. Part of the remit of the bureau involved 
administering a new tiered cautioning policy for young offenders. At a different level, 
social services and the probation department were directing their efforts towards the 
support of functions and initiatives which were more diversely supportive of community 
and individual needs. Part of the rationale for this related to the opportunities for voluntary 
groups to achieve altemative funding which the formal institutions were forbidden to seek. 
Close linkage with voluntary funded groups enabled finance to be targeted in such a way 
as to benefit the workings of social services, probation and voluntary groups alike. 
Donald Elliott, QPM, was chief constable of Devon and Comwall between 1984 and 1989, then moving to a position in Her 
Majesty's hispectorate, eventually retiring from the service in 1996. Between Alderson's retirement and Elliott taking command, David 
East, the deputy chief constable under Alderson had been promoted to chief constable ofthe force. 
226 
Community policing iii Devon and Comwall 
The level at which these developments had a direct impact upon the work of community 
constables was less observable from the point of view of both police and public. These 
were targeted measures, often with the primaiy beneficiaries being most obvious as those 
who had in some way transgressed societal rules. Youth and community services had 
become a centrally led function and the development of specialist officers within the 
divisions, operating under this banner, drew into question the precise, nature ofthe role 
which community constables were expected to perform. The terms of reference for a police 
inspector who undertook an evaluation of the role of community constables in Plymouth 
during 1986 included the question of whether they were 'the first tier in a community 
policing system or simply window dressing to appease the community?' (Shaw, 1987, p.l). 
Thirty three officers responded to a questionnaire which was sent to all fifty seven 
community constables in the city. Almost half felt that 'other social agencies' working in 
the area saw the problems which were cited by the officers themselves in the same way as 
they did, with a similar proportion identifying that there were tasks which the police 
undertook which 'might be dealt with by other agencies' (p. 17). 
Devon and Comwall was the subject of research in the field of community policing in the 
early 1980s when a comparison was made of the scheme with one of policing in Greater 
Manchester (Jones, 1983). In addition to establishing relatively high levels of public 
confidence in the police, where aspects of community policing were most obvious, Jones 
sought to compare the perceptions of both public and police conceming the image which 
they felt was portrayed. Where public expressions of satisfaction were concemed, these 
regularly fell below those which were perceived to be their levels of satisfaction by police 
officers in Devon and Comwall (although in Greater Manchester the opposite was the 
case). The most noticeable variation was in Plymouth where 74% of the public interviewed 
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indicated that they feh satisfied uath the way community poHcing was developing,, whilst 
89% of police officers asked said they felt-that the public were satisfied with-the situation. 
In March 1987, the results of an intemal review conceming the role of community 
constables was finalised in Devon and Comwall. This work concluded that it had been 
'difficult to isolate the role of the community constable fi-om that of any other PPD" 
constable for, in many respects, it is identical' and went on to indicate that conditions 
under which officers designated as community coristables hadto operate did not allow the 
concept of proactivity envisaged by Alderson to be accomplished (Willcox et al., 1987). 
The inception of the scheme in Plymouth had less dramatic effects in terms of geographic 
upheaval than in the rest of Devon and Comwall. The contextuality within Plymoiith bore 
a closer relationship to one of lost leadership and unwelcoming locale than difficulties 
associated with those in other areas of the Force such as St Austell. There was an apparent 
resentment, recalled by the officers interviewed for this thesis, conceming what were seen 
as Alderson's idealistic and political intentions.'^  
'I know everybody got really excited about Devon and Comwall when the riots 
occurred and said that we'd got it right, but we were doing all that already, it wasn't 
community policing that made us accepted in the community - we already were.' 
(DG) 
'Alderson just wanted to feather his own nest - you can see that. His ideas were 
"don't lock 'em up, talk to them instead" and getting involved in running youth clubs 
and the like. Officers got prizes for it.' (IV) 
" PPD stood for 'Prevenlad\-e Policing Department', a title given to officers performing routine patrol functions. 'Formerly described as 
the uniformed branch, the title... denotes a determination to prevent crime by social action rather than simply reacting after offences 
ha\-e been committed' (Chief Constable's Annual Report, 1979, p. 16). 
The latter was re-enforced to niany when, following his retirement, he stood as the Liberal parliamentary candidate for Teighbridge in 
1983 (he was iihsuccessfiil and did not stand for political office again). 
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The comments of officers were similar-to those made in outspoken form during the 'File 
on Four'- radio broadcast of 1979.'^  The officers from Plymouth who were interviewed in 
the programme had a sanguine view of community policing and what it would mean to 
them. 
'I think our job is quite simple, and if he starts to complicate it with these funny 
ideas, I think a lot of people are going to get disgruntled' with the job, jack it in, 
move away; transfer. It's starting now you know?' 'They understand [Alderson's • 
views/all right, but they don't want them.'/ 
'The Chiefs-idea is that if someone throws a piece offish and chip paper down on 
the floor we're supposed to tell them it's anti-social. Well you get a chap and you 
tell him it's anti-social, he thinks you're just a pile of muck and he'll pitch into you." 
Alderson's o-wn comments in the programme acknowledged the problem and depicted the 
issues which were prevalent in a city environment to be more difficult to overcome than in 
other areas. 
I think you will find that it's more difficult to convert, if that's the right word, 
officers who work in response circumstances in city centres. They do see the 
atmosphere as hostile and that is quite dangerous and it causes this drift and this 
alienation, it is ah occupying army syndrome and I've got to explain to these 
officers that is not acceptable." 
Despite such negative views, community policing had become a catalyst to change in 
policing philosophy which was to develop even more dramatically in the following years 
within many other areas of the country. To a large extent the feelings which officers 
appeared to hold, or at least, publicly proclaimed they held, was a reaction to change, but 
also a reaction to Alderson himself who was perceived by some as an academic rather than 
a policeman. The 'File on Four' quotes are clearly ideal fodder for media broadcasts and 
there would be great difficulty in sustaining an argument that the whole basis on which 
The quotes from the programme were reproduced in Police Review (6 April 1979, pp.538-539). 
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Devon and Cornwall's communitypoiIcing-v.'as built was universally dismissed by officers 
as worthless. Evidence tends to show that it was at least a title which encouraged positive 
attitudes from the public and the creation of a feel-good factor about how the local police 
were determined to place working in the community environment higher on the agenda. 
The same evidence also indicates that few had a genuine understanding of what the details 
of comnjunity policing actually iavolved, with many relating i f back to-pre-1979 
determinants Of foot patrol. Or the 'bobby on the beat' (a 'picture' which was neatly 
coloured-in through media interpretations of the concept also). The term 'community' was 
an essential element to its public acceptance as 'not only is this word rich in symbolic 
power, but it lacks any negative connotations' (Cohen, 1985, p. 117). 
But the essence of the Alderson model bore deliberate attention on the notion of 
consultation and policing by the community as well as the formal police organisation. It 
was an early attempt to convince that communities policed themselves and that the police 
role was one of assisting them to so do. The underlying message that the police would now 
'confrol' less, but assist to 'control', is one which remained at the heart of the debate on 
policing, arguably through the initiatives of the Conservative party's post-Thatcher period 
and more clearly with the recent Labour govemment moves towards police being seen as 
partners in the enterprise of crime reduction and not necessarily the lead agencies. 
Stonehouse's Community Constables 
There were still degrees of negotiation and frade-offs necessary in 1979 in order to fill the 
number of vacancies available for community constables. An officer who imdertook one of 
the first community roles in Stonehouse recalls: 
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'1 Was called .in and he (the superintendent) said "I see you're getting married in 
October." They wanted me to rnove to Bodmin Traffic. I said"well.that's goingto pe 
dandy for me!" or words to. that effect anyway. Then he said "Well I've got a 
vacancy here for a community constable cause I've got to find three more because 
they're starting this community policing, if you take that I guarantee you won't go to 
Bodmin traffic." I said "Thank you, I'll take it." It wasn't till I walked out the door I 
realised.' (CG) 
Other officers who had aheady estabhshed what was, effectively, a 'community' basis as 
their policing style adapted to the role more readily. •• 
'They asked meto be a community constable. I said "I already am."' (LG) 
However, Stonehouse had lost The Octagon police station twelve years previously and 
police deployment had been based far more on a reactive style of policing from the 
centrally based city centre stations during this period. Society had also changed 
dramatically; now more ready to question the role and authority of a uniform presence and 
react to what was, in the eyes of many, an alien rather than integrated presence. 
'I knew my residents. I could walk there, by myself, without any fear. When I (first) 
went there I had lumps of rock and stone all thrown at me. St Peter's Secondary 
School, I wouldn't dare walk past the playground there, I'd be absolutely mobbed 
with stuff coming over the wire. With a hundred kids in the playground there's no 
way you could ever identify who throws what could you? Not that they'd tell you 
anyway. But I cracked that, I kept going back there every day and I kept going 
back and in the end of course they.... I mean in a place like Rendle Street Flats 
that's where there was an awful lot of them. I could walk in most of those flats and 
there wouldn't be any trouble and deal with people and I'd deal with them, in difficult 
circumstances.' [For you to have to go in and overcome that beforehand seems 
quite an indictment of policing the place pre-1979] 'Yes, I think it is to a degree 
tjecause when they lost The Octagon they lost what they saw as their police.' 
(CG) 
Another of the community constables, who served in, the area for over a decade, 
proclaimed much of the philosophy to which Alderson prescribed as central to the style of 
policing which he developed in Stonehouse. 
'What you're doing is building up a relationship with the majority ofthe public then 
instead of dealing with a minority of the public which we're doing most of the time, 
which has to be dealt with, and you've got to put resources to that. There's a 
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wider view, of dealing.witli tiie majority of ihe public and gaining public sympathy 
and co-operation- and you can only get there by gaining their confidence and 
doing the sort of things we've been talking about. These are things which, over 
the years have tended to be pushed into the background because crime figures 
have risen and its gone to the stage now where a lot of the minor stuff is being 
disregarded.' (IL); 
'CG ' , a servant of eleven years in the role, considered that certain members of the 
community were likely to accept any officer who was prepared to become involved as 
more than just a uniform carrying individual charged with law enforcement: 
'In some families, even after eleven years, I was never accepted but I think, you 
know, (it) got better. I was in the schools, after eleven years i mean I had kids 
running round who were this high who had families of their own when I left. I'm 
Godfather to many and best man to others." [are tiiese people wlio you didn't 
l<now prior to you policing the patch?] 'Oh yes, too right' .... 'Godfather to half a 
dozen, eight.'.... '1 mean to a lot of kids I was a pseudo-father, I mean mother 
would call me in to batter their ears, if not physically, verbally because, you know, 
there was a lot of thieving within the family and if you're a single parent mother 
what sanction do you use? If you use the sanction (of saying) "I'll get the 
policeman for you" then you've got to get the policeman eventually. Being in the 
schools is a valued bit of it because it actually gets you recognised."... "I ended up 
being on nineteen committees." (CG) 
But there was an acceptance, by him, that his roles required a degree of authority to 
maintain credibility: 
Td never "'play" in uniform ... you don't want to lessen the power of the uniform ... 
particularly in the kid's eyes. So youth clubs was always in jeans, because I think 
kids can identify you can't they, they can identify you're playing a role, when your 
a policeman with your hat on your someone different to 'CG' who hasn't got his 
hat on.' (CG) 
These views were far from being generally accepted as the 'correct' style of policing in 
Stonehouse even amongst colleagues who performed similar roles on adjoining beats. The 
perception that a police officers primary role related to overt and direct involvement with 
the community in uniform only, and that to become embroiled in the organising and 
running of such establishments as youth clubs was inappropriate, was central to many 
arguments. 
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'Community, policing isn't about attending meetings and' mnning clubs.- its about 
walkiing the streets of the area you police, knowing the people you police and 
actually policing - detecting crime, moving on nuisance, enforcing the law.' There's 
no substitute for the fact that we are there to enforce the law. People know and 
expect that and respect you for it when you do it.' (LG) 
The position which the pohce found themselves in was one of trying to accomplish two 
primaiy demands which the public had. On .the one hand, a highly yisible presence with 
pro-active work being accomplished by community constables against Alderson's model 
and, on the other, swift and effective response to incidents as they arose. By 1986, four 
years after Alderson's departure from the Force, Chief Superintendent Brian Phillips," who 
was in charge of policing Plymouth acknowledged the problem formally. 
No-one would disagree that the relaxed, avuncular officer on foot patrol is 
desirable and comforting. However, he lacks one ability and that is to meet an 
equally persistent demand for rapid response. ( ) it has to be recognised that to 
some significant degree, these styles of policing - street walking and fifth cavalry -
are often incompatible (Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, 1986, p.46). 
The perceptions of Stonehouse residents about fhe nature of community policing following 
the public proclamation of this new style of police involvement was one which met with 
mixed reaction and varying degrees of understanding. There was a general inclination to 
re-draw the picture of the community constable in the same image as the one which was 
related by those residents who had been asked to recall their views on policing during the 
1960s and 1970s. The visible presence continued to be regarded as one of high importance, 
and this was an issue which few of those interviewed related as being a benefit which had 
become obvious through community policing. 
'The thing I thought was that we would see more policemen on the beat, but that's 
not something I can ever remember being the case.' (ref; 2/1994) 
Brain Phillips, QPM, MSc ended his career in Devon and Comwall Constabulary as Assistant Chief Constable, retiring in 1992. 
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'When .John Aldertpn'® took over he made a lot about how we were having our 
own community constables:, I knew who mine, was, 'CG' [inteiviewee correctly 
named the officer], but it wasn't like I saw him any more than. I'd seen police 
around the area before that.' (ref: 5/1991) 
'I believe in community policing and think it's right to have more police on the 
streets.' /'Do you feel that there were more police on the streets after community 
policing came in?] 'No, I don't. I think it was done to make us feel better about the 
police but it didn't result in us seeing much evidence of them being there.' (ref: 
29/1991) 
Of those residents who did relate a more visible presence being a benefit were two who' 
had specific involvement with community activities: 
'I was always aware that the police had an interest in the club [youth club] but 
there was a more positive approach when 'CG' came in. Probably there will 
always be barriers between the police and youngsters but 1 did feel that here was 
a real effort to break those barriers down. 'CG' came in very frequently and did 
this for as long as I remember him being our community constable. It dropped off 
after he left.' (ref: 53/1991) 
'As a resident on the committee I knew that the police would always come along if 
they were asked.. If there were any real problems, they would call on me 
sometimes. I think that community policing probably did have something to do 
with it. There was a reason behind what they did and it made them more 
available." (ref: 29/1991) 
Community constables' positions within the force were perceived by their colleagues 
within Plymouth in a similarly negative way to that which Irving et al. (1986) had 
identified elsewhere. Superintendent Webster, the sub-divisional officer responsible for the 
city centre area (which included Stonehouse) had identified that: 
They seem to be very much on their own and this tends to create a form of barrier 
between them and other departments. I would stress that the community officers 
themselves have made little effort in removing any barrier. Steps are in hand in an 
endeavour to rectify the situation (Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, 1981, p.52). 
The level at which this had been considered a problem was one which appeared to show an 
underlying belief by Superinterident Webster that thfe problem was more cormected to how 
The interviewee referred to "Alderton', meaning 'Alderson'. The mistake was common, with their being nimierous examples in the 
media of where the surnames ofthe chief constables of Devon and Comwall, and Greater Manchester (Anderton) became confiised. 
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commimity constables saw themselves than how others saw them. It was a theme which 
was acknowledged by officers in such positions themselves, although from an anticipated 
opposite stance. 
There were those who didn't l<now what we did and didn't appreciate the reasons 
for us doing it. I thinl< they saw it as a soft option and the way in which we could 
work shifts which were best for us, and the area we worked, was, I think, the 
cause of a degree of envy.'(LG) - . • • 
'1 did object to being called the 'social worker' by my sergeant. 'Look', I said, 'It's 
. part of the job", tjut he" always called me it, in front of junior officers too,- so what 
sort of impression did that give?" (NS) 
Research which had been conducted during the 1980s had revealed a gap between what 
had been originally intentioned as a proactive style of policing accomplished by specified 
community constables within a broader framework of inter-agency work, and the day-to­
day reality of policing. The studies conducted in Devon and Comwall (Shaw, 1987; 
Willcox et al., 1987) had identified time taken away from intended duties in order to fulfil 
more routine commitments, by bolstering the response sections, to be practical 
management which disfracted community constables from what was perceived to be their 
role. When a further study was completed some seven years later, things were found to 
have changed little (Virgo, 1994). Much was still made of the force's commitment to the 
concept of 'policing with the community' (Devon and Comwall Constabulary, 1993b) but 
the focus on how the proactive approach towards policing could be integrated into a fast 
evolving criminal justice system was developing outside the established positions of 
community constables themselves. 
Community involvement in Stonehouse 
Policing the Stonehouse area did not, of course, take place in a social vacuum. The area 
was one which exhibited numerous examples of community based initiatives which were 
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either specifically relevant to the local communities, or had a wider catchnient area, but 
were often based in Stonehouse or the city centre nearby. Groups and facilities included: 
Crossline, part of the Plymouth City Mission financed totally by voluntary contributions 
mainly from churches, providing a telephone counselling and drop-in service based in 
Union Street; Icthus (a church based community support organisation); Plymouth 
Homemakers, a care and resettlement agency sponsored by the. probation service and 
Plymouth City Housing Department; SWITCH (Support Women" in their Crisis Hours); 
Saifline, (support to adults who were sexually abused as children); a HIV-positive support 
drop-in centre based within the Eddystone Project; Voice, (mental stress and 
rehabilitation); as well as more established provisions such as the Citizens' Advice Bureau, 
NSPCC, Family Conciliation Service, Samaritans and Salvation Army. 
In the early 1990s, groups such as these met on a regular basis under the umbrella of 
Plymouth Inter-Agency Forum (PIAF), a meeting shaicture which one group representative 
feh to be of value because 'people rarely have just one problem and discussing and sharing 
our resources and knowledge can be of great value'.'' The personal interviews with 
residents which took place as part of this research sought to identify the extent to which 
those living in the area had both knowledge of, and involvement in, the various groups 
which formed part of area's makeup. It also asked residents to consider the extent td which 
they felt an affinity with the area in which they lived and required them, where possible, to 
give examples of what they considered to be observable 'community spirit' and whether 
the police and/or local authority should have a role in promoting such activities. 
" The author met representatives of many of these groups at one of their meetings in December 1990 and was able to take notes as a 
participant observer which informed the process of the research. 
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Although Stonehome consisted of one geographic area, the development of diverse 
housing and environmental factors within this meant that residents often considered 
themselves as being part of smaller identified groups rather than members of a general 
Stonehome community. This was based on different factors. Residents in older style, 
primarily terraced or semi-detached housing to the north of the area, in which many homes 
had been- turned into flats and bedsits, related to their 'coriimunities' in different ways. 
Some made reference to their residents' association which worked towards the .resolution 
of local community problems and provided contacts and meeting points for individuals at 
various points in their year, whilst more transient residents such as students and those 
living in, what they considered to be 'temporary accommodation', found less affinity with 
any community based on geography but more so within their work or academic 
environment such as the university. Those in the 'north of Union Street' council flat 
accommodation, several of which were identified as being relatively long-term residents 
related a stronger sense of 'belonging' to a community based around that specific area and 
often made reference to environmental factors which they felt impinged on their lives in 
that specific locality. To the south of Union Street, where small scale industrial and 
commercial premises abutted private and rented accommodation, there was a mixture of 
perceptions based on personal experience and en-vironmental factors such as the area 
commonly used for prostitutes to solicit for business. 
The information acquired from the sixty residents personally interviewed during 1991 did 
not allow a large enough set of data to be gathered for each area of Stonehouse to be 
analysed separately but there was, nevertheless, the opportunity to compare the types of 
responses given and consider common themes which enierged across the whole area. 
Generally, residents were relatively positive about their perspectives on whether a 
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'community spirit' existed in "the area in. which they resided with only one in four (14 -
23%) saying that they felt that there was 'no evidence of any community spirit' whilst'34 
(55%) said that they believed community spirit to be either 'very' or 'fairly strong'. When 
asked to score what residents believed to be their personal commitment to that community 
spirit however only 21 (35%) said that this was 'very strong' or 'fairly strong'. The notion 
of 'community spirit' was, of course, open to a degree of subjectivity^ in definition and 
interviewees were, therefore, asked to give their personal interpretation of what this meant 
to them, together with recollections which might exemplify their perspectives. These 
naturally varied although a common understanding of 'community spirit' involving 
individual activity in support of others was noticeable. 
'A wholeness in the community where individuals care and interact with one 
another in a mutually beneficial way' (ref: 9/1991) 
'People in this area getting together to try and maintain standards of property' (ref: 
1/1991) 
'Just looking out for each other I suppose* (ref: 37/1991) 
The extent to which the police were seen as being able to contribute to a 'community 
spirit' in the area showed that 51 residents (85%) felt this commitment should be either 'a 
lot' (32) or 'some' (19). In being asked to relate what form this could most beneficially 
take common themes related to increased visibility by foot patrolling, more involvement 
with young people, and a quicker response to residents when there were problems in the 
area. 
'...better to be seen as a partner in the community by being seen and being 
accessible. To be part of the community rather than a heavy hand when needed.' 
(ref: 4/1991) 
'It can work but it takes time to create a relationship. I feel the police shouldn't 
have to take the initiative but should then get involved. Drop-in centres for 11 to 15 
year olds can be good things. It seems to be missing in this age group particularly. 
People seem to know each other round here though ... most have nothing.' (ref: 
10/1991) 
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'Those born in the area have grown up rough and streetwise. They don't have no •. 
finesse about them and don't care or need 'community' encouraged by the police. 
They do their own thing and don't like the police ... many like it here because it's 
their scene, beer etc. They don't give a damn.' (ref: 6/1991) 
'The police can encourage community spirit by being seen and available. Showing 
that they have an interest in the area can make a difference. Not everyone has the . 
time to make the-effort but Ifeel the police should make that time and they would 
be repaid accordingly.' (ref: 44/1991) 
'We might not be able to mkke this place like Mayfair, but there's some good 
people down here who still respect the police and feel let down that they seem to 
have gone away from the area and not taken-an interest... they would be able to 
start to make a difference.' (ref: 51 /1991) 
The proportion of interviewees who said they knew at least one police officer personally 
by name and were able to identify the person whom they regarded as their 'community 
constable' was relatively low. Only 6 (10%) knew who their local officer was but a further 
11 (18%) were able to recount the names of police officers who worked in some capacity 
or other in the Stonehouse area. Few residents regarded the amount of effort which the 
police put into routine patrolling of their area (with the exception of late evening patrols in 
Union Street) as sufficient with only 3 (5%) recalling that they saw a police officer more 
regularly than once a month. It was interesting to note, given the level of late 1990s moves 
towards increasing the statutory ownership of 'community safety' towards local 
authorities, that residents felt this institution to have a relevant part to play in their area. 27 
(78%) felt that local authority involvement should be 'a lot' (45%) or 'some' (33%), with 
only 2 (3%) feeling that involvement should be 'little' or 'none' (18% being unsure). There 
was often more difficulty to residents in answering the question of what form such 
commitment had taken or should take. However the most common themes related to 
provision of activities and centres for young people, general cleanliness and repair of the 
area, and a need to redefine priorities to see more attention being given to residential areas 
of the city and less being spent within the shopping area. 
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'People aren't really interested in direct contact with local authorities'but the local 
authority can give assistance in financial ways.' (ref: 3/1991) 
'More should be done to encourage people to call in at community centres. Also 
the lighting here is very poor and old people are afraid to go out.' (ref: 11/1991) 
'The street cleaners don't do their jobs. All the alleys are foul and the litter is 
disgraceful everywhere outside the city centre.' (ref: 2/1991) 
'I am not sure that there is much they can do - they can't catch criminals for 
instance can they? That's the job ofthe police." (ref;. 50/1991) 
'If the council had to do certain things that the police wanted - like not letting 
drinking go on 'til all hours and not putting up with some of their council tenants -
kick them out when they cause a problem - then things could be better.' (ref; 
30/1991) 
Given the relatively high level of community based projects within or close to Stonehouse, 
many of which were established because of perceived need in the area, residents 
knowledge of these was considered important to identifying the extent to which their 
individual and community needs could be met over and above the service which they 
believed the police and local authority should be providing. In total, fourteen 'assistance' 
groups, facilities and organisations were related to respondents in the interviews and their 
levels of knowledge about the existence and purpose of these facilities was probed. It was 
accepted that, because of the specialised nature and relatively low-profile of some of these, 
few residents would be likely to respond that they were aware of the existence of all 
fourteen and this proved to be the case. However, there appeared to be a generally low 
knowledge amongst respondents of many of the facilities which were locally based, even 
where the purpose of these groups was generally appreciated e.g. neighbourhood watch 
(NHW), Victim Support and residents' associations. 
Table 9.1 indicates the level of knowledge and involvement which was shown by residents 
in groups or associations which were relevant to their community areas. In relation to 
NHW, although 57 (95%) said that they had not heard of or were unsure of a scheme 
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covering their area, 11 resided in streets which were covered, and in the case of residents' 
associations, where just over half of the interviewees (33) said they were unaware of such a 
group covering their area, all but 9 of the remainder fell within catchment areas where their 
presence on such a group would have been welcomed. The facility which most residents 
said that they were aware of (although only one identified as having had any dealings with) 
was the Plymouth Night Shelter, a facility not of specific benefit to residents of 
Stonehouse, but one which was well known of through publicity and its location in Bath 
Street, just off Union Street. Two-thirds (40) were aware of the services of Victim Support 
which, had this been a survey of general residents, may have been reassuring. However, in 
view of the fact that all interviewees had been victims of some form of crime this resuh 
was less encouraging, although only 14 (23%) victims were in categories which would 
have been regular referrals to that organisation (auto-crime, accounting for 47% of 
offences not normally being referred). 
Whereas involvement as either helper or client with the facilities listed was generally very 
low, the list was not seen to be exhaustive and, therefore, residents were also asked to 
indicate their involvement in other activities at both social and voluntary level as they 
related to the Stonehouse area and elsewhere. Two-thirds (40) said that they did not have 
regular dealings with any other local groups or facilities whilst 7 individuals (12%) cited 
voluntary work which included involvement in youth clubs. Save the Children and 
Samaritans. 
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Group or 
association 
Residents unaware 
or unsure 
Residents 
aware 
(no involvement) 
Residents 
with involvement 
(as eittier member or client) 
Eddystone project 58(97%) 2 (3%) 0 (0%) 
SWITCH 58(96%) 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 
Neighbourhood 
Watch 
57(95%) 1 (2%) 2 (3%) 
Icthus 56 (93%) 4 (7%) 0 (0%) 
Youth Enquiry 
Service 
56 (93%) 3 (5%) 1 (2%) 
Voice 56 (93%) 3 (5%) 1 ,(2%) 
Probation Co'munity 
Development Team 
56 (93%) 3 (5%) 1 (2%) 
Saifline 54 (92%) 2 (3%) 2(3%) 
Homemakers 49 (82%) 5 (8%) 6 (10%) 
Crossline 43 (72%) 15(25%) 2 (3%) 
Local residents' 
association 
33 (55%) 18 (30%) 9 (15%) 
Local Community 
Centre 
29 (48%) 26 (43%) 5 (8%) 
Victim Support 20 (33%) 33 (55%) 7 (12%) 
Night Shelter 19(31%) 40 (67%) 1 (2%) 
Table 9.1: Stonetiouse residents' knowledge/involvement with 
groups/associations relevant to their communities (1991) 
The extent to which residents' felt affinity with the area in which they lived was also tested 
in asking them to consider, providing there was no change to their personal circumstances, 
and the accommodation in which they resided was identical, whether they would choose to 
move to another location in the Plymouth area. Almost two-thirds (37) said that, given this 
opportunity they would take it. The most common primary reason given for this decision 
(given by 17 residents) was a perception that crime happened more frequently in 
Stonehouse than in other areas of Plymouth and that this change would reassure them of 
being less likely of becoming victims in the future. Just slightly less (16 residents) 
indicated that environmental factors such as a close proximity to Union Street, dirty streets, 
the change in status of many properties from one family residences to flats/bedsits and 
outward signs of low-level disorder (noise, drunkenness, graffiti, vandalism) formed the 
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main rationale for their decision. Two of the remaining three residents said that personal 
reasons associated with their crimes would make a move desirable and one person cited the 
move to be more beneficial to him because of his business. Of the 23 who said they would 
stay in the area, 15 refenred to the 'convenient' location, close to the city centre and local 
amenities as their principle reason for staying; 7 felt that as they had resided in the area 
over a long period and had made friends and associates they had no vwsh to move, and 1 
resident did not wish to move as they felt all other areas of Plymouth were 'just as bad'. 
'I like it here, it's close to town and mother wouldn't shift anyway.' (ref: 11/1991) 
'It's pr-obably pretty obvious from what I've said already: I was born here - brought 
up here - it's my home.' (ref: 9/1991) 
'We were debating about moving out of Plymouth altogether, but to another part of 
the city? No.' (ref: 7/1991) 
'I run the youth club and have a good time with friends here. I wouldn't want to 
move:'(ref: 4/1991) 
'It would be a job to find somewhere closer or more convenient to all the things on 
offer in the city centre. I can put up with some of the hassle - you can get that 
anywhere.' (ref: 34/1991) 
It must be acknowledged that the personal interviews conducted provided only a 'snapshot' 
of views and experiences in the early 1990s but were, nevertheless, telling in some ofthe 
responses which were given in terms of being told from within an area of relatively high 
deprivation and crime. Although perspectives on 'community spirit' varied across 
locations in Stonehouse there was an apparent desire to see both police and local authority 
play a bigger role in addressing issues of concem. The extent to which many of those 
interviewed believed that they had a meaningfiil part to play in improving the area was less 
certain given the relatively low instances of stmctured community involvement. No 
account was taken of whether any individuals had criminal 'careers' in their own right. The 
potential value in considering how variability in community makeup cdn enable an 
understanding of the influence this has upon crime rates (Reiss and Tonry, 1986) was 
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considered. However, for the purposes of developing- a structure within which the 
community policing of'Stonehouse was concerned, a decision to concentrate attention on 
resident victims and police specifically was considered sufficient, although not ideal. 
Ward Policing 
The 1994 reorganisation saw 'E ' division, which previously covered Plymouth and a 
substantial amount of West Devon, have its territorial boundaries changed to cover only 
the area which, it was anticipated correctly at the time, would be coterminous with those of 
the new local unitary authority for the city. This, combined with the change of divisional 
commander for the area, gave the opportunity for a number of initiatives to be undertaken, 
one of which involved a complete change to the way police patrolling was directed. 
Plymouth had four main police stations: Charles Cross, Devonport, Crownhill and 
Plympton. Previously, each of the three main stations had been the centre of a sub-division, 
but with the change to a 'single-tier' command structure, based at Crownhill, these sub­
divisions disappeared as 'lines on the map'. 
Following reorganisation, the vast majority of uniform staff were designated titles of either 
'response' or 'ward'. Al l response officers were posted to Crownhill from where the 
mobile reactionary nature of policing was distributed according to need. Ward officers 
were based at each of five stations around the city under the supervision of a sergeant at 
each location. Al l came under the command of a chief inspector specifically responsible 
for ward policing. One of the principles which was intended to be an essential element of 
these new positions was that officers who were part of ward teams should not be absfracted 
for routine response duties elsewhere. It was hoped that this would alleviate the type of 
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problems which had'previously been identified as one of the main factors in affecting 
community constable's abihties to perform the role for which they had been intended. 
The objectives of ward team policing were set out in a document dated 10 June 1994, the 
main aim being 'to reduce the public demand on police time by an effective ward based 
system that is able to target its policing.response in accord with local community needs' 
(Devon and Comwall, 1994a). Included in the paper were job descriptions which made it 
clear that members of the new teams were a 'front line' police resource who would be 
expected to take a 'longer term approach to law enforcement' by building knowledge and 
confidence in relationships with people in the community which they policed. The style 
which was being formulated was one which took account of recommendations elsewhere 
of the need to select officers who would be prepared to commit themselves to the project 
for at least two years (NACRO, 1988). 
Research which was conducted within the first twelve months of ward policing being 
introduced (Coffey, 1995) identified that officers surveyed felt the number of occasions on 
which they had been abstracted from their normal role, in order to fulfil some other 
functions, had been greatly reduced. Respondents also indicated that they were broadly 
happy with the size of the area which they were expected to cover and the shift system 
which they had to work. A concern was expressed by over half of the 54 who replied to the 
survey that of the amount of work which each officer carried was either 'too heavy' (21) or 
'much too heavy' (6). Mixed messages emerged from answers to other questions in the 
survey in terms of perceived status as viewed by both colleagues and the public, leading to 
the conclusion that it could not 'be claimed with any certainty that ... (status) ... has 
improved in comparison to community constables generally' (p.63). The findings also 
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showed a majority of officers (58%) beheving that ward teams should spend more time in 
collaboration with other agencies. However, 16 officers (30%) said they did not feel this 
should be the case (p.55).^ '' 
One of the purposes of ward policing was to develop a wider inter-agency team ethos 
towards community problem solving. This was not a totally new concept as there were 
nimierdus examples available, before the scheme came into being, of the .previous structure, 
producing results which had benefited the relatively smooth running of sub-divisions. The 
primary difference to the new approach was development of the teams based on council 
ward areas, where there was anticipated a greater sense of ownership and resolve to 
address problems would be common to more than one agency. The effects of the scheme 
have yet to be fully evaluated in terms of detailed understanding, of public perceptions and 
experiences. Nevertheless, at a point in the development of community policing within 
Devon and Comwall, when stmctural imperatives called into question the precise nature of 
the role which community constables were to fulfil, Plymouth's Ward scheme appeared to 
address many of the issues. 
Commumty policing in Devon and Cornwall: an overview 
This chapter has reviewed the various processes which the Devon and Comwall area, and 
Plymouth and Stonehouse in particular, have been subject to over a considerable period of 
time. It has concentrated upon the way in which commimity policing developed and, 
through a chequered history of acceptance amongst members ofthe constabulary, evolved 
into a model of ward policing within the reconstituted Plymouth division post-1994. 
Whereas more detailed contemporary evidence has not been cited from elsewhere in the 
A further 6 (12%) gare no reply to the question. 
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force area, similar difficulties to those encountered in Plymouth have been recorded 
through the intemal reviews undertaken by members of the constabulary during the late 
1980s and 1990s (Shaw, 1987; Willcox et al., 1987; Virgo, 1994) as well as participative 
observation and records of the author during his career and period of study. What has been 
obvious during this process is that community policing has had a variety of meanings to 
both those involved in providing a service and those who have been in receipt of it. This 
has been able to be applied in relation to long-term residents of Storehouse and police 
officers of various lengths of service, some of whom encountered substantial changes to 
their policing environments over many years. 
However, key themes have emerged which are worthy of review. Firstly, the locational 
perspective on policing which has been observed in residents' and police officers' views 
on where police stations (notably The Octagon) are sited in relation to the communities 
which they serve. Although providing only a partial picture of how the policing of 
communities takes place, and therefore not detailing the multifaceted nature of work which 
is undertaken, a clear linkage was observed through the interviews which indicated 
perceptions of police availability and pahrolling as apparently enhanced through knowledge 
that officers paraded for duty at locations which has some connection with a local area. 
Less obvious from the information gained, however, is the extent to which police officers 
did actually patrol the types of residential locations imder study in Stonehouse. Although 
there are recollections of personal involvement between residents and officers these have 
commonly been referred to as being a result of a specific incident or crime which had taken 
place. Perceptions that the police were more available to local residents due to their police 
base being in relatively close proximity have to be treated with some caution, particularly 
when referred to by interviewees who have been asked to recall, what many perceived to 
247 
Community policing in Devon and Cornwall 
be, a 'golden agfe' of policing. But perceptions are often more impactive than fact, and the 
so called 'golden age' of the 195Gs and early 1960s have been observed elsewhere in .the 
force to have given way to a new generation of local residents throughout Devon and 
Comwall who, in 1999, reflect upon a period pre-1996 when all telephone calls to the 
police were answered at local stations as opposed to a central call-handlmg facility which 
was introduced alongside improved 'comrnand and control' computerisation. 
Also of significance is the extent to which Alderson's vision of community policing, being 
reliant on 'activated' communities, was not evidenced in Stonehouse where a minority of 
surveyed residents appear to have active community interests. It is, of course, accepted that 
a small scale survey of the type undertaken can not be fully representative of the whole 
area, let alone Devon and Comwall, but as a 'snapshot in time' the findings are at least of 
interest and worthy of fiirther research. The Stonehouse experience is relevant because of 
the atypical nature of the area, as compared with the rest of the force, as it is an inner-city 
locality of high deprivation and social need, but one which has a high number of voluntary 
and statutory agencies and groups nearby which appear have been utilised or assisted by 
only a small number of those interviewed. The extent to which 'community spirit' appears 
to pervade more rural towns and villages in Devon and Comwall is clearly not able to be 
ascertained from the Plymouth data, however most other areas of the force have limited 
local organised resources on which to draw compared to the inner-city and the element of 
real and perceived need elsewhere is similarly worthy of further research. 
Finally, the extent to which community policing has sought to be reinvented, through the 
development of ward teams is significant to both Plymouth and the force as a whole. 
Taking account of more recent developments with the introduction of the Crime and 
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Disorder Act 1998 it has become a standard strategy in pohcing local districts to develop 
teams able to address local problems in conjunction with local authorities-and other 
agencies. The Stonehouse data gives some indications in respect of local residents' beliefs 
that agencies other than the police, and in particular local authorities, have a part to play in 
the wellbeing of communities. 
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This chapter is about the development of crime prevention in Devon and Comwall 
Constabulary with particular attention being paid to the way in which this emerged in 
Plymouth, notably .during the 1990s, wheii the majority of the initiatives which were being 
developed at national level began to bear fruit within the force. Details of the wider issues 
conceming their development, together with examples of initiatives elsewhere in the 
country have been discussed in chapters four and five. However the form which these took 
in the south-west, and in particular Plymouth, is subject to more detailed consideration in 
this chapter. Development of irmovative approaches to crime prevention in Devon and 
Comwall have not been universally obvious across the area, and neither have the 
opportunities afforded the majority of communities been as stmctured as those which 
applied in Plymouth. The reasons for this are partly due to the city's acknowledged urban 
status and the potential for additional fimding from govemment sources, but also the level 
of commitment which was given to the 1990s multi-agency approach by the management 
sfructure of the division. Consequently Plymouth developed a range of initiatives which 
were not in place elsewhere in the force and met with a measurable degree of success in 
some instances. However, to appreciate the background to developments in the 1990s, a 
review of how crime prevention was dealt with in the Devon and Comwall area over the 
decades preceding this will be useful. 
Crime prevention in Devon and Cornwall 
1950-1967: Plymouth City 
In the -early 1960s, the Cornish Cominittee had reconimended the • establishment of 
specialist crime prevention departments with an officer of at least inspector rank appointed 
in each force as its Crime Prevention Officer (CPO), with officers in each division being 
identified to liaise with patrolling constables. These departments had sprung up, relatively 
quickly, oh the back of the report and in 1966, the final year of the Plymouth City force 
(prior to amalgamation), one sergeant had been identified for the work. The Chief 
Constable's Annual Report of that year contained one and a quarter pages devoted to the 
implismentation of the initiative and various 'successful' projects which had been 
undertaken. The success was acknowledged to be difficult to accurately evaluate but, 
'through a constant flow of enquiries and requests for advice' it was considered that there 
was 'an increasing awareness of the need to take precautions to protect property against 
crime' (Plymouth City Police, 1967, paras. 101-113). 
The early interest in the scheme had enabled the Plymouth force to embark upon a number 
of projects which quickly became, and remained, commonly used methods of imparting 
and receiving information. Leaflets giving advice were one of the main methods and 
newsagents, hotels and the Local Authority Motor Taxation Department assisted in 
distributing over 60,000 public information leaflets.' Talks were given to various 
organisations and, according to the Annual Report, 'requests for these is increasing' (para. 
109). The media were apparently keen to support the initiative with the local independent 
television station. Westward, producing a weekly five minute programme entitle 'Crime 
Call'. Use was also made of a number of firms which utilised radio communication from 
' An initiative which is still used nationally through the (now centralised) Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority as well as other 
organisations such as insurance companies. 
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vehicle to vehicle in the city to pass infomiation about stolen vehicles and other crime 
related subjects. 
The initiatives do not seem especially imaginative when looked back on from the media-
technology driven 1990s but, as the first year of a new campaign dawned, the police's 
enthusiasm for producing information appeared to be substantial. There are, however, two 
main points which can be considered from the evidence locally: (i) recollections of police 
officers from the period do not support the contention that anything particularly new was 
happening, and (ii) the next twenty years were not perceived as producing any great 
tangible benefits, whilst the initiatives themselves did not form the basis for development 
of any criteria to measure the impact which they might have been having. 
'I don't think we were doing a great deal new really. The leaflets were there, and 
there was a new department, but that's about all.' (RD) 
'You reminded me about the talks - well yes there were talks given but I don't know 
what I could say they did to help us. They told people to lock their windows and 
doors, but the people I knew did anyway and it didn't stop people coming in.' (AQ) 
'So what else did we do after that? Surveys and talks to the converted most of the 
time.' (RB) 
Stonehouse residents' recollections were not especially revealing on the crime prevention 
issue as a specific subject when concenfrating upon the past. However, those who did offer 
an opinion as to whether or not there were real benefits to be derived from the system of 
specialisation which was developing, tended to cite the public relations face of the 
enterprise rather than its aims or results. 
'It was more obvious that they were interested in preventing crime and not just 
catching the culprits.' (ref: 5/1991) 
'We keep leaflets at the (community) centre and probably have long before i came. 
I don't think many get taken.' (ref: 4/1991) 
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when the notion of locally based police officers, known by name, were seen to have total 
responsibility for all aspects of policing for their area. The worth of developing the issue at 
residential level through the recollective evidence is dubious but, nevertheless, can be 
observed in the context of the responses which were also given in relation to the 
community policing issue reported on in chapter 9. 
The 1976s: development towards situational approaches 
Within the newly formed constabulary, the commitment to maintaining the crime 
prevention departments continued and with it the increased aura of the nature of those 
involved as 'specialists' grew. But, unlike other 'specialists' within the organisation whose 
roles were sought after as high status positions with varying degrees of operational 
credibility, e.g. CED and Traffic Patrol Officers, the crime prevention officers occupied 
positions which were conventionally seen as 'retirement posts'. Their roles had become 
more specialised in the areas which continued to be based on the 'locks and bolts' 
philosophy of prevention, and their work comprised of significant degrees of 
professionalism in producing security advice reports on behalf of property owners. Talks to 
groups continued, as did the circulation of leaflets and various initiatives which were 
bolstering attempts to address the rising tide of crime by the promotion of information to 
the public. There was little doubt that the police saw the commitment and co-operation of 
the public as essential to winning the fight, but the question of whether other agencies 
which served the public should become involved was not one which had yet taken shape in 
the early 1970s. The police were the primary owners of the crime prevention mantle and, 
although in 1974 nineteen CPOs formed the nucleus of the crime prevention department. 
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their work was almost exclusively based on a strategy of encouraging the public to take 
greater care of their belongings. 
Public apathy towards escalating crime - "it can't happen to me" attitudes - must be 
overcome if any significant progress is to be made in reversing the trends of the 
past year. (Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, 1975, p. 19) 
By 1976, the two pages of the Devon and Comwall Constabulary Annual Report devoted 
to the issue listed many of the features for which the growing expertise of the Crime 
Prevention Officers had been trained. It included an abundance of statistics showing the 
number of alarm installations, arrests as a result of them, hundreds of thousands of leaflets 
which had been distributed, and the emergence of a 'talking car' which was sh-ategically 
placed in car parks around the force area to periodically play a tape recorded voice which 
bemoaned the fact that its owner had left it unlocked v^ ath property clearly on display - it 
never got stolen! (Devon and Comwall, 1976, pp.20-22). 
In the course of the research, the strategies which were employed by the force in the field 
of crime prevention were examined through interviews which took place with three 
officers who had performed Crime Prevention Officer^ roles at periods which ranged 
between 1974 and 1996. In particular, two had served as what could be defined as 'old-
style' CPOs, whilst the other, who was in post during the late 1980s and 1990s presented a 
newly formed muhi-agency approach to his work. Of interest was the extent to which the 
strategy which they had adopted matched what they understood to be that of the force 
during the time they served. They were also questioned on their personal views of what the 
role Was intended to achieve and how this fitted with national policy in crime prevention 
^ Included in this term is that oi Community Safety Officer which became the new title during the 1990s. This is discussed later in this 
chapter. 
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models. Responses illuminated the position which these individuals perceived themselves 
as occupying within the organisation, where a specialist post was viewed in a generally 
negative fashion by many of their colleagues. There was acknowledgement that this, was 
the case but the level of commitment which the CPOs believed they had shown to their 
jobs was rarely understood or taken into account by other officers. 
It was clear that the specialist nature of their roles inspired in the CPOs a genuine belief in 
its value, and the training which they had received was perceived to be something which 
the force had been wise to invest in. The property visits, presentations, publicity and 
leaflets were acknowledged to be the way in which the CPO's role was seen by many, but 
the feeling was that this ignored the general importance of the position and additional work 
which was beginning to emerge in relation to positive contacts which were being 
established with, for example, local authorities and building firms in designing-out crime at 
an early stage. They felt there was ample evidence to suggest that the force was 
progressing with its strategy in line with the 'tools' and encouragement which were being 
given to it by govemment to fulfil the role intended. The extent to which a wider net 
should have been cast at that time to bring other social agencies into the equation was seen 
as something which had yet to become an accepted way of progressing, not only from the 
point of view of the police, but agencies such as the probation and social services. 
'I am sure that this is something of its time, it took a time for that to become the 
standard method of looking for solutions, it was difficult to perceive of a situation 
where it wasn't mainly the responsibility of the community to keep their valuables 
safe ... The police role was seen as the role which could best inform and 
encourage -1 don't only think it was seen like that by us, but by the public - and I 
think fhe government too.' (KN) 
"What we did for a long time was provide a useful service to those who wanted us 
to give advice ... certainly it was based on property protection but you have to 
remember that that's what the majority of crime is - property crime. It was logical to 
perform in the way we did ... the problem tended to be more of how we were 
believed to be operating by those who didn't know better. We helped them (the 
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constables) a lot when you think about it. If we weren't doing the visits and alarms 
for example then they would have had to.' (RB) 
There was a movement towards a constructive approach of 'opportunity reduction' 
preventative measures with the estabhshment in the headquarters department responsible 
for crime prevention of a constable appointed as the architectural liaison officer (ALO). 
(jiven specific training in issues relating to plaiming legislation, and through liaison with 
builders, local authority departments, and security firms, the officer was the force's attempt 
to pre-empt the building of property in such designs as might cause later problems in 
making them more vulnerable as crime target areas. The role was effectively advisory in its 
nature but was built on the theory of defensible space and the new importance which was 
being placed on the situational approach by government.' Partnership in the arena of 
crime prevention was evolving slowly on these types of structural lines, but the social 
prevention aspects were still to emerge iri the mid to late part of the 1970s through John 
Alderson's commitment to bringing a wider range of agencies together in an altemative 
focus on the issue. 
Late 1970s: the foundations of a multi-agency approach 
The historic development of crime prevention in Devon and Comwall during the mid to 
late 1970s was epitomised by the pioneering work of the Crime Prevention Support Unit 
(CPSU), inspired by chief constable John Alderson, and based in the city of Exeter 
Although this new scheme led to the late 1970s observing the introduction of community 
policing in the force, such a development merely served to reinforce the inter-dependant 
nature and close overlap between community policing and crime prevention. Because of 
See chapter 3 1967-1979: Teclmology to Commimity. 
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the author's 'growing up' with the system, and the subsequent interviews which were 
conducted with officers who recalled experiences' of community polibing jfrom a personal 
perspective, this aspect of policework has been able to be considered in chapter 9 but will 
be briefly covered. Less available from these interviews was a more in-depth 
understanding amongst the rank-and-file of the inter-agency perspective which was a 
mainstay of the CPSU during this period. An individual view on its successes and 
problems was recounted through one interview with an officer who, at the time, worked on 
the unit and, as part of his role, addressed various courses held at the police fraining 
college in Exeter. His particular recollections were perceived to be of relevance because of 
the observably negative and short-sighted attitude of one such course he attended, and 
debatably gave an insight into some of the problems with the 'sale' of community policing 
during the period.'' 
The potential misunderstanding of the scheme's benefits, and the different interpretations 
given to the role which each agency within the structure could most beneficially play, was 
exemplified at the time in the research which the head of the CPSU, Colin Moore, 
conducted by way of interview and attitude survey (Moore and Brown, 1981, pp.78-112). 
Agency workers showed more enthusiasm for non-reactive styles of policing than did the 
police themselves and there was a wider appreciation obvious, amongst the former group, 
of the scope and potential for initiatives which cut across more conventional beliefs of 
where the dividing line between policework and socially influential work lay. Few of the 
police verbatim responses given in Moore's work are in such critical vein as those which 
were reported in a BBC File on Four programme on Alderson and community policing 
•* The negativity is evidenced through the author's own involrement as one of the course. The general leviel of scepticism is also detailed 
in chapter 9 Community Policing in Devon and Conrwall. 
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(referred to in chapter 9). However the BBC quotes- were the views of constables in 
Plymouth and not the Exeter area, and were almost certainly based on little or no 
experience of policing in a style which had been implemented in the area where the CPSU 
had operated. Nevertheless the narrow-minded nature of the responses at a time when 
attempts were underway to develop a style of policing which relied on a less reactive 
approach and higher levels of cooperation between the police, public and other agencies is 
a significant indicator ofthe problems experienced in bringing the troops 'on board'. 
Elsewhere in the force the work of the CPSU was being developed which included 
research on the extent of juvenile crime patterns in West Comwall, the results of which 
were presented to representatives of social services, probation and education departments. 
This led to a more detailed evaluation being conducted of a specific problem estate and the 
overall information gained was used as the basis for establishing a juvenile bureau in West 
Comwall in 1980. Similar work in the east of the county, followed by a public presentation 
in Bodmin, resulted in the establishment of a community association. In Launceston a 
community action group which aimed to reduce juvenile crime was inaugurated after a 
series of successful police 'night schools'. An analysis of crime within Plymouth was used 
to consider methods of policing in the city and the chief constable presented the findings to 
Plymouth City Council and South Hams (South Devon) District Council. Building of 
bridges with other agencies was also underway through such initiatives as a weekend 
training course for youth workers and community constables where appreciation of 
respective roles and future cooperation was the aim. Also a total of 61 officers spent 
various week-long attachments to social service and probation departments and members 
of those agencies engaged in reciprocal visits (Devon and Comwall Constabulary, 1980, 
pp.21-22). 
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The 1970s h?.d seen the constabulary begin to follow much ofthe lead which was implicit 
in encouragement given by govemment for the situational approach to crime preverition. 
With the development of Alderson's appreciation of the need for a wider cross-section of 
society and other agencies to become involved in policing, the thrast given to community 
safety as a concept, rather than one which concentrated solely on the situational 
perspective, provided the opportunity for further irmovative and. impactive policing 
methods to be pursued. 
Late 1980s-early 1990s in Devon and Cornwall 
Govemment interest in seeing the multi-agency approach to crime prevention established 
was one which pre-dated the 1990s by several years. The 1984 circular to chief constables 
and local authority chief executives (Home Office, 1984) had encouraged them to adopt 
such an approach but had met with limited response. However, Home Office Circular 
44/1990 Partnership in Crime Prevention (Home Office, 1990a), which asked the same 
recipients to submit to the Home Office details of the arrangements which they had in 
place, or proposed, met with a joint policy statement being retumed, signed by the chief 
constable, heads of key agencies and chief executives, agreeing their respective 
organisations' commitment to working in partnership to devise strategies which would 
support the concept of community safety. 
The extent to which the force headquarters' community services stmcture became involved 
in a more coordinated steer being given to crime prevention throughout the area emerged 
during the next couple of years. The various circulars and articles emanating from central 
govemment around the time of the Morgan Committee report began to form the stimulus 
for more directed action throughout the force. Home Office Circular 44/1990 was 
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beginning to form the basis on which HMIC was viewing forces' effectiveness of dehvery 
in this field. The thrust of Morgan was one which encompassed far more agencies than just 
the police and, despite a respectable to good level of less coordinated relationships already 
existing between police and others with a part to play in community safety, the force was 
becoming concemed that the level of commitment which others had to developing such 
strategies was less than enthusiastic. In November 1992, in an attempt to re-invigorate the 
process which had already been signed up to by the leaders of the main agencies 
throughout the two counties in 1990, the chief constable, John Evans, wrote to one chief 
executive expressing his views on the lack of momentum which appeared to epitomise 
certain district councils' attitudes towards the community safety ethos. In pointing out that 
he considered that his force had already encompassed Morgan as the 'backbone of the 
Force's strategy on crime prevention' he made reference to others who had 'little 
knowledge' ofthe partnership approach and were 'currently reluctant to progress any 
further'. In the same letter he also made reference to the consultation which the force had 
been involved in with the two Probation Services which he felt were 'fully committed to a 
partnership approach'. 
During the next few years Community Safety Strategy Groups became established in 
several locations around the force and the Plymouth example of this stmcture was put into 
place in 1993. It contained representatives of the expected agencies and each of the four 
sub-divisional commanders in the Plymouth division as well as the divisional commander 
and divisional CPO. 
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Late 1980s - early 1990s in Plymouth 
The shucture of pohcing in Plymouth was still one based on three main city sub-divisions 
and one covering Plympton and Plymstock on the outskirts ofthe city. Each had their own 
crime prevention ojficer working to a relatively uncoordinated agenda. It was a situation 
which one of them recalled as needing reform in both its structure and status. 
'I was concerned that we were isolated from the structure. We were not at all 
regarded by our own organisation. We needed to find ways to move it into.the core 
business of the organisation ... CPOs were divorced from the real world. We didn't 
even have crime figures - it was response led activity.' (JZ) 
There was also a retrospective underlying resentment of the perception that police 
management generally were still more concemed with day-to-day reactive work than 
placing any additional resources or commitment into a coordinated crime prevention 
strategy. The CPOs were feh to each have individual agendas to which they worked, either 
because of personal perceptions of what was the most important or productive part of the 
role they were expected to fulfil, or because local sub-divisional commanders dictated they 
worked in certain ways. The officer interviewed in depth about his role as one of these was 
of the opinion that at least two of his colleagues were primarily used as 'gofers' for the 
local CID, being available to respond to specific tasks such as alarm installation or the 
provision of preventative measures which were designed more to apprehend offenders than 
prevent crime in the first instance. The role of another of his colleagues was predominantly 
connected with administrative work alongside the juvenile bureau, and the interviewee 
himself felt the need to provide a variety of services - from public presentations to alarm 
fitting - but against an undefined and unmeasurable set of objectives. 
His experiences also caused him to believe that the message which was being given was 
not particularly welcomed by the public generally, particularly the more vulnerable. In 
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talking of the presentational work he would regularly perform, often to groups who could 
inaccurately be described as 'the converted', he expressed the opinion that the work he was 
doing was simply 'not worth the effort' and cited one particular example of where he had 
attended a day centre to discuss crime prevention issues and man a display. The target 
audience were senior citizens who paid less than a passing interest in his work. 
*l got the impression that if we didn't talk about it then it would go away. Fear of 
crime affects the elderly but it's like talking about death, they prefer not to do it." 
(JZ) • 
The extent to which innovative ideas were developed but not embarked upon in such a way 
as to measure the effectiveness of activity against the resources put into them was 
exemplified by the crime prevention house which was opened to the public on 6 February 
1991 following negotiation with Plymouth City Council. They provided a terraced house 
about half a mile from the city cenfre which was fitted and equipped to a standard of 
security advised by the police and was to be available as a 'show-home' in which various 
crime prevention displays and presentations could be housed. The idea foxmd much favour 
and good local press but its servicing as an enterprise fell squarely on the shoulders of the 
police who found that the resources being put into it in terms of staff was unsustainable 
when other more beneficial inter-agency initiatives were being developed. 
The 1990s: Morgan and after 
Moves towards enhancing the commitment and resources of other agencies became a more 
evident feature of crime prevention policy in Devon and Comwall and Plymouth in 
particular during the early 1990s. In 1993 a Community Safety Sfrategy Group (CSSG) 
was established in the city. It was a voluntary partnership which agreed to the prioritisation 
of specific crime issues and sought to influence them. The group consisted of 
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representatives of the city council, probation service, social sen'ices and health as the main 
statutory bodies. If was an enterprise in which the police were primarily instrumental in 
encouraging development of issues relevant to crime and disorder in the city and the 
divisional commander of the area. Chief Superintendent Rus Mitchell, had no doubts about 
the potential advantages which could be derived from targeted and deliberate action to 
address the core issues. There was evidence of other partners in the process apparently 
being less enthused by the initiative, not necessarily because of a belief that there were not 
fundamental advantages to be gained through partnership working, but rather because of 
the necessity to commit resources to a process' which they did not particularly see as their 
core business. 
One particular individual who became involved in the process from the police service 
related the extent to which it was commonly the police, normally represented by the 
divisional commander, who were able to make executive decisions regarding the use of 
resources and commitment which could be given to specific projects, whilst others on the 
group often had no such personal authority and needed to get decisions ratified before 
action could take place. This was set agauist a perception that other agencies did not 
understand the full implications and advantages of 'community safety' as a Concept, felt it 
to be a police matter, and were threatened by govemment action to facilitate wider agency 
involvement without resourcing it nationally at a time of shrinking budgets. The lead-up to 
the establishment of Plymouth as a unitary local authority was also seen to be a barrier 
with groups such as the county based social services and education authority having 
apparent reservations as to what the position would'be oncePlymouth became autonomous 
in budgetary terms. The local authority were, however, perceived by the police to be the 
key agency which could make a difference to the effectiveness of estabhshing community 
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safety in the city. It was necessary, at times, for plain speaking in terms of the extent to 
which commitment was being shown towards developing a level of dynamism in the 
system. An attendee at one specific meeting related to the author the forthright stance 
which a senior police representative had taken with his counterpart from the local authority 
in threatening to walk away from the group if there wasn't a tangible example of continued 
commitment given. The meeting agreed to have a paper prepared for the lead-up to unitary 
status and to present proposals for the future development of community safety in the city -
one which was to place a wider level of ownership on agencies other than the police. 
However, in discussion with the author, one Plymouth based police officer with an interest 
in seeing the local work develop believed that there was a lack of a definite lead, and 
specific encouragement and support for community safety as a multi-agency concept 
within the force itself The Plymouth experience was one which was seen to have 
developed relatively successfiilly despite, rather than because of, a cenfrally inspfred lead. 
The force headquarters department which oversaw community safely issues was perceived 
to have not taken on board the extent to which key recommendations of the Morgan Report 
were becoming common ways of progression in areas such as Plymouth, this despite the 
chief constable's clear wish to encourage others into the process and a public commitment 
by the force to commit resources to initiatives. It was a position which caused the police 
officer discussing the issue to believe that the force commitment to encouraging the work 
which was ongoing was more 'rhetorical' than one committed to turning that 'rhetoric into 
action'. 
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Community Safety initiatives in Plymouth 
Despite the problems which were evident in some of the experiences of developing 
community safety as a meaningfiil and resourced concept in Plymouth, it should not be 
ignored that, in terms of the rest of Devon and Comwall generally, this city was 
progressing initiatives which the majority of other divisions had yet to address. Amongst 
these were projects which concentrated upon the potential to reduce youth crime and make 
yoimg people aware of their actions in crimes such as auto-theft. The mmiber of non or 
partially affiliated groups with a totally or semi-voluntary base which existed in the city 
during the early 1990s should not be ignored in terms of their impact on other aspects of 
the criminal justice system. The police played a role on the committee of Plymouth 
Mediation which developed a stractured programme of action to address both civil disputes 
(commonly neighbour disputes) and criminal activity, the latter involving a court based 
strategy in which the referral could be made to the group as part of either pre-sentence or 
court decisions. 
It is useful to consider research conceming two stmctured initiatives which took place as a 
result ofthe formal police/inter-agency work towards the mid 1990s as examples of where 
victims and offenders were both seen to have an equally important part to play in the level 
of crime which occurred. In 1994, Plymouth became incorporated into phase 2 of the Safer 
Cities programme which had as its objectives the reduction of crime, fear of crime and 
improvement in quality of life through community safety and crime prevention work. The 
programme provided for £100,000 to be available to Plymouth Safer Cities for a three year 
period with the costs of the actual project being funded from central source outside the 
£100,000. Central to its operation was a local inter-agency steering group, formed from the 
existing CSSG with additional members drawn from local business, academia, the media 
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and voluntary sectors. The steering group decided to target foiir .particular issues, of 
importance: violence, auto-crime, burglary and youth offending, and the police established 
respective committees, comprising of representatives of other agencies, to identify 
strategies which could be effective in addressing these problems. 
In relation to burglary. Victim Support, the local authorify housing department, probation 
service and the police formed the Domestic Burglary Strate^ Group (DBSG), the aim of 
which was to reduce burglary and fear of burglary particularly in one specific area where 
such crime was high. It also sought to improve the response given to victims and 
particularly repeat and vulnerable individuals who had been burgled. A sponsorship deal 
with an insurance company was facilitated by Crime Concem to cover seven Safer Cities 
locations and was given the title 'Homesafe', although what this entailed developed in 
different ways in different areas, depending upon local needs and inter-agency sfructures. It 
concentrated upon improving security by providing prioritised homes* with a security 
check, fitting security locks, chains and smoke alarms, marking property and providing 
advice and leaflets. In the area chosen to be targeted. Mount Gould, a number of other 
changes were reported which it was considered may have been as a result of public support 
for the Homesafe project including a new neighbourhood watch scheme being established, 
the re-opening of a community centre and improvements to footways by Devon County 
Council (Mawby, 1997, p.5). This acceptance of the initiative was perceived to be a 
relevant factor in a later positive evaluation ofthe service given and a reduction in burglary 
which was more marked in Mount Gould than elsewhere in the city and seen to be an 
effect of the Homesafe initiative in particular (pp. 13-14). 
Homes were prioritised particularly if they had been recently burgled or were recommended as priorities normally by police or Victim 
Support (Mawby, 1997, p.4). 
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The estabhshment of the DBSG also had the effect of accelerating an initiative which had 
first emerged following discussion between the assistant chief probation officer and chair 
of the local health authority, where both identified the fact that many repeat offenders had 
serious drug-related problems, often failed to comply with community-based sentences, 
and went on to commit more crime. This position was exacerbated because of a waiting list 
for local statutory drug agency referrals causing 'a revolving door between offending, drug 
use, court and prison'. The effect which the DBSG had on the situation was important 
because of the priority which had been given to household burglary through Safer Cities, a 
crime which was directly linked to offenders with a drug-related problem. The project 
encompassed a multi-agency approach evident as being encouraged in govemment 
literature ofthe mid-1990s (Department of Health, 1995; Howard, 1993) but was seen as 
being 'ahead of the game' in Devon and Comwall (a similar scheme having been 
established in Torbay) in respect of both its timing and by 'expanding current boundaries 
(by) being based on... the notion of enforceability' (Barton and Mawby, 1997, p.8). 
The scheme aimed to 'fast-track' offenders into dmg stabilisation opportunities provided 
by local agencies in an attempt to reduce the likelihood of them re-offending. It relied on 
the court process in that the judiciary had to have sufficient confidence to see the scheme 
as being a viable commxmity based option and sentence, with conditions of attendance, 
accordingly. The extent to which the scheme was successful was probably less able to be 
evidenced in terms of recorded burglary figures given the general fall in this type of crime 
and other initiatives evident in Plymouth during the period, and more in relation to the 
levels of cooperation and tmst which were engendered between diverse agencies. This was, 
in no small part, due to the 'unreserved support of the police' (Barton and Mawby, 1997, 
p.31) but also to individuals within the process who built arid eamed mutual respect for 
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ideological positions and organisational cultures within the environments they operated, 
Neighbourhood Watch 
The mid 1980s saw Neighbourhood Watch (NHW) become a focus of attention nationally 
and the Devon and Comwall Constabulary began to publicly promote the organisation of 
such schemes in 1987. In Plymouth NHW had begun in that year and the initial demand 
from the public for more information about joining or setting up schemes was 
overwhelming. With each enquiry came the necessity for the police to commit resources to 
helping establish contact, a job which was initially targeted at the commimity constables 
for the areas concemed. It was clear that a degree of organisation was necessary to the 
procedure and, as a result, a liaison group was set up which included established 
coordinators and the police. However the group was one which was dysfunctional in its 
makeup and perceived by an officer who had responsibility for overseeing its work as one 
in which 'the police had no role' (JZ). Although the committee continued for a number of 
years it produced relatively little of benefit to the wider community safety strategies which 
were being developed, and eventually folded. The Plymouth division appointed a police 
liaison officer to take responsibility for the quality and quantity of information which was 
disseminated to coordinators by the police, and to utilise the sponsored 'Ringmaster' 
automatic message passing service to best effect.^  
An evaluation of the public's subscription to Neighbourhood Watch schemes (NHW) in 
Devon and Comwall was conducted in January 1994 across its 20 sub-divisions resuhing 
* This system allowed tape recorded messages alerting coordinators to crime in their areas to be directed automatically to programmed 
numbers in the system. The 1994 survey of NHW co-ordinators (details of which follow in this chapter) indicated a less than 
positive response to this method of contact, a result which came as.no surprise to one officer (JZ) vvho believed that fhe 
public felt 'intimidated' by the process. 
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in figures which, showed a wide diversity between them. There were not strikingly obvious 
factors which infliienced the 'success' rate of sub-divisions in attracting volunteers to this 
aspect of crime prevention across the force. Sub-divisions at that time were more diverse in 
their geographic and social spread than was useful to analysing common factors on the 
quantity of households covered alone. Table 10.1 shows the diversity of take-up across the 
force according to the figures provided at the end of 1993 by local crime prevention 
officers. Interestingly, the two sub-divisions which had most households covered by NHW 
schemes were at either end of the spectrum of demographic factors in relation to housing 
tenure and household make-up. The difference in levels of crime in these areas was also 
significantly varied. The highest membership by some 17% above the force average and 
8% above the next highest ranking sub-division was the one covering Exmouth and East 
Devon where crime was proportionately lower than half the other sub-divisions and the 
average age of the residents significantly higher, particularly in the catchment bands of 
Budleigh Salterton, Sidmouth and Seaton - areas affectionately known to many as 'God's 
Waiting Room'. 
The second highest take-up, at over one quarter of households covered was the sub­
division policed from Exmouth Road, Devonport which included a number of high-crime 
and socially deprived areas (including part of St. Peters ward), as well as a small number of 
more conventionally urban-middle class occupancy locations which, nevertheless, suffered 
proportionately similar problems in relation to the amoimt of crime committed. Here there 
was a much lower average age of residents and a much higher level of crime per person 
than in East Devon. At first glance this appears to conflict with the conclusions drawn from 
a survey of NHW scheme co-ordinators conducted in 1989 across Plymouth and other 
parts of the force area. Whereas the results showed variations across different areas of the 
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force, Plymouth schemes were not particularly common in low status, high crime areas or 
in the middle-class suburbs but tended to be'more obvious in middle-class areas closer to 
the city centre. Schemes throughout the force were predominantly in better class housing 
areas (Mawby, 1990). The police figures (table 10.1) in relation to the Devonport sub­
division in Plymouth show a relatively high proportion of residencies covered by NHW 
and, given the relatively low social and economic demography ob.vious in a sizable 
proportion of this area, it is appropriate to consider the formulation of such information a 
little further. Here, the distinction between methods of recording apparent success in the 
'numbers game' of NHW is exemplified as being problematic. 
Sub-division coverina: Primarilv % 
Cambome/Redrutli/Helston Rural 9.8 
Faimoutli/Penryn Rural 10.6 
Newquay Rural 10.5 
Penzance Rural 14.3 
Truro Rural 15.7 
St Austell/Bodmin Rural 15.9 
Lisi<eard/Saltash/Looe Rural 15.1 
Launceston/Nortii Comwall Rural 17.3 
Bamstaple/North Devon Rural 22.7 
Bideford Rural 21.8 
Newton Abbot Rural 16.7 
Exmouth/East Devon Rural 35.3 
Tiverton Rural 21.6 
Plympton/Tavistbck Semi-Rural 16.9 
Paignton Semi-Rural 19.3 
Plymouth - City centre Urban 8.3 
Plymouth- Crownhill Urban 19.5 
Plymouth-Devonport Urban 27.5 
Torquay Urban 16.2 
Exeter Urban 17.6 
Force average 18.7 
(Devon & Comwall Constabulary - Quarterly Performance Re view,1/1994, p.21). 
Table 10.1: % of Households within sub-divisions of Devon & Comwall 
which were members of Neighbourhood Watch Schemes at the end of 1993 
NHW did not appeal to the underlying instincts of those directing policy and agency 
activity towards notions of social prevention, and neither was it portrayed in any such way. 
It was, in its most base form, 'nuts and bolts' crime prevention with a bonus: active two-
way support between commimities and police on a day-to-day basis which might ensure 
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that those members of the pubhc who chose to be invoh'ed could play a crucial role in both 
preventing themselves being victims of crime and helping the police catch those who were 
responsible. The attempt to straddle the border between an opportimity prevention and 
legislative prevention model was distinct and the primacy given to the NHW approach at 
national level soon pervaded the public relations strategies of forces nationwide. 
NHW has drawn a good deal of attention in research terms from a number of perspectives. 
There have been studies conducted in forces around the country in attempts to identify the 
value of the schemes which have been encouraged and these have, to a greater or lesser 
extent, provided information which was of no particular surprise in policing circles. Work 
conducted in Devon and Comwall both as a telephone survey in connection with this work 
and five other surveys based on the original telephone interviewing stracture, but 
distributed as a postal questionnaire as part of the force's inspection process, were 
administered during 1994 and 1995. The original questionnaire took into consideration an 
earlier questionnaire used by Mawby in a local study of NHW coordinators and replicated 
a number ofthe questions to provide a demographic picture of the status, age and housing 
tenure of the respondents. 
A list of individuals named as NHW coordinators which was held by the Plymouth Crime 
Prevention Department was used as the sampling frame. The list was provided at the 
beginning of 1994 and, upon being passed it, the researcher was advised that the 
department were uncertain as to how up-to-date the hst was as they were in the process of 
completing a review. The list totalled 513 names and addresses, the vast majority of which 
had telephone numbers alongside. Those which did not were checked against telephone 
directory entries and, where possible, numbers inserted. The list was sfratified 
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geographically across the sub-divisions of Plymouth, which included Plympton and 
Plymstock but excluded more rural locations which formed part of the division covered 
from the Plymouth headquarters and extended to as far as Tavistock some 12 miles north. 
Those which did not have telephone numbers recorded were excluded for the purposes of 
the work which was to be conducted entirely by telephone interview. Under different 
circumstances this decision would have been considered problematic due to the under-
representation of certain groups and areas which could have been ignored, thereby 
potentially produced a misleading picture of response based on a survey excluding lower 
social groupings, hi this instance it was decided that the high number of coordinators who 
had telephone numbers listed (489 - 95%) meant that any exclusion was more likely to be 
based on administrative oversight rather than the individual not having a telephone. The 
sample drawn, involved 244 individual coordinators being telephoned.'' 
As with the quality of service surveys, where no response was received to the first 
telephone call, two further calls were made on different nights before the case was 
recorded as 'no response'. Of the 244 names telephoned, 167 contacts were made. Of these 
a relatively high number, 59 (35.3%) said that they were not NHW co-ordinators, a 
response which bore out the concems which the Crime Prevention Department had as to 
the accuracy of the data provided for the research. Ofthe 59 who were not co-ordinators, 
12 said that they had never undertaken such a role. In all but 2 of these cases however this 
was due to the individual being spoken to at the address now being a new resident on an 
Use was made of the small bank of police civilian support staff who woiked during evenings after having completed their normal 
duties and had originally been established in 1992 to conduct telephone interview in connecdon Avith the force's quality of service-
initiative. The questionnaire was \vritten on SPSS DEII spftvrare which enabled responses to be entered directly onto tiie computer 
screens. Space was available for answers to open questions and those where an additional explanation or view was offered by the 
respondent. The training and experience which die interviewers had received during the previous eighteen months in contacting literally 
hundreds of members of the public who had been vicdms of crime or road traffic accidents ensured diat a good standard of interviewing 
took place. This system was one which had inbuilt quality control checks at both simultaneous and respective levels. See Chapter 8 
Quality of Service in Devon aiui Connvall. 
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old telephone number. This left a total of 106 co-ordinators who were contacted and all 
except one agreed to answer questions on the telephone. Therefore, of the original sample 
of244 names, a response rate of 43% was achieved. 
Around two-thirds of co-ordinators (66) had received at least one contact from the police 
over the previous six month period, either personally, on the telephone or by written 
commimication, and three-quarters (79) feh that the scheme was working 'very' or 'fairly' 
well in their area. Imparting information through a telephone call was believed to be a 
'good' way in which the police could make contact (80%), as was personal contact with a 
police officer (73%). However only 28% believed that sending a tape-recorded message to 
them over the telephone was good practice. A recently produced booklet entitled 'See it -
Note it', which should have been forwarded to all NHW coordinators throughout the area 
was reported to have been received by all but 19 (18%) and 74 (86%) of those having 
received it felt that it was a usefial initiative. Common reasons for dissatisfaction with the 
way in which NHW was working in their area tended to be around lack of police contact. 
Verbatim responses in this respect often related to, not only contact as a coordinator, but 
also to general perceptions of a lack of police presence generally. 
'Residents would like to know that there is actually someone there for them - they 
have to try and ring the police to get any contact." (ref: NHW/89/1994) 
'1 would like contact with the police occasionally to show they are interested.' (ref: 
NHW/87/1994) 
'It is a good concept but needs better communication from the police. We need to 
be updated about crimes in the area.' (ref: NHW/66/1994) 
'...more contact from the police - couldn't they just drive down the road to be 
seen?' (ref: NHW/65/1994) 
A theme which had emanated from the govemment of the day was one where local 
residents were encouraged to take an active part in the policing of their communities 
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together with the idea of volunteer special constables assuming the role of 'parish 
constables' having specific interest in particular areas. Much talk abounded on the value of 
'citizen patrols' which, whilst conjuring problems associated with vigilantism, saw a 
cautious degree of positive opportunity in the idea of NHW volunteers assisting in this 
process. The views of co-ordinators in this regard was perceived, to be important to 
gauging the extent of support for such an idea. Only 19 were 'strongly' (4%) or 'generally' 
(14%) in favour of this idea. However, interestingly, 27 (26%) co-ordinators indicated that 
'already did' or 'would be willing' to patrol if so requested. 
Nevertheless, NHW was still considered by many to be an 'untapped resource' and one 
which required regularity in servicing rather than less regular meetings. The extent to 
which NHW had become an important link with members of the community in 
disseminating information and gaining intelligence was one established within the pohce 
environment and a measurable number of successes in crime reduction and arrests began to 
be recorded. 
Crime Prevention in Devon and Cornwall: an overview 
The development of crime prevention during the 1960s and into the 1970s within the two 
counties of Devon and Comwall was epitomised by a stmcture which followed the national 
trend with the introduction of crime prevention deparhnents and the training of officers as 
'specialists' in the subject. There is nothing to suggest that Devon and Comwall, like the 
vast majority of other forces, avoided the pitfalls of alienated special departments viewed 
by other officers with scepticism. However the force made its first tentative steps to move 
away from this image during the latter part of the 1970s under John Alderson and his 
Crime Prevention Support Unit which led to the formation of community policing. Despite 
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this, and arguably because with the retirement of Alderson in the early IPSOs; some of the 
impetus for fully developing the inter-agency structure of crime prevention and community 
policing became attenuated amongst issues such as 'effectiveness and efficiency' and the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act, both of which were resource intensive requirements. 
Although the late 1970s had seen innovative and meaningful progress being made towards 
a wider community problem solving process, the next most significant work was not to 
emerge until over ten years later. Links with other agencies had continued to be developed 
during this period and were, on the whole, positive and supportive in their nature. There 
were, nevertheless, cuhural differences within these organisations (including the police) 
which needed to be overcome, and the extent to which this was beginning to happen was a 
testament to the professionalism of many of the leiading individuals in the process. 
Whereas a continued govenmient concem with crime prevention as a political theme 
continued to receive prominence during the 1980s, the extent to which the approach was 
embraced within forces was variable. In Devon and Comwall the closer work which was 
undertaken in regard to-youth offending and cautioning policy with other agencies 
signified an important departure from a police-based prosecution system. But it was not 
until the early 1990s that a more stmctured co-ordinated approach to community safety 
began to enierge, given increased impetus by the Morgan Report. In Plymouth this was 
fiirther encouraged through the increased fimding which became available through 'Safer 
Cities' but, in particular, through the work of the divisional commander who visualised and 
promoted the advantages which could be gained through combined social resources. The 
methods and aims of CPOs in the city began to change alongside new sfrategies leading to 
a new breed of specialist, less one of 'locks and bolts' advisor and more one of partnership 
worker. Ward policing supplemented the overall sfrategy (as detailed in chapter 9) and 
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examples such as this received acknowledgement nationally as good practice (Audit 
Commission, 1996b). 
This chapter has, therefore, primarily dealt with the strategies employed in leading towards 
a concept of 'community safety' replacing 'crime prevention'. The extent to which victims 
in the force area, and Plymouth and Stonehouse in particular, related to the changes and 
services provided to them is the subject of the chapter which follows. 
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Victims of Crime in 
Devon and Cornwall 
This chapter will consider a number of issues relating to the position of victims within the 
Devon and Comwall area. It will initially consider the perceptions of police officers with 
regard to victims and the issues surrounding their respective positions in the criminal 
justice process. Police policies will then be reviewed at force and local level, using 
information from the force records and through research conducted within the area. In 
particular, it will draw on evidence from the Plymouth City and Stonehouse areas to 
exemplify the level of effectiveness of these strategies. This issue will then be qualified in 
the consideration of results obtained from the Quality of Service surveys conducted during 
the 1990s and analysis of this and other data obtained through personal interviews. 
Within the Devon and Comwall Constabulary, and at more local levels, research has 
revealed little formal' interest in the victim as an actor on the criminal justice stage until 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Given the level of interest in the victim which was 
emerging during the late 1950s and early 1960s at national level, it might be assumed that 
the results of critical legislative changes such as the 1964 Compensation for Victims of 
Crimes of Violence Act would have manifested themselves in local police 
acknowledgement of their importance within a relatively short time period. This does not 
appear to have been the case. However, there were indications that certain aspects of the 
principles of both legislation, and wider moral concems with the victim as someone 
By 'fonnal' it is intended to indicate where specific policies or initiatives have been recorded in files, reports and other documents. 
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requiring an additional service were evident in the reminiscences of police officers and 
residents interviewed in Devon and Comwall and Stonehouse in particular. This section 
-will elaborate upon the findings in relation to both formal documentation and oral history 
during the period prior to the amalgamation of Plymouth City Police with the rest of 
Devon and Comwall. 
Much of the potentially revealing evidence from the Plymouth City Police reports is not 
available through the Devon and Comwall Constabulary archives. That which has been 
located has often been through the contacts which were established with individuals who 
retained items as mementoes, and who now jealously guard their 'inheritance'. In relation 
to strategies which may have reflected a specific commitment to acknowledge the position 
of victims of crime within the Plymouth area, little evidence exists to support a belief that 
this was more than a 'gleam in the eye' of certain mdividuals who were visionary in their 
outlook. Reports of Watch Conamittee meetings during the period had little within them to 
identify with the work which was beginning to emerge at national level. The role which the 
police played in the administration of the compensation legislation was restricted to the 
provision of reports to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board in appropriate cases, but 
records no longer exist at either local level, or through the CICB itself, to identify the 
proportion of victims of violent crime who made application for compensation during the 
early years of the scheme. 
Aimual reports of the chief constable similarly failed to acknowledge the position ofthe 
victim. The crime section of the 1967 report covered the issue of assaults in four 
paragraphs covering less than half a page. This indicated a 'substantial increase' of 111 
assaults (44%) over the 1965 figures (363 as against 252) with attention being drawn to the 
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'high proportion of young offenders' and the 'irresponsible' and 'unruly' behaviour 
evident amongst'this age group. The word 'victim' did not appear at all in the five pages 
devoted to crime, and neither could the word be found in any other section ofthe thirty two 
page report. These findings were identical to those within the three annual reports of 
previous years. A similar situation was found to be evident in the atmual reports of Devon, 
Exeter and Comwall constabularies around the same period. 
Recollections and views from the past 
Police officers who had served during the 1960s and 1970s, mainly within Plymouth and at 
The Octagon police station, were asked their views on what they understood the police 
position in relation to crime victims was and whether they recalled any specific instmction 
ever being given in relation to what was expected of them. None suggested that any formal 
policy existed, although some referred to more recent initiatives, mainly in relation to 
"Victim Support Schemes. However, there were a number of reminiscences of what officers 
recalled as being their contribution to lending a hand to victims of crime. A l l were 
individually personal in both their recollection and style of support which was recalled as 
being offered. The most common level of support which was suggested as being 
institutional in its stmcture was that of revisiting those who they regarded as most at risk; 
commonly the elderly and female residents. 
'I would always go back and check if they were ok. later on. I think we all did as 
much as we could.' (AQ) 
The 'old dears' used to get a bit upset quite often' 'They would sometimes 
come in and ask if we'd caught anyone and we would have a bit of a chat.' (BC) 
Td ask them how they were and if they wanted me to pop back and see them, 
sometimes they did - it depended on how old they were and if they lived alone 
mainly." (AB) 
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One officer equated his position as a pohceman at The Octagon with the provider of a 
service and conduit to other means of support in the reply to a question which was not 
posed as one related specifically to service provision to victims. He perceived the role as 
one of support for the residents regardless of their background or offender/victim status. In 
similar vein, another officer also reflected what he perceived to be the reality of the status 
of those residents ofthe area. 
'The people felt they could come in. It was-strong arm policing but they respected 
us for it. We always gave them a fair deal.' ... 'If necessary we used to tell the 
National Assistance people and social services to go to them.' (lA) 
'Don't forget, half of them were villains down there anyway. There was as much 
nicking went on between them as went on outside the place. We used to treat 
everyone the same - no prejudice - would get the same treatment as anyone else." 
['Did that include if they had been a victim?'] 'Yes. No prejudice. Everyone the 
same.' (RC) 
Discussions with police officers relating to the period, in terms of their dealings with 
victims of crime, were often well recalled with names, places, and crime details themselves 
being referred to. The nature of the interviews sought to estabhsh individual views on the 
position of the victim of crime within force policy of the time and the activities which took 
place at local level in their support at one level or another. One issue which commonly 
emerged was that of perceptions about what victims required and the extent to which 
police resources would allow any greater degree of involvement. A second issue related to 
how the officers perceived things to have not changed for victims in respect of the 
assistance given by the police and justice system agencies generally since they began 
policing. 
'When I went to a burglary, I used to feel like there wasn't enough time to spend 
with the person. There was always something else to go to.' ... 'Even when you 
left, you'd say you'd come back and let them know how things were going but, to 
be honest, I rarely had time to.' (RD) 
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'The cars meant we could get around more easily but it didn't seem to mean that 
we had more time,' 'I seem to think there was more time spent with people 
when you had to walk around". (lA) 
'Even then, once you left them they were on their own and had nobody to really 
help them, especially if they ever had to go to court." 'At least we used to go to 
court a bit more often to give evidence in the past so we could make sure they 
knew we were there;" (DQ) 
Senior police officers also referred to the policy which they felt was being enacted by their 
staff which may, or may not, have fitted with the needs of victims. Victims, as a group, did 
not figure' in recollections of any formal policies which were in being, the first such 
developments being post-1979 after the establishment of Victim Support. 
'My officers always did their best for victims, Tm sure, but how they did this was 
very much down to them." (ER) 
'I did make sure they knew that I wanted a good job done. I wanted arrests and I 
wanted thern to know this included supporting the victim to get them on our side if 
they went to court to give evidence.'... 'I did send a couple of written instructions 
on this." (GD) 
The interviews which were conducted with police officers and victim/residents in 
Stonehouse revealed some common strands which it is worth considering further by 
reference to the evidence which has been uncovered relating to the period between 1967 
and 1979; one during which Victim Support had yet to take root in the area. Victims who 
were able to recall experiences during this period told similar tales to the police officers 
interviewed. Commonly, the perceptions of how well the officer who had deah with them 
was related to issues of empathy and politeness rather than the nature of specific services 
which had been provided. These 'services' recounted during a period of some fifteen to 
twenty years past were not able to be measured -with the same degree of accuracy as those 
which were later provided and measured through the quality of service analysis of the 
1990s but the recollections of what was, or was not impressive, still appeared to be 
relatively easy for victims to recall. 
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'I think the time -I saw a policeman about the break-in was one I remember 
because of how helpful he was, even though I knew there wasn't much chance of 
anyone being caught.'(ref: 4/1994) 
'Perhaps him not coming back to let me know what happened took the edge off it. 
At the time he came I do remember he seemed like he was going to make sure 
everything would be OK but I never heard any more." (ref: 23/1991) 
It was interesting to note, although not especially surprising, that victims' perceptions of 
the standards of service which the police had provided, together with expectations of these, 
were similar to those expressed about more recent 1990s crimes. The attitude of the 
officers attending, together with any further contacts, were the aspects of police 
performance most often referred to without any specific prompting during the interviews. 
When considering the levels of satisfaction v^ dth police actions during the 1990s it will be 
seen that these factors still appear to be common criteria against which victims judge the 
standards of police activity. 
Victim Support Schemes 
The issues which surrounded the establishment of the Devon and Comwall Constabulary, 
following amalgamation in 1967, were often problematic in equating the different styles of 
policing, and individuals themselves, to one set of policies. Within the new force. Victim 
Support Schemes (VSS) appear to have been a contentious issue at a relatively early stage 
of their, development. The speed of the uptake of VSS as an idea may well have owed 
much to the geographic location of the first scheme to be established within the force area: 
Exeter, situated some eighty miles fi-om Bristol, where the original initiative was formed.^  
However, the strides which were being made in developing inter-agency work between the 
police and, in particular, the probation service in Exeter clearly underlined the enthusiasm 
^ See chapter 3 1967-1979: Teclmology to commumty for details ofthe emergence of the first scheme in the Bristol area. 
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which was exhibited by members of these groups for the new concept..(Moore and Brown, 
1981). There was a 'commitment provided by local agencies. The probation service was 
especially enthusiastic, with the Assistant Chief Probation Officer, John Harding, already 
committed to community developments within the criminal justice system' (Mawby and 
Gill, 1987: p. 137). By the end of the 1970s, schemes had also begun to operate, or were 
being conceived, in Bamstaple, Torbay, Crediton, Teignbridge and Cambome/Redmth as 
well as Plymouth. The development of the Victim Support Scheme in Plymouth was 
established under the auspices of, primarily, the Guild of Community Services which, 
together with the Council for Christian Care, played an important part in the establishment 
of the initiative. It was a scheme which was relatively ad-hoc in its implementation and 
heavily reliant on the police for its custom. Little more can be said about this era, however, 
since most of the literature available refers to the early 1980s and onwards. 
The schemes had common aims in line with those of their national co-ordinating body but, 
as might be expected with an enterprise as new as this, the way in which these aims were 
achieved were not without teething problems. Although support for the volunteers was 
becoming accepted by agencies such as the police and probation service, when it came to 
providing the type of support which was necessary for the groups themselves to operate in 
a productive way the situation was mired by uncertainty, protectionism and some degree of 
dogma. These traits were most observable in police officers' reactions to the schemes with 
their inherent role of 'gatekeepers' of the system and the information held withiii it. VSS 
looked to the police for its referrals and there was little indication in these early stages that 
those victims who were being selected for referral by police officers were identified 
against any criteria other than age and gender. Similar findings were imcovered by Mawby 
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and Gill in 1.985 where referral rates in. the Devon and Comwall area overall showed each 
available volunteer taking an average of just eight referrals during the period 1984/85.' 
The Devon and Comwall Constabulary had laid out their support and the instmctions to 
officers as to how VSS should be regarded in memoranda and orders of the time. Records 
from this period were difficult to locate, mainly because of the force's enthusiasm for 
discarding documents after a relatively short period of time.'' Records sought for the early 
development of Victim Support from within the police headquarters revealed that a move 
of offices in the early 1990s, for example, had resulted in widespread destmction of files 
which may have shed more light on this development, hiformation at the force museum 
and library was siniilarly lacking. Data from the early period was therefore obtained 
primarily through interviews with officers and victims who recalled the period. This 
evidence revealed an underlying scepticism amongst officers with the development of a 
voluntary organisation which now sought to provide a relatively imtried level of support in 
an area which many of them perceived to be a limited level of demand, hi reahty the tme 
nature of police officers' views of the period are not able to be judged but the interviews 
did uncover a divergence of opinions which were tinged v^th a degree of reminiscence. 
'We were told that there was a new group who were going to help victims and we 
could tell them if someone needed help. I think the idea is good, but in the time you 
are talking about I don't think many people got put in touch, it wasn't that we didn't 
want to, but we had to consider what the person who had been hurt wanted.'... 'It 
wasn't seen as appropriate to have someone else call on them other than the 
police I don't think.' (BT) 
'What we were told about them was not very clear.'... ' I knew they existed but, to 
be honest, I wasn't too sure what they did. There was a general feeling, I suppose. 
' The figure is only indicative as.the data provided in Mawby & Gill (1987: p. 140) shows the number of volunteers as the number 
available during 1985 and the figures ofreferrals by each scheme ranges from January 1984 to March 1986. 
The force's 'central registry', to which all official headquarters files should have been routed upon completion, was found to liot 
contain the items sought The process whereby individual departments stored, and eventually disposed of their own files, was found to 
be relatively widespread. 
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that trust played a part. Trust is important. We didn't 'not trust' them but we didn't 
trust them either.' (IL) 
The idea of 'trust' in the volunteers concemed, and the idea of an organisation set up to 
look after a group which had previously been either, at worst ignored, or at best seen by the 
police as a preserve of their own, came across as important to the police officers who 
recounted their feelings about the early establishment .of Victim Support. The experience 
was similarly recalled elsewhere by an early-involved volunteer from Comwall who was 
spoken to, by chance, at a meeting totally unconnected with Victim Support. As 
reminiscences of other events unfurled in the course of conversation the subject of the 
individual's involvement in the voluntary sector came to the fore. The person concemed 
had not served in a role with the scheme for more than a few months but, when the 
question of how he thought things might have developed if he had stayed he was relatively 
dismissive of its potential as a result of his experience. He recounted that he had only been 
asked to visit two people and that, upon his arrival, they were surprised but grateful that 
someone had called. Overall he got the impression that the police did 'not really see the 
point of it'. 
The 1980s was the period during which the victim 'came of age' and became a more 
established part of the daily workings of the police service. The position in Devon and 
Comwall was reasonably advanced in its attitude towards the Victim Support Schemes 
which existed, but was not without its problems. The schemes arrived as a concerted 
initiative at roughly the same time as Alderson's model of community policing. With a 
commitment to a philosophy based around active citizenship, assisted by the police, the 
concept of Victim Support seemed to complement the overall policing ethos within Devon 
285 
Victims of crime in Devon cmd Cornwall 
and Comwall. However, schemes themselves suffered from a general lack of volunteers 
prepared to undertake such work, against a background of low perceived needs. 
Research identified the relatively large number of schemes operating in the area where 
crime rates and the number of referrals per scheme were relatively low. The independent 
nature ofthe schemes, together with ambiguity apparent in formal police support, were 
additional factors quoted which emphasised problematic aspects of a co-ordinated 
approach in these early stages (Mawby and Gill, 1987, pp. 139-142). Mawby and Gill had 
sought the views of police officers on Victim Support and had received replies to a postal 
questioimaire from 179 officers of varying ranks, but primarily constables and sergeants. 
This was similar to the composition of the officers, both serving and retired, who were 
personally interviewed for this research during the early 1990s, the majority of which were 
constables and sergeants. The responses were gained through semi-stmctured interviews 
which covered a wide range of issues. Victim Support being one of them. Responses to 
questions which sought to illuminate certain issues were later coded to indicate whether a 
generally positive or negative view had been offered. In the case of Victim Support the 
issues were raised, whether or not the officer had been serving during the time when such 
schemes were in operation. 
Questions about police officers' knowledge of Victim Support required a response which 
showed that the respondent knew what he or she was talking about. Whereas this did not 
mean that detailed knowledge of all that the scheme did was needed, a rough indication of 
their purpose and methods of operation was sought to qualify for a coding of 'Yes', 
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Otherwise a 'No' was recorded.* Positive responses to the other two issues were where no 
overall concem was expressed with the services which the individual believed Victim 
Support provided to either the victims or police service. An overwhelming number of 
respondents had a positive view of the role which Victim Support played. Only one had a 
negative view of the organisation in relation to both victim and police and one had 
reservations about the valiie ofthe scheme to the police only. Positive responses tended to 
relate to issues of 'support', 'sympathy' and 'care' for victims, and in terms of assisting the . 
police. The nature of support which was seen as unable to be provided from anywhere else 
was also commonly cited (Table 11.1). 
Yes or generally positive No or generally 
negative 
No view/unsure 
Know of Victim Support 
and what it does 
Yes:17 No: 8 1 
Victim Support provide 
useful service to victims? 
Positive: 16 Negative: 1 9 
Victim Support provide a 
useful facility for police 
Positive: 14 Negative: 2 9 
Table 11.1: Serving and retired police officers' perceptions of Victim Support 
'The scheme here in Plymouth is very good. I have called on them a couple of 
times and they have always been there within 24 hours.' (LG) 
'1 don't think the police have the time to spend with victims anymore. I think we 
should, but, as we don't Victim Support do the job.' (NR) 
' i used them when there was an RTA (road traffic accident) and they were very 
useful.' (JW) 
'1 know they help victims for a fact. The help they gave a relative of mine when she 
got burgled was very appreciated by her.' (AQ) 
'There's a lot more they do now than ten years ago. I think I was a bit sceptical 
when they first started, but I can see the advantages now." (NS) 
Within the responses which officers gave were a number of actual examples of where they 
had personally called upon the services of Victim Support to assist in cases with which they 
' This included the officers who were not serving when the schemes \yere in operation. 
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were dealing. These tended to be solicited experiences, through the- interviewer asking if 
they could give any specific examples. 
'I have rung them about an elderly woman who had been burgled and who was 
really upset and had no relatives nearby. I had to leave a message on their 
answerphone but I know they went round the next day.' (MM) 
'I saw her (the Victim Support co-ordinator) at the station when she was checking 
the crime complaints and told her about the one I had just been to. She said she 
would make sure someone went around later on.' (CX) 
The wish for the service to remain in its localised form amongst Victim Support schemes 
generally was, to a large extent, informally replicated in the way the police responded to 
the issue. Whereas the force had committed itself to support Victim Support through access 
to its records, local police commanders were allowed to practice relative autonomy in 
deciding the extent to which they would permit this to occur. However, where a senior 
officer pledged his officers' support to the principle of'open access', one station in the east 
of Comwall, to which a visit was made by the author during the late 1980s, resulted in a 
conversation with a sergeant who expressed her concem that it was for the police to decide 
on which cases should be referred as it was the police who had made initial contact with 
the victim and were best able to judge their needs. The local co-ordinator did not make 
regular visits to the station, possibly as a result of such attitudes, and referral rates were 
low. 
In Charles Cross police station (which covered Stonehouse), at the time when the initial 
personal interviews with victims were being conducted (1991), the position was one where 
the Victim Support co-ordinator would visit on a regular basis and be allowed access to the 
'crime book' to select her referrals. It was therefore interesting to note that, of the sixty 
cases which formed the sample for interview, personal enquiries with the co-ordinator at 
her office revealed that only five of the burglaries were Usted for referral and one 'theft 
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from person'. VSS were selective in the cases they took, primarily because of limited 
resources, but household burglaries nonnally received attention. However fifteen cases in 
the interview sample were such crimes and only five of these had been actioned by VSS.^ 
In discussion with, the co-ordinator the reasons for this apparent lack of contacts could not 
be explained other than by reference to an inadequate filing process. However discussion 
on the relevance of selecting victims by reference mainly to factors such as their age and 
crime committed allowed the opportunity for the author to relate the experiences of one 
young single mother from Stonehouse who had been interviewed as a result of being the 
victim of a vehicle theft. Her car was her only means of personal transport and its loss had 
caused her considerable problems over several weeks in getting her daughter back and 
forth to school and going to another part of Plymouth to work (ref 19/1991). The extent to 
which a wider selection process of victims in need could be drawn from the data available 
in the 'crime book' was clearly one which the co-ordinator indicated as being useful i f it 
were to be able to accomplished. However, as she convincingly pointed out, had the case 
been refened to her by the officer who had dealt with the crime, contact would have been 
made with the victim. The Stonehouse experience could not be regarded as indicative of 
Victim Support activity elsewhere and later research conducted by the force showed the 
referral rate to be in the region of 70% for burglary victims across the two counties (Devon 
and Comwall Constabulary, 1994c). 
Victim Support appeared to have an impact on the way in which the police considered 
dealing with victims' needs but, on a more stmctural front within the force itself, the issue 
of keeping victims up to date with the progress of enquiries was emphasised as an 
^ In i cases personal visits had been made successMly, in 2 cases visits had found no one at home aiid a leaflet had been left. In the case 
of the 'theft form person' a letter had been sent. 
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important aspect of overall professionalism. Prior to the introduction of crime screening^ 
from the late 1980s onwards, and to a lesser extent after this, officers were expected to 
retain the crime which they had recorded for a minimum of ten days prior to filing in 
undetected cases. This period was to allow further enquiries to. be completed and for the 
victim to be advised of the result. The reality was different. Officers where the author was 
stationed (Devonport, Plymouth) regularly 'carried' some dozen crime complaints on 
average, with many holding more than this number over a period of time. The paperwork 
contained a 'progress sheet' which was to enable all enquiries to be noted prior to 
submission, at which point they would be checked to ensure no fiirther lines of 
investigation should be conducted. As the author was the sergeant who completed all 
'crime screening' for the station during 1989, he became aware of the level of inaccuracy 
in entries on progress sheets. On one occasion he telephoned ten victims of crime to 
establish the level of accuracy in the entries made, particularly where it had been stated 
that the victim had been advised of the result of enquiries. In only one of these cases was it 
found that this statement was true and a report submitted by him to the sub-divisional 
commander outiined his concems. Other local research similarly highlighted concem at the 
level of information which was given to victims whose crimes had been detected. Here, out 
of eleven victims who were interviewed six months after their crimes had been committed, 
two were unaware of the fact that the person concemed had been arrested and dealt with, 
whilst others had still be to advised of the final outcome even though they knew the case 
had been detected (Bunt, 1990). 
' Crime Screening was based on a system of 'scoring' crimes to 'screen out' those which were considered not worthy of further 
investigation. Based on an initial system developed in the Metropolitan Police ('HAYES'), the Devon and Comwall version was based 
on two scores being multiplied together, one reflecting 'seriousness' and the other 'solvability'. Scoring for each was out of five and it 
required a score of 8 or more to be referred for fiirther enquirj'. 
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Levels of service to victims in the 1990s 
The Victim's Charter (Home Office, 1990b), together with the later 'Charter for Policing' 
in Devon and Comwall (Devon and Comwall Constabulary, 1993b) gave a public 
commitment to provide all victims with a minimum level of service. These commitments 
included initial key services which required the officer attending the scene to provide the 
victim with their name, a reference number for the crime, give them a leaflet explaining the 
services of Victim Support, a contact telephone number and explain what further action 
would be taken. Measurement of the extent to which these service were being provided 
was accomplished from 1992 onwards through the surveys conducted by the force Quality 
of Service Unit. 
One particular requirement which proved problematic in the early stages was that of 
providing a leaflet to victims. Initially the survey question related to the leaflet published 
by the Home Office entitled 'Victims of Crime' which was believed to be widely available 
to all officers throughout the force. In fact, foUov^ng the first two surveys conducted 
(which showed less than one in three victims as having been given the form), two divisions 
contacted the Quality of Service Unit to explain that there were no such documents to be 
found in their stores. The matter was easily rectified and a significant rise in the number of 
leaflets given was observable by early 1994, although only to the extent of two-thirds of 
burglary victirns, and four in ten violence victims, reporting having received them. There 
was also a noticeable difference between the recollections of burglary and violence 
victims. In the latter case, leaflets available, specifically for victims of violence should 
most appropriately have been given but the research revealed that this was happening only 
in a minority of cases. The provision of a leaflet of some description, which provided 
victims with answers to questions which they might have, was seen as the primary 
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objective however. This was because it drew attention to the services available from Victim 
Support and had a space on which the officer could write their name, contact telephone 
number and reference number, all of which would have ensured some of the initial services 
being measured through the surveys were, in fact, provided. 
This issue became even more relevant during 1993 due to a complaint which was received 
from a victim who had been visited by a Victim Siipport volunteer The person involved 
had not been rnade aware that her details would be passed to this organisation and was 
concemed that the force had infringed the Data Protection Act 1984. The immediate result 
of this was an instmction being issue to officers to specifically ask victims if they required 
the services of Victim Support and to ensure that, in all cases, a tick-box on the crime 
complaint form was completed only where the information could safely be given to 
scheme members. Unsurprisingly the number of referrals across the two counties dropped 
dramatically leading one co-ordinator to raise the issue with an assistant chief constable. 
After detailed discussion, and advice in relation to the legal position, new instmctions 
were issued in a memorandum dated 27 September 1993. The procedure relied heavily on 
the Home Office leaflet being given in order to comply with the Data Protection Act as 
information contained therein indicated the action which the police would take in respect 
of passing information about the victim.* The instraction read: 
i) Each victim will be issued with the Home Office 'Victims of Crime' 
leaflet. This is a requirement of the Data Protection Registrar. This will 
be closely monitored by Sub Divisional Commanders, Inspector (OPl) 
and (XSY).^ 
' The policy was given further reinforcement during 1993 when the force produced its 'Charter for Policing*. In this it confirmed that 
the police would 'refer your case to victim support imless you ask us not to do so*, h addition, a decision had been made to replace the 
Home Office leaflet with a 'paid for by advertising' booklet which, in addition to a space for officers to record details such as name, 
telephone number and reference number included a disclaimer on the cover, under the title 'Data Protection Act 1984' which used 
similar wording to that in the charter to draw attention to the force's procedures. 
' Inspector (OPI) referred to the officer based at headquarters who was responsible for liaison with Victim Support. Inspector (XSY) 
was the officer in the Quality of Service Unit (at that time the author of this work). 
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ii) The statement on Form 41 'Victim Support Required' will always be 
ticked. The reporting officer will not decide whether the victims details 
are referred to Victim Support. Victims will not be asked whether they 
require Victim Support. If they specificaliy ask not to be referred, 
without prompting, then this fact will be written above the entry. 
The change in poHcy had the effect of increasing the number.of referrals which Victim 
Support began to take. The 'open door' system to co-ordinators which had been 
established in the 1980s, allowing them to visit police stations and thumb through crime 
reports in order to identify cases of interest, remained. This, combined with the fact that 
the 'Victim Support Required' box on the forms was now taken to read 'Yes' unless there 
Was some specific comment to the contrary, ensured that a free choice was being given as 
to which cases the volunteers decided to take as referrals. 
Surveying victims and quality checks 
Within the Devon and Comwall Constabulary surveys seeking the views of victims of 
household burglary and violent crime have been conducted regularly since 1992. Personal 
interviews with a total of sixty six resident-victims in the Stonehouse area also took place 
between 1991 and 1994 for the purposes of this thesis. Earlier in the process, a system of 
Quality Assurance Checks (QAC) considered how the police in Devon and Comwall had 
gone about the actual investigation of cases of burglary. This included visits by sergeants 
and inspectors to the homes of victims to ascertain their views. °^ They were seen more as 
an intemal police management inspection than as a way of gaining a detailed insight of 
victims views. The QACs involved supervisory police officers visiting a total of 505 
victims of household burglary, within each of the force's twenty sub-divisions and asking 
' See chapter GMellwdology and chapter 8 Oiialiry of service in Devon and Cormvall for information relating to the way in wliich these 
sim'eys and QACs were conducted. 
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them whether they could recall the actions which the officer concemed actually took when 
attending the scene to investigate the crinie (table 11.2). • 
Aspects of inspection % of officers reported as having 
complied with standard 
(n=505) 
Whether or not officer identified themselves to the victim 82% 
Whether or not officer provided victim with contact details 81% 
Whether or not officer provided a HO VOC leaflet 31% 
Were House to House enquiries completed? 54% 
Were Scenes of Crime Officers called to attend? 55% 
Was a message circulation completed as required? 86% 
Was a statement of evidence taken? 69% 
Was victim told result of case? 23% 
Was victim satisfied with action police had taken? 91% 
Was supervisor reviewing satisfied with standard of work? 52% 
Table 11.2: Results of Quality Assurance Checks (burqiarv- dwelling). 1992. 
What appeared evident, was a high level of victim satisfaction with the way in which the 
police had dealt with the incidents. The QAC check sheet did not include rating 
satisfaction" as is the case with most surveys which identify some quantitative evaluation. 
Even from the qualitative perspective it might be considered in some senses lacking as the 
reasons for the dissatisfaction were not required to be specifically stated. But where a 
supervisory officer indicated that a victim was not satisfied, a reason was offered in the 
vast majority of cases. There was some suggestion fi-om the reading of the retums received 
that the 'victim satisfaction' section of the sheet did not bear a specific relationship to the 
standard of work which the officer had been judged to have performed by their supervisor. 
In relation to the questions which might be considered 'essentials' of an investigation 
(enquiries in the area, and scenes of crime examination), lack of action by the officer to 
ensure these tasks were completed did not appear to affect the overall perceptions of the 
victims in respect of the types of replies which were given. It did, however, affect the 
views of the sergeant or inspector conducting the review with only half considering that all 
Victim satisfaction was asked, but only to the extent of a 'yes - satisfied', 'no - dissatisfied' response. 
294 
Victims of crime in Devon and Cormvall 
aspects of the enquiry had been completed to a satisfactory standard. There were no 
distinguishable variations between areas of the force in the types of evaluations which 
were made of crime investigation although certain anomalies in administrative practice 
were highlighted'^ and subsequently led to clarification of force policy 
The enquiries which were expected to form part ofthe normal investigation, such as house-
to-house calls, were found to be lacking as supervisors had been specifically requested to 
make personal calls at houses nearby to ascertain residents' recollections about being 
contacted. In the 232 cases (46%) where house-to-house enquiries had not been completed 
satisfactorily, supervisors had routinely found neighbours who said that they had never 
been contacted at all by the police, as well as a number of instances where addresses listed 
as having been visited on crime progress sheets had clearly been recorded 'erroneously'. 
The QAC procedure also clearly identified a small number of officers who had entered 
information on the progress sheets which bore little resemblance to fact. One detective 
inspector who had been rather affronted by the requirement to undertake QACs, citing the 
fact that he checked crime recording paperwork on a monthly basis, and found few errors, 
was reflective enough of his administrative check to report back on its shortcomings. He 
freely admitted that, in order to conduct the QAC process in as short a time as possible, he 
had selected a burglary that he knew had been investigated by a well respected and 
experienced conimunity officer Having visited the victim he found that two further visits, 
logged on the progress sheet as being to 'update on the progress of enquiries', had never 
occurred; that no neighbouring resident had ever been visited (even though specific 
addresses were recorded on the crime report); and that, although the circumstances of the 
" One example was that of statement taking at the time ofthe report of the crime (described later in tliis chapter). 
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crime scene would cleariy have meant forensic evidence might have been foimd, the scenes 
of crime deparhnent had never been alerted. His personal evaluation was one which caused 
him to consider that it may be the most experienced officers who were most capable of 
'writing-up' a good investigation, rather than completing all aspects of the work required. 
Whereas- such instances of officers exaggerating the work they had conducted were 
relatively rare, the extent to which procedural variance occurred was obvious. Statements 
being taken in 69% of cases actually highlighted a general misunderstanding of the 
procedure which showed that, even within the same divisions, officers were performing 
this routine aspect of their work differently. For example, in the Charles Cross sub-division 
of Plymouth, 98% of burglary victims had statements of evidence taken, whilst in the 
Crownhill sub-division of the same city, only in 33% were such statements taken. The 
extent to which this variation indicated any lack of professionalism on behalf of the 
Crownhill officers, however, was not evidenced by reference to force standing orders, 
which allowed for different interpretations as to the circumstances requiring statements to 
be taken. This anomaly resulted in more concise instructions being given, during the next 
few months, of when statement taking procedures should occur, with policy being re­
defined to indicate that this should only be where specific evidence, likely to be required 
by a court, was going to be gained." 
Findings from surveys 
An early trend which had been noticed in the Quality of Service survey process was that 
" This meant that statements were only normally required where a victim could give evidence relating to identifiable property or 
suspects. 
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the overall satisfaction pf victims of violent crimes was significantly lower than those 
recorded by victims of burglary. Analysis of the data from 1994 sought to identify whether 
the trend was equally observable in Plymouth and Stonehouse as elsewhere in the force 
and seek possible explanations for the findings. The 'total' satisfaction of victims in the 
whole of Plymouth was generally lower than elsewhere in the force and those within the 
Stonehouse area were the lowest overall. Of those burglary victims who said that they 
were 'satisfied with all aspects' of pohce action, 62% in Stonehouse and 66% in the rest of 
Plymouth rephed in this way, whilst 72% of victims elsewhere in Devon and Comwall 
said they were totally satisfied. However, in terms of those who expressed 'general' or 
'total' dissatisfaction, there was less to indicate that perceptions were more negative within 
the Plymouth area: 9% {Stonehouse), 9% (rest of Plymouth) and 8% (rest of force). 
Victims of violence were also divided in their opinion along geographic lines with 41% 
{Stonehouse), 48% (rest of Plymouth) and 52% (rest of force) expressing 'total' 
satisfaction with police action. Overall, victims of violence were almost three times more 
likely to express 'total' or 'general' dissatisfaction than burglary victims (19% as against 
7%) and almost a quarter of victims who had been assaulted in Stonehouse, said they were 
dissatisfied (24%) as against 18% in both the rest of Plymouth and tiie force (Table 11.3). 
Stonehouse Rest of Plymouth Rest of force Overall 
(n=166) (n=256) (n= 1018) (n=1440) 
Burglary victims 
Totally satisfied 61.5% 66.9% 72.4% 70.2% 
Generally satisfied 29.5% 24.2% 21% 22.5% 
Generally dis'atisfied 5.1% 3.2% 4.9% 4.7% 
Totally dissatisfied 3.8% 5.6% 1.6% 2.6% 
Violence victims 
Totally satisfied 41.1% 47.6% 52% 49.7% . 
Generally satisfied 34.8% 34.3% 30.3% 31.6% 
Generally dis'atisfied 17% 10.5% 10.8% 11.7% 
Totally dissatisfied 7.1% 7.6% 6.8% 7% 
Table 11.3: Victims satisfaction ratings - Quality of Service survevs 1994 
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Analysis of some, of this data which was undertaken during 1.994 drew attention to the 
correlation between provision of (initial or secondary) police arid Victim Support services 
to victims and overall satisfaction scores. Data collected during the latter part of 1994 was 
added to this to provide a larger sample for analysis and served to reinforce the findings. 
'Analysis of victims' levels of satisfaction in relation to the overall handling of their 
cases during 1994 were found to relate closely to the levels of service which they 
received from the police. Those who were, provided with the most information 
initially by the officer recording the incident, and those who received further 
communication from the police, were; significantly more, positive in their evaluation 
of the service overall. The apparently contradictory findings that police response to 
burglaries, with low detection rates, are viewed more favourably by victims than 
police responses to violence, with much higher detection rates, are explained in 
these terms. That is, it is the service that the police provide for victims at the time 
the crime is reported and subsequently that determines public satisfaction. The 
public does not have unrealistic expectations about the possibility of detection' 
(Bunt and Mawby; 1993; 1994). 
The trend for there to be a 20% differential in satisfaction ratings between the two 
categories of victims was observable forcewide. However, whether aspects of the service 
victims had received was comparatively worse in Stonehouse and Plymouth required 
fiirther exariiination to determine if they had impacted accordingly with the negative 
satisfaction levels recorded in these areas. The six key services" which should be given by 
the officer attending the scene were evaluated against the responses given by victims to the 
question of whether or not they were satisfied, overall, with the service the police 
provided. The responses to the questions were re-coded to show an answer of 'yes' to be 1 
and 'no', 'don't know' or 'can't recall' as '0'. Computing ofthe results by adding the 1 or 0 
given to each question was then undertaken, resulting in an overall score, for each case of 
between 0 and 6 being attained. These results were then re-coded into three categories to 
" 'Initial key services' were regarded as giving a naine, contact and reference number. Victim Support leaflet and advice on support, 
telling the victim what would happen next Secondary contacts included questions on whether any further contact had been made and 
from who. 
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show victims who had received 5- or 6 services, those who had received3 or 4 and those', 
receiving less than 3. 
hi the case of burglary victims, across the entire force area, an average of 52% had been 
provided with 5 or 6 of the initial services by the pohce, with victims in Plymouth 
indicating that they had received this level of service in 55% {Stonehouse) zxidi'56Vo (rest' 
of Plymouth) of cases. One in five Stonehouse burglary victims (22%) and one iri ten of 
those in the rest of Plymouth (9%) had received less than 3 services, compared to one in 
five (18%) across the rest of the force. It appeared that these victims in Plymouth were not 
likely to receive a lower level of service, judged against the six initial 'charter standards' 
and may have actually received a better service than elsewhere in the force. By 
comparison, victims of violence seemed to have been better serviced initially in 
Stonehouse than both the rest of Plymouth and the remainder of the force: 43% within 
Stonehouse having received a 5/6 level as against 33%) (rest of Plymouth) and 27% (rest of 
force). Similarly, only one in four Stonehouse victims were likely to have had less than 
three services provided (27%) as against an average of aroimd 40% elsewhere.'^  
Victims were also asked whether they had received any further contact from the police 
following the visit of the first officer This was stated as 'any contact - either in person, by 
telephone or by letter'. The survey enabled victims to identify who this contact had been 
from and each person making contact was awarded a score of T for the purpose of 
analysis.'^  One in three burglary victims in Stonehouse (35%) and one in four such victims 
See appendix 'M' for tabulated results supporting this section. 
It should be noted that if a victim had identified that they had been visited by the same ofiBcer more than once, this would still only 
coimt as ' r on the score. 
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. in the rest of Plymouth (27%), reported, not having.had any further contact from the.police, 
whilst only one in'five victims in the rest of the force (20%) were likely to have received 
no further encounters. Those in the rest of the force also said they had received at least two 
further contacts in almost half the cases (45%), whilst the likelihood of this being the case 
in Stonehouse was one in four (27%) and in the rest of Plymouth, one in three (32%). 
As far as burglary victims were concerned,, the level of further contact received from the 
police was, therefore, shown to be lower in both Stonehouse and Plymouth generally, but 
had not, apparently, been reflected in significantly lower levels of satisfaction than in the 
rest of the force. This level of secondary contact from the police was, similarly, not shown 
to be a major factor in determining whether burglary victims generally would be 
dissatisfied with the overall service provided by the police. Of those, throughout the force, 
who had received no further contact, 68% still responded that they were 'satisfied with all 
aspects' of what the police had done, whilst approximately 70% those who had received at 
leastone further contact gave such a reply. Of those who had received no further contact, a 
higher proportion responded that they were 'generally' or 'totally' dissatisfied, with 11% 
responding this way as against 6% who had one or more contacts. 
In relation to victims of violence, three quarters of those who were assaulted in Stonehouse 
had some further contact with the pohce, whilst elsewhere the chances were not much 
more than one in three. The data indicates that, overall, victims of violence were less likely 
to have received some form of additional contact from the police than were burglary 
victims (66% as against 77%) although those in the Stonehouse category appear to have 
been contacted on more occasions (75%) than in the rest of Plymouth (62%) and the force 
(64%). However, across the force as a whole, victims of violence who had received no 
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(27% as against 16%' of those who had received one further contact and 9% of those who 
had received more than one). This criterion alone did not, therefore, appear to be ind'cative 
of why satisfaction levels of those who had been violence victims in Stonehouse were 
lower than elsewhere. 
The role which Victim Support played in visiting and supporting victims was riot igriored .• 
as it was felt that their role was one which may complement overall impressions of how 
the police were dealing with the case." Victims were asked whether they had received any 
form of contact from this organisation, either by personal visit, telephone call, being sent a 
letter or having a leaflet delivered or posted. More burglary victims in Plymouth and 
Stonehouse had received some form of contact from Victim Support than similar victims 
in the rest of the force, and personal visits appeared to have been generally higher in 
number than elsewhere, with Stonehouse victims indicating that one in five of them had 
received a visit (22%). However, only 8 burglary victims in Stonehouse (5%) and 12 in the 
rest of Plymouth (5%) said they had received a telephone call as a form of contact, whilst 
in the remainder of the force 168 (17%) said that this means had been used to follow-up 
their crime. If the combination of a visit or telephone call are classed as 'personal contact', 
it can be seen that the overall performance of Victim Support outside Plymouth and 
Stonehouse schemes in relation to burglary offences equates to almost one in three victims 
(30%) receiving 'personal contact'. In Stonehouse it is roughly one in four (27%) and in 
the rest of Plymouth, nearer one in five (22%). 
At the time ofthe personal interviews conducted in 1991 referral rates had been found to be low even though this had not been noted 
as a contributoij' factor in victim dissatisfaction with the overall service which the police had provided - see earlier section on Victim 
Support. 
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Victims of violence reported a significantly different response from-Victim Support acros^ 
the force. Just over a quarter had received any sort- of contact at all (28%) and only half of 
these individuals had encountered any 'personal contact' by-visit or telephone. Overall, 
only one in twenty five victims had been visited personally by a volunteer (4%) and the 
personal visit response in Plymouth and Stonehouse combined equated to approximately 
just one in fifty (2%).-
The findings, across the three geographic divides, appeared to be somewhat contradictory 
in this respect; for whereas satisfaction levels had been observed to correlate with the level 
of initial services and further police contacts provided across the force area, within 
Plymouth (and Stonehouse in particular), the extent to which lack of these services being 
provided had shown a negative impact upon victim satisfaction was less obvious, hi fact, 
in the case of victims of violence, both the levels of initial services and further contact 
from the police appeared higher in Stonehouse than in both the rest of Plymouth and the 
force generally. Even though the extent of 'personal contact' from Victim Support within 
Stonehouse was less than elsewhere, this Was not perceived to necessarily be a significant 
contributory factor in victims' overall levels of satisfaction expressed with how the police 
had deah with the matter 
What was shown to be of importance to victims of both burglary and violence was the 
expectations which they had of police activity. Victims of burglary tended towards a more 
sanguine view of what the police were likely to accomplish than those who had been 
subject of assaults. The former appeared to have little expectation that the police would be 
successful in identifying the burglar and, therefore, lack of any further contact was taken 
as confirmation of their views. However, victims of violence often knew or could identify 
302 
Victims of crime iiiDevon cmd Cornwall 
the person who-had committed the crime, had made statements clarifying their suspicions, 
and expected that the police may be likely to identify and charge the offender. Here, where 
little further positive information had been forthcoming, victims appeared more likely to 
have a negative view some six weeks later when asked to gauge their satisfaction level. 
'I have phoned three times tospeal< with the officer in the case but have had none . 
of my calls returned.' (ref: 3249; burglary victim, female, age range 35-44 yrs) 
'If the police want public support they ought to do more to look after the victim. Can 
you tell me why I have not been told whether he has been charged? i see him in "' 
our street and all he does is smirk at me." (ref: 421; violence victim. Male. Age 
range 16-24 yrs) 
'A lady up the road saw them (the olTenders) and could recognise them but she 
has not seen any 'mugshots' as she was told she would.' (ref: 3237; burglary 
victim, male, age range 16-24 yrs) 
'It's as if they're trained to keep you in the dark. They only tell you what you ask. 
They seem to have the ability to make you think it's your 'problem' but their 
'business.' I find when I speak to policemen they're a bit like doctors in that way.' 
(ref: 6/1991; burglary victim, female, age range 25-34 yrs) 
'No information was given and the only contact afterwards was when they came 
back with a person in a car and said they wanted to look at the flat. They never 
said whether they had caught anyone or not.' (ref: 4/1991; victim of wounding, 
male, age range 16-24 yrs) 
'There appeared to be a lack of information generally about what would happen 
next. I made a statement but never got contacted again.' (ref: 203: violence victim, 
male, age range 16-24 yrs) 
Interestingly, in cases where the police had advised the victim of the result, and this did 
not accord with that individual's feelings about what should have happened (most 
commonly a decision to take no further action or to 'caution' the offender), negative 
satisfaction scores with the police were often recorded. This was despite the fact that a 
decision to discontinue proceedings may have been made by the Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS) over whom the poHce had no direct control.'* Victims' perceptions of 
police performance appeared, therefore, to also be dependant upon factors which may have 
Although police have no direct control ov-er CPS decisions, such decisions would be made having taken account of the evidence 
available and police representation on die file. 
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been outside the direct influence of the police, thus reinforcing the 'lightning coilductor' 
effect of all dissatisfaction being channelled through this most obvious symbol of the 
criminal justice system. Analysis ofthe verbatim and written responses achieved through 
the survey process gave some credence to these assumptions. 
"Sometimes you wonder, 'what"s the point?",, who decides what happens? 1 
presume it must be down to the.evidence, but how much more did.they need? Why 
' do I get told they have warned him after all he has done? 1 wanted to. see him in ' 
court." (ref: 736: assault victim, male, age .range: 25-34 yrs) 
'I was contacted last week by the officer to say that no further action was going to 
be taken, even though they had arrested my attacker. I was amazed to say the 
least." (ref: 1890: assault victim, male, age range: 25-34 yrs) 
'I read in the paper that he had been to court and got fined. It would have been 
nice to have been told this." (ref: 2126, burglary victim, female, age range: 25-34 
yrs) 
Although not directly provable from the data, there is evidence to suggest that it is not the 
number of contacts which victims have with the police which play a direct part in 
determining the likelihood of their eventual levels of satisfaction, rather it is what they 
might be told during these encounters which is important. Whereas this might not lead to a 
feeling of dissatisfaction .with the police overall, those victims who did not respond that 
they were 'totally' satisfied often cited the 'final' outcome as their reason for having some 
reservations. Whether the outcome was directly within the confrol of the police did not, 
necessarily, play a part in determining their feelings, hi having observed the perceived 
needs of victims to be kept up to date with the progress of enquiries in 'detected' cases 
(Bunt, 1990), the author drafted and submitted, on behalf of the divisional commander for 
Plymouth, an application to Plymouth City Council for Urban Aid Funding of a victim 
liaison officer during 1991. The proposal was made having identified a similar post which 
was so funded on Tyneside, Newcastle where victims were personally updated on the 
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progress of their cases by a case status officer}^ Despite a generally positive reaction from 
local politicians the revenue based scheme was not successful, other projects perceived as 
being of more benefit to the people of the City taking priority.^" 
The extent to which victims who were resident in Stonehouse responded negatively to 
questions of satisfaction with police action also appeared to have a separate dimension. 
Here, environmental factors euiierged as potential determinants- of victims-'- feehngs about 
the police. These feelings were most obviously portrayed during the personal interviews 
which were conducted during 1991 and 1994, where individual perceptions were able to be 
probed in more detail than either through telephone interview or self-report questionnaire. 
Whereas views on the quality of policing provided in the Stonehouse area fi-om a 
'community' perspective tended to indicate a wish for a more locally based response, so 
the reactions of victims to their crimes referred on many occasions to the perceived 
lawlessness ofthe area in which they lived and the inability of the police to impact on this. 
Although not able to be confirmed as significant from the statistical data gathered, this 
aspect of policing within an area with a relatively high crime rate, conceivably played a 
disproportionate part in determining victims views of police actions in their individual 
cases. 
There's little the police do about the petty crime in the area ... the street comer 
youths and the areai which makes us feel vulnerable' (Female burglary victim, ref: 
6/1991) 
'Our residents' association sees a policeman from time to time but not enough for 
an area like this.' (ref: 29/1991) 
" The Nbrthumbria Constabulary had employed a dedicated civilian member of staff to explore options for fimding such as that which 
was attained to pronde the Case Status Officer (CSO) and a clerk/typist. The role ofthe CSO was to monitor the progress of detected 
crimes and provide a direct liaison and contact point for v-ictims in the process. Letters or phone calls would be generated at specific 
points in the enquiiy and this included a regular contact with Victim Support. 
This was not without a good deal of personal effort being put into the process by the author who, supported by his sub-divisional 
commander, lobbied a number of councillors and attended the council meeting where the final decision was made. 
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'There's "always one or two idiots,, isn't'there? The graffiti in the area is awful. 
Overall, Ikeep myself to myself, but I do speak to the neighbours."(ref:-48/1991) 
'Although the neighbours are chatty, we all feel a bit like we are prisoners 
sometimes.' (ref: 20/1991) 
However, sight should not be lost of the fact that it was the minority of victims who felt 
aggrieved at the lack of police action, or dissatisfaction with the service standard more 
generally. "Victims were regularly appreciative of the attihide "displayed by officers with. 
whom they had contact, whilst being supportive of the police service in general. 
'There are some particularly charming officers' 'I was very pleased with the 
support I received from the officers who have helped me.' (ref: 3141; burglary 
victim, female, age range 45-55 yrs) 
'Pleasant young man. Was very helpful.' (ref:: 3045; burglary victim, female, age 
range 65+ years) 
'The policeman spent a long time with us and took all the details and a statement. I 
would rate his performance as exemplary.' (ref: 58/1991; burglary victim, male, 39 
years) 
Victims of crime in Devon and Cornwall: an overview 
The extent to which formal police concem for victims developed over the last half of the 
century, and in particular since the 1980s, is considerable. Information gained from the 
research has indicated that there was a good deal of empathy 'with the position in which 
victims found themselves from police officers serving before 1980 and this was confirmed 
by the small number of victims interviewed who had some dealings with the police that 
long ago. It was not until the emergence of Victim Support that a voluntary 'army' became 
available for the police to use but, once this became formalised, there appears to have been 
a reluctance amongst officers in Devon and Comwall to make referrals to the service as 
exemplified in the evidence gained for this research. Whilst there was a discernible level 
of apparent commitment from senior officers in the force to promote the scheme, and 
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headquarters ownership of the initiative was under the direction ofa speciahst deparhnent 
the implementation of Victim iSupport was not unproblematic. 
The 1990s saw victim surveys become an established part of monitoring the level of 
service which was provided through the quality of service programme which, in Devon 
and Comwall, developed as a pragmatic approach with the actions of officers themselves 
being seen as more important to improving the-level of investigation than the statistical 
monitoring of victims' satisfaction through surveys.' The advantage of this was that 
surveys which became developed had an inbuilt feedback mechanism which ensured 
senior officers were advised of where victims were dissatisfied in order that they could, i f 
possible, take remedial action. The national movement away from the cultural issues of 
quality of service, to one of collecting and publishing performance indicators however saw 
the Devon and Cornwall model similarly change. Surveys which were conducted by the 
force during the early to mid 1990s did provide actionable information on which 
improvement could be made, as well as. identifying a number of key anomalies such as the 
significant difference in satisfaction between victims of burglary and, violent crime. This 
data was subsequently able to be used in considering factors which could account for this 
and the level of initial services provided appeared to be one criterion against which 
victims' satisfaction levels could be influenced. Research in Stonehouse similarly 
suggested the potential for individual expectations and environmental factors to be 
influential. 
The history of victims of crime in Devon and Comwall is one which has not been out of 
step with other areas of the country in terms of its development or strategic 
implementation problems. If looked at firom a wider perspective, initiatives which have 
sought to address fear of crime and repeat offending within the crime prevention (and 
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latterly communitv" safety) arena have clearly impacted on-.victims' perceptions of police 
commitment at local- level.^' Other initiatives within the inter-agency structure wliich 
developed most noticeably during the 1990s have also involved levels of service to victims 
but have not been discussed within this work. The fact that policing has developed a wider 
problem-solving approach to community issues in general, however, can only be positive 
in terms of victims of crime who, because of their vulnerability, will be brought into that 
process^  • . • 
See chapter 10 Crime Prevention in Devon catd Cornwall. 
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... and into a new century 
In this concluding chapter the issues which have been of specific relevance to this study 
will be reviewed and discussed.-In particular, the extent to which policing has developed 
over the last half century against a backdrop ofthe public's, confidence in a. State-service 
being regularly and critically tested through numerous social changes and events which 
have occurred is one which provides an opportunity to interpret alterations in policing at 
both national and local level. Within each of the four main themes considered; community 
•policing, crime prevention, victims of crime and quality of service, the need for those 
policed to have confidence in the envirormient within which activities took place can be 
considered to have been influential in determining the effectiveness of changes which 
occurred. Therefore, to begin with, this notion of public confidence will be discussed 
generally to develop the review and conclusions which follow. During this process, the 
situation will be brought up to date by reference to the changes which have taken place 
during the period between 1997 and 1999 at both national level and locally v^thin Devon 
and Comwall. 
'Confidence' in policing? 
The period between 1950 and 1998 was one during which policing underwent many 
changes. Still at its core were notions of preventing and detecting crime, enshrined in the 
objectives for policing established a century and a half earlier, together with an underlying 
development of the service as non-military, and operating within a remit of 'public 
consent'. However, developments during the latter half of the twentieth century caused 
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both the principle- of 'policing by consent', and the primary objectives of the police 
institution itself, to be tested and reviewed from political, ideological and implemehtational 
perspectives. It was a period which saw major realigrmients to forces' geographic 
boundaries, management systems and structures of political accountability. There was 
heightened tension between police and public in the environment of, particularly inner-
cities, which brought the; issues of policing diverse communities into sharp focus, leading 
to legislation designed toincrease accountability in both evidential and consultative arenas.. 
Recognition emerged of crime prevention needing to be considered more widely as 
community safety with initiatives being owned or supported through inter-agency groups. 
The police service's own attempts to regain some of the ground which was lost in 
maintaining public confidence through the quality of service programme became subsumed 
within a wider debate over police effectiveness-and efficiency. Al l of these developments 
can be considered as having the reinforcement of public confidence as an underlying 
imperative to the way in which police services were provided. 
The 'golden age' of policing, customarily defined as most likely referring to the 1950s 
when British policework became of particular interest within the dramatised media, was 
one which remained within the recollections of the general public well into the following 
decades. Perceived declines in policing standards and activity were subject to criticism 
against a backdrop of this 'golden age'. But the issues which underpinned how the national 
picture of 'bobby on the beat' was becoming eroded in many of the public's minds, could 
be considered to have a specific rationale related to the confidence which was felt in the 
State's ability to ensure safety at local levels. It is this notion of public confidence which 
permeates significant strands of the changes to policing which were observed during the 
second half of the 1900s, Whilst 'crises' have come and gone, the need to provide a service 
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which the pubhc could have confidence in seemed to pervade the rhetoric of the. media, 
politicians and spokespersons for the police themselves. The reaction is not surprising, nor 
unwarranted. The early 1950s appears best described as a period in which the country was 
still regaining its feet and fictionalisation of characters such as Dixon were convincing 
melodrama to the extent of sublime indifference to any reality. As the 1960s became the 
present decade so appeared the elements of ''kitchen-sink,realism and toughness' in the 
television series Z Cars (Emsley, 1991 p. 169). The media presentation of the police grew 
in political significance, a point recognised during the period from an early point (Reiner, 
1985 p. 138). Opportunities which existed to communicate ran in two directions, and 
controlling the news envirormient became significantly important in the police armoury of 
public reassurance and confidence. 
The 1950s had concluded with a number of scandals involving police officers, which 
'seem in retrospect pretty small beer' (Reiner, 1985 p.62) when considered against far 
more serious, and potentially damaging revelations, which were to reshape legislation, 
policy and practice throughout forces during the following decades. Public opinion became 
entwined with key issues and, whereas 'disquiet about aspects of police behaviour in the 
1960s remained muted' (Emsley, 1991) the vocal nature of the public conscience during 
the 1970s and 1980s grew considerably more influential in engendering a coherent police 
response. The basis on which the issue of confiidence became of such central importance 
relied not only on the 'rear-guard' action which became necessary for the police, in 
reaction to emerging scandals and miscarriages of justice, but on the underlying tenet of 
'policing by consent'. The 'golden age' of policing, often affectionately referred to, never 
appeared to exist as an unchallenged local phenomena. Non-co-operation, and non-
acceptance by certain sections of society, had clearly always been present, and the level of 
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skills of police officers ih^  the past, combined "with the extent of 'legitimate' violence-
necessary to enforce order, was a factor of little dispute.' Despite the lack of the 'golden 
age' 'there was little attempt at any period to challenge the legitimacy of the police force in 
a systematic way', or to identify how it could be managed, 'so that a desired style and 
pattern of policing' was actually produced. It is this type of challenge which has been made 
• in recent years' (Morgan, 1989). • • 
But the movement to reach the type of public consensus-involvement, legislated for in the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, itself was subject to question in terms of how far 
this legitimised the doctrine of policing by consent. Its impact on attitudinal and 
operational consent was not so easily assessed (Morgan, 1989). The nature which 
approaches to policing, post-Scarman, have had against a central notion of public 
confidence, have remained problematic. However, the confidence factor became 
increasingly identified as one which was central to the positive development of policing. 
The police service took action towards the end of the 1980s to lead the way v^th 
establishing, amongst other things, the nature of public attitude and police activity (ACPO, 
1990a). The quality of policing, although in itself a difficult term to define, became the 
thrust of re-establishing public confidence which had been perceived, and recorded, as 
having fallen significantly during the past twenty years. This lead was given increased 
credibility during the next couple of years with the political initiatives ofthe newly elected 
Conservative govenmient and its Citizen's Charter. Combined with the legislative 
movement towards collection and publication of performance indicators for public service 
organisations (including the police) under the Local Govemment Act 1992, and increased 
The nature of police action in response to control through violence is well recited, and often justified by the teller. Brogden's (1991) 
oral hisfoiy accounts on policing Liverpool between the Wars provides good examples. 
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levels of information required by Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary (HMIC) in-' 
relation to qualify indicators, this ensured that a contemporary idea became increasingly 
part of police management culture. 
By the l990s public confidence had become formally established as a marker of police 
performance. However, the mould had been cast with the potentially substantial impact of 
the Sheehy.report (Home Office, 1993a), the work of Posen;(Home Office, 1994b)i and 
Cassels (Police Foundation and Policy Studies Institute, 1994), together with the revision 
of accountability, control and financial flexibility delivered through the Police and 
Magistrates Courts Act 1994. Taken alongside the increasing legislative involvement of 
the Audit Commission through the Local Govemment Act 1992, and the more directed and 
stringent review of force organisation and performance evident from Her Majesty's 
Inspectorate, policing in the mid 1990s had developed in a more measured and politically 
accountable way than at any time in the past. 
The late 1990s saw a change in Govemment and with it the introduction of a wide-
reaching piece of legislation aimed at building upon notions of community safety which 
had been recommended in the Morgan Committee Report (Home Office, 1991a). 
Introduced as a parliamentary Bil l in 1997, and receiving Royal Assent during the summer 
of 1998, the Crime and Disorder Act had 'a simple, practical ambition: to build a safer and 
more responsible society' (Home Secretary, second reading of the Bil l , April, 1998). As 
well as introducing a number of measures to address youth crime, racism, protection ofthe 
public against offenders, and swifter, clearer sentencing provisions, the Act built upon the 
new Labour Government's manifesto commitments to address anti-social behaviour by 
widening the responsibility for implementing strategies across a more diverse group of 
313 

1950 -1999 ... and into a new century 
agencies. Central.to this was the new focus on local authorities as havinga key, statutory• 
partnership role, alongside the police in addressing these issues. This was a position 
advocated at the beginning of the 1990s in the Morgan Committee Report, but one which 
had failed to find favour with the Conservative Govemment of the period. Each district, or 
unitary, authority was required, with the police and (where appropriate) coimty authority, 
to undertake an audit of their local area which was: to include oonsultatioh with the public 
and, specifically, 'hard-to-reach' minority groups. These audits were specifically directed 
to be based upon as wide a range of data as was available, and not to be based solely on 
information provided from official police records. From this process, sfrategies were to be 
drafted, consulted upon, and published by 1 April 1999. In all, work which was to be 
conducted over a relatively short period of time - just nine months from the Act's 
inclusion on the statute book to the April deadline.^  Sfrategies had to include objectives 
and targets against which performance could be measured and, for the first time, local 
authorities were legally required to take accoimt of the crime and disorder implications of 
all their policies. 
Working relationships with local authorities, and other agencies, were already well 
advanced across Devon and Comwall, and the effect of the Crime and Disorder Act was 
one which placed these local arrangements on a more structured basis still. The force re­
organisation in 1994 had already taken account of the benefits which could be derived 
from having divisional boimdaries tied to those of local authorities. With this more distinct 
geographic responsibility being placed upon the nine divisional commanders, community 
safety sfrategy groups, originally formalised in Plymouth during the early 1990s, had been 
^ In fact, through circulars and other means of communication such as seminars, most areas were alerted to the tight time-scale several 
months before this. Howe\-er, this still left relatively little time to organise a process which was requiring widespread consultation, 
against a backdrop of data being held in varying forms, within numerous agencies. 
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established in many areas of the two comities. Tliese commonly incorporated' fruitful inter-, 
district working arrangements, although the notion of specific local authority ownership of 
the wide range of issues which were to become established under the new Act, meant that 
it was primarily the police who were the driving force behind many of these arrangements. 
Nevertheless, the structures which had been established, together with a wider acceptance 
of inter-agency initiatives being of benefit in addressing specific issues, meant that the 
basis on which the new statutory arrangements were to come into operation Was less 
problematic than might have otherwise been. The extent to which the force's structure was 
best able to meet the new challenges inherent in the Crime and Disorder Act, however, was 
a cenfral motivating factor which caused a further re-organisation to take place in 1999.^  
Community policing 
The raft of changes which took place during the last half of the century impacted upon 
local policing, and the way in which this was perceived by the public, in a number of ways. 
Of significance were local residents' perceptions of a community style of policing being 
the most appropriate to their particular locality, although definitions of what that style 
should encompass were inevitable ambiguous. The research at local level in Stonehouse 
appeared to show an affinity, amongst residents who had resided in the area for some 
considerable period, with the local police base at The Octagon which closed as a 
conventional station in 1967. A style of policing which had a degree of personal 
availability and identity within it was one which was similarly shown to meet with general 
approval, whilst the infroduction of community policing in Devon and Comwall at the end 
of the 1970s provided a title with which local residents were to become familiar, without 
See chapter 7: National Perspective.'; to Local Implementation. 
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fully. appreciating the wider multi-agency opportunities which were being developed 
within that concept. The locational nature of policing, with an identifiable nearby base, and 
a perception that police officers walked a beat, appeared to play a part in the satisfaction of 
the public with their policing system. However, closure of local bases, the development of 
Unit Beat Policing, and a crime rate which continued to rise during the 1960s through to 
the 1990s provoked questioning of how effective the more reactive styles of policing 
actually were. 
The movement away from small local bases was a relatively common phenomena across 
forces throughout the country, with Devon and Comwall being no exception, hi mral 
communities these 'stations' had often been little more than houses owned by the police 
authority and occupied by its officers who commonly did not have the right to purchase 
their oAvn properties under local police regulations of the day. As this situation changed, 
and owner-occupation became a more accepted form of residence, so police-owned 
property began to be sold-off and officers moved to homes sometimes miles away from 
where they actually worked. Technological developments and increased availability of 
transport, also meant that responding to calls did not rely on police bases being as 
geographically close to communities as they once were, and pressure on police budgets 
made the sale of smaller police stations a financially sound proposition. It would be 
impossible to identify any one of these factors as having been overridingly responsible for 
the apparent fall in the confidence displayed by the public in the police's ability to provide 
a service. However, the extent to which the closure of The Octagon, as a local police base 
in Plymouth, was made reference to through the research, provided a microcosmic example 
of individual and conimunity reaction. 
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Less observable, at local level, was the extent to which public perceptions of police 
effectiveness took account of less visible factors, such as inter-agency initiatives. 
Individual interpretations of conmiunity policing rarely displayed an understanding of the 
basis on which Alderson's model became established. Similarly, the minority of residents 
in Stonehouse indicated knowledge of local groups established to provide specific 
community services. However, an apparently wider belief that' the local authority had a 
role to play in promoting a 'community spirit' in the area alongside the police was evident; 
a factor which, if taken to include a definition of 'community safety', signifies" a positive 
aspect to developments during the 1990s where the Morgan Committee Report and Crime 
and Disorder Act became influential in directing future policy. This linkage between a 
visible police presence, inter-agency work, and wider responsibility for community safety, 
is one which has the potential for further research. 
Crime prevention 
Policing has been intrinsically linked with the notion of prevention and detection of crime 
since the emergence of the 'modem' police in the nineteenth century. Crime prevention 
developed a more stmctured approach nationally in the 1960s, providing, alongside the 
changes which took place to police forces following the Royal Commission of 1964, a 
college to teach crime prevention officers, and the Cornish Committee which established 
the basis on which fiiture crime prevention stmctures at national and local level were to be 
developed. It should not be surprising to note that both the commission and Cornish 
Committee report occurred at a time during which there were concems with the stmcture of 
policing accountability and a rising crime rate. Although crime prevention had been a 
subject on the policing agenda since the last century, an overall perception that public 
confidence in the policing process generally needed reinforcing appeared to play a part in 
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the decision to raise the pubhc profile of crime prevention nationally. The effect of .this 
enterprise, was one which saw crime prevention departments become relatively quickly 
established as part of police forces' arsenals, with a wider-reaching interest in situational 
approaches to the issue developing during the 1970s. By the 1980s, the potential effects of 
involving agencies other than the police in this process had become more commonly 
accepted, alongside the need to consider rehabilitative measures -which could prevent 
recidivism. During the 1990s, the opportunities to place vAdex ownership of the problem of • 
community safety with other agencies became officially recognised in the Morgan 
Committee Report (Home Office, 1991a) and realised in the Critne and Disorder Act 1998. 
If there was a conscious attempt to reinforce confidence amongst the public within the 
crime prevention process, it was one which appeared to commonly place the emphasis 
upon success far more with public actions than it did with the actions of the police or any 
other agency. Whereas relatively few police resources were devoted overtly to crime 
prevention as an issue, proportionately far greater emphasis was placed upon the role 
which the public needed to play in protecting themselves, by ensuring greater security of 
their property. Development of local policing strategies, which encompassed a wider 
disciplinary approach, took until the 1980s to become more generally established. Despite 
policies which had been relatively unsuccessful in encouraging individual citizens to take 
personal action in preventing crime, a new apparent appetite to become involved in aspects 
of 'self-preservation' was signified by the extent to which membership of neighbourhood 
watch schemes grew during the 1980s and 1990s. This growth was police, and not 
Govemment, led in the first instance, but as its popularity grew, the Home Office became 
more instrumental in promoting the perceived benefits of the scheme. The actual 
effectiveness of neighbourhood watch in crime prevention terms has tended to be difficult 
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to quantify and, where research has been conducted, mixed resuUs have been noted, hi 
many locations where it has been introduced, rates of criminal activity have been low and 
neighbourhood watch has been 'no more than a formalisation of the ongoing process of 
support to the police from the community' (Laycock and Tilley, 1995, p.20). Nevertheless, 
police forces continued promotion of neighbourhood watch (or similarly entitled 'watch' 
schemes) and became judged on their performance during the 1990s according to the 
number of homes in their areas which were covered, regardless of any success exhibited:by 
these schemes. 
The experience in Devon and Comwall was one which developed in line with the pace 
being set nationally until the wider opportunities to develop a multi-agency approach was 
introduced by John Alderson with his Crime Prevention Support Unit during the latter half 
ofthe 1970s. Even though this initiative spawned community pohcing during the 1980s, 
the extent to which the conventional role of the crime prevention officer, and much of the 
work which was undertaken by way of giving advice and surveying property, changed, did 
not take place until much later. The indications gained from this study clearly point to a 
degree of frustration amongst some officers with the extent to which crime prevention 
strategies appeared to be taking a back-seat against the more reactive styles of policing 
which were being pursued during the 1980s and early 1990s. This secondary importance 
which was perceived as attached to the role of crime prevention officer was not one v/hich 
was out of line with experiences elsewhere in the country in terms of the opportunities for 
crime prevention to become a minor specialism, rather than an all-pervading purpose of 
police activity; in fact it had specifically been warned against at the time of the Comish 
Committee Report. The frustrations exhibited during the early 1990s, however, appeared to 
be ones where new opportunities which were emerging alongside partnerships with other 
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agencies, and the enthusiasm and drive exhibited by the-police for the new enterprises, ' 
were not ahvays shared to the same level of commitment -by others in the process. 
Nevertheless, work which was conducted in Plymouth did develop constructively as the 
decade progressed, and structures such as the community safety strategy group became the 
model which other areas of the force followed. 
Victims of crime 
Whereas the issue of victim services did not widely emerge on the policing agenda until 
the 1980s, the extent to which policework had naturally involved direct contact with this 
section of societj', could not be ignored in the overall impact which it had on perceptions 
of police activity and effectiveness. The evidence of police involvement with victims, and 
their pivotal developmental role alcmgside the Victim Support structure during the 1980s 
and 1990s showed that the position of victims, and the level of importance given them in 
the hierarchy of policing activity, was one which emerged during a period in which wider 
public perceptions of how the police operated was under particular scrutiny. The 1980s, 
having begun with widespread inner-city disorder and criticism of police practice in 
evidence gathering and jH-ocedure, latterly led to more critical evaluation of the service 
against a more 'cost-centred' approach which the police responded to by attempting to 
move the agenda to one which was based upon the quality of work actually undertaken. 
Victims of crime figured more prominently on this new agenda than at any time in the past 
and, taken together with a clear indication that they now comprised a significant political 
place in the issue of law and order nationally (through the publication of a Victim's 
Charter), the need to regain confidence in the criminal justice system generally became a 
key strand of development for both the police service and Government. 
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Local evidence in Plymouth tended to indicate a perception amongst residents who had 
experience as victims that their direct contact with police officers formed an iniportant 
benchmark against which they judged policing activity. Survey data fi-om the 1990s also 
identified the extent to which the initial services provided by the first officer attending a 
crime influenced victims' opinions of how well their cases had been dealt with. Linkages 
between this, and the provision; of a: secondary voluntary -.support service provided by 
Victim Support, also signified how perceptions; of police activity could be positively 
interpreted by victims of crime. 
The linkage between what the police actually did in the course of recording and 
investigating crime, and the extent to which these activities were perceived as appropriate 
by victims themselves, appeared to have some interesting contrasts. Viith how supervisory 
police officers interpreted the effectiveness of such actions. Whereas victims of burglary 
tended to report generally high satisfaction levels with police response, supervisory 
officers were regularly more critical about what could have been done during the course of 
investigation. Whether these findings had a wider overall effect upon victims' confidence 
in the police ser\'ice generally is not clear. However, the expectations of a system which 
should provide a minimum level of support was more obviously displayed in the case of 
victims of violence. Here, victim satisfaction levels were commonly lower than those of 
burglary victims, and the extent to which high detection rate violence cases attracted a 
belief that the police would do more than in unsolved burglary cases, often showed that 
disappointed expectations led to dissatisfaction. Although not specifically forming part of 
this research, the tendency for detected cases to move into a different arena, vis-a-vis the 
court and Crown Prosecution systems, showed possibilities that responsibility for 
perceived shortfalls in service delivery became laid at the police's door, whether or not 
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they had a direct influence over that particular aspect of service. This, taken together with 
perceived 'unsatisfactory outcomes' of some detected cases, such as where offenders, had 
been cautioned or received relatively low punishment on the tariff scale, could be 
interpreted as having had a negative effect on the confidence of victims and, 
correspondingly, on those with whom victims had conversed or formed an opinion from 
media porfrayals of'soft justice'. • " . 
Victims of crime have, therefore, played an important role in the overall development of 
policing during the latter half of the century. Although their emergence onto the national 
stage pre-dated specific police activity in support of their needs, until over twenty years 
after the death of their champion, Margery Fry, the extent to which the willingness of the 
police service to embrace and support the concept of Victim Support, provided much of the 
credibility associated with this particular organisation. The fact that this process emerged 
during a period when the police themselves were becoming more regular features of 
societal and media attack was more fortuitous, than it was intended. However, the 
development of policing activity in this particular arena provided a significant c^portunity 
to provide evidence of a service which was more all-embracing of its 'customers' than one 
which concentrated purely upon catching offenders. The opportunities which exist to 
develop these services still fiirther against the backdrop of the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998, and the potential linkages v-ith other agencies, still has to be evidenced. However, 
the examples already being set by several probation services, such as the one in Comwall, 
whereby its service is publicly declared to be one which is acting on behalf of 'the 
community', and not solely on behalf of 'the offender', indicates the extent to which 
victims have become a more central platfonn of criminal justice policy at national and 
local level. 
322 
1950-1999... cttuiUUo anew century 
Oualiiy of service 
The term 'quality' itself had always proved difficult to define in police circles. Review of 
how this term became interpreted at various points, and by different groups during the 
latter half of the century, clearly showed that a variety of attempts to put the term into 
action had not been without their problems. Of central importance to appreciating how the 
quality of service initiative played a part in moving policing forward during the last ten 
years has to be the perceived need of the leaders ofthe police to regain public confidence 
in its ability to provide levels of service which met with public expectations. Attempts by 
the police themselves, to regain the lost ground of public confidence in policing during the 
1980s, became regarded as an intrinsic part of the police mission for the early 1990s. 
The mission, under the umbrella of quality of service, grew in significance against a 
background of increasing govemment attention being paid to how cost effective the police 
were in providing core services. The Devon and Comwall experience was one which never 
sought to alter the policing culture against templates such as those already prepared by 
other forces, or against ACPO's attempt at Total Quality Management theory in the form 
of 'Getting Things Right'. However, the pragmatic approach to activity monitoring within 
the force's Quality of Service Unit, saw a number of significant developments take place, 
not least of which was the work conducted as part of the quality assurance checks and 
surveys (both of which have subsequently been used to inform this study). Of interest in 
considering how the Devon and Comwall experience compared with the national strategy 
was the determined attempt which was made by the force to avoid general public attitude 
surveys, seeking instead to concentrate attention on those specific groups who had 
experienced the policing service firsthand. Whilst not meeting with the approval of HMIC 
in the early stages of development, and subsequently moving to a process which also 
323 
1950 -1999 ... and into a tmv century 
included %\ider public attitude surveys, the experience was one which underpinned a belief 
that the way to improve was through better line management, minimum standards, and 
reparative action where necessary. 
The extent to which scrutiny of the police by the Audit Commission became more stringent 
during the 1990s also, underscored how the quality of service provided by the police, and 
latterly other groups through the development of community safety strategies, had become 
the focus of institutional effectiveness. In producing joint strategies during 1998/1999, in 
line with the Crime and Disorder Act requirements, attention became more focussed upon 
how the partnerships were working. The Audit Commission (in Devon and Comwall 
through the District Audit Service) commenced detailed research to identify amongst 
district, county and unitary authorities, as well as the police and other agencies, how 
effective these new working arrangements were. Of particular interest within their research 
appeared to be the extent to which information was being shared, and how wide-reaching 
the audits which had been conducted were, in relation to the data-sets used to inform the 
strategies. Early informal information received tended to indicate that few areas in the 
country had succeeded in gaining the breadth of information in their audits which was 
required by the Act, and the extent to which minority groups had been identified, and data 
from a variety of non-police sources attained, was likely to be the subject of justifiable 
criticism. The findings, when released, are unlikely to be of surprise to those concemed. 
Whereas factors such as data protection legislation clearly impinge on certain aspects of 
this, opportunities for partners to share statistical information which can inform decisions 
and priorities, still has a fair way to go. 
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Conclusions 
The overall purpose of this study has been to provide an overview of how policing has 
developed in England and Wales between 1950 and the late 1990s, with particular attention 
being paid to how the various changes at naticmal level have effected the way in which 
policing has developed in the south-west of the country'. Within this, concentration upon 
the four key themes chosen, community policing, crime prevention, victims of crime and 
quality of service, can only provide a. partial overview of policing "activity. Clearly, the 
significance of each has different importance across the period of study, and has been 
influenced by a variety of factors. However, when considered against the wider perceptions 
of the public, and focusing in upon an atypical location within Devon and Comwall 
{Stonehouse), the opportunity to make informed observations on policing becomes clearer 
This has to be set against a raft of divergent interp-etations which have accompanied 
academic discourses throughout the period and have illuminated the underlying jmnciples 
of control and accountability' within a State administered order-maintenance institution. 
However, this work has not sought to develop a detailed debate around theories of police, 
societal and political interactions, but to identify the extent to which a complex series of 
changes have become implemented and perceived at a local level. 
A nunaber of conclusions can be drawn from this. Firstly, it is clear that the way in which 
policing developed has been one often inspired, not by major political or ideological 
change, but as a result of relatively localised factors which have, of themselves, been 
prominent enough to draw into question how confident both politicians and the public have 
been in policing structures and practices. Major national concems over police impropriety 
led to the Royal Commission in 1964, and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 
whilst being part of a review of police evidence gathering processes, was informed by the 
325 
1950-1999 ... mid into a iiew century 
report of Lord Scarman intothe inner-city riotsof the early 1980s. Even so, these pieces of 
legislation were set against a backdrop of other changes to the policing environment, such 
as technological innovations, and police inspired initiatives such as community policing, 
which provided the opportunity for more wide-ranging reform. 
Secondly, although making legislative structural and procedural changes, alterations were 
arguably- of a relatively cautious nature throughout this period, never intentionally seeking 
to undermine the public persona of the 'bobby on the beat' which had become synonymous 
with the 1950s Dixon era. If an attempt to move away from this image was observed, it 
was more often from vrtthin the police service itself, where continually rising crime 
appeared to be, by necessity, combated in a reactive way. Exceptions to this were obvious 
through initiatives which sought to maintain levels of personal contact, and reassurance. 
But the emerging wisdom, supported by academic study, showed the relative 
ineffectiveness of routine, untargeted, foot pafrol; the visible presence of which was 
regularly shown to be of high priority to the public. 
Thirdly, despite the politicisation of the police through cenfral co-ordination and direction, 
especially during the miners' strike of 1984, the potential for a 'third-force' policing 
structure, able to respond in paramilitary style, was never seriously itemised on the 
national policing agenda. There remained, through times of natitmal upheaval, an 
underlying tenet of policing jAilosophy which regarded the oft-quoted principle of 
'policing by consent' as primaiy to whatever ftiture direction policing might take. There is 
clearly no consensus over precisely what this term means, neither is there a supposition 
within this text which dismisses the potential capital which can be gained through its 
quotation as a simplistic ideology. Nevertheless, despite the wide-ranging nature of 
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changes which have taken place to, the structure of policing over almost fifty years, certain 
principles have rerriained relatively unchallenged and 'policing by Consent', together with a 
continuing emphasis re-emerging at various junctures, as to the issue of public confidence, 
form cornerstones against which developments can be considered. 
Fourthly, the research within Devon and Cornwall showed perspectives of policing which 
had been influenced by national trends, but which had riot necessarily impacted on public 
perceptions as much as changing local factors when considered at the more localised, 
Stonehouse, level. Findings which identified a community wish to have an identifiable 
police presence, were set against visible signs of urban decay, and a series of household 
deprivation factors. It was at this local level which perceptions were gauged, rather than by 
reference to wider policing or social structures. Similarly, recollections of police officers 
whose beats covered the area, and whose periods of services spanned a period in excess of 
fifty years, related policing practice and procedure being influenced more by local factors 
than central direction. Whereas changing police culture showed a wider perspective being 
taken by officers charged with routine patrol of the area during the 1990s, there remained 
an aflinity with the specific characteristics ofthe area, particularly amongst those who had 
a responsibility as communit}' constables. 
Finally, the extent to which central watchdogs of the police service (HMtC, Audit 
Commission) have become more ardent critics of management structures and processes, 
can be seen to have had a far more significant impact during the 1990s than at any time in 
the past. Their roles have not merely been reinforced through respective legislation and 
guidance, but the overall change away from the tri-partite structure (post-1994), has seen 
the position of chief constables in the process become increasingly reliant upon their police 
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authorities whose responsibihties nov/ include consultation with the public and setting 
policing priorities. This increased level of accountability at chief officer level has 
correspondingly meant that other senior officers have begun to shoulder greater 
responsibility at local level. Within Devon and Comwall this has manifested itself, through 
two reorganisations during the 1990s, into a structure which involves direct responsibility 
for producing results at local level resting with- commanders of superintendent or chief 
inspector rank.. Taken alongside the wider remit now given to local authorities through the 
Crime and Disorder Act, the localised nature of policing has, once again, become a more 
influential factor in determining priorities and procedures. 
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Appendix 'A' 
Groundrules for use of NASAP 
data recording 
Notes to be made immediately after an incident or informal interview had taken 
place, or if not practicable, as soon as possible after the event, but not generally 
more than twenty four hours to have elapsed between the incident and note 
making. 
For purposes of confidentiality notes to be referred to by means of date/time 
referencing and initials ascribed to officer making any comments. Initials to not be 
those of officer concemed but, to enable recollection by the author, these initials td 
be armotated against a short description ofthe person concemed by means of rank, 
service and particular factors of relevance to the individual. 
The ethical consideration ofthe process needs to be paramount. It is not 
considered practical to advise each officer with whom the author had contact in his 
daily routine to be personally advised that 'anything which he said may be taken 
down', and neither is this particular issue seen as problematic. 
(Officers at Charles Cross were made aware that the author was conducting 
research into policing the Stonehouse area by way of formal memorandum from 
the deputy sub-divisional commander and the researcher himself briefed his 
section and community officers that part of his work entailed an analysis of how 
police officers were actually working the streets). 
No information gained for this study to be capable of being translated into a form 
which could identify any individual. (However, officers who had dealings with the 
author would have been fully aware of his management position as an inspector 
and acted accordingly in the work environment. Any occurrences which caused 
the inspector to perform a normal supervisory role would always be dealt with 'by 
the book' and in no way compromise either his operational integrity or the 
accuracy of separate recording for purposes of the research. In the event this did 
not prove in any way problematic. No instances of a disciplinary nature were 
recorded, with the exception of one occurrence where the location arid 
circumstances have been altered in re-telling to ensure no embarrassment could 
be caused.) 
Notes made, to refer as much as possible to the environment in which the data had 
been gained. As such, 'verbatim notes' (where consigned to a position in the 
NASA? note-books) would try to give a flavour of the situation in which 
comments were made. 
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Semi-structured interview schedules used with 
Community constables and police officers 
S e m i - s t r u c t u r e d i n t e r v i e w c h e c k l i s t f o r p o l i c e 
o f f i c e r s 
1 . P e r s o n a l d e t a i l s . •, . • . 
a . M a l e / f e m a l e 
b . A g e now 
c . S e r v i n g / r e t i r e d 
d . I f r e t i r e d w h e n ? 
e . R a n k o n r e t i r e m e n t 
f . R a n k ( s ) w h i l s t s e r v i n g 
g . When j o i n e d f o r c e 
h . Hov7 l o n g i n a l l a t O c t a g o n / p r e s e n t s t a t i o n 
i . W h e r e b r o u g h t u p 
2 . C h a n g e s d u r i n g t i m e i n s e r v i c e 
a . How p o l i c e p e r c e i v e d 
b . What r e g a r d e d a s m o s t s u c c e s s f u l / u n s u c c e s s f u l 
p a r t o f p o l i c i n g s t r a t e g y i n r e c e n t y e a r s 
c . S h o u l d t h e r e b e m o r e l o c a l p o l i c e b a s e s ? 
d . I f s o - w h a t d i f f e r e n c e w o u l d i t m a k e ? 
e . V i e w s o n ( i f a p p l i c a b l e ) : 
UBP 
C o m m u n i t y P o l i c i n g 
C r i m e P r e v e n t i o n ( a n d CPOs) 
V i c t i m S u p p o r t 
O t h e r r e l e v a n t i s s u e s 
3. C o m m u n i t y i n v o l v e m e n t 
a . C u r r e n t r o l e a n d n a t u r e ( r e a c t i v e / C o m m u n i t y ) 
b . E x t e n t o f n o n - r e a c t i v e p a t r o l 
c . P e r c e p t i o n s o f S t o n e h o u s e a s a n a r e a 
d . P e r c e p t i o n s o f r e s i d e n t s o f S t o n e h o u s e 
e . R e c o l l e c t i o n s o f a n y c o m m u n i t y - b a s e d 
i n v o l v e m e n t 
f . P e r c e p t i o n s o f c u r r e n t p o l i c y 
4 . O t h e r i s s u e s 
a . P r o b e a r e a s made c u r r e n t t h r o u g h o t h e r 
comment s / i n t e r v i e w s 
b . P e r c e p t i o n s o f t h e l i k e l y f u t u r e d i r e c t i o n o f 
p o l i c i n g 
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Draft letter used as introduction to retired police officers 
(sent on police headed paper) 
D e a r S i r ^ . 
Y o u r name a n d a d d r e s s h a v e b e e n g i v e n t o me 
b y B e r t R i g g s o f N A R P O , a s b e i n g someone who may 
p o s s i b l y b e a b l e a n d p r e p a r e d t o s p e n d a s h o r t p e r i o d 
o f t i m e d i s c u s s i n g t h e p o l i c i n g o f P l y m o u t h some t w e n t y 
t o t h i r t y y e a r s a g o . 
I am c u r r e n t l y e n g a g e d o n r e s e a r c h c o n c e r n i n g 
c r i m e , f e a r o f c r i m e a n d i n t e r - a g e n c y c o - o p e r a t i o n i n 
t h e S t o n e h o u s e a r e a o f t h e c i t y . A s p a r t o f t h i s , a n d 
w i t h a v i e w t o d e v e l o p i n g t h e P o l i c e r o l e i n a 
h i s t o r i c a l a s w e l l a s c o n t e m p o r a r y c o n t e x t , I w i s h t o 
r e c o r d t h e v i e w s o f a f e w o f t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s who 
u s e d t o w o r k , a n d h a v e some c o n t r o l o v e r p o l i c i n g f r o m 
t h e O c t a g o n P o l i c e S t a t i o n . 
I t w o u l d b e m o s t u s e f u l t h e r e f o r e i f y o u 
c o u l d s p a r e some t i m e o v e r t h e n e x t f e w w e e k s . I w i l l 
c o n t a c t y o u a g a i n i n t h e h o p e o f m a k i n g m o r e d e f i n i t e 
a r r a n g e m e n t s b u t i n t h e m e a n t i m e i f y o u w i s h t o s p e a k 
t o me c o n c e r n i n g t h e p r o j e c t I c a n b e f o u n d a t C h a r l e s 
C r o s s , ( 7 0 1 1 8 8 ) e x t e n s i o n 4 0 5 . 
I l o o k f o r w a r d t o t h e o p p o r t u n i t y o f m e e t i n g 
y o u i n t h e f u t u r e . 
Y o u r s f a i t h f u l l y . 
P h i l i p Bunt 
I n s p e c t o r 
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Interview schedule used with 
police officers who sferved at The Octagon 
1. P e r s o n a l d e t a i l s 
a . M a l e / f e m a l e 
b . A g e now 
c . S e r v i n g / r e t i r e d 
d . I f r e t i r e d when? 
e . R a n k o n r e t i r e m e n t 
f . R a n k ( s ) w h i l s t a t O c t a g o n 
g . When j o i n e d f o r c e 
h . How l o n g i n a l l a t O c t a g o n 
i . W h e r e b r o u g h t u p 
2 . When f i r s t s t a t i o n e d a t O c t a g o n . . . 
a . I n i t i a l i m p r e s s i o n s o f a r e a 
b . W o r k u n d e r t a k e n 
c . P o l i c y o f p o l i c i n g a r e a 
d . F o o t / c a r p a t r o l s 
e . C o n t a c t s l o c a l l y 
f . M a i n t y p e s o f c a l l s 
g . C r i m e - d o m e s t i c / p u b l i c o r d e r r e c o l l e c t i o n s 
3 . C h a n g e s d u r i n g t i m e a t O c t a g o n 
a . How p o l i c e s e e n 
b . What r e g a r d e d a s m o s t s u c c e s s f u l / u n s u c c e s s f u l 
p a r t . o f p o l i c i n g f r o m t h e O c t a g o n ? 
c . S h o u l d p o l i c e s t a t i o n b e m o r e l o c a l now? 
d . I f s o , w h a t d i f f e r e n c e w o u l d i t m a k e ? 
e . V i e w s o n p o l i c y c h a n g e s - U B P / c o m m u n i t y 
p o l i c i n g / V i c t i m s e r v i c e s e t c . 
f . A w a r e o f c u r r e n t p o l i c y a n d mode o f p o l i c i n g 
a r e a ? 
4 . C o m m u n i t y i n v o l v e m e n t 
a . What c o n t a c t s w i t h c o m m u n i t y 
b . W h e r e d i d o f f i c e r s l i v e ? 
c - A n y c o m m u n i t y c o n s t a b l e s ? 
d . O f f i c e r s a l l o c a t e d t o s p e c i f i c p r o b l e m s / p r o b l e m 
a r e a s ? 
5 . O t h e r i s s u e s / f a v o u r i t e s t o r i e s 
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'Cast list' of officers referred to in the research 
. (Initials do not reflect, in any way, tlie initials of those actually concemed) • , 
A B Retired sergeant. Joined Devon Constabulary in 1931 and transferred in 1939 to 
Plymouth City Police following the Plymouth Extension Act 1938. Served as 
constable at Octagon from 1944 to 1950 and as Sergeant there from 1954 to 1957. 
A Q Serving constable - joined Plymouth City Folic© in 1964, served within the city 
iriostof his career. 
B C About to retire constable joined in 1959, served in Plymouth all his career. 
BP Retired constable - joined Plymouth City Police 1946. Ser\'ed at The Octagon 1952 
to 1956. Retired 1978. 
B T Serving sergeant serving at main city centre station and responsible for shift 
policing which included Stonehouse. 
C D Serving police inspector now a superintendent. Previously served at Devonport. 
C G Serving constable who had been a communily constable responsible for one of the 
two beats covering Stonehouse - at time of interview had not policed area for 18 
months, being stationed elsewhere. 
C X Serving constable on response section at Charles Cross, Plymouth. 
DQ Retired constable. Joined Plymouth City Police in 1947. Bom and raised in 
Stonehouse area. Stationed at Octagon between 1949 and 1960 as beat constable 
with 12 month period attached to CCD. 
D V Retired superintendent. Joined Plymouth City Police in 1939. Served at Octagon 
from 1947-1949 as PC prior to being promoted to Detective Sergeant at 
Greenbank. 
E R Retired superintendent. Joined Pljroouth City Police in 1935. Never stationed at 
Octagon but had responsibility for policing of area as Superintendent from Ker 
Street. 
GD Ser\'ing superintendent responsible for policing various areas in Plymouth, 
including Stonehouse, during his career. 
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JA Retired sergeant. Joined Plymouth City Police in 1947. Served at Octagon from , 
1966 to 1968 as both constable and sergeant.'(JB) • 
IL Serving community constable responsible for one of the tvi^ o beats covering 
Stonehouse- at time of interview still employed as such, having done that role for 
approx. 3 months. 
IV Serving constable joined police 1970, served at Crownhill and Plympton. 
J M Retired Chief Inspector. Joined Plymouth City Police in 1947. Served at Octagon 
jfrom 1963 to 1966 as Sergeant. 
JW Serving sergeant at main city centre station and responsible for shift policing which 
included Stonehouse. 
JZ Serving CPO in the Plymouth division during 1990s. 
K N Serving constable who spent time as a CPO in Plymouth during 1980s. 
L G Serving commimity constable responsible for one of the two beats covering 
Stonehouse - at time of interview still employed as such. 
L V Serving superintendent based at force headquarters working in a department related 
to policy issues. 
M M Serving probationary constable working jfrom Charles Cross, Plymouth. 
NR Serving constable - joined Devon and Cornwall in 1986 and served at Charles 
Cross and Crownhill during the period to present day. 
NS Recentiy retired community constable in the Plymouth area who left early in 1990. 
QC Retired constable. Joined Plymouth City police in 1944. Stationed throughout 
Plymouth including The Octagon. Retired 1974. 
R B Serving constable, involved in work as CPO during the 1970s in areas ofthe force 
other than Plymouth. 
R C Serving constable at main city centre station and involved in shift policing which 
included Stonehouse. 
R D Serving constable joined Plymouth City Police in 1961, served at The Octagon and 
other city stations in Plymouth. 
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Supplementary interview schedule used for long-term 
resident-victims in Stonehduse (1991 and 1994) 
1 . Why m o v e d t o a r e a 
2 . R e c o l l e c t i o n s o f d e a l i n g s . w i t h p o l i c e i n a r e a 
a . p o s i t i v e / n e g a t i v e 
b . c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
c . i n t e r e s t i n g e n c o u n t e r s 
3 . A w a r e n e s s o f c o m m u n i t y p o l i c i n g s t r a t e g i e s 
a . r e c o l l e c t i o n s o f UBP 
b . a w a r e n e s s o f c h a n g e s 
c . o p i n i o n o f w h a t c o m m u n i t y p o l i c i n g i s 
4 . A w a r e n e s s o f v i c t i m s t r a t e g i e s 
a . o t h e r i n v o l v e m e n t s a s v i c t i m 
b . p o l i c e / V S S c o n t a c t s o t h e r t h a n a l r e a d y r e c o u n t e d 
5 . O t h e r m a t t e r s o f i n t e r e s t 
6 . A w a r e n e s s o f Q u a l i t y o f S e r v i c e 
a . w h a t i t m e a n s t o v i c t i m 
b . how p o l i c e r e a c t t o c r i t i c i s m 
c . o p i n i o n s o n i m p r o v e m e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s 
(6 above was added for the 1994 interviews, not being probed in this form during 1991) 
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Personal interview schedule used in Stonehouse 
• V I C T I M - Q U E S T I O N N A I R E 
e n t i f i c a t i o n R e f e r e n c e : D a t e c o m p l e t e d : 
fflULD L I K E TO B E G I N BY A S K I N G YOU SOME QUESTIONS ABdUT THE 
"LME WHICH YOU REPORTED A FEW DAYS A G O . ' ' ~ ' 
What was t h e c r i m e w h i c h was c o m m i t t e d a g a i n s t y o u ? 
a . A s s a u l t 
b . B u r g l a r y - d w e l l i n g ( s t e a l i n g o r a t t e m p t i n g 
t o s t e a l f r o m y o u r home b y a t r e s p a s s e r ) 
c . B u r g l a r y - o t h e r ( s t e a l i n g o r a t t e m p t i n g 
t o s t e a l f r o m y o u r p l a c e o f w o r k b y 
a t r e s p a s s e r ) 
d . R o b b e r y ( s t e a l i n g o r a t t e m p t i n g t o s t e a l 
f r o m y o u b y u s i n g f o r c e a g a i n s t y o u ) 
e . T h e f t o f y o u r m o t o r v e h i c l e 
f . T h e f t f r o m y o u r m o t o r v e h i c l e 
g . Damage t o y o u r m o t o r v e h i c l e 
h . T h e f t o f a n y o t h e r t y p e o f p r o p e r t y 
i . Damage t o a n y o t h e r t y p e o f p r o p e r t y 
j . O t h e r o f f e n c e 
[ ] 
C ] 
C ] 
C ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
C ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
C a n y o u d e s c r i b e f o r me e x a c t l y w h a t h a p p e n e d p l e a s e ? 
( a ) E x a c t l o c a t i o n t h a t c r i m e t o o k p l a c e 
Ques t i o n n a i r e . 337- P a g e 1 
Where were you when the crime was committed? 
a. At home - as leep 
- awake 
- u n c e r t a i n 
b . In the immediate v i c i n i t y of your home [ ] 
(eg: i n the s t r e e t or nearby) 
c . In a nearby s t r e e t or neighbourhood [ ] 
( P r e c i s e l y where?) 
d . Away from the area a l t o g e t h e r [ ] 
( P r e c i s e l y where?) 
e. Other [ ] 
f . Don ' t know/not sure [ ] 
Were you aware of the cr ime be ing committed at tha t 
time? 
Yes C ] No [ ] 
IF ' Y E S ' GO TO Q.6 
When were you aware that the cr ime had been committed? 
( i e : how long a f t e r i t had happened) 
3 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e . Page 2 
How d i d y o u become a w a r e o f t h e c r i m e h a v i n g b e e n 
c o m m i t t e d ? 
a . Y o u w e r e a w i t n e s s t o i t h a p p e n i n g 
b . H e a r d / s a w s o m e t h i n g w h i l s t t h e c r i m e was 
b e i n g c o m m i t t e d w h i c h r e s u l t e d i n y o u 
d i s c o v e r i n g i t t h e n 
c . D i s c o v e r e d t h e c r i m e p e r s o n a l l y , a f t e r i t 
h a d o c c u r r e d 
d . T o l d a b o u t i t b y a n o t h e r h o u s e h o l d member 
e . T o l d a b o u t i t b y s o m e o n e f r o m o u t s i d e t h e 
h o u s e h o l d , ( s p e c i f y who) 
f . O t h e r 
W e r e y o u i n company w i t h a n y o n e e l s e a t t h i s t i m e 
who was a l s o a w a r e o f t h e i n c i d e n t h a v i n g o c c u r r e d ? 
Y e s [ ] No 
I f * Y e s ' t o Q . 7 : Who w e r e y o u w i t h ? 
a . S p o u s e o r p a r t n e r f r o m y o u r home a d d r e s s 
b . P e r s o n ( s ) u n d e r 16 y r s . f r o m y o u r home a d d r e s s 
c . O t h e r p e r s o n ( s ) n o r m a l l y r e s i d e n t a t y o u r 
home a d d r e s s 
. O t h e r p e r s o n ( s ) who r e s i d e i n t h e i m m e d i a t e 
v i c i n i t y o f t h e i n c i d e n t 
( W o u l d y o u be p r e p a r e d t o name them i n o r d e r 
t h a t I may h a v e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o s e e t hem 
i f r e q u i r e d ? ) 
S . O t h e r p e r s o n ( s ) 
I . N o t a p p l i c a b l e 
I 
Ques t i o n n a i r e . P a g e 3 
Why d i d y o u d e c i d e t o c o n t a c t t h e p o l i c e ? 
a . Y o u w i t n e s s e d t h e o f f e n c e 
b . Y o u w e r e i n j u r e d 
c . Y o u f e l t y o u n e e d e d h e l p 
d . Y o u f e l t t h e o f f e n c e was v e r y s e r i o u s 
e . Y o u w a n t e d t h e o f f e n d e r ( s ) c a u g h t 
f . Y o u w a n t e d t o make a n i n s u r a n c e c l a i m 
g . Y o u w a n t e d some s o r t o f c o m p e n s a t i o n 
h . Y o u f e l t t h e p o l i c e w o u l d w a n t t o b e t o l d 
i . Y o u f e l t i t was y o u r ' d u t y ' t o r e p o r t i t 
j . Y o u b e l i e v e d t h e p o l i c e c o u l d c a t c h t h e 
o f f e n d e r ( s ) 
i . Someone e l s e p e r s u a d e d y o u t o c o n t a c t t h e 
p o l i c e 
| j . O t h e r 
| 9 . ( i ) W h i c h o f t h e s e was t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t r e a s o n ? 
jHow w e r e t h e p o l i c e c o n t a c t e d ? 
.. T e l e p h o n e ( 9 9 9 ) 
>, T e l e p h o n e ( o t h e r ) 
. . P e r s o n a l v i s i t t o P o l i c e S t a t i o n 
. . P e r s o n a l c o n t a c t w i t h o f f i c e r o n s t r e e t , 
i . O t h e r 
! 0 . ( i ) Was i t y o u who made t h i s i n i t i a l c o n t a c t 
] r s o m e o n e e l s e ? ( i f s o m e o n e e l s e s p e c i f y who) 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e . P a g e 4 

Do y o u know t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e f i r s t p e r s o n 
f r o m t h e p o l i c e who y o u s p o k e t o when y o u i n i t i a l l y 
c o n t a c t e d them? 
a . P o l i c e C o n s t a b l e C 
b . P o l i c e o f f i c e r o f o t h e r r a n k L 
c . C o m m u n i t y C o n s t a b l e [ 
d . C i v i l i a n e m p l o y e e I 
e . N o t s u r e I 
Wha t w o u l d y o u d e s c r i b e a s t h e m o s t i m p r e s s i v e /h'o 
f e a t u r e o f t h i s f i r s t c o n t a c t : 
a . P r o f e s s i o n a l a p p r o a c h I 
b . H e l p f u l a t t i t u d e I 
c . S y m p a t h e t i c a t t i t u d e ' 
d . A t t e n t i o n t o d e t a i l i n t a k i n g i n f o r m a t i o n 
e . G i v i n g y o u i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t w h a t t h e p o l i c e 
w o u l d do n e x t 
f . R e a s s u r i n g y o u o f a p o s i t i v e p o l i c e r e s p o n s e 
g . P r o m p t p h o n e a n s w e r i n g / a t t e n t i o n a t e n q . d e s k 
h . O t h e r i m p r e s s i v e f e a t u r e 
i . N o t i m p r e s s e d w i t h a n y a s p e c t 
'm Q u e s t i o n n a i r e . P a g e 5 
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What w o u l d y o u . d e s c r i b e as t h e m o s t u n i m p r e s s i v e 
f e a t u r e o f t h i s f i r s t c o n t a c t : 
a . U n p r o f e s s i o n a l a p p r o a c h 
b . U n h e l p f u l a t t i t u d e 
c . U n s y m p a t h e t i c a t t i t u d e 
d . L i t t l e i n f o r m a t i o n r e q u e s t e d / r e c o r d e d 
e . N o t t o l d w h a t p o l i c e i n t e n d e d t o do nex t -
f . G i v e n no r e a s s u r a n c e o f p o s i t i v e p o l i c e 
r e s p o n s e 
g . S l o w p h o n e a n s w e r i n g / a t t e n t i o n a t e n q . d e s k 
h . O t h e r u n i m p r e s s i v e f e a t u r e 
i . N o t u n i m p r e s s e d w i t h a n y a s p e c t 
W e r e y o u g i v e n a n y i n d i c a t i o n o f w h a t t h e p o l i c e ^ 
w o u l d do n e x t ? ____ 
a . Y e s - t o l d t h e y w o u l d s e n d a p o l i c e o f f i c e r 
i m m e d i a t e l y 
b . Y e s - t o l d a p o l i c e o f f i c e r w o u l d c a l l a s 
s o o n a s p o s s i b l e 
c . Y e s - t o l d a p o l i c e o f f i c e r w o u l d c a l l when 
o n e was a v a i l a b l e 
d . Y e s - a s k e d t o come t o a p o l i c e s t a t i o n t o 
p r o v i d e f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n 
e . Y e s - t o l d t h a t d e t a i l s h a d b e e n n o t e d a n d 
no o n e was g o i n g t o c a l l 
f . Y e s - t o l d t h e m a t t e r w o u l d b e p a s s e d t o t h e 
C o m m u n i t y C o n s t a b l e f o r h i s a t t e n t i o n 
I g . No - no i n f o r m a t i o n o f t h i s n a t u r e was g i v e n 
I h . C a n n o t r e c a l l 
l i . N o t a p p l i c a b l e 
l o i d y o u r e q u e s t a n y i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h was n o t g i v e n ? 
I Y e s [ ] No 
l l f ' Y e s ' s p e c i f y w h a t : 
Vi Q u e s t i o n n a i r e . P a g e 6 
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D i d a p o l i c e o f f i c e r a t t e n d t h e s c e n e / c o m e a n d s e e y o u 
Y e s [ ] No 
I f ' Y e s ' t o Q . 1 6 : 
How l o n g , a f t e r t h e i n i t i a l c o n t a c t w i t h t h e p o l i c e 
d i d i t t a k e f o r an o f f i c e r t o a r r i v e ? 
a . W i t h i n 5 m i n u t e s 
b . 5 - 15 m i n u t e s 
c . 16. - 30 m i n u t e s 
d . 31 - 60 m i n u t e s 
e . 1 - 2 h o u r s 
f . 2 - 4 h o u r s 
g . 4 - 8 h o u r s 
h . o v e r 8 h o u r s 
D i d a n y o n e p r o v i d e y o u w i t h a n y o f J K C 
t h e f o l l o w i n g i n f o r m a t i o n : 
a . H i s name a n d / o r c o l l a r n u m b e r / s t a t i o n 
b . A r e f e r e n c e n u m b e r o f t h e c r i m e r e p o r t 
c . V e r b a l d e t a i l s a b o u t ' V i c t i m S u p p o r t ' 
d . A l e a f l e t a b o u t ' V i c t i m S u p p o r t ' 
e . V e r b a l d e t a i l s a b o u t c o m p e n s a t i o n 
f . A n y l e a f l e t a b o u t c o m p e n s a t i o n 
g . V e r b a l o r w r i t t e n d e t a i l s a b o u t a n y o t h e r 
a g e n c i e s / g r o u p s w h i c h may b e a b l e t o h e l p y o u 
h . W h e t h e r h e o r a n y o t h e r o f f i c e r w o u l d c o n t a c t 
y o u a g a i n 
i . T h e l i k e l i h o o d o f c a t c h i n g t h e o f f e h d e r ( s ) 
j . N o n e o f t h e a b o v e 
1 8 . ( i ) Who p r o v i d e d t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n ? 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e . P a g e 7 

Was there any in fo rma t ion you requested that 
was not provided? 
Yes [ ] 
P lease s p e c i f y : 
No [ ] 
Did you express any wish to be contac ted again 
by the p o l i c e ? 
Yes [ ] No [ ] 
I f ' Y e s ' to Q.20: 
Why d i d you want to be contac ted again? 
a . To be advised of the r e s u l t of the enquiry [ ] 
b . To be g iven answers to s p e c i f i c quer ies [ ] 
S p e c i f y : 
c . To be advised of the r e t u r n of any proper ty 
d . Other reason: 
e. Not a p p l i c a b l e 
What would you d e s c r i b e as the most impress ive 
fea ture of your con tac t w i t h t h i s o f f i c e r : 
a . P r o f e s s i o n a l approach 
b . H e l p f u l a t t i t u d e 
c . Sympathetic a t t i t u d e 
d . A t t e n t i o n to d e t a i l i n t a k i n g i n f o r m a t i o n 
e. G i v i n g you i n f o r m a t i o n about what the p o l i c e 
would do next 
f . Reassur ing you of a p o s i t i v e p o l i c e response 
g . Prompt response 
h . Other impress ive f ea tu re 
S p e c i f y : 
[ ] 
[ ] 
C ] 
r PC-
C ] 
C ] 
[ ] 
C ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ 3 
Not impressed w i t h any aspect [ 1 
Ques t i o n n a i r e . Page 8 
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What w o u l d y o u d e s c r i b e as t h e m o s t u n d e s i r a b l e 
f e a t u r e s o f y o u i : c o n t a c t w i t h t h i s o f f i c e r : (SHOWCARD G) 
a . U n p r o f e s s i o n a l a p p r o a c h . L J 
b . U n h e l p f u l a t t i t u d e [ J 
c . U n s y m p a t h e t i c a t t i t u d e [ J 
d . L i t t l e i n f o r m a t i o n r e q u e s t e d / r e c o r d e d L . 
e . N o t t o l d w h a t p o l i c e i n t e n d e d t o do n e x t [ 1 
f . G i v e n no r e a s s u r a n c e o f p o s i t i v e p o l i c e [ J 
r e s p o n s e • • . 
g . S l o w r e s p o n s e [ ] 
h . O t h e r u n d e s i r a b l e f e a t u r e C ] 
S p e c i f y : 
i . No u n d e s r i a b l e a s p e c t s [ . 
2 3 . ( i ) W h i c h was m o s t u n d e s i r a b l e 
J L D NOW L I K E TO A S K YOU SOME MORE G E N E R A L QUESTIONS ABOUT 
' O L I C E AND ANY P R E V I O U S I N V O L V E M E N T YOU MAY HAVE HAD WITH 
iDo y o u h a v e a r e l a t i v e o r c l o s e f r i e n d who i s 
a p o l i c e o f f i c e r ? 
I Y e s [ 3 
p e c i f y : 
No [ 3 
0 y o u know a n y o f f i c e r , who w o r k s i n t h i s 
r e a , w e l l e n o u g h t o c a l l h i m b y name i f 
o u mee t h i m / h e r ? 
Y e s [ 3 
p e c i f y : 
No C ] 
ow r e g u l a r l y , o n a v e r a g e , do y o u s e e a p o l i c e 
f f i c e r on f o o t p a t r o l i n t h i s a r e a ? (SHOWCARD H) 
. E v e r y d a y [ 3 
| . A t l e a s t o n c e a week [ 3 
| . A t l e a s t o n c e a m o n t h [ 3 
| . L e s s t h a n o n c e a m o n t h [ ] 
N e v e r ' [ 3 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e . P a g e 9 
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How r e g u l a r l y , on a v e r a g e , do y o u s e e a p o l i c e 
o f f i c e r on m o b i l e p a t r o l i n - t h i s a r e a ? (SHOtfCARD H) • 
a . E v e r y d a y • ' [ ] 
b . A t l e a s t o n c e a week [ ] 
c . A t l e a s t o n c e a m o n t h C ] 
d . L e s s t h a n o n c e a m o n t h [ ] 
e . N e v e r ' [ ] 
Do y o u - t h i n k t h i s a r e a r e c e i v e s m o r e o r l e s s a t t e n t i o n 
f r o m t h e p o l i c e t h a n o t h e r are .as o f t h e c i t y ? . 
M o r e [ . ] L e s s [ ] A b o u t t h e same [ ] D o n ' t know [ ] 
2 8 . ( i ) G e n e r a l l y , do y o u t h i n k i t i s m o r e e f f e c t i v e 
i n t a c k l i n g t h e t y p e o f p r o b l e m s w h i c h o c c u r i n t h i s a r e a 
t o h a v e o f f i c e r s on f o o t o r i n m o t o r v e h i c l e s ? 
F o o t [ ] M / V e h [ ] 
1 2 8 . ( i i ) Why? 
N o t s u r e [ ] No o p i n i o n [ ] 
IWhen was t h e l a s t t i m e ( p r i o r t o t h i s i n c i d e n t ) 
] t h a t y o u h a d a n y c o n t a c t w i t h t h e p o l i c e ? (SHOWCARD I) 
L. L e s s t h a n 1 m o n t h a g o [ ] 
|3 . 1 - 3 m o n t h s ago [ ] 
| : . 3 - 12 m o n t h s a g o [ ] 
I. O v e r a y e a r ago [ ] 
N e v e r a n y c o n t a c t [ ] 
\ . C a n ' t r e c a l l / d o n ' t know [ ] 
IWERS ' e ' o r ' f GO TO Q . 3 2 
i Q u e s t i o n n a i r e . P a g e 10 
What w e r e t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f . t h i s c o n t a c t ? 
a . A s a v i c t i m o f c r i m e -
b . As a w i t n e s s o r as a p e r s o n r e p o r t i n g a c r i m e 
o r o t h e r m a t t e r i n w h i c h NOT a v i c t i m *s 
c . A s a s u s p e c t o f a c r i m e 
d . I n r e l a t i o n t o a r o a d t r a f f i c m a t t e r 
e . I n r e l a t i o n t o a n y o t h e r m a t t e r . . 
f . C a n n o t r e c a l l / n o t s u r e 
g . N o t a p p l i c a b l e . 
3 0 . ( i ) C i r c u m s t a n c e s a s r e l a t e d by r e s p o n d e n t : 
C a n y o u r e c a l l how y o u f e l t a b o u t t h e way t h e 
Lce d e a l t w i t h y o u on t h a t o c c a s i o n ? (SHOWCARD J) 
a . V e r y s a t i s f i e d 
b . S a t i s f i e d 
c . N e i t h e r s a t i s f i e d n o r d i s s a t i s f i e d 
d . D i s s a t i s f i e d 
e . V e r y d i s s a t i s f i e d 
f . C a n ' t r e c a l l 
g . N o t a p p l i c a b l e 
lO 
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C a n y o u g i v e y o u r o p i n i o n ' o f .how s a t i s f i e d o r 
o t h e r w i s e y o u a r e w i t h t h e way y o u h a v e b e e n ' 
d e a l t . w i t h o v e r a l l by t h e p o l i c e ? (SHOWCARD J) 
a . V e r y s a t i s f i e d 
b . S a t i s f i e d 
c . N e i t h e r s a t i s f i e d n o r d i s s a t i s f i e d 
d . D i s s a t i s f i e d 
e . V e r y d i s s a t i s f i e d 
3 2 . ( i ) Do y o u c o n s i d e r t h a t y o u r f e e l i n g s a b o u t t h e 
p o l i c e g e n e r a l l y h a v e c h a n g e d o r b e e n i n f l u e n c e d b y 
t h e c o n t a c t y o u h a v e h a d w i t h them? 
How l o n g h a v e y o u l i v e d i n t h i s p r o p e r t y ? 
a . L e s s t h a n 1 m o n t h [ ] 
b . 1 m o n t h - 6 m o n t h s [ ] 
c . 6 m o n t h s - 1 y e a r [ . 
d . 1 - 5 y e a r s [ ] 
e . 5 - 1 0 y e a r s [ ] 
f . 10 - 20 y e a r s [ ] 
O v e r 20 y e a r s c ] 
S p e c i f y : 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e . P a g e 12 
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1/34. Do y o u f e e l t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g i n c i d e n t s a r e 
m o r e f r e q u e n t , l e s s f r e q u e n t o r a b o u t t h e same 
i n t h i s a r e a a s o p p o s e d t o i n t h e p a s t ? 
3 3 . 
1 y r a g o ; 
Same - N / K 
3 4 . 
5 y r s a g o : 
•+ Same, - N / K 
A S S A U L T S 
1 BURGLARY 
1 ROBBERY 
1 R A P E / S E X . A T T A C K S 
1 V A N D A L I S M 
1 T H E F T OF V E H I C L E S 
1 T H E F T FROM V E H I C L E S 
1 DRUNKENESS I N S T R E E T 
1 F I G H T I N G I N S T R E E T 
1 DRUG T A K I N G 
1 DOMESTIC ARGUMENTS 
1 N O I S E / N U I S A N C E 
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e . P a g e 13 
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>/36. Do y o u f e e l t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g i n c i d e n t s a r e 
more f r e q u e n t , l e s s f r e q u e n t o r a b o u t t h e same 
i n t h i s a r e a a s o p p o s e d t o t h e r e s t o f P l y m o u t h o v e r a l l ? 
3 5 . 
T h i s a r e a 
+ Same - N / K 
3 6 . 
R e s t o f P l y m o u t h 
+ Same - N / K 
1 A S S A U L T S 
1 BURGLARY . 
1 ROBBERY 
1 R A P E / S E X . A T T A C K S 
1 V A N D A L I S M 
1 T H E F T OF V E H I C L E S 
1 T H E F T FROM V E H I C L E S 
1 DRUNKENESS I N S T R E E T 
1 F I G H T I N G I N S T R E E T 
B DRUG T A K I N G 
1 DOMESTIC ARGUMENTS 
1 N O I S E / N U I S A N C E 1 
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) 
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T h i n k i n g o f t h e ' f u t u r e , w h i c h o f t h e f o l l o w i n g do y o u 
t h i n k m i g h t be m o s t l i k e l y t o h a p p e n t o y o u i n t h e 
n e x t t w e l v e m o n t h s ? 
a . A s s a u l t [ ] 
b . B u r g l a r y [ ] 
c . R o b b e r y ' C ] ' 
d . S e x u a l a t t a c k [ ] 
e . Damage [ ] 
f . T h e f t o f / f r o m v e h i c l e C ] 
g . O t h e r t h e f t [ ] 
h . O t h e r [ ] 
i . None [ ] 
3 7 ( i ) W h i c h 1 ar.e y o u m o s t l i k e l y t o become a v i c t i m o f ? 
Do y o u f e e l t h e p o l i c e do e n o u g h t o p r e v e n t t h i s 
t y p e o f o f f e n c e b e i n g c o m m i t t e d ? 
Y e s [ ] No [ ] N / A [ ] 
I f ' N o ' , s p e c i f y : 
o y o u f e e l t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s c o u l d do m o r e t o 
r o t e c t t h e m s e l v e s f r o m b e c o m i n g v i c t i m s o f 
h i s t y p e o f o f f e n c e ? 
Y e s [ ] No [ ] N / A [ ] 
f ' Y e s ' s p e c i f y : 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e . P a g e 15 
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•WOULD NOW L I K E TO. ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS ON YOUR VIEWS OF THE 
l E A I N WHICH YOU L I V E AND THE A G E N C I E S AND GROUPS WHICH 
' E R A T E T H E R E : ' ' ~ 
How w o u l d y o u d e s c r i b e y o u r f e e l i n g s a b o u t t h e 
a r e a i n w h i c h y o u l i v e ? I n t e r m s o f t h e p r i d e y o u 
h a v e i n l i v i n g w h e r e y o u d o , w o u l d y o u s a y y o u w e r e : 
a . V e r y p r o u d o f t h e a r e a a n d i t s r e s i d e n t s 
b . F a i r l y p r o u d o f t h e a r e a a n d i t s r e s i d e n t s 
c . - N e i t h e r p r o u d n o r a s h a m e d o f t h e a r e a o r 
i t s r e s i d e n t s 
d . Q u i t e a s h a m e d o f t h e a r e a a n d i t s r e s i d e n t s 
e . V e r y a s h a m e d o f t h e a r e a a n d i t s r e s i d e n t s 
f . D o n ' t know 
Y o u w i l l h a v e h e a r d t h e t e r m ' c o m m u n i t y s p i r i t ' 
u s e d . W h a t d o e s t h i s t e r m mean t o y o u ? 
4 1 . ( i ) T h i n k i n g o f t h e p a s t , do y o u f e e l t h i s 
h a s c h a n g e d v e r y much? 
I n t e r m s o f a n y ' c o m m u n i t y s p i r i t ' w h i c h i s 
o b s e r v a b l e i n t h e a r e a i n w h i c h y o u l i v e , w o u l d 
y o u d e s c r i b e i t a s : 
a . V e r y s t r o n g c o m m u n i t y s p i r i t i n v o l v i n g 
t h e m a j o r i t y o f r e s i d e n t s 
b . F a i r l y s t r o n g c o m m u n i t y s p i r i t a m o n g s t 
some o f t h e r e s i d e n t s 
c . U n c e r t a i n o f w h e t h e r a n y c o m m u n i t y s p i r i t 
e x i s t s o r n o t 
d . L a c k i n g a n y c o m m u n i t y s p i r i t 
e . D o n ' t know 
m Q u e s t i o n n a i r e . P a g e 16 
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How s t rong do -you f e e l your pe r sona l commitment 
to any community s p i r i t i s ? 
a . Very s t rong [ ] 
b . F a i r l y s t rong [ ] 
c . Not p a r t i c u l a r l y s t rong [ ] 
d . Not s t rong at a l l C ] 
e. There i s no community s p i r i t [ ] 
f . Don ' t know [ ] 
4 3 . ( i ) Are there any examples you c o u l d g i v e of 
your , or o ther p e o p l e ' s commitment to any 
community s p i r i t i n the area? 
How much of a commitment should the p o l i c e have 
towards encouraging community s p i r i t and p r i d e i n 
t h i s a rea : 
a . A l o t 
b . Some commitment 
c . Very l i t t l e commitment 
d . None - i t ' s not t h e i r bus iness 
e. Not sure 
4 4 . ( i ) Are there any examples of how y o u - f e e l the 
p o l i c e do, or shou ld encourage community 
s p i r i t i n t h i s area? 
m Q u e s t i o n n a i r e . P a g e 17 
How much of a commitment should the l o c a l a u t h o r i t y 
have' i n encouraging community s p i r i t and p r i d e i n 
t h i s a rea : 
a . A l o t 
b . Some commitment 
c . Very l i t t l e commitment 
d . None - i t ' s not t h e i r bus iness 
e. Not sure 
4 5 . ( i ) Are there any examples of how you f e e l the 
l o c a l a u t h o r i t y do, or should encourage 
community s p i r i t and p r i d e i n the area? 
re there any groups , o r g a n i s a t i o n s , teams e t c . 
h i c h are based i n t h i s area which you be long to? 
b . ( i ) Any o u t s i d e the area? 
u e s t i o n n a i r e . Page 
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Draft letter used as introduction to victims of-crime 
in Stonehouse (1991) 
(sent on p o l i c e headed paper) 
Dear " 
I understand t h a t you were r e c e n t l y "the-victim'of a 
crime i n or near your home. 
I am a P o l i c e Inspector a t Charles Cross P o l i c e 
S t a t i o n i n Plymouth and am c u r r e n t l y engaged i n research i n 
co n j u n c t i o n w i t h P o l y t e c h n i c South West i n t o crime, f e a r of 
crime and inter-agency response i n your area. 
I t would be most b e n e f i c i a l t o me, and h o p e f u l l y of 
i n t e r e s t t o you, i f you c o u l d spare a short p e r i o d of time t o 
dis c u s s t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case w i t h me. I t would be my hope t o 
v i s i t you dur i n g the week of and w i l l 
endeavour t o contact you beforehand t o arrange a d e f i n i t e 
time. I f you would p r e f e r me not t o c a l l upon you at a l l you 
can leave a message t o h i s e f f e c t a t Charles Cross P o l i c e 
S t a t i o n f o r my a t t e n t i o n . (Plymouth 711188 x t . 405 or 502) 
I would emphasise t h a t our d i s c u s s i o n would be- i n 
the s t r i c t e s t confidence and I would not be i n uniform when I 
c a l l e d . H o p e f u l l y I w i l l have the o p p o r t u n i t y t o meet you 
soon. 
Yours f a i t h f u l l y . 
P h i l i p Bunt 
Inspector 
357 
DEVON AND CORNWALL CONST 
- QUALITY OF SERVICE REN Appendix T 
I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD COMPLETE THIS QUESTIONNAIRE AND RETURN IT IN THE 
FREEPOST ENVELOPE PROVIDED 
PLEASE PLACE A TICK (•) Ref.: 
IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX 
BURGLARY 
XSY519 2&3«3 
How were the police made aware of this crime? 
I telephoned 999/emergency phone 
I telephoned (non-999) 
Someone else contacted them 
The police discovered the crime 
1 attended a Police station 
Not sure 
Other 
[Please specify 
GO TO QUESTION 5 
Would you say that the time it took the police to answer your call was 
acceptable? (if you dialled 999 you would have first spoken to a BT Operator) 
Acceptable 
Not acceptable - too long 
j Unsure 
Cannot recall 
Other [please specify 
Were you told whether a police officer would attend the scene? 
JTold an officer WOULD ATTEND 
iTold an officer WOULD NOT ATTEND 
INOT TOLD whether an officer would attend 
lUnsure/Cannot recall 
WVere you told how long it would be before an officer would attend? 
biven an estimated time 
fold "Assoon as possible" or similar 
Kiot given any indication 
Unsure/Cannot recall 
llutuaily convenient time arranged 
Did you think that the time it took for the police to attend the scene was 
Satisfactory? 
Satisfactory 
Unsatisfactory - too long 
n?ure if satisfactory or not 
IH^not recall 
•:ne has attended GO TO QUESTION 7 B 
Did the first officer who visited you give you any of the folloAw 
Appendix 7' 
^ YES NO 
His/Her name or shoulder number? • • • 
A reference number of the crime? . " • • • 
A telephone number should you have any queries? • ' • • 
Inform you about the services of Victim Support? • • • 
Give you a leaflet with information for victims of crime? • • • 
Explain what further action the police would take? • • • 
Since the officer first visited you have you been contacted by anyone else 
about THIS MATTER, either in person, by telephone, or by letter? 
In person or By Telephone: 
Further visit by the officer who first attended 
Uniformed Officer(s) [rank if known ] 
C.I.D. Officer(s) [rank if known .••—]• 
Scenes of Crime Officer (ie: Fingerprints/Photographs) 
Victim Support Volunteer 
Other Agency [please specify ] 
Other Police [please specify ] 
By Letter/Postal Leaflet: 
Police 
Victim Support 
•Other Agency 
B/Vhat information did this letter/leaflet give? 
lave the police advised you of the result of their enquiries? 
es 
|o 
nsure/Cannot recall. Please write any comments below: 
o you feel there is anything else which the police could do or could have done? 
fes - could do or could have done something else 
bthing else could have been done 
psure. Please write any comments below: 
b you expect to be contacted again by the police? 
U - in any event 
ply if there is something positive to tell me 
b, do not expect any further contact 
Isure 
[please tick all appropriate boxes] 
Appendix 7' 
Why do you expect this? 
Told so by an officer-
Told so in a letter/leaflet 
Assumed this is normal procedure 
Because the police cannot be bothered 
Because ,1 had asked them to tell me 
Other [Please specify 
Not sure 
Would you say you were generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the way in 
which this matter was dealt with? 
Satisfied - all aspects 
Generally satisfied - some areas of dissatisfaction 
Generally dissatisfied - some areas of satisfaction ^ Please comment if desired: 
Dissatisfied - all aspects } 
Other than this matter, during the past 12 months have you had any contact 
with the police? 
Mo. GO TO QUESTION 15 • Three or More 
Dnce • Unsure 
Twice • Cannot recall 
^hat was/were the reason(s) for the contact? [please tick all appropriate boxes] 
hctim of Crime • To Express an Opinion 
Buspicious Incident • Professional Capacity 
Joise/Disturbance/Nuisance • To Sign a Bail Form 
ost/Found Property/Animal • Witness to an Incident 
issing Person • As an Offender 
rime Prevention Advice • Cannot recall 
,sk Advice (other) • Other [Please specify below: 
oad Traffic Accident 
udden Death 
s a Motorist (not Road Traffic Accident) .; ] 
o you believe that the amount of time which the police spend on routine foot 
|atrol in the area you live in is satisfactory? 
tisfactory - right amount • Unsure 
Dt satisfactory - too little • Other. 
Dt satisfactory - too much Police presence ] 
o you believe that the amount of time the police spend patrolling in cars in 
)ur area is satisfactory? 
itisfactory - about right - ' 
)t satisfactory - too little patrolling in cars 
)t satisfactory - too many police in cars and not enough walking 
)t satisfactory - too much patrolling of the area generally 
sure 
per [Please specify. , : ] 

If you have recently attended an Enquiry Office at a Police S1 Appendix / 
to this or any dther matter please complete the following: 
. IF NOT GO to QUESTION 22 
lich Police Station did you attend most recently?, 
lat was the approximate date of your visit? 
When you went to the Police Station did you have to wait to be seen, if so, 
what was the reason for the wait? 
Did NOT have to wait GO TO QUESTION 20 
Had to wait because of: 
Persons being served/waiting to be served 
Clerk/Officer busy on telephone 
No one in-attendance at desk 
Clerk/Officer busy with other matters 
Other reason(s) [Please specify 
Do you consider the time you had to wait was: 
Reasonable • Unsure 
Unreasonable • Cannot recall 
Would you say that the person who dealt with you: 
Was polite 
Was of smart appearance 
Answered your questions satisfactorily • N/A 
Gave a good impression of the Police 
YES NO UNSURE 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
Would you say that you were generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the 
service you received at this Police Statu 
Satisfied - all aspects 
Generally satisfied - some areas of dissatisfaction 
Generally dissatisfied - some areas of satisfaction ^ Please commer desired 
)issatisfied - all aspects } 
ire there any ways you feel that the Devon and Cornwall Police could 
Improve their service to the public? 
|ERAL: The area in which the offence occurred (Town/Village) 
Your o^ e*. Your sex: • MALE • . FEMALE 
\Your replies and comments will be treated in confidence. If you have no objection to us knowing who completed this 
orm please enter your details below> The Devon and Cornwall Constabulary thank you for your help. 
JAME 
\DDRESS. 
Tel. No, 
DWON AND CORNWALL CONSTABUI ^^ ^^ "^ '^ 
QUALITY OF SERVICE REVIEW 
/ would be grateful if you would complete this questionnaire and 
return it in the freepost envelope provided 
Please place a tick (y) in Ref: 
the appropriate box 
Violent Crime 
How were the police made aware of this crime? 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
I telephone 999/emergency phone 
I telephonefnon 999) 
Someone else contacted them 
The police discovered the crime 
I attended a police station 
Not sure 
Other (please specify): 
} Go to question 5 
Would you say that the time it took the police to answer your telephone call was 
acceptable? (If you dialled 999 you would have first spoken to a BT Operator) 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Acceptable 
Not acceptable - too long 
Unsure 
Cannot recall 
Other (please specify): 
Were you told whether a police officer would attend the scene? 
• Told an officer W O U L D A T T E N D 
• Told an officer W O U L D NOT A T T E N D 
• NOT TOLD whether an officer would attend 
• Unsure/cannot recall . 
Were you told how long it would be before an officer would attend? 
Q Give an estimated time 
• Told 'As soon as possible' or similar 
Q Not given any indication 
Q Unsure/cannot recall 
• Mutually convenient time arranged 
Did you think that the time it took for the police to attend the scene was 
satisfactory? 
Q Satisfactory 
G Unsatisfactory - too long 
Q Unsure if satisfactory or not 
Q Cannot recall 
• No one has attended 

information:- ^ 
His/her name or shoulder number? 
A reference number of the crime? 
A telephone number should you have any queries? 
Inform you about the service of Vict im Support? 
Give you a leaflet with information for victims of crime? 
Were you told what further police action was going to be taken? If so, who told you? 
Q Unsure/cannot recall 
any of t Appendix T 
Yes No Unsure 
• • • • 
• • • 
• • • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• Not told 
• Told the following:. 
Told by: • 
Was a written statement taken from you? (You would have been asked to sign this). 
• Yes • No (Go to question 9) Q Unsure 
Were you given, or sent a form entitled 'Witness Information ' A' explaining what 
would happen now you had made a statement? 
• Yes -g iven • Yes - sent • Yes - other • No • Unsure 
Since the officer first visited you have you been contacted by anyone else about 
this matter, either in person, by telephone, or by letter? 
In person or by telephone 
Q Further visit by the officer who first attended 
• Uniformed officer(s) (rank if known): • • 
• CID officer(s) franfc i/fcnown;: • 
Q Scenes of Crime officer (i.e. fingerprints/piiotographs) 
Q Victim Support volunteer 
• Other agency (please specify): 
Q Other police (please specify): 
By letter/postal leaflet 
• Police • Victim Support • Other agency 
• What information did this letter/leaflet give?: 
Have the police advised you of the result of their enquiries? 
• Yes • No • Unsure/cannot recall. Please write any comments below: 
1.' Do you feel there is anything else which the police could do or could hax Appendix T 
2. Do you expect to be contacted again by the police? 
• Yes - in any event • Only if there is something positive to tell me 
• No - do riot expect any further contact Q Unsure 
3. Why do you expect/not expect to be contacted? 
Would you say you were generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the way in which 
this matter was dealt with? 
Q Satisfied - all aspects 
Q Generally satisfied - some areas of dissatisfaction ^ 
• Generally dissatisfied - some areas of satisfaction V Please comment 
Q Dissatisfied - all aspects 
5. Other than this matter, during the past 12 months have you had any contact with 
the police? 
• No (Go to question 17) Q Once • Twice • Three or more . 
Q Unsure Q Cannot recall 
6. What was/were the reason(s) for the contact? 
7. Do you believe that the amount of time which the police spend on routine foot 
patrol in the area you live in is satisfactory? 
• Satisfactory - right amount • Not satisfactory - too little 
Q Not satisfactory - too much police presence Q Unsure 
Q Other (please specify): , -
5. Do you believe that the amount of time the police spend patrolling in cars in your 
area is satisfactory? 
Q Satisfactory - about right 
• Not satisfactory - too little patrolling in cars 
• Not satisfactory - too many police in cars and not enough walking 
j • Not satisfactory - too much patrolling of the area generally 
• Unsure 
• Other (please specify): ,.: • 
If you have recently attended an enquiry office at a police station in rela Appendix T 
or any other nfatter please complete the following. If not go to question 
Which police station did you attend most recently?: ••• 
What was the approximate date of your visit?: • • 
When you went to the police station did you have to wait to be seen, if so, what 
was the reason for the wait? 
• Did not have to wait (Qo to question 22) 
Had to wait because of:-
Q Persons being served/waiting to be served 
Q Clerk/officer busy on telephone 
• No one in attendance at desk 
• Clerk/officer busy with other matters 
Q Other reason(s) (please specify): 
• Do you consider the time you had to wait was?: 
• Reasonable • Unreasonable Q Unsure 
Would you say that the person who dealt with you: 
was polite? 
was of smart appearance? 
answered your questions satisfactorily? 
gave a good impression of the police? 
. Would you say that you were generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the service you 
received at this police station? 
Gl Satisfied - all aspects 
Q Generally satisfied - some areas of dissatisfaction A 
Q Generally dissatisfied - some areas of satisfaction i - Please comment 
Q Dissatisfied - all aspects J 
Q Cannot recall 
Yes No Unsure N/A 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
Are there any ways you feel that the Devon and Cornwall Police could improve their 
service to the public? 
eneral 
The area in which the offence occurred (town/village): • 
Your age: Your sex: male Q fenaale Q 
Your replies and comments will be treated in confidence. If you have no objection 
to use knowing who completed this form please enter your details belowi-
Name: , 
Address: 
Tel. No.: 
The Devon and Cornwall Constabulary thank you for your help. 
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1 QUALITY A S S U R A N C E CHECKING 
1.1 Purpo.se 
1.1.1 Quality assurance checking is a mechanism by which supervisors have an 
opportunity! to re-examine the actions of their officers and to evaluate the 
quality of response or investigation. It is important to examine the actual 
task undertaken and to see if it meets with the expectations and 
satisfactions of 
(a) the public, and 
(b) the standards set by the organisation. 
1.1.2 It is a means of not only examining and assessing the quahty of the service 
delivered by the original officer, but also an opportunity to examine other 
areas involved in the process which would normally be outside that officer's 
control. 
2.1 Methodology 
2.1 The sub-divisional commander will have the prime responsibility for 
administering the quality assurance checking programme. The subject and 
number of cases to be checked will be determined by the Quality of Service 
Unit. 
2319C 
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The sub-divisional commander may use his discretion as to which cases he 
chooses to have examined but it is suggested that, as a guide, 50% of those 
chosen should be selected randomly and that the remaining 50% reflect a 
targeted quota of cases specifically of interest to the sub-divisional 
commander concerned. 
2.2 Each file and, if necessary, Falcon log should be allocated to a named 
supervisor together with the Template and Re-examination Report 
pro-forma (Appendices A and B). 
2.3 The officer conducting the quality assurance check should make contact 
with the victim or member of public, by telephone if possible, to make a 
suitable appointment for a personal visit. He should explain the reason is 
to examine the quality of service delivered and not necessarily to 
re-investigate the case or to give any further information regarding its 
progress. 
2.4 On arrival by appointment the supervisor should introduce himself and 
explain in detail the purpose of his visit. 
2.5 He should go through the case papers examining in detail the action taken 
to test its veracity and comment on the scope of the enquiry and 
professional competence of the investigation. 
2.6 
2319C 
He should seek the person's view as to satisfaction with the service 
provided. 
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2.7 He should submit the report to the sub-divisional commander with any 
relevant comments. 
2.8 An important part o^f the quality assurance checking mechanism involves 
the officer who has been tasked with examining the case discussing with the 
investigating officer (and any other officer involved) the views of the 
member of public and the standard of the investigation). 
2.9 In cases where members of the public have been left with a poor impression 
of the action taken, sub-divisional commanders should ensure that they are 
given appropriate feedback as to what remedial action (if appropriate) has 
been taken. 
2.10 , Sub-divisional commanders should submit the completed forms together 
with their own views and any remedial action taken to the Quality of 
Service Unit through their own divisional chief superintendents who should 
comment on the inspection process. 
3 Feedback 
3.1 The examining officers should discuss with the original officer areas of 
concern and take remedial action as appropriate. 
3.2 Matters affecting sub-divisional policy or tactics should be documented and 
discussed with the sub-divisional commander. 
2319C 
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Issues of wider significance, sucli as matters affecting Force policy, should 
be considered and commented on by the sub-divisional commander in his 
submission to his divisional commander. 
The divisional commander wiil consider the significance of these 
recommendations and either take appropriate action or submit a paper to 
the Quality of Service Unit for further evaluation. 
Resource Implications 
It is suggested that the programme has no additional resource implications. 
It is a function of supervisors to supervise and there is nothing in the quahty 
assurance checking programme which contravenes this basic principle. 
Costings 
Manpower costings need not be considered for the reasons given above. 
Administrative costs will be minimal and confined to photocopying and 
some mileage of both private and police vehicles. 
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6 Timetable 
6.1 Every two months each Sub-Division will conduct a quahty assurance 
checking programme on a given subject.' The first month will be devoted to 
the checks themselves and to reporting the results. 
6.2 The second month will be devoted to analysis and feedback of the results 
and the implementation as necessary of remedial action programmes. 
7 Monitoring 
7.1 The Quality of Service Unit will receive all reports from divisional and 
sub-divisional commanders. It will examine and evaluate any areas of 
concern and decide if issues raised have local or Force imphcations. 
7.2 In the case of the former it will discuss with divisional and sub-divisional 
commanders areas of best practice or suggested solutions. 
7.3 In the case of the latter, the Unit will evaluate and prepare a monthly 
synopsis for presentation to the Deputy Chief Constable. 
2319C 
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Each year, on the back of the Inspectorate examination of the Force, 
quaHty of service issues will be raised by the Deputy Chief Constable in his 
discussions with divisional chief superintendents and their senior staff. 
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APPENDIX A 
OFFICER/CLERK RECEIVING REPORT 
1 On initial report, interview aggrieved person fully. 
2 If report is in person and the criteria is met, obtain statement. 
3 Inform the Divisional Operations Room for initial response (see later) if appropriate. 
4 Inform immediate supervisory officer, in order that responsibihties at (see later) may 
be carried out. 
5 Complete all crime recording/report forms and submit promptly. 
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DIVISIONAL OPERATIONS ROOM 
1 On receipt of information, ensure prompt attendance at scene. 
2 Consider activation of: 
(a) Checkpoint Scheme 
(b) Early Warning Alert Scheme 
(c) Neighbourhood Watch and other Watch Schemes 
3 Call specialist support as appropriate: 
(a) Dog Handler 
fb) Scenes of Crime 
fc) Optical Evidence Gatherer 
(d) Other specialists 
4 Consider liaison with Crime Management Bureau for suspect vehicle 
check and possible'link of crime, etc. 
5 If burglary in progress, consider containment and instructions re 
mode of approach. 
6 Obtain debrief from all officers in the initial investigation and: 
a) Complete Falcon Log 
b) Ensure all information is available to investigating officer. 
7 Consider informing the victim of the result to date. 
2109C 
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FIRST OFFICER AT SCENE 
1 Attend the scene as soon as possible' 
2 Preserve the scene as appropriate. 
3 Provide early situation report to Divisional Operations Room for 
consideration of action. 
4 Interview aggrieved person and obtain witness statements if required. 
(Refer to Standing Order B l ) 
5 Complete local enquiries, which may include: 
(a) house to house (leave details at those houses where no one is in 
and check those premises for similar break-ins). 
fb) tradesmen 
fc) nearby workmen 
fd) identified regular users of the road/street/area 
(e) enquiries about stolen property. 
6 Inform supervisory officer via Divisional Operations Room in order 
that he/she may attend or provide appropriate support. 
7 Arrange for duty CID officer to be informed and appraised of the full 
circumstances (where appropriate). 
8 Consider the victim's welfare and suppori requirements, contacting 
Victim Support if appropriate. 
9 Make contact or arrange for same with neighbourhood watch 
co-ordinator, who may assist wider house to house enquiries. 
[10 Liaise with the Community Constable, acquainting him with the 
circumstances, in order that he may: 
fa) make local enquiries and speak with contacts 
fb) provide crime prevention advice 
(c) consider local publicity. 
11 Ensure crime report is sent to Crime Management Bureau.as soon as 
I possible. 
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\ 
THE FIRST SUPERVISOR 
1 
2 
3 
,4 
5 
Ensure that the officer at the scene receives the appropriate level of 
support. 
Attend the scene if available and appropriate. 
Ensure that all immediate enquiries and actions are completed. 
Ensure that CID support is available. 
Ensure. that the appropriate initial investigation is correct and 
compile. 
Ensure that all papers are checked and expeditiously routed to Crime 
Management Bureau (CMB) for instructions and to indicate whether 
further enquiries are necessary and give advice re appointment of 
investigating officer (CID enquiry, uniform enquiry, etc) 
109C 
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SCENES OF CRIME OFFICER 
1 Attend the scene and complete the necessary scientific examination. 
2 Liaise with the initial investigator and/or the invtigating officer. 
3 Complete the scientific report and ensure it is submitted to the CMB 
as soon as possible and, in any case, before the end of the tour of duty. 
4 Preserve and deal with the exhibits as appropriate, making contact 
with the Forensic Science Laboratory and Force Fingerprint Bureau. 
5 Liaise with CMB and assist in linking crimes through scientific 
examination of the scene (foot marks, instrument marks, MO, etc) 
2109C 
Receive all reports of crime from initial investigator through 
supervisor. 
Check that the initial investigation is complete. 
Give advice on the continuation and direction of the further 
investigation and level of response (CID enquiry etc) 
Ensure prompt return ofoffence reports for further investigation to 
designated sergeants with instructions. 
Ensure that the scene of crime report is attached to the offence 
report and the result of the scientific examination is taken into 
account when giving advice to investigators. 
Examine the data on reported crimes to identify crime patterns and 
trends, with a view to: 
fa) advising the LIO for identifcation of suspects. 
fb) advising the Detective Superintendent. 
(c) advising Sub-Divisional Officers and Sub-Divisional Supervisors. 
Check that investigating officers have submitted all crime intelligence 
in respect of their enquiries. 
Report any failures in the crime investigation sytem to the Divisional 
Head of CID. 
Ensure victims of crime are updated at conclusion of the investigation. 
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INVESTIGATING OFFICER 
1 Co-ordinate and direct the whole ir.vestigation. 
2 Ensure: 
Al l action in the initial investigation is complete. 
Carry out the instructions from the Crime Management Bureau, 
developing where necessary. 
Continue liaison with: 
The Crime Management Bureau, 
The Local Intelligence Officer. 
to identify linked crimes and possible suspects, for example if 
premises have been previously burgled ensure a review of the 
previous file. 
4 Maximise the use of informants, acting on information as appropriate. 
5 Ensure that all officers are acquainted with developments through 
briefing parades. 
6 Identify and interview, where appropriate, prisoners with similar MOs 
or descriptions coming into custody. 
7 Where prisoners come into custody, ensure post arrest searches are 
complete for: 
(a) stolen property. 
(b) scenes of crime evidence, 
(c) financial investigation documentation. 
8 Update and amend all documentntion for CIS record. 
9 Complete: 
fa) Crime prosecution file or 
(b) Undetected report as appropriate. 
10 In the case of 9(a), ensure: 
fa) The 41d is complete, particularly with the MO. 
(b) A crime intelligence debrief report is submitted for CIS Update. 
11 Ensure contact is made with the victim and the principal witnesses 
during the course of the investigation. 
2109C 

SUB-DIVISIONAL C O M M A N D E R 
1 Ensure that a high standard of: 
(a) response to reports of crime 
fb) investigation 
(c) supervision 
is maintained. 
2 Prepare and staff op>erations to combat identified scries and serious 
crimes. 
3 
4 
Ensure a proper level of investigation and supervision is maintained. 
Monitor the quality of the investigation and supervision by checking 
from time to time individual investigation reports and attending the 
scene of crime. 
]09C 
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APPENDIX B 
QUALITY OF SERVICE 
RE-EXAMINATION REPORT 
Date: 
Crime Complaint No 
F A L C O N Log Ref 
Other Source Ref: 
Victim/Complainant Name 
Address 
Tel No: 
Quahtv Check List 
[Reporting 
1 How was it reported? 
eg *9997telephone/personal 
Was there any difficultv in reporting? 
Yes/No 
If yes, explain. 
Comment 
i4 Was the person given an indication of 
when an officer would arrive? 
\5 Was the police response prompt or as 
promised? 
Does the victim/complainant feel the 
time taken to respond reasonable/ 
unreasonable? 
What is the examining officer's view 
of the response time? 
kl09C 

Statements Comment 
8 Did the officer take a statement? 
b) Was it required under Standing 
Orders (Bl)? 
c) Did it contain all the necessary 
information? 
Was it accurate? 
c) What was the quality of the 
statement overall? 
Property 
a) 
c) 
Was all property accurately 
recorded? 
Was it correctly circulated? 
Was it promptly circulated? 
Enquiries 
10 a) 
b) 
c) 
Were house-to-house enquiries 
completed? 
If no, why not? 
If yes, was the area covered 
adequate/inadequate.? 
Was there any information 
forthcoming as a result ofthe 
enquiries? 
Were any follow-up enquiries 
completed where there was no 
reply initially? eg by 
letter/card or by attendance 
from resident beat officer or 
another officer? 
What other enquiries were made? 
Were any other lines of enquiry 
necessary? 
IScenes of Crime Attendance 
11 a) 
^^  c) 
j -f) 
|lb9C 
Were scenes of crime requested? 
Did they attend? 
Was information given to the 
victim as to the estimated time 
of arrival? 
Did they arrive at the stated 
time? 
What information or advice was 
given to the victim concerning 
the scene prior to the scenes 
of crime attendance? 
Did scenes of crime obtain any 
intelligence or any other 
information? 
g) Were the resuhs passed to the 
investigating officer. 
If so, when? 
Comment 
Level of Supervision 
12 What was the supervision? 
a) At the scene, at the time of 
the incident? 
b) Prior to screening? 
c) During the course of the 
investigation? 
d) Prior to final submission of 
the case papers? 
What was the level of supervision 
overall? 
Victim's View 
13 a) Was the victim satisfied or 
dissatisfied with the police 
investigation. 
b) What was the victim's view of the 
attitude of the officers with 
which he came into contact? 
(ie caring, professional, 
concerned, etc) 
c) Was there personal contact by the 
investigating officer, if not the 
original officer? 
d) Was the victim informed of 
progress, and if so, how often? 
e) Was the victim informed of the 
result, if so, when? 
[Summary of Inspection 
Reporting Officer Date 
Appendix 'J' 
Noted Sub-Divisional Commander Date-
'Co"mmcnts 
Noted Divisional Commander Date 
Comments 
Noted Quality of Service Unit Date 
Comments 
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Victims surveyed in Stonehouse by personal interview during 1991 and 1994 
('Long-term' residents sown in italics) 
Offence Location of residence Age Gender Reference No. 
Assault Stonehail Fiats 27 M 4/1991 
Norm Road West 47 F 29/1991 
Rendle Street 50 M 2/1994 
Burglary (dwelling) Wolsdon Street 44 F 6/1991 
includes 'theft in Wolsdon Street 39 M 42/1991 
dwelling' offences Wolsdon street 26 M 52/1991 
Eton Place 24 M 17/1991 
Eton Place 34 F 21/1991 
King Street 30 F 34/1991 
King Street 68 M 33/1991 
King Street 48 F 4/1994 
High Street 52 M 1/1994 
Hastings Ten-ace 19 F 40/1991 
Patna Place 44 M 35/1991 
Wyndham Square . 40 M 55/1991 
Wyndtiam Square 24 F 24/1991 
North Road West 20 M . 56/1991 
Worth Road West 55 M 6/1994 
Archer Terrace 69 F 23/1991 
Cecil Street 52 F 3/1994 
Dumford Street 46 F " 59/1991 
Francis Street 41 M 48/1991 
• Francis Street 55 •M •5/1994 
Auto-crime Hastings Terrace 30 M 39/1991 
includes theft of and from Bayswater Road 45 M 54/1991 
but not damage to vehicles Well Gardens 67 yw 511991 
North Road West 19 M 14/1991 
North Road West 30 M 49/1991 
North Road West 32 F 28/1991 
Dumford Street 29 M 13/1991 
Dumford street 29 M Z7/1991 
King Street 49 11/1991 
King Street 44 F 18/1991 
King Street 32 M 27/1991 
Union Street 26 F 30/1991 
Union Street 27 M 15/1991 
Eton Terrace 27 M 53/1991 
Archer Place 19 M 41/1991 
Cecil street 24 F 19/1991 
Wyndham Street 21 M 20/1991 
Wolsdon Street 30 M 10/1991 
Sidney Street 41 M 43/1991 
Gloucester Court 29 F 22/1991 
Frands Street 22 F 32/1991 
Barrack Place 26 M 9/1991 
Caroline Place 35 M 44/1991 
Oamage Bayswater Road 64 F 2/1991 
Melboume Street 30 M 8/1991 
North Road West 46 F 38/1991 
North Road West 33 M 47/1991 
Norft Road West 39 F 1/1991 
Carlton Tenrace 59 7/1991 
King Street 50 M 51/1991 
Oxford Ten-ace , 34 M . 26/1991 
Stoke Road 28 M 57/1991 
Dumford Street 39 M 58/1991 
Union Street 22 M 45/1991 
High Street 49 F 31/1991 
Other offences Dumford Street 22 F " 12/1991 
Hastings Ten-ace 31 F 36/1991 
Wolsdon street 20 F 3/1991 
Gloucester Court 41 M 25/1991 
Melboume Street 24 M 60/1991 
Manor Street 18 F 50/1991 
Admiralty Street 24 M 46/1991 
Emma Place 46 F 16/1991 
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Selection of data from personal interviews with 
Stonehouse victims (1991) 
Q1 What was the crime committed against you? (n=60) 
Theft from Theft Burglary Theft of Damage to Damage Assault 
vehicle (other) (dwelling) vehicle vehicle (other) 
14 13 12 8 6 5 2 
03 Where were you when the crime committed? (n=60) 
Home Home Home Immediate In Away Other Not known 
asleep awake uncertain vicinity neighbourhood from area or unsure 
5 6 22 . 2 6 14 0 5 
Q4 Were you aware of the offence being committed? (n=60) 
4 were aware, in 2 cases this was because they were assaulted 
Q5 When were you aware it had been committed? (n=60) 
Unable to say 1 Within 8 hours Within last 5 mins More than 8 hours Immediate 
21 i 17 6 12 4 
Q6 How did you become aware of it being committed? (n=60) 
Discovered 
personally 
Witnessed/ 
assaulted 
Heard or saw 
something 
Told by another 
in household 
Told by 
neighbour/friend 
Other means 
42 2 2 3 6 5 
Q7/a Were you accompanied? (n=60) 
Unaccompanied With partner Person 
under 16 
16+ from 
household 
Neighbour Employer Other 
32 14 4 4 2 1 3 
Q9 Why contact police? (most important reason) n=60) 
Needed help 2 Duty to report it 10 
Thought matter serious 4 Belief in police catching 3 
Wanted offender caught 15 Someone persuaded 4 
Insurance claim 8 Unaware reported 1 
Compensation 10 Because previous victim 3 
QIC How police contacted? (n=60) 
999 call by 999 call by Telephone Telephone Attended Other attend Unsure how 
victim other by victim by other police station police station contacted 
4 5 20 7 20 1 2 
Q11 Who spoken to on first reporting? n=50) 
Police constable Other police rank Community PC Civilian Not sure 
13 3 0 12 22 
Q12 Most impressive aspect about first encounter? (n=50) 
Professional 7 Giving information 1 
Helpful 19 Reassuring 5 
Sympathetic 2 Prompt at desk or phone 1 
Attention to detail 5 Nothing pleasing 10 
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Q13 Most unimpressive aspect about first encounter? (n=50) 
Unprofessional 1 No reassurance 0 
Unhelpful 2 Slow at desk or phone 11 
Unsympathetic 0 Other 2 
Lack of attention to detail 0- Nothing unimpressive 32 
Little or no information 2 
Q14 Told what police would do next? (n=51*) 
Send someone immedtly 1 Told no one would call 13 
Send ASAP 15 Pass info to Com'nty RC 1 
Call when available 5 Other info given 5 
Asked to come to P/stn 10 No info given 4 
* 1 wcfim wtio did not report the matter personalty was appraised by a friend of what the police had said. 
Q15 Request any information which wasn't given? (n=50) 
4 victims did not feel that they had been given satisfactory answers to their queries. 
Q16 Did a police officer attend? (n=60) 
Whereas 40 victims had further contact with the police only 29 had an officer attend in direct 
response to their initial contact. 
Q17 Within what period of time the police arrived (n=29) 
5 minutes 15 minutes 30 minutes j 60 minutes 2 hours 8 hours After 8 hours 
1 8 5 i 3 4 3 5 
Q18 Information/service provided at anytime? (n=60) 
Officers name or number 23 Leaflet: compensation 3 
Reference number 38 Made aware other help 0 
Told of Victim Support 9 Told of further contacts 9 
Leaflet: Victim Support 10 Told of likely success 25 
Told of compertsatton 3 Told none of these 5 
Q19 Information requested that was not provided by officer attending (n=29) 
2 victims said they had asked for infomnation which had not been provided. 
Q2D/21 17 victims said ttiat they had expressed a wish to the officer to be kept updated, 14 wanted to be 
advised of the result or any enquiries, 2 about retum of property and 1 with a separate query (n=29) 
022 Most impressive aspect about this encounter? (n=29) 
Professional 5 Giving information 3 
Helpful 10 Reassuring 1 
Sympathetic 3 Prompt attendance 3 
Attention to detail 3 Nothing impressive 1 
Q23 Most unimpressive aspect about first encounter? (n=29) 
Unprofessional 0 Lack of reassurance 3 
Unhelpful 1 Slow attendance 3 
Unsympathetic 1 Other 2 
Lack of attention to detail 1 Nothing unimpressive 17 
Lack of information 1 
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024 Relative or close friend is a police officer (n=60) 
20 said they either had a relative or someone they knew well enough to describe as a friend who was 
a police officer. 
Q25 Lxical officer known by name (n=60) 
17 victims knew a local officer by name, 6 of these referred to the community constable by name. 
026 How regulariy see officer on foot patrol in area? (n=60) 
Every day Once a week Once a month Less than once a 
month 
Never 
2 1 9 13 35 
How regulariy see officer on mobile patrol in area? (n=60) 
Every day Once a week Once a month Less than once a 
month 
Never 
9 20 20 6 5 
Q27 
028 Does this area receive more or less attention from police than elsewhere in city generally? (n=60) 
More Less Same Unsure 
9 16 5 30 
028 (i)/(ii) 38 victims felt foot patrols in their area would be more effective than cars and 4 felt mobile patrol 
would be better. 18 were uncertain. The most commonly cited reason for foot patrol was the 
perceived likelihood of an officer coming across some wrong-doing (n=60) 
Q29 When last had contact with police before this? (n=60) 
Less than 1 1-3 months 3-12 months Over 1 year Never Unsure 
month ago ago ago ago 
6 6 14 21 10 3 
Q30 What were circumstances of (last) contact? (n=47) 
Victim of Witness to Suspected Road Personal Professionally Other non­
crime incident of offence traffic matter criminal 
matter 
24 8 3 4 2 2 4 
Q31 Satisfaction with previous encounters with police (n=47) 
Very satisfied Satisfied Neither Dissatisfied V. dissafisfied Can't recall 
8 21 7 8 1 2 
Satisfaction with the way dealt with overall by police (n=60) 
Very satisfied Satisfied Neither Dissatisfied V. dissatisfied Unsure 
12 36 7 3 0 2 
Q32 
Q33 How long lived in property/area? (n=60) 
Under 1 1 - 6 6-12 1-5 5-10 10-20 Over 20 
month months months years years years years 
.1 3 6 19 24 5 2 
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Q33/34 Are offences more or less frequent than 5 years ago? (n=60) 
More frequent Less frequent Same as before • Don't know 
Assaults 5 5 32 18 
Burglary 23 0 19 18 
Robbery 5 3 34 18 
Rape/sex attacks 5 0 37 18 
Vandalism 19 2 21 18 
Theft of vehicles 16 0 26 18 
Theft from vehicles 22 0 20 . 18 
Street drunkenness 12 2 28 18 
Street fighting 8 5 29 18 
Drug taking 14 2 26 18 
Domestic argument 6 • 3 33 18 
Noise/nuisance 11 1 30 18 
Q35/36 Are offences more or less frequent in this area as opposed to the rest of Plymouth overall? (n=60) 
More frequent Less frequent Same as elsewhere Don't know 
Assaults 7 0 36 17 
• Burglary 20 0 23 17 
Robbery 4 1 38 17 
Rape/sex attacks 7 1 35 17 
Vandalism 15 0 28 17 
Theft of vehicles 13 0 30 17 
Theft from vehicles 21. 0 22 17 
Street drunkenness 16 0 27 17 
Street fighting 11 1 31 17 
Drug taking 13 0 30 17 
Domestic argument 3 2 38 17 
Noise/nuisance 14 1 28 17 
Q37 Offence felt most likely to be a victim of in next 12 months (n=60) 
Assault Burglary Robbery Sex attack Damage Auto-theft Other theft Other 
2 14 0 1 12 23 5 8 
Q38 Do police do enough to prevent this type of crime happening? (n=60) 
28 felt the police did not do enough and 25 felt they did. 7 were unsure. 
Q39 Could individual members of the public do more to prevent this type of crime? (n=60) 
42 felt individuals could do more and 14 felt they couldn't. 4 were unsure. 
Q40 How proud are you with the area you live in? ( n=60) 
Very proud Fairly proud Neither Quite ashamed Very ashamed Unsure 
6 18 23 6 4 3 
Q42 Wtiat level of 'community spirit' observable in area? (n=60) 
Very strong Fairiy strong Uncertain whether 
any exists 
Lacks community 
spirit 
Unsure 
7 26 13 14 0 
Q43 What personal commitment victim has to 'community spirit' (n=60) 
Very strong Fairiy strong Not particulariy 
strong 
Not strong at all There is no 
'cmntee spirit' 
Unsure 
9 12 21 8 9 1 
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Q44 What commitment should police have .towards encouraging 'community spirit'? (n=60) 
A lot j Some Very little None Not sure 
32 1 19 3 0 6 
Q45 What comniilment should local authority have towards encouraging 'community spirit'? (n=60) 
A lot Some Very little None . Not sure 
27 20 1 1 11 
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Selected data from Devon and Cornwall Constabulary Quality 
of Service surveys of burglary and violent crime victims 
Burglary victims' satisfaction ratings across three areas of Devon and Cornwall 
Stonehouse Rest of Plymouth Rest offeree Overall 
Satisfied with all 
aspects 
102 
(61.5%) 
- 171 
(66.9%) 
737 
(72.4%) 
1010 
(70.2%) 
Generally satisfied 49 
(29.5%) 
62 
(24.2%) 
214 
(21%) 
325 
(22.5%) 
Generally 
dissatisfied 
9 
(5.2%) 
9 
(3.3%) 
51 
(5%) 
69 
(4.7%) 
Dissatisfied with all 
aspects 
6 
(3.8%) 
14 
(5.6%) 
16 
(1.6%) 
36 
. (2.6%) 
Total 166 256 1.018 1,440 
Violence victims' satisfaction ratings across three areas of Devon and Comwall 
Stonehouse Rest of Plymouth Rest of force Overall 
Satisfied with all 
aspects 
46 
(41.1%) 
56 
(47.6%) 
277 
(52%) 
379 
(49.7%) 
Generally satisfied 39 
(34.8%) 
41 
(34.3%) 
162 
(30.4%) 
242 
(31.6%) 
Generally 
dissatisfied 
19 
(17%) 
12 
(10.5%) 
58 
(10.8%) 
89 
(11.7%) 
Dissatisfied with all 
aspects 
8 
(7.1%) 
9 
(7.6%) 
36' 
(6.8%) 
53 
(7%) 
Total 112 118 533 763 
Number of initial services* given to victims of burglary by the officer attending 
Stonehouse Rest of Plymouth Rest of force Overall 
Given 5 or 6 of 
services 
92 (55.4%) 144 (56.3%) 518 (50.9%) 754 (52.4%) 
Given 3 or 4 of 
services 
38 (22.9%) 90 (35.2%) 314 (30.9%) 442 (30.7%) 
Given less than 3 of 
services 
36 (21.6%) 22 (8.6%) 186 (18.3%) 244.(17%) 
Total 166 256 1018 1,440 
Number of initial services* given to victims of violence by the officer dealing initially 
Stonehouse Rest of Plymouth Rest of force Overall 
Given 5 or 6 of 
services 
48 (42.9%) 39 (33.1%) 141 (26.5%) 228 (29.9%) • 
Given 3 or 4 of 
services 
32 (28.6%) 34 (28.8%) 173 (32.5%) 239 (31.3%) 
Given less than 3 of 
services 
32 (26.6%) 45 (38.1%) 219(41.1%) 296(38.8%) 
Total 112 118 533 763 
* Services are as defined in the text above, i.e. giving name/shoulder number, a reference number for the crime, telephone 
number, advising about what the police wilt do, details of Victim Support and giving a "Victim of Crime' Leaflet. 
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Comparison of services given at initial visit with burglary victims' overall satisfaction 
Given less than 3 
services 
Given 3 or 4 
services 
Given 5 or 6 
services 
Total* 
Satisfied - all 
aspects 
138 (66.9%) 286(66.5%) 542 (73.2%) 966 (70.2%) 
Generally 
satisfied 
42 (20.4%) 106 (24.7%) 162(21.9%) 310 (22.5%) 
Generally 
dissatisfied 
18 (8.7%) 20 (4.7%) 26(3.5%) 64 (4.7%) 
Dissatisfied - all 
aspects 
a (3,9%) 18 (4,2%) 10 (1.4%) 36 (2.6%) 
Total 206 430 740 1,376 
* 64 cases missing due to either inaccurate completion or small number of computer software problems encountered in one 
survey. 
Comparison of services given at initial visit with violence victims' overall satisfaction 
Given less than 3 
services 
Given 3 or 4 
services 
Given 5 or 6 
services 
Total* 
Satisfied - all 
aspects 
102 (37.5%) 116(52%) 137 (62.3%) 355 (49.7%) 
Generally 
satisfied 
94 (34.6%) 67 (30%) 65 (29.5%) 226(31.6%) 
Gef>eraHy 
dissatisfied 
38(13.9%) 30(13.5%) 16 (7.2%) 84(11.S%) 
Dissatisfied - all 
aspects 
38 (13.9%) 10 (4.5%) 2 (0.9%) 50 (6.9%) 
Total 272 223 220 715 
* 48 cases missing due to either inaccurate completion or small number of computer software problems encountered in one 
survey. 
Whether victims of burglary received further contact from the police 
Stonehouse Rest of Plymouth Rest of Force Total* 
No further 
contact 
54 (34.6%) 66 (26.6%) 192 (19.8%) 312 (22.7%) 
1 further 
contact 
60 (38.5%) 102 (41.1%) 340 (35%) 502 (36.5%) 
More than 1 further 
contact 
42 (26.9%) 80 (32.3%) 440 (46.3%) 562 (39.8%) 
Total 156 248 972 1,376 
^ a number of telephone surveys had revealed inlerviewers failing to ask certain question in a small number of cases thereby iedi«:ing 
fhe total victims who had responded to this and two other questions. The error was found to be in the ctHnputer prograaHne at an early 
stage and easily rectified for the remainder. 
Comparison of furtlier contacts by the police with burglary victims' overall satisfaction 
No further 
contact 
One further contact More than one 
further contact 
Total 
Satisfied - all 
aspects 
212 (67.9%) 340 (67.7%) 414 (73.7%) 966 (70.2%) 
Generally 
satisfied 
66(21.2%) 128 (25.5%) 116(20.6%) 310(22,5%) 
Generally 
dissatisfied 
20 (6.4%) 20 (4%) 24 (4.2%) 64 (4.7%) 
Dissatisfied - all 
aspects 
14 (4.5%) 14 (2.8%) a (1-4%) 36 (2.6%) 
Total 312 502 562 1,376 
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Whether victims of violence received further contact from the police 
Stohehouse Rest of Plymouth Rest of Force Total* 
No further 
contact 
28 (25%) 40(38.1%) 178(35.7%) 246 (34.4%) 
1 further 
contact 
57 (50.9%) 50 (47.6%) 225 (45.2%) 332 (46.4%) 
More than 1 further 
contact 
27 (24.1%) 15 (14.3%) 95 (19.1%) 137 (19.2%) 
Total 112 105 498 715 
* a number of telephone surveys had revealed interviewers failing to ask certain question in a small number of cases 
tiiereby reducing the total victims who had responded to this and two other questions. The en-or was found to be in the 
computer programme at an early stage and easily rectified for the remainder. 
Comparison of further contacts hy the police wfith violence victims' overall satisfaction 
No further 
contact 
One further contact More than one 
further contact 
Total 
Satisfied - all 
aspects 
92 (37.3%) 174(52.4%) 89 (64.9%) 355 (49.7%) 
Generally 
satisfied 
88 (35.7%) 103(31%) 35 (25.6%) 226(31.6%) 
Generally 
dissatisfied 
33 (13.4%) 41 (12.4%) • 10 (7.3%) 84 (11.8%) 
Dissatisfied - all 
aspects 
33 (13.4%) 14 (4.2%) 3 (2.1%) 50 (6.9%) 
Total 246 332 137 715 
Whether victims of burglary received further contact from Victim Support 
Stonehouse Rest of Plymouth Rest of Force Total 
No 
contact* 
62 (37.4%) 110(41.9%) 450 (44.5%) 622(43.2%) 
Personal 
visit 
36 (21.7%) 46 (17.6%) 138 (13.6%) 220 (15.3%) 
Telephone 
call 
8 (4.8%) 12 (4.6%) 168 (16.6%) 188 (13.1%) 
Other form of 
contact** 
60 (36-1%) 94 (35.9%) 256 (25.3%) 410 (28.5%) 
Total 166 262 1012 1,440 
Commonly a letter or leaflet either posted or put through the door when a victim was not at home 
Whether victims of violence received further contact from Victim Support 
Stonehouse Rest of Plymouth Rest of Force Total 
No 
contact 
88 (78.6%) 88 (74.6%) 374 (70.2%) 550(72.1%) 
Personal 
visit 
0 (0%) 4 (3.4%) 26(4.9%) 30 (3.9%) 
Telephone 
call 
5 (4.5%) 11 (9.3%) 61 (11.4%) 77 (10.1%) 
Other fomti of 
contact* 
19 (16.9%) 15 (12-7%) 72 (13.5%) 1Q6 (13.9%) 
Total 112 118 533 763 
* Don't know/unsure included as 'No contacf 
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